ROSADO v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Ericxon Rosado fled from law enforcement when they arrived at his residence to arrest him for a violent offense that occurred the day before. Following a bench trial, Rosado was convicted of resisting law enforcement and sentenced to 320 days of incarceration. Rosado now appeals and raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the State violated Rosado's due process rights by failing to record body cam footage of his flight;

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Rosado's conviction for resisting law enforcement; and

3. Whether Rosado's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 17, 2024, Deputy Tyler Cooper of the Bartholomew County Sheriff's Office went to Rosado's apartment in Columbus, Indiana, to arrest Rosado in connection with a domestic battery investigation. Deputy Cooper was driving his fully marked patrol vehicle and was in full uniform. When Deputy Cooper arrived at the residence, he saw Rosado sitting in front of the apartment. Deputy Cooper immediately recognized Rosado because the two had known each other for more than ten years—they went to school together and had several previous interactions relating to Rosado's past run-ins with law enforcement.

[4] As Deputy Cooper exited the vehicle, he made eye contact with Rosado, and Rosado stood up and started running toward the apartment. Deputy Cooper identified himself as a sheriff's deputy and ordered Rosado to stop, but Rosado kept running. Once Rosado entered the apartment, he closed the door behind him. Deputy Cooper turned on his body camera after Rosado fled the scene.

[5] The State charged Rosado with resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor ¹ . During Rosado's bench trial, Deputy Cooper testified to the events as described above. When asked why he did not turn on his body cam prior to chasing after Rosado, Deputy Cooper stated, “[I]n the moment, with a fresh pursuit, it's not something that I have the most memory to remember to turn on.” Tr. Vol. II at 17–18. Rosado testified on his own behalf, denying Deputy Cooper's account of events and contending that he was not present at his residence at the time the incident was alleged to have occurred. The trial court found Rosado guilty as charged and sentenced him to 320 days of incarceration. Rosado now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Rosado Has Waived Appellate Review of His Due Process Claim

[6] Rosado first argues that the State violated his due process rights when Deputy Cooper, “acting in bad faith, failed to record and preserve potentially useful evidence” in the form of Deputy Cooper's body cam footage. Appellant's Br. at 10. Rosado did not raise any such argument to the trial court, so his claim can only be analyzed under the fundamental error doctrine. See Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. 2010)) (“Failure to object at trial waives the issue for review unless fundamental error occurred.”). However, Rosado does not address his due process claim under the fundamental error doctrine, so he has waived it for our review. See Terpstra v. State, 138 N.E.3d 278, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (concluding the defendant waived his right to appeal because he “never raised a due process objection at trial, and ․ does not argue that the alleged violations of his due process rights constituted fundamental error”), trans. denied.

2. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Rosado's Conviction

[7] Rosado next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor. Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[8] In order to convict Rosado for resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rosado “knowingly or intentionally ․ fle[d] from a law enforcement officer after the officer, by visible or audible means ․ identified himself or herself and ordered the person to stop.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (effective July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025). Rosado contends that he was not present at the residence when Deputy Cooper arrived, so he could not have disobeyed Deputy Cooper's order. Rosado's argument amounts to a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[9] Rosado argues in the alternative that, even if he was present when the officer arrived, “Deputy Cooper's testimony failed to provide the detail needed to ascertain whether Rosado could have heard Deputy Cooper's alleged audible order to stop.” Appellant's Br. at 11. Rosado essentially argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly disobeyed Deputy Cooper's order. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-31-2-2(b). Knowledge is a mental state, and “absent an admission by the defendant, the [factfinder] must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1091 (quoting Stubbers v. State, 190 N.E.3d 424, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied). Thus, knowledge “may be proven by the defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id. at 1092 (quoting Stubbers, 190 N.E.3d at 432).

[10] The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that when Deputy Cooper arrived at Rosado's residence, Rosado was sitting at the front entrance of the home and the two were close enough to make direct eye contact with each other while Deputy Cooper exited his patrol car. When Deputy Cooper commanded Rosado to stop running, Rosado was already fleeing but not yet inside the house. It is true that there is no direct evidence indicating the volume level at which Deputy Cooper commanded Rosado to stop; Deputy Cooper was not asked how loudly he told Rosado to stop, nor can we determine from a cold record whether Deputy Cooper raised his voice while testifying to mimic how loudly he told Rosado to stop. The issue for us now is whether it was unreasonable for the factfinder to determine that Rosado knew he had been ordered to stop. Deputy Rosado, who was in full uniform, parked his fully marked patrol car about 40 feet from Rosado's apartment. As Deputy Cooper exited his car, he made eye contact with Rosado who stood up and began to flee the area. While only about 40 feet away Deputy Cooper “ordered” Rosado to stop. Tr. Vol. II at 11. Rosado “made eye contact with [Deputy Cooper] and disregarded” Deputy Cooper's order to stop. Id. at 11–12. Rosado then ran into the apartment and out through another door.

[11] Based upon Rosado's conduct, it was not unreasonable for the factfinder to believe that he was aware that he had been ordered to stop. The factfinder is permitted to consider the distance between the officer and Rosado, the conduct of the parties, and Rosado's flight to conclude that Rosado heard and understood that he should stop fleeing. Despite hearing Deputy Cooper's verbal command to stop running, Rosado continued to do so. As with Rosado's initial contention, finding otherwise would require us to reweigh evidence already considered by the factfinder, which we cannot do, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Rosado's conviction for resisting law enforcement.

3. Rosado's Sentence is Not Inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[12] Lastly, Rosado contends that his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)).

[13] Our Supreme Court has explained our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) as follows:

“[O]ur constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Cramer [v. State], 240 N.E.3d [693,] 698 [(Ind. 2024)] (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017)), an act that, importantly, is reserved for “exceptional” cases, id. (citing Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015)). Determining a sentence's appropriateness thus “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 985.

Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092.

[14] Additionally, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “his or her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 698). And because sentencing “ ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference,’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character ․’ ” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[15] In reviewing the defendant's sentence, “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count,” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Similarly, a defendant “need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts” so long as “one of the prongs weighs heavily in favor” of revising the defendant's sentence. Id. at 126–27 (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)) (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).

[16] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). Here, Rosado was convicted of resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor. “A person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year.” I.C. § 35-50-3-2. The trial court sentenced Rosado to 320 days executed at the Indiana Department of Correction, which was less than the maximum sentence.

[17] Rosado contends that, since his “conviction was for a non-violent offense and no harm was done to others,” his sentence was disproportionate. Appellant's Br. at 12. We do not find this argument persuasive. While it is true that Rosado's offense in this case did not result in any physical harm, his flight was an attempt to avoid being arrested in connection with an ongoing domestic violence investigation. Flight from a pursuing law enforcement officer does create risk of injury to the pursuer and the pursued. Additionally, it creates risk of danger to those in the vicinity. Here, Rosado was with two other people when he began to flee, and his mother was in the apartment into which he ran.

[18] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122). Rosado committed this offense and the previous day's alleged battery while on probation for a prior domestic battery conviction. During his pretrial incarceration in this case, Rosado failed to follow jail rules and was sanctioned for refusing to obey an order from a jail staff member. Especially relevant to the charge here, Rosado has two previous felony convictions for obstruction of justice. These convictions, along with Rosado's conviction for resisting law enforcement in the present case, demonstrate Rosado's “clear and continuing disregard for the rule of law, which reflects poorly on his character.” Crum v. State, 239 N.E.3d 858, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. not sought. Based on the nature of Rosado's offense and his history of criminal behavior, we cannot say that Rosado has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate.

Conclusion

[19] In sum, Rosado waived his due process claim for our review, the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for resisting law enforcement, and his sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm Rosado's conviction and sentence.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (effective July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025).

Felix, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.