BROWN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Christopher Brown appeals his convictions for Level 3 felony armed robbery and Level 3 felony criminal confinement. Brown raises three issues on appeal which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Brown committed armed robbery and criminal confinement. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2023, Kenneth Young was residing at the Atlas Hotel in Indianapolis. Brown also resided there until he moved out in June. Around 3:00 a.m. on June 23, Brown returned to the hotel and knocked on several residents’ doors. Brown appeared “sneaky” while walking through the hallway and was “pretty insistent about keeping [his] left hand in his pocket all the time.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 65, 71.

[3] Soon, Young awoke to “a rapping at the door.” Id. at 32. He opened the door and saw Brown who was “very well covered[,]” wearing a jacket, a head covering, and a mask. Id. at 33; State's Ex. 3, Clip 5. Brown “brandished a small gun[,]” “pushed his way in” Young's room uninvited and shut the door behind him. Id. at 33-34. Initially and “out of disbelief,” Young thought the gun may have been a pistol-shaped lighter. Id. at 34, 46. Young asked Brown, “Is that a lighter,” and Brown responded, “Does it look like a f***ing lighter?” Id. at 34. For his own safety, Young accepted Brown's response and cooperated under the belief the object was a gun. See id. at 34, 46.

[4] Inside the room, Brown demanded to Young, “Give me my money.” Id. at 34. Thinking “[j]ust do what I need to do to survive[,]” Young produced his wallet. Id. at 36. Brown grabbed the wallet and took Young's cash—about twenty-one or twenty-two dollars.

[5] Then Brown took Young's phone and motioned over to Young's bed with the gun. Unsure about what Brown was going to do next, Young thought, “I'm getting the heck out of here” and fled to the door. Id. Brown pursued Young, the pair struggled, and Brown pushed the door closed. At that point, Young could not have gotten out of the room because there was “too much ․ resistance there[.]” Id. at 37. Shortly after, Brown started to leave. Young pleaded with Brown to return his phone, and Brown ultimately complied.

[6] After Brown left, Young locked the door and immediately called 9-1-1 to report he had been robbed at gunpoint. He told the responding officer he had been robbed with “a small gun” and identified Brown as the person who robbed him. State's Ex. 12 at 4:24.

[7] The State charged Brown with two counts of Level 3 felony armed robbery and one count of Level 3 felony criminal confinement, and alleged Brown was a habitual offender. The court held a bench trial in February 2025 and found Brown guilty on all counts. After vacating one count of armed robbery on double jeopardy concerns, the court sentenced Brown to an aggregate term of twenty-two years in the Indiana Department of Correction.¹ This appeal ensued. Additional facts are provided as necessary.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Brown's sole issue on appeal is whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove he committed armed robbery and criminal confinement. Our standard of review is well settled:

For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).

I. Armed Robbery

[9] To convict Brown of armed robbery, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown “knowingly or intentionally [took] property from another person ․ by putting any person in fear” “while armed with a deadly weapon[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1(a)(2) (2017). A “deadly weapon” includes a “loaded or unloaded firearm[.]” Ind. Code. § 35-31.5-2-86(a)(1) (2012).

[10] Brown first contends the State failed to prove he used a gun to commit the robbery. In support of his argument, Brown notes “the only evidence that [he] used a gun in this incident is the testimony of Young.” Appellant's Br. p. 7. He reiterates other witnesses’ statements that they did not see Brown with a gun and discusses Young's uncertainty about whether Brown had a pistol-shaped lighter or a gun. Brown also questions Young's credibility because of Young's discussion with the prosecutor about a sentence modification.² Brown's argument is a request to reassess Young's credibility and reweigh witness testimony, which we will not do. See Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1191.

[11] Here, Young testified that Brown “brandished a small gun” when he entered Young's room. Tr. Vol. II p. 33. Although Young initially thought the gun resembled a pistol-shaped lighter, Brown's statement—“Does it look like a f***ing lighter?”—made Young believe the object was a real gun. Id. at 34. Young also testified that Brown “motioned [him] over to [his] bed with the gun[.]” Id. at 36. Finally, after Young called 9-1-1 to report he had been robbed at gunpoint, he told the responding officer that Brown robbed him with “a small gun.” State's Ex. 12 at 4:24. It is well-established that the uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction on appeal. Scott v. State, 871 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. We will not reassess Young's credibility or reweigh his testimony. Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1191. His consistent testimony that Brown had a gun is sufficient to find that Brown committed the offense with a deadly weapon.

[12] Brown also challenges whether the State proved he “took any property” from Young. Appellant's Br. p. 9. He argues the approximately twenty-one dollars he took from Young was “payment of a debt,” not a robbery. Id. Brown claims the fact that he “did not take any other valuable property such as the bank card or the phone” should be given greater weight. Id. Brown provides no legal authority to support this argument and again requests that we reweigh the evidence which we will not do.

[13] The evidence shows that Brown entered Young's room, brandished a small gun, and took money from Young's wallet without Young's consent. From this, a reasonable fact finder could find the State proved the elements of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown's conviction for Level 5 felony armed robbery was proved by sufficient evidence.

II. Criminal Confinement

[14] To convict Brown of criminal confinement, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown “knowingly or intentionally confine[d] another person without the other person's consent” “while armed with a deadly weapon[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(3)(A) (2019). Having already established the evidence was sufficient to prove Brown committed robbery while armed with a gun, we need not revisit the deadly weapon element of this conviction.

[15] As with his other arguments, Brown again challenges the credibility of Young's testimony. He recounts Young's testimony that he attempted to get out of the room, but Brown pushed the door closed, preventing him from leaving. Brown then alleges that Young contradicted himself because the responding officer said, “I believe [Young] said [Brown] stayed outside the door.” State's Ex. 12 at 4:19. This argument is another request for this Court to assess Young's credibility and reweigh the evidence which we cannot do.

[16] Here, a reasonable fact finder could have found the State proved the elements of criminal confinement beyond a reasonable doubt. Young testified that he tried to escape while Brown was in his room. Brown pursued Young and pushed the door closed, preventing Young from leaving the room. When asked whether he felt like he could get out of the apartment, Young answered, “No. There was too much ․ resistance there, I couldn't have[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 37. This evidence was sufficient to prove Brown's conviction for Level 3 felony criminal confinement.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Brown was sentenced to eleven years for his armed robbery conviction, enhanced by twelve years for being a habitual offender, and eleven years for his criminal confinement conviction to be served concurrently with his sentence for armed robbery.

2.   During Young's cross-examination, Brown's counsel asked Young whether he negotiated with the prosecutor assigned to Brown's case. Young said, “I have discussed with prosecution about the logistics of a sentence modification, but it hasn't been contingent on the basis of -- of this case.” Tr. Vol. II p. 43. Young also testified that he had not been provided any benefit for his testimony in this case. See id. at 42-43.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.