IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.G. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] B.G. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to M.W. and J.W. (“the Children”). Mother raises the following restated issue for our review: whether the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and J.T.W. (“Father”)¹ (together, “Parents”) are the biological parents of M.W., born in June 2016, and J.W., born April 2018. Mother is also the biological mother of two older children, who are not in her care and are not a part of this action. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) first became involved with the family on June 6, 2022, based on a report that the Children were the victims of neglect and abuse by Parents. On June 5, 2022, J.W. sustained an injury, specifically a bloody nose, while in the care of Parents. On June 6, 2022, the Children, who were five and four years old at the time, were left in a car when Mother was intoxicated and went into a bar to get food. The same date, DCS removed the Children from Parents’ care and placed the Children with paternal grandparents, where the Children remained for the duration of the case.

[3] On June 7, 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”) due to lack of adequate supervision, sustaining injuries while in Mother's care, and residing in the same household as adults who had been charged with committing specified offenses under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-2-(b)(1) against another child residing in the home. The day before the petition was filed, the State charged Mother with Level 5 felony domestic battery with bodily injury to a person under fourteen, Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a person less than sixteen, and two counts of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent. Father was also charged with Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent.

[4] On October 1, 2022, Mother stipulated that the Children were CHINS in part because of her pending criminal charges and the resulting no contact order. Based on this stipulation, the trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS. On October 3, 2022, the trial court issued a dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things, refrain from criminal activity; maintain safe and suitable housing; abstain from the use of alcohol and illegal substances; complete diagnostic, substance abuse, and domestic violence assessments and follow all recommendations and services; notify DCS of any change in household address within forty-eight hours; and submit to random drug screens.

[5] DCS referred Mother to substance abuse treatment, and in June 2022, she began engaging in that service with Quality Counseling. Mother completed a substance abuse treatment assessment and then participated in substance abuse treatment from June 2022 to December 2023. Mother initially completed recommended sessions with Quality Counseling but then tested positive for alcohol several times, which resulted in her having to re-engage in the treatment program. However, she failed to re-engage as the program required. Mother stopped attending services completely in December 2023 and never completed her required sessions. In November 2023, Mother tested positive for THC and cocaine sporadically.

[6] In addition to the substance abuse treatment, Mother began participating in parenting education and various home-based services in June 2022. As part of these services, Mother was working on financial stability, budgeting, and maintaining stable employment. Mother completed some, but not all, of the curriculum and moved to an as needed basis for home-based services. At the time Mother began the home-based services, she had sufficient housing, but after she disengaged from services in the fall of 2023, she faced eviction for nonpayment of rent. Mother also refused DCS's assistance with housing.

[7] In late 2022, Mother pleaded guilty to two of the neglect of a dependent charges she had been facing from June 2022, and she was placed on probation. In January 2024, Mother was arrested and charged with operating while intoxicated. As a result of the new charge, the State filed a petition to revoke Mother's probation. Mother was incarcerated from the time of her arrest in January until March of 2024. After her release, Mother continued to struggle to maintain stability and sobriety. During an initial home visit in March 2024, community corrections officers found marijuana in Mother's home as well as drug paraphernalia that tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine and cocaine. Mother was evicted from her residence in May 2024 for non-payment of rent. In July 2024, when probation visited the home where Mother was residing, officers discovered a man living there who had active warrants for domestic battery and probation violations.

[8] On June 20, 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Children. At the time of filing, the Children had been removed from Mother's care for two years, and Mother had failed to comply with any services for months. The trial court held the termination fact-finding hearing on October 21 and 31, 2024.

[9] At the termination hearing, the DCS family case manager (“the FCM”) testified that she met with Mother on multiple occasions and reminded her of the services that had been ordered in the dispositional order. The FCM stated that Mother was “very bumpy when it c[ame] to her services.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 100. Specifically, the FCM testified that Mother was compliant when the case began and completed many of the assessments and recommended services, but beginning in the fall of 2023, she became less compliant and eventually stopped participating in services completely. Mother did not re-engage with services until the spring of 2024. Mother was never fully compliant with substance abuse treatment and services. However, after the filing of the termination petition in June, Mother had begun to re-engage with a new provider in September 2024.

[10] The FCM testified that Mother was inconsistent with the drug screening ordered in the dispositional order but did submit to the drug screening ordered through her home detention and probation. She only re-engaged with the DCS-ordered drug screening a few weeks prior to the termination hearing. The FCM testified that she had concerns that Mother only remained sober when there was criminal intervention, such as incarceration or home detention, and that her sobriety would not be maintained when Mother was released from probation.

[11] Mother experienced housing instability throughout the case. She faced eviction twice for non-payment of rent. Mother had moved to a new residence about two weeks prior to the termination hearing but failed to provide information regarding her new address to DCS. Mother was required to provide DCS with her new address within forty-eight hours of her move. She testified that she was living with her mother but could not remember the address and was not able to provide a lease. Because Mother had failed to notify DCS of her move, DCS was unable to confirm Mother was residing at the residence or to assess it prior to the hearing.

[12] Throughout the case, Mother never proceeded beyond supervised visitation with the Children. In the beginning of the case, Mother was unable to engage in visitation with the Children due to the no contact order in place as a part of her neglect charges. The no contact order remained in place until Mother pleaded guilty to the neglect charges in late 2022. Mother was consistent in her supervised visitation once it began, but due to her incarceration in 2024, she was unable to maintain consistent engagement in supervised visitation.

[13] At the time of the hearing, the Children had been removed from Mother's care for twenty-eight months and had been in the care of paternal grandparents throughout the length of the case. The Children were well-adjusted in their placement, and paternal grandparents were able to meet the Children's needs and wanted to adopt the Children.

[14] The FCM testified that she believed that termination was in the Children's best interests because, after twenty-eight months, the Children needed permanency. The FCM stated that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of Mother's case had not yet been remedied because Mother had never been successfully discharged from substance abuse treatment, which “was a big reason for [DCS] involvement” and because Mother had struggled to maintain stability and sobriety as she had only been able to achieve sobriety while being monitored by the criminal court. Id. at 109. The court appointed special advocate (“the CASA”) also testified that termination was in the Children's the best interests, citing concerns about Mother maintaining her sobriety and the Children's need for permanency and stability after such a lengthy case.

[15] On January 29, 2025, the trial court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children. The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside of her care, that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to the Children's well-being, that termination was in the Children's best interests, and that there was a satisfactory plan for the Children's care and treatment, which was adoption. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[16] While the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their children, the law allows for the termination of parental rights based on a parent's inability or unwillingness to meet parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005); In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Thus, parental rights are subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. In re. J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d at 1231. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[17] As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts ․” E.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). Indeed, we do not reweigh evidence; rather, we defer to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). In evaluating the trial court's findings and conclusions in an order terminating parental rights, we review only for clear error, and we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.” Id. If the evidence and reasonable inferences support the trial court's decision, we must affirm. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[18] Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's decision terminating her parental rights to the Children. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, the State must allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c).² As stated above, a petition must allege the existence of one or more of the circumstances contained in subsection (d). Here, the pertinent alleged circumstance was:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). The State's burden of proof for establishing these allegations is one of clear and convincing evidence. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (emphasis added).

[19] Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so she has waived any arguments relating to the unchallenged findings, and we therefore accept all of the trial court's unchallenged findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting this court accepts unchallenged trial court findings as true). Instead, Mother first argues that the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the removal of the Children and the reasons for placement outside of the home would not be remedied was not supported by sufficient evidence. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, a court engages in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, the court must determine what conditions led to the child's placement and retention in foster care, and second, the court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id.

[20] In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing a parent's recent improvements against “ ‘habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). Under this rule, “[trial] courts have properly considered evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.” In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

[21] In addition, DCS need not provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “We entrust th[e] delicate balance to the trial court, which has [the] discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. When determining whether the conditions resulting in removal would be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the offers of help from DCS or the service providers. D.B., 942 N.E.2d at 873.

[22] Here, the Children were removed from Mother's care on June 6, 2022, due to allegations of neglect and abuse by Parents which stemmed from the Children being left in a car when Mother was intoxicated and went into a bar to get food and from one of the Children sustaining an injury while in Mother's care. Further, at the time of removal, Mother was charged with several felony neglect of a dependent charges which were the result of actions against another child residing in the home.

[23] The evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that Mother's participation in services was inconsistent throughout the duration of the case. Mother did have periods of compliance, particularly with her substance abuse treatment, but Mother relapsed and became non-compliant. During the twenty-eight months that the Children were removed, Mother struggled to maintain stability and sobriety. Mother's only significant period of sobriety occurred when she was monitored by the criminal court as a result of her criminal convictions and terms of probation. The FCM testified that Mother had never been successfully discharged from substance abuse treatment, which “was a big reason for [DCS] involvement.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 109. When the Children were first removed, Mother was facing several felony neglect of a dependent charges and was later placed on probation after pleading guilty. In January 2024, Mother was arrested for operating while intoxicated, which was a violation of her probation, and she was incarcerated for several months in early 2024. Over the course of the twenty-eight-month case, Mother was also not fully compliant with her drug screening requirement under the dispositional order. She only consistently submitted to the drug screens ordered through her home detention and probation and only began to re-engage with the DCS drug screens after the termination petition had been filed.

[24] Mother was additionally unable to maintain stable housing, and she had been evicted for non-payment of rent in May 2024 and, at the time of the hearing, had moved in with her mother. However, although ordered to notify DCS within forty-eight hours of a change in address, Mother had not provided DCS with any information regarding her move until the date of the hearing, which was over two weeks after the move. At the hearing, Mother had not shown proof of a lease or allowed DCS to assess the home to ascertain its appropriateness. Further, in March 2024, during a probation search of her home, officers found marijuana and drug paraphernalia that tested positive for methamphetamine and cocaine. During another home visit in July 2024, probation officers found a man staying at Mother's residence who had active warrants for probation violations and domestic violence.

[25] The evidence revealed that, while Mother did engage in services at the beginning of the case, she ceased her participation in services in late 2023 when she tested positive for alcohol and illegal substances. She then began participating in services again only after DCS filed the petition to terminate her parental rights. It was within the trial court's discretion to weigh Mother's history of inconsistent compliance with services and inconsistent progress in maintaining sobriety more heavily than her efforts made only shortly before the termination hearing. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.

[26] During the entire duration of the case, the Children were never returned to Mother's care, and visitation never progressed past being fully supervised. Mother remained unable to demonstrate that she could safely parent the Children or demonstrate any meaningful and lasting change such that DCS could return the Children to her care. The trial court, therefore, could reasonably conclude that, based on Mother's historical patterns of conduct and failure to show any substantial change, Mother had not shown any change in “her thinking and continue[d] to use poor judgment and make poor choices.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 35. The trial court also reasonably concluded that Mother had not been able to remedy “the issues of her substance use, engaging in criminal behavior, associating with dangerous men, and making poor choices” that started this whole matter and that Mother failed to benefit from the services provided throughout the case. Id. at 43.

[27] As the Indiana Supreme Court has observed, a child “ ‘cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions which resulted in the Children's removal and continued placement outside the home would not be remedied.

[28] Mother next argues that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the Children's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of the child, a trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of a parent to those of the child. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. (citing In re R.S., 774 N.E.2d 927, 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment along with the parent's current inability to do so supports a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d at 82. Testimony of the service providers, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Before terminating the parent-child relationship, the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Id. (citing McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

[29] Our review of the totality of the evidence reveals that, at the time of the termination hearing, Mother had not appreciably improved her ability to safely care for the Children. Indeed, the Children had been removed from Mother's care for twenty-eight months, and Mother never progressed to unsupervised visitations with the Children. As discussed above, DCS presented sufficient evidence that there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy the reasons for the Children's removal and continued placement out of her care. Additionally, both the FCM and the CASA testified that they believed that termination was in the best interests of the Children. The FCM testified that she believed that termination was in the Children's best interests because, after twenty-eight months, the Children needed permanency and because Mother struggled to maintain stability and sobriety without criminal court intervention and had never successfully completed substance abuse treatment, which “was a big reason for [DCS] involvement.” Tr. Vol. 2 p.109. The CASA also testified that termination was in the Children's best interests due to concerns about Mother maintaining her sobriety and the Children's need for permanency and stability after such a lengthy case.

[30] The trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015). The Children should not have to wait any longer for Mother to make changes to demonstrate that she is able to safely parent the Children. Looking at the totality of the evidence, the trial court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the Children's best interests was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

[31] We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in its judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children.

[32] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's parental rights were terminated in the same proceedings as Mother's. However, Father does not participate in the instant appeal.

2.   This statute was recently amended, effective July 1, 2025. However, none of the cited subsections were affected by the most recent amendments.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.