STEELE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] David L. Steele, Jr. (“Steele”) appeals the trial court's determination that he committed a traffic infraction by violating Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(1). We consolidate Steele's issues into a single issue, which is whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Steele violated Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(1). Identifying sufficient evidence to support the infraction, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 17, 2024, Indiana State Police Trooper Chris Davis (“Trooper Davis”) was conducting traffic enforcement near a northbound worksite on I-69 in Steuben County. Trooper Davis was positioned at the 349-mile marker. Before northbound traffic reached the worksite, informational signs were positioned starting around mile marker 347 providing notice of the construction zone to northbound traffic. At mile marker 348.8, there were “55 mile an hour ․ signs” that were “full time signs” posted “on both sides of the road[.]” Tr. Vol. I p. 6. Trooper Davis testified that these signs at mile marker 348.8 were “what start[ed] the construction zone.” Id. At mile marker 349.8, there was an arrow board closing the left-hand lane and directing vehicles to the right. Id. From there, “the lanes shift[ed] back and forth, where the workers [were], at the 350[-]mile marker[,] and then [the lanes] shift[ed] back” with “End Construction Zone” signage at mile marker 351. Id.

[3] Trooper Davis was positioned in the median “about a mile into [the] zone[,]” such that he was “before the lane closure but after the signs lowering the speed limit[.]” Id. Trooper Davis was outside his patrol vehicle holding a handheld laser device when he observed Steele's semi-truck “coming in at a very high rate of speed.” Id. Trooper Davis visually estimated that Steele was traveling “over the sixty-five (65) mile an hour speed limit for semis in the State of Indiana” and noted that “at this time [Steele] was well inside the fifty-five (55) mile an hour zone.” Id. Trooper Davis activated the laser device and clocked Steele's speed at sixty-seven miles per hour “for a ․ pretty good distance up until sixteen hundred and thirteen (1,613) feet from [Trooper Davis's] location.” Id. Trooper Davis got into his marked patrol vehicle and activated a radar system in his car, which clocked Steele's speed at “sixty-seven (67) mile[s] an hour in the fifty-five (55) zone all the way up to [Trooper Davis's] location.” Id. at 7.

[4] Trooper Davis pulled out behind Steele's semi-truck and followed it through the construction area. As the two vehicles traveled through the area, the vehicles “went past the workers that were actually setting up for the day.” Id. at 8. The workers “had yellow flashing lights on their vehicles” and “had ․ yellow vests and hard hats on[.]” Id. Trooper Davis testified that, by the time Steele passed through the single-lane area where the construction workers were located, Steele was “probably [traveling] under ․ fifty-five (55)” miles per hour. Id. at 9. After reaching a safe location, Trooper Davis stopped Steele's semi-truck and issued Steele a citation for violating a worksite speed limit established under Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11. When Trooper Davis asked Steele about his speed, Steele stated that he was traveling “sixty-five (65) or sixty-six (66)” miles per hour and “didn't see any fifty-five (55) mile an hour signs.” Id. at 8.

[5] On March 13, 2025, a bench trial was held. At trial, Steele represented himself. Steele testified that he saw a sign for fifty-five miles per hour when “going into the area” but did not see signs stating, “Work Zone Begins Here” or “Begin Work Zone Speed Limit.” Id. at 10. Steele argued that, under Indiana Code section 9-13-2-200—which defines the term “worksite”—“any place there is a lane restriction[,] construction worker, construction equipment, that's defined as a work zone, so I had reduced my speed before entering the work zone.” Id. The trial court found that Steele committed the traffic infraction and imposed a $300 fine plus $164.50 in court costs. Steele now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Steele claims there was insufficient evidence that he committed a traffic infraction under Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(1), asserting that he was not speeding within a worksite as defined by Indiana law and that no workers were engaged in active construction at the worksite itself. The State has the burden of “prov[ing] the commission of an infraction ․ by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ind. Code § 34-28-5-1(d). This requires proving that the person more likely than not committed the infraction. See Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., Inc., 73 N.E.3d 663, 670 (Ind. 2017). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses. Rosenbaum v. State, 930 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Rather, we look to the evidence supporting the judgment and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting the trial court's judgment, it will be affirmed. Id. Moreover, to the extent the case involves statutory interpretation, we review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010). The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. “The best evidence of that intent is the language of the statute itself, and we strive to give the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind. 2008). Furthermore, we presume that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals. Id.; see also Nicoson, 938 N.E.2d at 663.

[7] Here, Steele was found to have committed an infraction by violating Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(1), which relates to worksite speed limits. In general, a person who violates a speed limit established under Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11 will be found to have committed a Class B infraction and be subject to a fine of at least $300, with heightened penalties applicable if the person has prior infractions under the statute. I.C. § 9-21-5-11(d). Subsection (a) of the statute provides that, “[s]ubject to subsection (b),” the Indiana Department of Transportation (“INDOT”), the Indiana Finance Authority, or a local authority “may establish temporary maximum speed limits in their respective jurisdictions and in the vicinity of a worksite” and that “[t]he establishing authority shall post signs notifying the traveling public of the temporary maximum speed limits established under this section.” I.C. § 9-21-5-11(a) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) requires that the “[w]orksite speed limits ․ be at least ten (10) miles per hour below the maximum established speed limit.” Further, a “worksite speed limit set under this section may be enforced ․ [i]f workers are present in the immediate vicinity of the worksite.” I.C. § 9-21-5-11(c)(1).

[8] Steele argues that law enforcement may only enforce a speed limit established within a “worksite” as that term is defined in a separate statute, Indiana Code section 9-13-2-200. That statute defines “worksite” as “a location or area upon which” construction or maintenance activity “is being performed on a highway,” including “the lanes of a highway leading up to the area upon which [the activity] is being performed, beginning at the point where appropriate signs directing vehicles to merge from one (1) lane into another lane are posted.” I.C. § 9-13-2-200. Based on this definition, Steele argues that he was not speeding within the bounds of a “worksite” because Trooper Davis observed him speeding before reaching the point where signs directed vehicles to merge, and Trooper Davis indicated that Steele was not speeding in the worksite itself.

[9] Although Steele focuses on the precise boundaries of a “worksite,” we note that Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(a) authorizes the establishment of temporary speed limits “in the vicinity of a worksite[.]” We therefore reject the contention that Steele cannot be found to have committed the infraction while outside the worksite itself. In this case, the evidence established that signage was posted for a fifty-five-mile-per-hour speed limit beginning at mile marker 348.8, which was one mile ahead of the merge point and lane restrictions for construction at mile marker 349.8. We conclude that this speed limit was established “in the vicinity of” a “worksite,” consistent with Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11.

[10] Steele also claims there was insufficient evidence he committed the traffic infraction because of testimony that the workers were setting up for the day. Steele argues that, “[a]ccording to INDOT Operations Memorandum 06-01, a worksite speed zone ‘shall be in effect only where and while work is actually in progress,’ and generally begins 1,500 feet before the physical work activity and within 500 feet beyond the work area.” Appellant's Br. p. 9 (emphasis added) (quoting INDOT Operations Memorandum 06-01 (Aug. 3, 2011), pp. 2–3). Steele argues that speed limits in worksites are ultimately enforceable only “if the conditions outlined in the memorandum are followed.” Id.

[11] Steele's arguments again focus on “worksite” speed limits. However, Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11 provides for the enforcement of reduced speed limits established in the vicinity of worksites and—here—Steele was alleged to have violated a speed limit established in the vicinity of a worksite. Steele has not demonstrated how the cited memorandum has any bearing where, as here, the matter involves temporary speed limits established in advance of a worksite. Furthermore, to the extent Steele claims there was insufficient evidence of a traffic infraction because the workers were merely setting up for the day—as opposed to undertaking specific construction tasks—we note that Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(1) requires only that workers be “present in the immediate vicinity of the worksite.” We need not dissect the specific activities of the workers between set-up or active work and readily conclude the presence of workers satisfied this statutory requirement.

[12] In the end, there was evidence Steele was speeding in the 55-mile-per-hour zone that was established in the vicinity of a worksite when workers were present in the immediate vicinity of the worksite. This was sufficient evidence that Steele committed a traffic infraction under Indiana Code section 9-21-5-11(c)(1).

[13] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.