P.W. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] P.W. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her two children, B.M. and S.M. (collectively, Children). Children were removed from the home based on allegations of physical abuse by their father, A.M. (Father), and at that time, Mother lacked custody of Children due to a prior allegation of abuse. Over the next three years, Mother was inconsistent with court-ordered services aimed at reunifying her with Children and only came into compliance a few months before the termination hearing. Mother now claims the trial court clearly erred by terminating her parental rights. We affirm.¹

Facts

[2] In February 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that B.M. (then 6 years old) and S.M. (then 5 years old) were children in need of services (CHINS). The CHINS petition alleged that Children were observed with visible bruising which Father admitted he caused while physically disciplining them. Additionally, B.M., who had been diagnosed with autism, had missed more than 20 days of school. The petition also alleged that Mother was unable or unwilling to provide Children with safe housing, adequate education, and appropriate supervision because pursuant to a prior CHINS proceeding, Children had been removed from her care and placed in Father's custody. As a result of the present CHINS petition, Children were removed from Father's home and placed in foster care after Mother could not be located.

[3] Children were adjudicated as CHINS in March 2022. Mother was ordered to complete various services, including a diagnostic assessment and its recommendations, a psychological evaluation, home-based services, and supervised visitation with Children. By this time, Mother had moved to Michigan, where she continued to reside throughout these proceedings.

[4] Over the next two and half years, Mother's engagement in the required services was inconsistent. Though her residence in Michigan made it difficult for DCS to find providers for services, DCS accommodated her in numerous ways. DCS gave Mother gas cards to drive to appointments and at times paid her phone bill so they could remain in contact. DCS also made referrals for virtual services and reached out to numerous service providers near the Indiana-Michigan border, making a total of 33 referrals. Still, Mother did not consistently engage.

[5] Mother participated in visitation with Children but never progressed to unsupervised visitation. Though she submitted to a diagnostic assessment, she failed to complete the services it recommended: she attended only about three sessions of home-based services, never obtained medication management, and attended just half of her individual therapy sessions, even though they were held virtually.

[6] Meanwhile, Children moved between multiple foster homes. After their first placement, Children had to be placed separately due to inappropriate sexual behaviors between them. B.M. and S.M. each received therapy for their respective autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, as well as counseling for their anxiety and trauma stemming from Father's physical abuse. After a few moves, each child settled in pre-adoptive foster homes.

[7] DCS petitioned to terminate Mother and Father's parental rights in June 2024, and the trial court conducted fact-finding hearings on the petition in December 2024 and January 2025. At the hearings, the DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) testified as to Mother's pattern of inconsistent engagement, stating that “there [had not] been any real compliance until the last three months.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 153. The FCM also explained that though Mother had stable housing in Michigan for most of the case, that changed four months before the hearing when Mother lost her job and moved in with her mother, also in Michigan. There, Mother works for a family business and receives an undefined cash allowance of “what [her mother] can afford to give her.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 5.

[8] The court appointed special advocate (CASA) testified that Children need permanency, as they have “significant behaviors” and need stability. Tr. Vol. II, p. 194. She explained her “grave concerns” that the conditions that prompted Children's removal would not be remedied because “it's been three years and any compliance that we're seeing is more new and more recent.” Id. at 195. The trial court terminated Mother's parental rights, and Mother appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] A parent's right to establish a home and raise their children is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. However, these parental rights “must be subordinated to the child's interests” when determining whether termination is warranted. Id. Termination is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” Id.

[10] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment, giving “due regard” to the trial court's “unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. We set aside the judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. To make this determination, we look to “whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

[11] Here, the trial court entered fourteen pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law, but on appeal, Mother fails to specifically challenge any of them. Instead, she makes only a general assertion that termination was clearly erroneous and emphasizes that she was in compliance by the time of the termination hearing. Because Mother does not challenge the trial court's extensive factual findings, she has waived any argument that they are clearly erroneous. See In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding parent's failure to specifically challenge findings and conclusions resulted in waiver of claim that they were clearly erroneous). We accept these unchallenged findings as true, Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), and look to whether they support the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights.

[12] To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, three elements: (1) that termination is in a child's best interest; (2) that there is a satisfactory plan for the child's care; and (3) that one or more of the circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) exists. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). Here, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, that the following subsection (d) circumstances existed:

• That Children had been removed for fifteen of the most recent 22 months and that despite DCS's reasonable efforts, Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in Children's removal.

• That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied.

• That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Children.

See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4) (2024).

[13] Mother does not challenge the trial court's conclusions as to the first two elements—that termination was in Children's best interests and that there was a satisfactory plan for their care. Her argument focuses solely on the subsection (d) circumstances.

I. DCS Proved Conditions Resulting in Removal Would Not Be Remedied

[14] Because Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) requires only the existence of “one (1) or more” of the listed circumstances, proof of just one is sufficient. See In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (finding similar language in prior version of statute—“one (1) of the following is true”—required proof of only one listed circumstance). We find dispositive the conclusion that there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in removal would not be remedied.

[15] In reviewing this conclusion, we first ascertain the conditions that led to Children's removal and then “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). Here, the conditions leading to Children's removal were Father's physical abuse and Mother's inability to provide care and supervision for Children. A prior CHINS proceeding involving Mother had placed Children in Father's care when he physically abused them, and Mother could not be located at the time of Children's removal. As a result of Children's removal, Mother was ordered, among other things, to complete a diagnostic assessment and its recommended services, a psychological evaluation, home-based services, and supervised visitation.

[16] The trial court found that after nearly three years, Mother failed to complete these services, which were in place to prepare her to care for Children and their unique needs. It found that “Mother did not benefit from these services” and that despite DCS's attempts, “there remains only blame and a lack of responsibility.” App. Vol. II, pp. 113, 116. The court then concluded there was a reasonably probability these conditions will not be remedied.

[17] In challenging this conclusion, Mother emphasizes her recent compliance with services. Although she is correct that a trial court “must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding” and consider “evidence of changed conditions,” the court must also look to a parent's “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (internal quotations omitted and brackets in original). Here, the trial court's unchallenged findings establish Mother's pattern of “only com[ing] into compliance prior to hearings.” App. Vol. II, p. 116. The trial court was within its discretion to assign greater weight to Mother's years of non-compliance rather than her efforts in recent months. See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (noting that court has “discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination”).

[18] Mother also broadly references the barriers to services she faced while living in Michigan, but she provides no developed argument or citation to authority on this point. Even so, the trial court's findings demonstrate that logistical barriers were not the primary issue. The court found that even “when services could be provided[,] Mother did not participate.” App. Vol. II, p. 116. She attended “at best fifty percent of her virtual appointments” for individual therapy and failed to engage with home-based services, which ended “due to the inconsistency and missed appointments.” Id. at 113. Additionally, DCS provided 33 referrals for services, including providers around the Indiana-Michigan border, but Mother “did not locate any providers in Michigan and ask for the Department to assist her in obtaining these services.” Id. Mother bore the responsibility for completing these court-ordered services, regardless of her chosen residence.

[19] Finally, Mother contends that she was not required to have “independent housing,” citing Tipton v. Marion Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 629 N.E.2d 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Appellant's Br., p. 19. But the trial court never made a finding that independent housing was required. Instead, the court found more broadly that just four months before the termination hearing, Mother lost her job, moved in with her mother due to financial circumstances, and now worked for a cash allowance. The court also found that Mother failed to offer “a plan for [Children's] care given the inability of the children to be placed together.” App. Vol. II, p. 119. These findings center not on whether her housing was independent, but on Mother's recent financial instability and her inability to provide adequate plans for Children's care. Moreover, Mother's citation to Tipton is unavailing. In that case, a parent's frequent moves served as the only evidence supporting termination, whereas here Mother's housing situation was noted along with other issues of noncompliance with services and lack of a plan for Children's unique needs.

[20] Given the foregoing, we conclude that the unchallenged findings support the trial court's determination that there was a reasonable probability the conditions prompting Children's removal were unlikely to be remedied.

Conclusion

[21] Mother fails to show that the trial court's decision to terminate her parental rights was clearly erroneous. The court's unchallenged findings of fact—detailing Mother's non-compliance with services, her recent change in financial circumstances, and her lack of plan to meet Children's needs—support the trial court's determination that DCS met its burden in terminating Mother's parental rights.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's parental rights to Children were also terminated, but he does not participate in this appeal.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.