Deborah Walton, Appellant-Plaintiff v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., Appellees-Defendants (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 75(B)(1), the trial court ordered a change of venue to Hamilton County, the county in which Deborah Walton should have filed her pro-se action against JP Morgan Chase (Chase), Manzil Koholi, MKPKDK Realty LLC (MKPKDK), Brian Berger, Ted Swiecichowski, and Richard E. Hendrickson (collectively, Defendants). After Walton failed to pay the costs of transfer within twenty days of the order transferring venue, as required by T.R. 75(B)(2), the trial court dismissed Walton's action without prejudice and ordered her to pay $500 in attorney fees.

[2] On appeal, Walton contends that the dismissal of her action was improper and entered in violation of due process. Her arguments, however, reflect a fundamental misreading of T.R. 75(B)(3) and lack of cogency. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal order.

[3] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[4] On February 24, 2025, Walton filed, in Marion County, a complaint against Defendants, alleging claims of fraud, breach of contract, and theft and seeking eight million dollars in damages. But Marion County was not a county of preferred venue under T.R. 75(A), so Koholi, a resident of Hamilton County, filed a motion for change of venue on March 6, 2025, asking the trial court to change venue to Hamilton County Superior Court 6 and tax transfer costs to Walton. The trial court granted this motion on March 7, 2025, with an order providing:

[Koholi], having moved the Court for change of venue to Hamilton County, Indiana, as the County of preferred venue and having alleged Hamilton is the county in where these issues are already pending and the Court being duly advised FINDS that no individual Defendant is a resident of Marion County, Indiana and Defendant, [Koholi] is a resident of Hamilton County. The Court further FINDS that this matter should be ordered transferred to Hamilton County Superior Court 6, costs taxed to Plaintiff.

Appellees Koholi & MKPKDK's Appendix Vol. 2 at 19.

[5] On March 28, 2025, Koholi and MKPKDK filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Walton had failed to pay the court costs associated with changing venue and that pursuant to T.R. 75(B)(2), she was required to do so by March 27, 2025. They sought dismissal of the action without prejudice and an order directing Walton to pay reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $500. On April 1, 2025, the trial court granted the motion in both respects. In its dismissal order, the trial court cited T.R. 75(B)(3)’s requirement that the court dismiss the action without prejudice and order the payment of reasonable attorney fees where the party filing the action does not pay costs of transfer within twenty days of the order transferring venue.

[6] That same day, April 1, Walton filed both a notice to the court that she had paid the transfer fee and a notice of appeal. Walton claimed that she had paid the fee on March 25, as that was the date she obtained a money order, but the record establishes that she did not submit the money order for payment to the Marion County Clerk until April 1. See Appellees Koholi & MKPKDK's Appendix Vol. 2 at 25 (reprinted receipt from the clerk reflecting that Walton paid a $232 “Change of Venue Fee” by tendering a money order at 2:00 p.m. on April 1, 2025).

[7] Walton now appeals only the trial court's dismissal order. That is, she does not appeal the trial court's earlier order transferring venue to Hamilton County Superior Court 6.

Discussion & Decision

[8] T.R. 75(B) addresses claims or proceedings filed in an improper court and provides:

(1) Whenever a claim or proceeding is filed which should properly have been filed in another court of this state, and proper objection is made, the court in which such action is filed shall not then dismiss the action, but shall order the action transferred to the court in which it should have been filed.

(2) The person filing the action shall, within twenty (20) days, pay such costs as are chargeable upon a change of venue and the papers and records shall be certified to the court of transfer in like manner as upon change of venue and the action shall be deemed commenced as of the date of filing the action in the original court.

(3) If the party filing the action does not pay the costs of transfer within twenty (20) days of the order transferring venue, the original court shall dismiss the action without prejudice and shall order payment of reasonable attorney fees to the party making proper objection.

[9] The trial court based the dismissal order on T.R. 75(B)(3), as Walton had not paid the costs of transfer within the required twenty days. On appeal, Walton argues both that she paid the costs timely and that the trial court should have required Koholi to pay said costs because he was the party that filed the motion to transfer venue. Walton is wrong on both counts.

[10] T.R. 75(B)(2) unambiguously requires the party that filed the action in the improper court to pay the costs of transfer within twenty days of the transfer order. See Ahmad v. Duncan, 732 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (observing that “the burden is upon the plaintiff or claimant”, not the movant, to pay the transfer costs), trans. denied. Walton filed the complaint, and thus she was responsible for paying the costs of transfer. Moreover, the record shows that she did not pay the costs until April 1, which was five days beyond the twenty-day deadline.

[11] Under the circumstances, the trial court was mandated by T.R. 75(B)(3) to do exactly what it did – dismiss the action without prejudice and order Walton to pay reasonable attorney fees to Koholi.¹ Cf. Daugherty v. Robinson Farms, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 192, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“We construe the word ‘shall’ as mandatory rather than directory.”), trans. denied.

[12] Walton also asserts that the trial court was required to give her an opportunity to respond to Koholi and MKPKDK's motion to dismiss and that the trial court's failure to do so violated her right to substantive due process. Walton does not provide any relevant authority supporting her claim that a trial court is required to wait to rule on a motion to dismiss under T.R. 75(B)(3). Moreover, the record establishes that the motion to dismiss was filed on March 28, 2025, and the trial court did not grant the motion until four days later, on April 1, 2025. Walton's due process argument is not supported by cogent argument and is without merit.

[13] In sum, Walton failed to abide by T.R. 75(B)(2), and thus the trial court was required by T.R. 75(B)(3) to dismiss Walton's action without prejudice and order the payment of reasonable attorney fees to Koholi. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's dismissal order.²

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court awarded the attorney fees jointly to Koholi and MKPKDK. Technically, only Koholi was entitled to an award of fees, but this is of no moment because these parties were jointly represented by the same counsel.

2.   Defendants Chase and Swiecichowski filed a separate appellees’ brief in which they agree with Koholi, MKPKDK, and the trial court that dismissal was mandated under T.R. 75(B)(3). Chase and Swiecichowski ask that we go further and rule on the merits that Walton's claims against them are barred by res judicata and are frivolous and that no Indiana trial court has personal jurisdiction over Swiecichowski. Chase and Swiecichowski filed a motion to dismiss, making these and other arguments, on March 14, 2025, but that was after the trial court had already issued its transfer order. We are not unsympathetic to the well-documented assertion that Walton is a vexatious, serial litigator who pursues frivolous actions. But we will leave the issues raised in Chase and Swiecichowski's motion to dismiss for a trial court to rule upon first, that is, if Walton chooses to refile her action in the proper court, Hamilton County Superior Court 6. We remind Walton, however, that filing frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless claims or litigating in bad faith could result in her being ordered to pay the reasonable attorney fees incurred by Defendants if they successfully defend the action. See Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b).

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur. Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.