Jamion Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jamion Johnson (“Johnson”) brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss a charge of murder brought against him, claiming the charge should be dismissed under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-4(a)(5) and (a)(11) because it is undisputed he did not fire any bullet that struck and killed the victim, who was instead shot by a third party returning Johnson's gunfire. We affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss the charge of murder.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 19, 2024, the State filed a four-count information against Johnson that included a charge of murder for the death of Kevin Stigger (“Stigger”). The remaining counts were for Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 5 felony reckless homicide, and Level 5 felony criminal recklessness. With regard to Count I—the count of murder—the charging information specifically alleged as follows: “On or about September 30, 2022, JAMION JOHNSON did knowingly kill another human being, to-wit: Kevin Stigger[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. In the accompanying probable cause affidavit, the State more specifically alleged that, on September 30, 2022, gunfire was exchanged at a barbershop in Indianapolis, wounding some individuals and killing Stigger. The probable cause affidavit referenced a police interview with Johnson where he allegedly admitted to firing a handgun six times in self-defense when he saw someone enter the barbershop who was armed and reaching for his weapon. Johnson said he exited the back of the barbershop. The probable cause affidavit referred to surveillance footage capturing the exchange of gunfire. The probable cause affidavit alleged that, while Johnson was inside the barbershop, two men entered the barbershop, one of whom was wearing a black hoodie. Shortly thereafter, Johnson allegedly began “shooting towards the male wearing the black hoodie,” who at that point dove to the floor as Johnson ran to the rear of the barbershop. Id. at 19. The probable cause affidavit alleged that the male in the black hoodie then “appear[ed] to mistake ․ Stigger for the original shooter”—in that they “both ha[d] similar builds and [were] wearing similar colored clothing”—and “fire[d] multiple shots at Stigger as Stigger [was] moving towards the front door[.]” Id. Stigger was fatally wounded.

[3] On November 4, 2022, Johnson belatedly filed a motion to dismiss the charge of murder, which the trial court accepted. In an accompanying memorandum, Johnson argued he was seeking dismissal under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-4(a)(5), which permits dismissal of an information where “[t]he facts stated do not constitute an offense,” and subsection (a)(11), which permits dismissal for “[a]ny other ground that is a basis for dismissal as a matter of law.” As to dismissal under subsection (a)(5), Johnson argued the State would be unable to prove he caused Stigger's death because he “did not commit the act of killing” Stigger nor “did he inflict an injury on ․ Stigger that contributed to his death.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 81. As to subsection (a)(11), Johnson claimed a violation of his due process rights, arguing that the murder statute—Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1)—was void for vagueness as applied to him. According to Johnson, the statute “d[id] not contain language that would allow a person to reasonably understand that conduct that leads to a chain of events where another actor commits an act that results in a death is a murder.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 89. The State filed a responsive memorandum arguing that dismissing the murder charge was improper under subsection (a)(5) because the charging information was facially adequate and “whether the State can prove [Johnson] committed [m]urder” was “a question of fact reserved for trial[.]” Id. at 99. In the alternative, the State argued that it could obtain a conviction for murder under a theory of proximate cause. As to subsection (a)(11), the State argued that Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1) was not void for vagueness as applied to the factual scenario because Johnson was adequately informed of the proscribed conduct and able to intelligently prepare a defense.

[4] On December 6, 2024, a hearing was held on the motion. At the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of the probable cause affidavit. The trial court also admitted into evidence the surveillance video referenced in the probable cause affidavit, as well as still shots from that video and a copy of the autopsy report for Stigger. Johnson asserted that “[t]o be subject to prosecution for murder, the [d]efendant must knowingly perform the specific act which kills the other person.” Tr. Vol. II p. 19. Johnson claimed that “[t]he murder statute is not supposed to be treated as a catch-all” and that there were lesser charges available that applied to the relationship between Johnson's conduct and Stigger's death. Id. at 20. Johnson further argued that “the State doesn't get to decide the law” and that “[b]y proceeding under th[e] theory” that Johnson killed Stigger under the circumstances, the State was “enlarging the murder statute beyond the fair meaning of the language used.” Id. at 21. The State disagreed, arguing that the charging information did “state a crime which is murder” and alleged Johnson was “responsible for it under the knowingly aspect[.]” Id. at 28. The State added that Johnson had notice of the charged conduct and was “still able to come up with [his] defenses” to the charge. Id.

[5] The trial court took the matter under advisement and, on December 27, 2024, issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. In its written order, the court determined that dismissal was not warranted under subsection (a)(5) because the State “ha[d] not failed to recite facts constituting murder.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 137. The court added that facts alleged in the charging information, “if proven at trial, would support a charge of murder.” Id. As to subsection (a)(11), the trial court said that it “d[id] not agree with [Johnson's] assertion that the State [was] attempting to expand the felony murder statute[,]” ultimately determining that Johnson had adequate notice that he could be liable for murder under the specific factual scenario involved in the case. Id. In so concluding, the court noted Indiana has “recognized the proximate cause theory in other contexts” where the defendant's acts involved “the death of a third person.” Id. at 138. Following the adverse ruling, Johnson perfected this interlocutory appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Johnson claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of murder where he was alleged to have caused the death of Stigger. In general, we review a ruling on a motion to dismiss a criminal charge for an abuse of discretion. State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 440 (Ind. 2022); Gutenstein v. State, 59 N.E.3d 984, 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the court misinterpreted the law. Gutenstein, 59 N.E.3d at 994. To the extent an appeal presents a question of law, our review is de novo. Armes v. State, 191 N.E.3d 942, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[7] Here, Johnson sought dismissal under (1) Indiana Code section 35-34-1-4(a)(5), which permits dismissal of a charge when “[t]he facts stated do not constitute an offense”; and (2) Indiana Code section 35-34-1-4(a)(11), which permits dismissal for any ground not otherwise enumerated in the statute “that is a basis for dismissal as a matter of law.” A motion to dismiss a criminal information “presents a pure question of law, subject to de novo review.” State v. Dickens, 261 N.E.3d 778, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Regarding a criminal charging information, we recently explained in Dickens that “[t]he purpose of a charging information is to provide the defendant with notice of the crime charged so he can prepare a defense.” Id. Consistent with this purpose, Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2 specifies that the “indictment or information shall be in writing and allege the commission of an offense by,” among other things, “stating the name of the offense,” “citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated,” and “setting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged in plain and concise language without unnecessary repetition[.]” The probable cause affidavit “serves a different function.” Dickens, 261 N.E.3d at 781. “As opposed to providing notice, the probable cause affidavit serves as ‘a means of satisfying the constitutional and statutory requirements that the pre-trial detention of the accused to face the charge be based upon a determination, by a neutral and detached magistrate, that probable cause exists to believe that the accused committed the crime.’ ” Id. (quoting Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Ind. 2000), abrogated on other grounds). With this background in mind, we turn to Johnson's claims for dismissal under subsections (a)(5) and (a)(11).

Subsection (a)(5)

[8] When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Indiana Code section 35-31-1-4(a)(5)—where it is alleged that “[t]he facts stated do not constitute an offense”—our review is “limited to whether, taking the facts alleged in the information as true, the information failed to allege the defendant committed a criminal offense.” Dickens, 261 N.E.3d at 781 (emphasis added). Put differently, “it is ‘only when an information is facially deficient in stating an alleged crime that dismissal for failure to state an offense is warranted.’ ” Id. (quoting Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied). Thus, as an example, in State v. Isaacs, we affirmed dismissal of a charge where the information alleged the defendant committed the offense of operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substance in his body, but the charging information specifically identified three substances that were not Schedule I or Schedule II controlled substances and it was “not a crime per se” to operate a vehicle with the listed substances in one's body. 794 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“The facts recited ․ fail[ed] to state a crime”). In contrast, in Dickens, we reversed the dismissal of charges involving the possession of contraband when the defendant was merely inviting us to look beyond the language in the charging information and take as true contradictory information in the probable cause affidavit suggesting that the item in the defendant's possession was not contraband. Dickens, 261 N.E.3d at 782–83.

[9] Here, Johnson was charged with murder under Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1), which specifies that a person who “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being” commits murder, a felony. The charging information alleged as follows: “On or about September 30, 2022, JAMION JOHNSON did knowingly kill another human being, to-wit: Kevin Stigger[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25. Standing alone, the facts alleged in the charging information adequately stated a charge of murder. As was the case in Dickens, Johnson is inviting us to look beyond the charging information and review allegations in the accompanying probable cause affidavit to conclude that the State could not prove its case. However, a motion to dismiss a charge under subsection (a)(5) is not designed for courts to make a premature assessment about whether the State will ultimately be able to satisfy its burden of proof at trial. Rather, this motion tests whether the State adequately alleged a valid charge at all. See, e.g., Dickens, 261 N.E.3d at 782–83. Because the charging information on its face alleged a valid charge of murder, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the charge under subsection (a)(5).¹

Subsection (a)(11)

[10] Johnson also sought dismissal under subsection (a)(11), which permits dismissal of a charge for “[a]ny other ground” not otherwise enumerated in the statute where that ground “is a basis for dismissal as a matter of law.” I.C. § 35-34-1-4(a)(11). Here, Johnson claimed dismissal under subsection (a)(11) was warranted because the murder statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, violating his right to due process under the United States Constitution.

[11] In general, “[a] penal statute that is ‘so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning’ violates ‘due process of law.’ ” McClernon v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1104, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)), trans. denied. Notably, however, “due process does not require perfect statutory precision.” Id. at 1108. Therefore, that there may be “marginal cases” in which it is “difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls” is not a “sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense.” Id. (quoting Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570, 575 (Ind. 2014)). Moreover, vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment rights—like the murder statute at issue in this case—are to be “examined in light of the facts of the case at hand” with “the statute ․ judged on an as-applied basis.” Morgan, 22 N.E.3d at 574 (quoting Maynard, Warden, et al. v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988)). In reviewing for constitutional vagueness, we “consider statutes from the perspective of a reasonable person” and recognize “that a vagueness challenge based upon [d]ue [p]rocess ‘may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk.’ ” Id. at 575 (quoting Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361).

[12] Here, Johnson argues that a reasonable defendant would not have known they could be criminally culpable for knowingly killing a person when the victim was shot by a third party, who was not a co-conspirator. We note, however, that the circumstances of this case are that Johnson pulled out his gun and fired at the third-party, who attempted to return fire but mistakenly shot Stigger instead. We conclude that this is the sort of scenario where “reasonable persons would know that their conduct is at risk.” Morgan, 22 N.E.3d at 575 (quoting Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361). Indeed, the State alleged Johnson was liable for “knowingly or intentionally” killing Stigger under Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1). As the State points out on appeal, a person commits an act “knowingly” when he is “aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b).

[13] Moreover, to the extent Johnson argues his charge involves a novel application of the mens rea requirement or stretches principles of causation, it is worth pointing out that the Indiana Supreme Court previously identified sufficient evidence supporting two counts of murder under circumstances bearing similarity to those at hand. Indeed, in Leonard v. State, the Court rejected arguments similar to Johnson's and ultimately identified sufficient evidence the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed two neighbors where the defendant was responsible for filling the home next door to them with natural gas and setting a time-delayed spark. 73 N.E.3d 155, 161–63 (Ind. 2017) (noting that the close proximity of the homes “increased the likelihood that a fire or explosion in one home would impact the neighboring home”).

[14] It will be up to a fact-finder to determine whether, in firing his weapon inside the barbershop, Johnson was aware of a high probability that someone's death would result from his actions. See id. It will also be up to a fact-finder to determine whether Johnson was the proximate cause of Stigger's death. In the end, however, our precedent establishes that “due process does not require perfect statutory precision.” McClernon, 139 N.E.3d at 1108. And, that there may be “marginal cases” in which it is “difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls” is not a “sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense.” Id. (quoting Morgan, 22 N.E.3d at 575). At this early stage, we cannot say Johnson lacked adequate notice that he could be liable for murdering Stigger in the factual scenario at hand. Therefore, the applicable murder statute—Indiana Code section 35-42-1-1(1)—is not unconstitutionally vague, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Johnson's motion to dismiss the charge under subsection (a)(11).

[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Resolving the issue on this basis, we do not address Johnson's specific arguments calling for application of facts not contained within the four corners of the charging information.

Foley, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge May concur. Altice, C.J. and May, J., concur.