Beatrice M. Reese, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Beatrice Reese (“Reese”) appeals her conviction, following a jury trial, for Level 6 felony residential entry.¹ She argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence; and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction. Concluding that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain evidence; and (2) there is sufficient evidence to support Reese's conviction, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence.

2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Reese's conviction.

Facts

[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that in June 2023, Miranda Montanez (“Montanez”) and Jimmy Brown (“Brown”) lived in an apartment in Indianapolis. Montanez was the only person on the lease, and Brown had been living with her for three months.

[4] At approximately 10:00 p.m. on June 21, 2023, Montanez and Brown's young daughter (“the daughter”) were doing laundry in the apartment's laundry facilities while Brown played video games in the apartment. As Montanez and the daughter were returning to the apartment from the laundry facilities, Reese, who Montanez did not know, “approached [Montanez] very aggressively[ ]” and asked her in which apartment building she lived. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 172). Montanez asked Reese “[w]hat [was she] looking for[,]” and Reese again asked Montanez in which apartment building she lived. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 172).

[5] Reese then asked the daughter where to find Brown. Thereafter, Reese “charged in” the apartment building, kicked the front door to Montanez's apartment, twisted the door knob, opened the door, and ran into the apartment. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 172). Montanez, who had not given her consent for Reese to enter the apartment, did not confront Reese as she entered the apartment because Montanez was pregnant and she also wanted to protect the daughter.

[6] Montanez followed Reese into the apartment and began to yell, “who is this in my house?” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 172). Reese ran to the back of the apartment and found Brown, who she began to punch. Brown removed Reese from the apartment and told Montanez to contact the police. Reese banged on the front door of Montanez's apartment but left the apartment building before a police officer arrived at approximately 10:15 p.m.

[7] When the police officer arrived at Montanez's apartment, Montanez told the officer that Reese had run up and had asked her where she lived. Montanez further told the officer that the next thing she knew, Reese was “charging in [her] house and started fighting on [Brown].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 176).

[8] After the police officer had left, Reese immediately returned to Montanez's apartment, banged on the front door, and attempted to talk to Brown through the door. Reese then went to the patio area at the back of the apartment and attempted to slide open the patio door. In addition, Reese banged on and broke a bedroom window at the back of the apartment. Montanez called the police again, but Reese had left the apartment before the officer arrived at approximately 11:00 p.m.

[9] In December 2023, the State charged Reese with Level 6 felony residential entry for knowingly breaking and entering Montanez's apartment. Two days before the February 2025 trial, the State filed a motion to amend the charging information to include an additional count for Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief. Specifically, the additional count alleged that Reese had damaged Montanez's window and/or grill.

[10] In response to the State's motion to amend the charging information, Reese filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of “other wrongs, prior bad acts, and non-charged conduct or criminal offenses not reduced to convictions ․ pursuant to Rule[ ] 404(b)[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 96). The trial court held a hearing on the two motions and denied the State's motion to amend the charging information. However, the trial court further explained that it would allow testimony regarding the acts that would have given rise to the criminal mischief charge because those acts were “part and parcel of the event.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 72).

[11] At trial, Montanez, who was the State's only witness, testified regarding the facts as set forth above. When the State asked her if she had given Reese “permission or consent to enter [her] apartment[,]” Montanez responded, “I did not.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 172).

[12] Reese, who was the defense's only witness, also testified at trial. Specifically, Reese testified that she and Brown had been dating for seven years. According to Reese, she had gone to the apartment complex to pick up Brown and the daughter. Reese further testified that after waiting in her car for thirty minutes, she had gotten out of her car to look for Brown and the daughter. In addition, Reese testified that she had seen the daughter walking with a woman who Reese did not know. According to Reese, she approached the woman, introduced herself, and asked the daughter where to find Brown. Reese further testified that Montanez had walked her to the apartment and had “just let[ ] [Reese] in.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 194). In addition, Reese testified that Brown had seemed surprised to see her in the apartment and had walked her outside so that they could talk. According to Reese, she and Brown had begun arguing. Reese further testified that during the argument, she and Brown had walked to the apartment's patio and she had banged on and had broken a window. In addition, Reese testified that when Brown had told her that he was going to call the police, she had left the apartment complex and had not returned.

[13] During rebuttal, the State asked Montanez if she had “open[ed] [her] apartment door and basically walk[ed] [Reese] in[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 203). Montanez responded that she had not done that.

[14] The jury convicted Reese of Level 6 felony residential entry. The trial court sentenced Reese to one year in the county jail and suspended the sentence to probation.

[15] Reese now appeals.

Decision

[16] Reese argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence; and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction. We address each of her contentions in turn.

1. Admission of Evidence

[17] Reese first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that she “c[ame] back to the apartment and br[oke] a window[.]” (Reese's Br. 12). However, because our review of the record reveals that Reese testified that she had broken the window, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Reese returned to Montanez's apartment a second time.

[18] The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024), cert. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and the effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

[19] Here, we need not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Reese returned to Montanez's apartment a second time because any error in the admission of this evidence was harmless. The basic premise of the harmless error rule is “that a conviction may stand when the error had no bearing on the outcome of the case.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018). Under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A), an error is harmless “where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Under this probable impact test, Reese bears the burden of demonstrating how “the error's probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding below.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), reh'g denied, cert. denied. In determining whether Reese has met her burden, we consider the likely impact of improperly admitted evidence on a reasonable, average jury considering all evidence in the case. See id. If substantial independent evidence of guilt exists and our confidence in the outcome is not undermined, the error is harmless. Id.

[20] Here, Reese cannot meet her burden on this record. Specifically, our review of the evidence reveals that Reese does not provide any reason to believe that this single piece of evidence – Reese returning to Montanez's apartment a second time – “would have moved the needle.” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 859 (concluding that appellant had provided no reason to believe that a single additional piece of evidence “would have moved the needle”). The probable impact of any possible error in admitting the challenged evidence, in light of all the evidence in this case, is sufficiently minor so as not to undermine our confidence in the outcome of this case. See Hayko, 211 N.E.3d at 492. Thus, even if the trial court had erred in admitting evidence that Reese had returned to Montanez's apartment a second time, the error would be harmless. See id.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[21] Reese next argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction. Specifically, she contends that Montanez gave her permission to enter the apartment.

[22] “Our standard for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency challenges is well established, as we have made clear that it is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025) (cleaned up). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). We review only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom and will reverse “only where it is shown that no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1090-91 (cleaned up).

[23] To convict Reese of Level 6 felony residential entry, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reese knowingly or intentionally broke and entered Montanez's apartment. See I.C. § 35-43-2-1.5. “Lack of consent is not an element of the offense the State is required to prove.” Townsend v. State, 33 N.E.3d 367, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (cleaned up), trans. denied. “Rather, it is the defendant who must claim and prove the defense of consent.” Id. (cleaned up). A defendant's belief that she has permission to enter must be reasonable for the defendant to avail herself of the defense of consent. Id.

[24] Here, two witnesses testified at trial. Montanez testified that Reese did not have consent to enter her apartment. Reese testified that she entered Montanez's apartment with Montanez's consent. After weighing the evidence and judging the credibility of the two witnesses, the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Reese had broken and entered Montanez's apartment. In other words, the jury believed Montanez. We will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090. There is sufficient evidence to support Reese's conviction.²

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5.

2.   Reese also argues that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction because even if she was mistaken about having consent to enter Montanez's apartment, “the mistake was reasonable and negated culpability necessary to commit [the] crime.” (Reese's Br. 15). In support of her argument, Reese directs us to Indiana Code § 35-41-3-7, which provides that “[i]t is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was reasonably mistaken about a matter of fact, if the mistake negates the culpability required for commission of the offense.” However, the State is correct that “Reese has waived any affirmative defense of mistake of fact by failing to raise it before the trial court.” (State's Br. 26). See State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (explaining that arguments raised for the first time on appeal are waived), trans. denied.

Pyle, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge DeBoer concur. Altice, C.J., and DeBoer, J., concur.