Deborah Walton and Margaret Walton, Appellants-Defendants v. NA (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Deborah Walton (“Deborah”), pro se, appeals following the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (“Chase”) in this mortgage foreclosure action.¹ Deborah raises several issues on appeal challenging the finality of the judgment and the adequacy of the notice she received prior to the filing of the foreclosure action. However, Deborah's notice of appeal was filed nearly three months after the trial court's entry of summary judgment, and Deborah has not asserted any extraordinary circumstances to justify reinstating her forfeited appeal. We accordingly dismiss.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 13, 2007, Deborah and Margaret executed a mortgage and promissory note with Washington Mutual Bank, FA, securing a loan in the principal amount of $473,000.00 for property on Mayfair Lane in Carmel, Indiana. The mortgage was subsequently assigned to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”). On February 29, 2024, Chase filed a complaint to foreclose the mortgage, in which Chase alleged the Waltons defaulted on their mortgage payments beginning in April 2018.

[3] On March 22, 2024, the Waltons, pro se, filed a motion to dismiss Chase's foreclosure complaint based on the complaint allegedly violating the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on April 29, 2024. At no point did the Waltons file an answer to Chase's complaint.

[4] Chase filed a motion for summary judgment on July 8, 2024. The Waltons did not respond to the summary judgment motion. On August 21, 2024, Chase moved the trial court to enter summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase on September 10, 2024. The judgment included a finding that there was “due and owing to the [Chase] $649,457.28 through May 31, 2024 as a valid subsisting lien on the property[.]” (Appellee's App. Vol. 2 at 177.)

[5] Deborah then “filed a petition for writ of mandamus” with the Indiana Supreme Court, (id. at 195), and asked the Supreme Court to vacate the trial court's foreclosure judgment. On September 23, 2024, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed Deborah's original action because the remedy she sought was “not appropriate under the rules and law governing writs of mandamus and prohibition[.]” (Id. at 196.) Then on October 7, 2024, Deborah filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court to appeal the Indiana Supreme Court's decision.²

[6] The sheriff's sale occurred on November 7, 2024, and the property sold to a third party. On November 25, 2024, Deborah filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment in the foreclosure action under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). On December 2, 2024, the trial court granted a writ of assistance to the third-party purchaser that ordered the Sheriff to remove the Waltons from the property. On December 6, 2024, the Waltons filed a notice of appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Initially, we note that Deborah proceeds pro se. When a party proceeds on appeal without counsel, she “is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented[,]” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014), and is expected to follow the same procedural rules that licensed attorneys are expected to follow. McCullough v. Citimortgage, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 820, 825 (Ind. 2017). As a result, pro se litigants “must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure” to follow procedural rules. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[8] The Waltons filed a notice of appeal on December 6, 2024, and attached as the order being appealed the trial court's December 2, 2024, order permitting the third-party purchaser to intervene and ordering the Sheriff to remove the Waltons from the property. However, on appeal, the majority of Deborah's brief challenges the validity of the trial court's entry of summary judgment for Chase on September 10, 2024.³

[9] Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A)(1), an appeal is initiated by “filing a Notice of Appeal ․ within thirty (30) days after the entry of a Final Judgment is noted in the Chronological Case Summary.” Deborah indicates she waited to appeal from the December order to remove her from the property because the September 10, 2024, summary judgment order was not a final judgment. According to Deborah, “for a summary judgment order to be a final order, the trial court in writing expressly determines under Trial Rule 54(B) or Trial Rule 56(C) that there is no just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of judgment.” (Appellant's Br. at 7-8.)

[10] However, the language referenced by Deborah applies when the trial court enters a decision that “adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties[.]” Trial Rule 54(B). See also Trial Rule 56(C) (court must make express determination in writing for an order to be final when the summary judgment impacts “less than all the issues involved in a claim or ․ less than all the claims or parties”). Here, the summary judgment order resolved all claims against all defendants in a single order and, as such, was appealable as a final order. See Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H)(1) (“A judgment is a final judgment if: (1) it disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]”). Because the Waltons waited to file a notice of appeal in December, their challenge of the final judgment entered in September was untimely under Indiana Appellate Rule 9.

[11] An untimely notice of appeal does not divest this court of jurisdiction, but it does forfeit an appellant's right to appeal. In re O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 9(A)(5) (“Unless the Notice of Appeal is timely filed, the right to appeal shall be forfeited except as provided by P.C.R. 2.”). While we have the authority to reinstate a forfeited appeal, dismissal of a forfeited appeal is “never error[,]” and the exception for reinstating a forfeited appeal is “narrow[.]” State v. B.H., 260 N.E.3d 953, 956 (Ind. 2025). To reinstate an appeal, “an appellant must show that there are ‘extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be restored.’ ” Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray, 162 N.E.3d 1097, 1098 (Ind. 2021) (quoting O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 791).

[12] Deborah has not asserted any such extraordinary circumstances exist here, and we “decline to make these showings on [her] behalf.” Sevion v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). At issue is foreclosure on mortgaged property, not a fundamental liberty interest such as the right to parent a child in In re O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 965. We accordingly dismiss Deborah's appeal. See, e.g., Cooper's Hawk, 162 N.E.3d at 1098 (dismissing untimely appeal because appellant's only asserted justification for reinstating appeal was a ground for granting a discretionary interlocutory appeal).

Conclusion

[13] The trial court's summary judgment order constituted a final appealable judgment. The Waltons’ notice of appeal, which was filed nearly three months after entry of judgment, was untimely, and Deborah has offered no extraordinary circumstances to warrant excusing her procedural default. We accordingly dismiss Deborah's appeal.

[14] Dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to Appellate Rule 17, both Deborah Walton and Margaret Walton are parties to this appeal because they were parties in the trial court. Deborah and Margaret both signed the notice of appeal, but thereafter the briefs were signed by Deborah only. Because Margaret did not sign Deborah's brief, Margaret has not provided any argument on appeal, we dismiss her appeal based on her failure to file a brief.

2.   Deborah's petition for certiorari was denied on December 9, 2024.

3.   Deborah also argues the trial court should have addressed her Trial Rule 60(B) motion prior to issuing the order for the Sheriff to remove her from the property; however, the argument that she provides in support thereof – that she should receive relief from the summary judgment because she did not receive proper presuit notice – is the argument that she first asserted in her Trial Rule 60(B) motion. Because Deborah filed her notice of appeal prior to the trial court ruling on her Trial Rule 60(B) motion, that issue is not properly before us.

May, Judge.

Judges Weissmann and Scheele concur. Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur.