IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.M. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The trial court terminated the parental rights of C.M. (“Mother”) to her minor daughter, R.M. (“Daughter”). Mother appeals and claims: (1) the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the child-in-need-of-services (“CHINS”) case; (2) the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and the trial court violated Mother's due process rights during the CHINS proceeding and the termination of parental rights proceeding; and (3) the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was clearly erroneous. We disagree and affirm.

Issues

[2] Mother presents three issues, which we reorder and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the CHINS case.

II. Whether DCS and the trial court violated Mother's due process rights during the CHINS and termination of parental rights proceedings.

III. Whether the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] Mother has a history of criminal activity and substance abuse. Prior to Daughter's birth on April 7, 2023,¹ Mother had one child who was the subject of an action by the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), two other children who were in the care of their great-grandmother, and another child who was the subject of a DCS case in Indiana and was in the custody of that child's father. Mother was also incarcerated in Illinois in 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2018.

[4] Daughter tested positive for methamphetamine at birth and was placed in the neonatal intensive care unit due to breathing issues. Mother exhibited unusual behavior at the hospital following Daughter's birth. Mother and the alleged father did not appear for a scheduled feeding and had not visited with Daughter. The next day, a DCS family case manager (“FCM”) went to the hospital to assess the situation and spoke with hospital staff. On April 10, 2023, another FCM went to the hospital and met with staff, who stated that Mother and the alleged father had visited Daughter a few times but that Mother displayed erratic behavior. Hospital staff also reported that Daughter was displaying signs of methamphetamine withdrawal. Mother admitted that she sought no prenatal care during her pregnancy.

[5] On April 13, 2023, an FCM met with Mother and informed her that Daughter had tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother claimed that she had accidentally ingested methamphetamine by drinking from a cup that contained an unknown substance while pregnant. Mother claimed that she had given the alleged father's mother guardianship over Daughter, but Mother did not know the alleged guardian's name, address, or contact information. That day, DCS removed Daughter from Mother's care.

[6] DCS filed a petition on April 14, 2023, alleging that Daughter was a CHINS under Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 ² and 31-34-1-10.³ The trial court held a CHINS fact-finding hearing on July 6, 2023, but Mother failed to appear. The trial court granted the request of Mother's court-appointed attorney to withdraw his appearance because of Mother's lack of participation in the case.⁴ The trial court found Daughter to be a CHINS because Daughter was born with methamphetamine in her system, Mother had a prior history with DCS in Indiana and DCFS in Illinois, and Mother had prior and pending criminal charges. DCS attempted to place Daughter with Mother's relatives in Illinois but could not do so because these relatives did not complete the necessary process for placement.

[7] The trial court held a CHINS dispositional hearing on July 24, 2023, and Mother again failed to appear.⁵ The trial court issued a dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things: (1) maintain a stable home; (2) obey the law; (3) avoid the use of alcohol or illicit drugs; (4) complete a parenting assessment and substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations; (5) submit to random drug screens; and (6) attend all scheduled visitations with Daughter. Mother admittedly did not comply with these requirements and only visited Daughter one time during the three visitations that were offered before Mother's incarceration in Illinois; nor did Mother have stable housing.

[8] Mother was arrested in Illinois in late July 2023 and has been incarcerated since that time. Mother was ultimately convicted of distribution of methamphetamine in Illinois, and her projected release date is in April 2027. Due to Mother's lengthy incarceration in Illinois, DCS had difficulty providing services to Mother: DCS could not provide her with a substance abuse assessment, substance abuse treatment, a parenting assessment, or a mental health assessment. The only service DCS could provide was virtual visitations with Daughter.⁶ At a permanency hearing in January 2024, the trial court approved a concurrent permanency plan of adoption and reunification. Mother did not appear at this hearing, but her attorney appeared.

[9] On June 27, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Daughter. DCS sought orders from the trial court to transport Mother to Indiana for the initial hearing and to order the Illinois Department of Corrections (“Illinois DOC”) to allow Mother to appear remotely. The trial court denied the transport order request but granted the request to order the Illinois DOC to allow Mother to appear remotely. An initial hearing was held on July 24, 2024, at which Mother appeared via Zoom. The trial court appointed counsel for Mother for the termination proceedings and continued the initial hearing.

[10] The continued initial hearing was held on August 27, 2024. Mother did not appear even though the trial court had granted DCS's motion to require the Illinois DOC to allow Mother to appear via Zoom. Mother's counsel was unaware of why Mother did not appear via Zoom, but he argued that the Illinois DOC was aware of the order to allow Mother to appear remotely and that the failure to appear could not be attributed to Mother. DCS requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the CHINS case and reset the matter for an evidentiary hearing. When the trial court indicated its intent to take judicial notice of the CHINS case, Mother's counsel affirmatively stated, “I have no objection to that.” Tr. Vol. II p. 14. The trial court granted DCS's motion for a writ to assure Mother's attendance at the rescheduled evidentiary hearing, which was set for December 17, 2024.

[11] On the day of the evidentiary hearing, Mother's counsel filed a motion to continue and alleged that, due to Mother's incarceration in Illinois, he had only been able to discuss the case with Mother since November 25, 2024. The trial court denied the motion, and Mother appeared at the fact-finding hearing remotely via Zoom. At the hearing, DCS proffered, and the trial court admitted, certified copies of the CHINS pleadings and orders. Mother did not object to these exhibits. The trial court heard evidence that Mother was still in custody of the Illinois DOC with a projected release date of April 2027.

[12] Mother testified and stated that she had become compliant with services following her arrest and incarceration. Mother claimed to have: (1) undergone a mental health assessment and substance abuse assessment; and (2) participated in a “WRAP” program,⁷ parenting skills class, anger management program, and a “relationships” group; and (3) completed some college-level coursework. Tr. Vol. II pp. 41-42. Mother explained that she could have her sentence reduced by six months if she passed a paralegal training test, and she planned to participate in a substance abuse treatment program that could further reduce her sentence. Mother admitted that, at the time of the hearing, she could not take care of Daughter due to her incarceration. Mother also had charges pending in Knox County, Indiana, for dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony; possession of methamphetamine, a Level 3 felony; and possession of a hypodermic syringe, a Level 6 felony. These charges could not be resolved until after Mother was released from the Illinois DOC.

[13] FCM Stephen Beatty testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Daughter's best interests. Court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Denise Swink similarly testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Daughter's best interests because Daughter was bonded with her foster parents and needed permanency and stability in her life. If Mother's parental rights were terminated, Daughter's foster parents planned to adopt her.

[14] On April 10, 2025, the trial court entered exhaustive findings of fact and conclusions thereon terminating Mother's parental rights to Daughter. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. The trial court did not err by taking judicial notice of the CHINS case.

[15] Mother argues that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the underlying CHINS case because, according to her, the statements contained in the CHINS reports were either false or misleading. “[W]e review a trial court's decision to take judicial notice of a matter, like other evidentiary decisions, for abuse of discretion.” Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1157 (Ind. 2016). Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding to admit or exclude evidence. In re K.R., 154 N.E.3d 818, 820 (Ind. 2020). We generally review decisions to admit evidence for an abuse of that discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion only when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

[16] When the trial court stated that it would take judicial notice of the CHINS case, Mother's counsel did not object. To the contrary, Mother's counsel affirmatively stated, “I have no objection to that.” Tr. Vol. II p. 14. If a party affirmatively informs the trial court that she has no objection to evidence, that party waives any claim of error with regard to the admission of that evidence. Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 679 (Ind. 2013); Adams v. Lazaro, 249 N.E.3d 661, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).⁸ Mother's argument regarding judicial notice is, accordingly, waived.⁹

II. Mother was not denied due process.

[17] Mother also claims that she was denied due process during the CHINS and termination of parental rights proceedings. In addressing this argument, we first note that Mother did not present a due-process argument to the trial court. As a general rule, an appellant may not present an argument for the first time on appeal. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Gurtner, 27 N.E.3d 306, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When a parent makes a due process claim based on CHINS irregularities for the first time on appeal, we may consider the claim waived. In re M.M.E., 146 N.E.3d 922, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020); see also In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (“[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.”). “However, as the word ‘may’ implies, ‘we have discretion to address such claims.’ ” M.M.E., 146 N.E.3d at 924 (quoting In re D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), aff'd on reh'g, 122 N.E.3d 832, trans. denied). Here, we exercise our discretion to address Mother's arguments on their merits.

[18] In A.P. v. Porter County Office of Family and Children, 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, this Court noted that “[t]he nature of the process due in parental rights termination proceedings turns on a balancing of the ‘three distinct factors’ specified in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 [ ] (1976).’ ” The three Matthews factors are: (1) “the private interests affected by the proceeding,” (2) “the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure,” and (3) “the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” Id. (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335). Because of the interlocking nature of the CHINS and termination statutes, “procedural irregularities in a CHINS proceeding[ ] may be of such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to the termination of his or her parental rights.” Id. at 1112-13. Our Supreme Court has explained:

In balancing the three-prong Mathews test, we first note that the private interest affected by the proceeding is substantial—a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of her child. We also note the countervailing Mathews factor, that the State's parens patriae interest in protecting the welfare of a child is also substantial. Both the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by the proceeding. So, we turn to the third Mathews factor, the risk of error created by DCS's actions and the trial court's actions.

In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917-18 (Ind. 2011).

A. Mother's Participation During the CHINS Proceeding

[19] Mother claims that DCS and the trial court failed to ensure her attendance and participation during the CHINS proceedings, but Mother showed little interest in the case even prior to her incarceration. The CHINS proceedings began in April 2023, and Mother was not incarcerated until the end of July 2023. Despite this, Mother failed to appear at the CHINS fact-finding hearing, which occurred prior to her incarceration; nor did she appear at the CHINS dispositional hearing, although she may have already been incarcerated then.

[20] Thereafter, Mother was incarcerated in another State. Mother claims that the trial court should have ordered her to be transported to Indiana to attend the hearings. But the trial court was concerned about its authority to order the Illinois DOC to allow Mother to attend the hearings and instead granted DCS's request to permit Mother to appear remotely via Zoom. Mother then appeared remotely at the November 25, 2024, hearing on DCS's motion to suspend visitations with Daughter and at the December 16, 2024, permanency hearing. Thus, Mother's claim that the trial court and DCS failed to secure her appearance during the CHINS proceedings is not supported by the record.¹⁰ Moreover, Mother identifies no risk of error created by the hearings she was unable to attend or by her attending the hearings remotely. The difficulties in securing Mother's attendance at the CHINS hearings were the result of Mother's incarceration in another state.

B. Reasonable Efforts to Reunify During the CHINS Proceeding

[21] Mother next argues that DCS violated her due process rights by failing to make sufficient reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Daughter during the CHINS proceeding. To be sure, DCS is required to make reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family during CHINS proceedings.¹¹ In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-21-5.5), trans. denied. “In determining the extent to which reasonable efforts to reunify or preserve a family are appropriate under this chapter, the child's health, welfare, and safety are of paramount concern.” I.C. § 31-34-21-5.5(a). This CHINS statutory provision, however, “is not a requisite element of our termination statute, and ‘failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.’ ” S.K., 124 N.E.3d at 1232 n.1 (quoting In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).

[22] DCS's ability to preserve the family was severely limited due to Mother's incarceration. DCS's inability to provide services to an incarcerated parent is not a denial of due process. H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 148 (citing Castro v. Ind. Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)); see also K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235-36 (Ind. 2013) (“ ‘Individuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children.’ ”) (quoting In re A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). DCS provided Mother with the service it could provide due to Mother's incarceration—remote visitations. And even before she was incarcerated, Mother admittedly did not “comply ․ too much” with the services ordered. Tr. Vol. II p. 41. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that DCS's inability to provide Mother with services during her incarceration constituted a failure to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family, thereby depriving Mother of due process during the termination proceedings.¹²

C. Motion to Continue the Termination Hearing

[23] Mother also briefly argues that the trial court gave her counsel insufficient time to prepare for the termination of parental rights hearing and notes that the trial court denied her counsel's motion to continue the hearing. “[A] trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is subject to abuse of discretion review.” In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243-44 (Ind. 2014) (citing Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion by denying a motion to continue if the moving party has shown good cause for granting the motion, “but ‘no abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial.’ ” Id. (quoting Rowlett, 841 N.E.2d at 619).

[24] Mother's motion to continue was made on the day of the hearing. Such last-minute motions to continue are not favored. See Blackford v. Boone Cnty. Area Plan Comm'n, 43 N.E.3d 655, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Lewis v. State, 512 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 1987)). Mother's counsel had over two months to prepare for the hearing, and she identifies no prejudice caused by the trial court's denial of her last-minute motion to continue. Thus, we cannot say that the denial of Mother's motion to continue the termination hearing constituted a denial of due process.

III. The trial court did not clearly err by terminating Mother's parental rights.

[25] Mother also argues that the trial court clearly erred by terminating her parental rights to Daughter. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230. “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of their child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). When determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights, we recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[26] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur, DCS is required to allege and prove, among other things:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c).¹³ Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including “[t]hat there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016); see also Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2.

[27] If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c). Here, the trial court entered such findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

A. The trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.

[28] Mother argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights because the trial court's conclusions were based on several factual findings that Mother claims are clearly erroneous.

1. Finding 12(a).

[29] Mother first attacks the trial court's Finding 12(a),¹⁴ which provides that “DCS has complied with the child's case plan.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 71. Mother claims that this is clearly erroneous because the only service DCS provided was virtual visits. But this was due to Mother's incarceration, which occurred approximately three months after Daughter was born and continued throughout the CHINS and termination proceedings. As noted above, DCS is not required to provide services to an incarcerated parent, and the failure to provide such services does not violate a parent's due process rights. See H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 148 (citing Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 377). Finding 12(a) is not clearly erroneous.

2. Finding 12(c).

[30] Mother also challenges Finding 12(c), which states:

[Mother] has not complied with the child's case plan. [M]other is incarcerated at this time. Throughout the report period [M]other has only completed one supervised visit with [Daughter], has not been engaged in home-based casework, has not completed a substance abuse assessment or substance abuse treatment, has not completed a psychiatric evaluation or psychiatric treatment, has not completed a family functional assessment or any treatment, has not submitted to any random oral drug screens, and has not made any call-in's regarding drug screens.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 71. Mother claims that this is clearly erroneous because DCS failed to provide services to her. But the reason Mother could not participate in or complete any services was her own incarceration, which was due to Mother's criminal actions, not the actions of DCS.

3. Finding 12(d).

[31] Mother also attacks Finding 12(d), which provides in relevant part that “[Mother] has not enhanced her ability to fulfill her parental obligations.” Id. Mother claims that this finding is erroneous because she did enhance her parenting abilities. As evidence of this, Mother notes that the trial court itself recognized that Mother obtained certificates for completing several programs while incarcerated. But at the time of the termination hearing, Mother still had over a year until her earliest release date, and she still had pending charges in Indiana that must be resolved. Mother was, and will be for the near future, unable to act as a parent to Daughter. This finding is not clearly erroneous.¹⁵

4. Finding 12(m).

[32] In a similar vein, Mother attacks Finding 12(m), which noted that Mother had been “given the opportunity to participate in case planning, periodic case reviews, dispositional reviews, placement of the child, and visitation.” Id. at 72. Mother claims that she was not given a real opportunity to participate in these services because she was unable to participate due to her incarceration. Under such circumstances, Mother claims that the offer to participate was a “hollow gesture.” Appellant's Br. p. 22. At the risk of repeating ourselves, Mother's inability to participate was due to her incarceration. That Mother could not participate due to her own actions does not mean that DCS did not offer her the opportunity to do so.

5. Finding 18.

[33] Mother next claims that Finding 18 is clearly erroneous. Finding 18 simply noted that, upon Mother's release from the Illinois DOC, she will have to address an active warrant for the pending charges in Knox County. Mother acknowledges this is true but argues that these pending charges do not prove that she is guilty or that she will be incarcerated and unable to care for Daughter. Mother's arguments do not alter the fact that the trial court's finding is factually correct and is, therefore, not clearly erroneous.

6. Finding 19.

[34] Finding 19 noted that Mother “has a significant criminal history and has repeatedly been incarcerated in the Illinois [DOC] and has participated in services through the Illinois [DOC] but continues to repeat offenses.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 73. Mother claims that this finding is clearly erroneous because she has not committed any new crimes since her incarceration. But this does not alter the fact that Mother was incarcerated in Illinois in 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2018, and again in 2023. The fact that Mother committed no new crimes in the controlled, structured environment of prison does not mean that the trial court had to ignore her prior, repeated criminal conduct. See A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that trial courts must evaluate a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect and may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history). This finding is not clearly erroneous.

B. Conditions that led to removal or placement outside of home.

[35] Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is “a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in a [child's] removal ․ will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In the first step of this analysis, it is not just the reasons for the initial removal of the child that may be considered, but also the reasons that resulted in the continued placement outside the home. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied.

[36] In analyzing the second step, the trial court assesses the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[37] Mother argues that there is no evidence that the conditions that led to Daughter's removal—Mother's drug use and Daughter testing positive for drugs at birth—have not been remedied. Daughter remained outside of Mother's care initially because Mother did not engage in the services DCS offered and did not participate in visitation consistently. Then, just a few months into the CHINS case, Mother was arrested and incarcerated. Mother remained incarcerated for the remainder of the CHINS and termination cases. Her projected release date is in April 2027, with the possibility for an earlier release if she completes certain programs. Even after her release from the Illinois DOC, however, Mother has pending charges in Knox County that must be resolved.

[38] Mother also notes that there was no evidence that she was using drugs while incarcerated and that, at the time of the termination hearing, she was preparing to enroll in a substance abuse program. But Mother admitted that she had a substance abuse problem, and she had not yet completed a treatment program. Mother had several previous convictions for dealing or possession of drugs, was incarcerated on a drug dealing conviction, and faces additional drug charges in Indiana when released from the Illinois DOC. Mother's sobriety while incarcerated, though laudable, did not preclude the trial court from concluding that Mother's substance abuse issues remain a problem. Mother's current period of sobriety occurred in the structured environment of prison, and the trial court was not required to conclude that Mother would maintain her sobriety outside of this environment. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234 (holding that trial court did not clearly err by concluding that mother's substance abuse would not be remedied even though mother had not used illicit drugs in seventeen months because the first eleven months of this period occurred while mother was still in prison and mother had a pattern of substance abuse and criminal behavior).

[39] Given Mother's substance abuse and continued incarceration, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Daughter's removal, and her continued placement outside of Mother's home, would not be remedied. See Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 374 (holding that trial court did not clearly err by concluding that the conditions that led to child's removal from father would not be remedied where father had been incarcerated throughout CHINS and termination proceedings and was not expected to be released until after termination hearing), trans. denied.¹⁶

C. Termination of the parent-child relationship was in Daughter's best interest.

[40] Mother also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship was in Daughter's best interest. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. A child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[41] Daughter was removed from Mother's care at birth after testing positive for methamphetamine. Just months after the initiation of the CHINS proceedings, Mother was arrested and has been incarcerated ever since. Thus, Mother has never had custody of Daughter, who has instead been cared for by her current foster parents, with whom she is bonded. Even prior to her incarceration, Mother was in no position to care for Daughter. Mother was frequently incarcerated, abused illicit drugs, and had no stable place to live.

[42] The earliest Mother might get out of prison is 2026, and her projected release date at the time of the termination hearing was April 2027. By that time, Daughter will be four years old and will have never been in Mother's care. And again, Mother still has serious charges in Indiana that remain to be resolved. “ ‘[C]hildren cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49 (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648).

[43] In addition, both the FCM and the CASA testified that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Daughter's best interests. “[R]ecommendations by the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, [are] sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re J.S., 133 N.E.3d 707, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019); see also In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (affirming trial court's conclusion that termination was in child's best interest based on opinions of the CASA, guardian ad litem, and child's psychiatrist). In sum, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Daughter's best interest.

Conclusion

[44] Mother waived her argument that the trial court erred by taking judicial notice of the CHINS case, and waiver notwithstanding, the trial court did not err by taking judicial notice. Neither DCS nor the trial court violated Mother's due process rights during the CHINS termination proceedings. Lastly, the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was not clearly erroneous. We, therefore, affirm the trial court.

[45] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The identity of Daughter's father is unknown. The alleged father ultimately denied paternity, did not participate in the CHINS or termination proceedings, and is not involved in this appeal.

2.   This statute provides that a child is a CHINS if the child's “physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent ․ to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision” when the parent is “financially able to do so” or “due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent ․ to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so,” and the child needs “care, treatment, or rehabilitation that ․ the child is not receiving; and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” I.C. § 31-34-1-1.

3.   This statute provides that, with certain exceptions not relevant here, a child is a CHINS if the child is born with “any amount, including a trace amount, of a controlled substance, a legend drug, or a metabolite of a controlled substance or legend drug in the child's body ․,” and the child needs “care, treatment, or rehabilitation that ․ the child is not receiving; and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” Ind. Code § 31-34-1-10.

4.   The trial court reappointed counsel to represent Mother in October 2023.

5.   Mother may have been incarcerated in Illinois at this time, as she was incarcerated “at the end of July” of that year. Tr. Vol. II p. 31.

6.   These virtual visitation services were interrupted in August 2024 because the service provider was unable to find a visitation supervisor, but the visitations were resumed the following month.

7.   This appears to be a re-entry program. See Tr. Vol. II p. 41.

8.   The fundamental error exception to the waiver rule is inapplicable when a party affirmatively states that she has “no objection.” Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 679. Moreover, Mother makes no claim of fundamental error.

9.   Waiver notwithstanding, Mother would not prevail. Mother refers us to only two allegedly false or misleading statements in the CHINS filings. The first is contained in the CHINS pre-dispositional report, which states that DCS “diligently” searched for Mother's relatives as a placement for Daughter. Ex. Vol. I p. 157. Mother claims this is false because she testified that she did not know the individuals referred to in the report. This presupposes that the trial court was required to believe Mother's self-serving testimony; it was not. In re Br.B., 139 N.E.3d 1066, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).The other allegedly misleading statement to which Mother refers is contained in a CHINS progress report and states that Mother's cousin and the cousin's husband were aware of the CHINS case involving Daughter but chose not to seek Daughter's placement with them. Mother claims that this is misleading because, according to her, the cousin's decision was based on the CASA's statement that she would not approve placing Daughter with the cousin. But the CASA testified at the termination hearing that she did not discourage any of Mother's relatives from seeking Daughter's placement with them. Instead, the CASA testified that she was not in favor of moving Daughter at that time. Mother's cousin also wanted a guarantee that Daughter would end up in the cousin's custody, but the CASA could give no such guarantee.

10.   We also note that DCS provided Mother with the case reports and notices for the hearings. Mother's counsel also provided Mother with copies of the court's orders.

11.   The CHINS statutes do not require DCS to make reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify families under the circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code Section 31-34-21-5.6(b), which are inapplicable here.

12.   Mother also complains that DCS failed to comply with its own Child Welfare Policy Manual, which states that an FCM has a duty to maintain contact with a parent even if that parent is incarcerated. Mother fails to explain, however, how a violation of a policy manual constitutes a deprivation of due process. More importantly, DCS presented evidence that the FCM provided Mother with supervised, virtual visits with Daughter during Mother's incarceration and provided Mother with copies of the trial court's orders during the CHINS case. Thus, Mother has not shown that the FCM violated the policy manual.

13.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again on July 1, 2025. Here, DCS filed its petition on June 27, 2024. Thus, we apply the version of the statute in effect at that time.

14.   We note that Finding 12 was incorporated into the trial court's termination order from the order following the October 2023 review hearing in the CHINS case.

15.   Mother also attacks Finding 12(l), in which the trial court found that the reason for Daughter's placement outside of Mother's home had not been remedied. We address this claim below.

16.   Mother also argues that there was no reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Daughter. DCS was only required to prove the existence of one of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1). The trial court here found a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Daughter's removal or reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Daughter.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.