Karim Abdullah, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment against Karim Ibn Abdullah III El for operating an unregistered vehicle, a Class C infraction. Abdullah, pro se, raises six issues on appeal, contending that the judgment violates various constitutional and statutory protections.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On November 4, 2024, Carmel Police Department Officer Michael Miller was driving on City Center Drive behind a black Chrysler 200 and noticed that it had a “different looking license plate,” not issued by the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles and a type that Officer Miller had never seen in his twenty-plus years of law enforcement. Transcript at 5. Officer Miller initiated a traffic stop and made contact with the driver, Abdullah. Abdullah told Officer Miller that he did not have a driver's license but produced a “United States passport card.” Id. at 6. When Officer Miller asked Abdullah about the license plate, Abdullah replied that he “didn't qualify” for an Indiana license plate as he “is not a resident of Indiana, he just resides in it.” Id. Abdullah further told Officer Miller that the license plate on his vehicle “was issued to him by his religious society” and that “everything is in the trust.” Id.

[4] Officer Miller returned to his police vehicle and ran a check on the VIN, which showed that the vehicle was never registered in Indiana. Officer Miller also ran Abdullah's name and date of birth as reflected on the passport card through BMV records, confirming Abdullah's identity with his picture, and saw that Abdullah had an Indiana driver's license and a Hamilton County address. The vehicle was later towed from the scene pursuant to Ind. Code § 9-18.1-2-10 (providing that law enforcement may take into custody a vehicle operated without “proper certificate of registration and license plates”).

[5] On November 8, 2024, the State of Indiana filed a summons and citation in Carmel City Court alleging that Abdullah had operated an unregistered motor vehicle in violation of I.C. § 9-18.1-11-5. In the next several months, Abdullah made many pro-se filings: Letter regarding Notice of Constitutional Rights Violation and Motion to Dismiss; Motion for Bill of Particulars; Formal Request for Full Disclosure of Commercial Activities, Separation of Natural Person from Legal Fiction, Challenge to Delegation of Authority, and Acceptance for Value of Obligations; Motion to Stay Proceedings; Motion for Leave to Open Equity Side of the Court, Constitutional Dismissal, and Judicial Notice; Motion to Compel Prosecution to Provide Evidence and Prove Claims; Motion to Compel the Court to Address Constitutional Issues, Motion to Recuse the Judge; and Memorandum of Law in Support of Unalienable Rights. On February 10, 2025, the court vacated the bench trial set for that date, recused itself, and transferred the case to Hamilton County for reassignment

[6] After the case was docketed in the Hamilton Superior Court, Abdullah's pro-se filings continued: Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, Violation of Constitutional Rights, and Religious Freedom Protections; Memorandum of Law in Support of Unalienable Rights; Motion for Declaratory Judgment; Petition for Writ of Ultra Vires and Judicial Notice; Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Warrant and Illegal Seizure; Motion to Recuse for Failure to Apply Constitutional Law; Motion for Final Judgment; Judicial Notice on Inalienable Rights, Due Process and Religious Freedom Protections; and Judicial Notice on Commercial Activity and the Clearfield Doctrine. The trial court denied Abdullah's motions.

[7] At the bench trial on March 20, 2025, Officer Miller testified regarding the November 4 traffic stop and noted that he had checked the BMV records for the vehicle before appearing for trial and it still had not been registered in Indiana. Before Abdullah testified, the trial court reminded him, “we're just talking about ․ the registration issue[.]”¹ Transcript at 10. Abdullah testified that his vehicle was not registered because

it is lawfully registered under a living trust which is governed by a religious society. The church operates under its own motor vehicle laws which is protected under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 2 and 3 of the Indiana Constitution which protects religious liberties and the right to self-govern its religious matters.

Id. at 11.

[8] At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court determined that Abdullah had committed the infraction of failure to register his vehicle, fined him $35.50, and assessed court costs of $139.50. Abdullah filed a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal, which the trial court granted. Abdullah now appeals.²

Discussion & Decision

[9] Abdullah's seeks reversal on the basis that the State of Indiana “violated [his] constitutional protections” by “enforc[ing] commercial vehicle registration laws against a vehicle held in a private religious trust that is not engaged in commerce.” Appellant's Brief at 6, 8

[10] Initially, we observe that Abdullah proceeds pro se in this appeal. It is well-settled that we hold pro-se litigants to the same standard as trained attorneys and afford them no inherent leniency because of their self-represented status. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Pro-se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Picket Fence Prop. Co. v. Davis, 109 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. We will not “become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Perry v. Anonymous Physician 1, 25 N.E.3d 103, 105 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied, cert. denied (2015).

[11] Further, we will not set aside a judgment rendered following a bench trial unless it is clearly erroneous. Coleman v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1043, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Here, the relevant facts are undisputed, and we are presented with a pure question of law. In that circumstance, our review is de novo. Id.

[12] I.C. § 9-18.1-11-5 (the statute) provides, in relevant part, that a person who fails to register a vehicle within a specified time after either acquiring it or moving to Indiana commits a Class C infraction and is subject to a BMV fine.³ Abdullah “does not challenge general traffic laws or dispute the government's interest in regulating public roadways.” Reply Brief at 7. Nor does Abdullah dispute that he operated an unregistered vehicle in violation of the statute. Rather, he argues that his conduct should be excused because

[t]he private religious trust, which is also Appellant's living trust, holds title to the vehicle. Appellant is the beneficiary, but not the legal owner. The trust is governed by an ecclesiastical government. Specifically, it is organized under the Indigenous Americans Republic of Peace, a de jure religious government and indigenous autonomous Nation-State. This Nation-State functions as a Private Religious Society and Unincorporated Association, operating solely under ecclesiastical law. It maintains its own internal system of governance, including property ownership and registration rules, which are distinct from and not subject to the commercial administrative laws of the State of Indiana or the United States. The vehicle is registered exclusively under that religious legal system and is not used for any commercial purpose.

Appellant's Brief at 10. He identifies six issues that we consolidate and address, as best as we can discern his arguments, ultimately determining that Abdullah is not entitled to reversal.

Applicability of the Statute

[13] Several of Abdullah's arguments are rooted in the premise that the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to him. For instance, Abdullah asserts that “forcing [him] to subject ecclesiastical trust property to state registration” violated his rights under Indiana's Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Id. at 16. We have recognized that “[a] party establishes a prima facie RFRA defense by showing the disputed governmental action substantially burdens a sincerely held religious belief.” Blattert v. State, 190 N.E.3d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The “exercise of religion” is defined in RFRA as “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” I.C. § 34-13-9-5.

[14] Assuming without deciding that Abdullah outlined an exercise of religion under RFRA – when he asserted that his church operated its own motor vehicle laws and that his vehicle was registered under a living trust governed by a religious society – he fails to demonstrate that Indiana law substantially burdens his religious belief. That is, we agree with the State that Abdullah “has not shown why his ability to place his vehicle under a religious trust and operate under a religious society's motor vehicle laws is burdened in any way by a parallel requirement to register his motor vehicle under the Indiana Code.” Appellee's Brief at 19. For like reasons, we reject Abdullah's related claim that “forcing [him] to subject ecclesiastical trust property to commercial state regulation” violated the First Amendment by interfering with the internal operations of a religious trust. Appellant's Brief at 16; Reply Brief at 10.

[15] Abdullah also suggests that application of the statute to him violates “the Clearfield Doctrine,” which, according to him, “prohibits the government from compelling individuals to engage in commercial activity without their consent.” Appellant's Brief at 11. We do not follow the argument, as there is no indication that Abdullah was compelled to engage in commercial activity. To the extent that he argues that the statute applies only to commercial entities and not individuals, we are unpersuaded. As observed by the trial court at the bench trial, a person for purposes of the motor vehicle title of the Indiana Code is defined to include an individual, a firm or partnership, an association, a fiduciary, executor, administrator, a limited liability company, sole partnership, a trust, or other entity. Ind. Code § 9-13-2-124 (emphases added). Further, many times we have affirmed judgments entered against individuals for motor vehicle infractions. See e.g., Rosenbaum v. State, 930 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (affirming individual's Class A infraction for operating motor vehicle without financial responsibility in effect), trans. denied. Abdullah has not established that the statute applies only to commercial entities.

Due Process

[16] Abdullah asserts that his vehicle was taken without due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.⁴ He argues, in part, that due process “requires notice and hearing before seizure,” which he was not provided. Reply Brief at 8. As our Supreme Court has recognized, citizens are presumed to know the law, as long as the law is accessible, so that they can conform their conduct accordingly, and “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” Bellwether Properties, LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462, 467 (Ind. 2017), trans. denied. Motor vehicle laws are readily accessible, and users of Indiana's roads are presumed to know them and bound by their requirements. Pursuant to I.C. § 9-18.1-2-3, a vehicle may not be operated on a highway unless it is registered as required by the Indiana Code and displays proof of registration. As to Abdullah's claim that he was entitled to a hearing prior to deprivation, our legislature has established that an officer may take custody of a vehicle operated on an Indiana roadway without “proper certificate of registration and license plates.” I.C. § 9-18.1-2-10.

[17] In asserting that these statutes violate his due process rights, Abdullah argues, in part, that seizure of his vehicle violates the Mathews v. Eldredge balancing test ⁵ because the government's interest in enforcing registration “does not override the due process rights of a religious trust that lawfully withdrew[⁶ ] from commercial registration.” Reply Brief at 9. Abdullah has failed to demonstrate a violation of due process under Mathews v. Eldredge considerations.

[18] That is, even if an individual's private interest in the personal ability to operate a vehicle is substantial, on balance the factors weigh in favor of the State's action. The risk of erroneous deprivation is low as BMV records are immediately available and the State's interest in keeping the roads safe is of great public importance. Further, as the State points out, registration assists the State with administrative matters such as collection of fees and taxes, and it provides information about a vehicle's owner, which is especially important following an accident or during the investigation of criminal or tortious behavior. It also provides a “check-point” for determining the existence of valid insurance. Appellee's Brief at 13. Moreover, we agree with the State that “post-seizure procedures are more than adequate to cure any error that might occur,” and Abdullah was not prevented from obtaining proper registration and retrieving his vehicle. Id. at 15.

[19] As to his claim that Indiana's motor vehicle code “is administrative and cannot be enforced in ways that deprive individuals of fundamental rights without due process,” Appellant's Brief at 17, driving a vehicle is not a fundamental right. Brown v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1219, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (recognizing that there is no fundamental right to drive a motor vehicle), trans. denied. We likewise reject his argument that his right to travel is a “fundamental constitutional liberty” that was implicated. Id. at 20. Abdullah is free to travel; he is just prohibited from operating an unregistered vehicle.

Seizure

[20] He also argues that the seizure of the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment ⁷ because it occurred without a warrant or probable cause. As an initial matter, it is well settled that an officer may initiate a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated or that other criminal activity is taking place. See Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009) (officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct traffic stop due to suspected license plate violation). Here, Officer Miller determined that the vehicle had never been registered in Indiana, and Abdullah provided no indication that it was validly registered in any other state. Abdullah's failure to register was a Class C infraction and, as discussed, I.C. § 9-18.1-2-10 permitted Officer Miller to seize the unregistered vehicle without obtaining a warrant.

[21] Abdullah suggests, without support, that “forcing individuals to surrender private property, under threat of fines and seizure without consent or contract, constitutes involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Appellant's Brief at 20. His argument lacks relevant and applicable support and fails to demonstrate that the stature results in unconstitutional involuntary servitude.

Supremacy Clause

[22] Abdullah contends that the statute is subordinate to federal constitutional law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, which he initially claims – generally and without relevant authority – “provides that federal constitutional protections supersede state codes.” Id. at 17. Later, he argues that application of the statute “results in direct conflict with higher federal law,” namely his constitutional protections as well as Indiana's RFRA such that the statute cannot be enforced against him. Reply Brief at 18. Having found no violations of his federal constitutional protections or RFRA, and thus no conflict with the statute, his Supremacy Clause argument fails.

[23] For all the reasons discussed herein,⁸ Abdullah has not established that the trial court's judgment was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[24] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court explained, “I know you have made constitutional arguments. Those have been, I think Judge Poindexter [Carmel City Court] denied them[,] but Judge Campbell [of Hamilton Superior Court] has also denied them so those are issues that have already been determined.” Transcript at 10.

2.   Abdullah subsequently filed in this court a motion to stay proceedings, which was denied as moot.

3.   We note that “ ‘[t]here need be no showing of mens rea before judgment may be entered in an infraction case because it is not a criminal matter. A mere showing the statute was violated by the defendant suffices.’ ” Hevenor v. State, 784 N.E.2d 937, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Pridemore v. State, 577 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).

4.   Abdullah also states that the statute violated his due process rights under Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. He makes no separate argument and provides no authority in support. That claim is thus waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 45(A)(8); Holloway v. State, 69 N.E.3d 924, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (recognizing failure to provide separate and independent Indiana Constitution analysis results in waiver), trans. denied.

5.   Abdullah's argument refers to a balancing test outlined in Mathews v. Eldredge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) in which the following four factors are evaluated in determining whether a due process violation occurred: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used; (3) the value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (4) the State's interests, including any burdens that additional or substitute procedures would impose.

6.   Abdullah states that he “served a Notice of Revocation of Contract to the [BMV], lawfully withdrawing any prior consent to participate in the State's registration system.” Reply Brief at 8.

7.   Abdullah states generally that Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution was also violated but makes no separate argument or analysis and thus his state constitutional claim is waived. See Holloway, 69 N.E.3d at 931.

8.   To the extent that we have not expressly addressed a specific issue or argument raised by Abdullah, we have found such to not warrant separate discussion either because it was subsumed in another that we addressed, was unpersuasive or lacked merit, or was not cogent and waived.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur. Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.