Joshua Andrew Burton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Joshua Burton was charged with Level 1 felony attempted murder and use of a firearm enhancement. His first jury trial resulted in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict. Burton was found guilty as charged at the conclusion of his second jury trial. Burton raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court committed structural error when it denied Burton's request for a transcript of the mistrial; and (2) whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it admitted evidence of Burton's statements to police. Finding neither error occurred, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Around 8:30 p.m. on December 27, 2023, Burton drove into a parking lot and parked next to Edinburgh Police Department Officer Shawn Pendleton's patrol vehicle. Burton exited his car and knocked on Officer Pendleton's window. Officer Pendleton rolled down his window to speak with Burton. Burton immediately asked, “[A]re you proud to be a traitor to your country?” Tr. Vol. II p. 170.

[3] Officer Pendleton exited his vehicle and activated his body camera. Burton declared “the Edinburgh Police Department is a corporation that lives in D.C., and that everything that [the police] do is illegal.” Id. at 171. Burton refused to identify himself and appeared “hostile” and “aggressive” while holding his hands in the pocket of his hooded sweatshirt. Id. at 172-73. Officer Pendleton ordered Burton to show his hands. Burton initially refused until Officer Pendleton brandished and turned on his taser. Burton also refused multiple orders to disengage, prompting Officer Pendleton to radio for backup.

[4] Officer Pendleton then walked over to Burton's vehicle to run the license plate number. At this point, Burton returned to his car and sped away. A few moments later, Officer Clayton Embry drove into the parking lot. Officer Pendleton apprised Officer Embry of the situation and asked him to follow Burton while Officer Pendleton awaited a return on the plate.

[5] Burton eventually pulled into the driveway of his home. Officer Embry pursued and parked just behind Burton's vehicle. Burton then stepped out from behind the driver side of his car armed with an AR-15 rifle. Officer Embry exited his vehicle and ran behind it for cover. At the same time, Burton pointed the rifle in Officer Embry's direction, “shouldered” the rifle, and “lung[ed] forward with the [rifle] in anticipation of recoil.” Id. at 200, 209. When the rifle did not fire, Burton tilted it to examine the chamber and safety switch. Officer Embry drew his weapon and ordered Burton to drop his rifle and get on the ground. Burton complied and then began calling Officer Embry a “traitor” and said the police worked for “King Charles[.]” Ex. Media Vol. State's Ex. 3, 00:27-00:38.¹

[6] Officer Pendleton arrived a few moments later and handcuffed Burton. Officer Embry seized the rifle and observed the safety was on and a cartridge was in the chamber. As Officer Embry drove Burton to a police station, Burton learned Officer Embry was in the military. Burton asked if Officer Embry “enjoyed invading other countries and killing other people[,]” and stated Officer Embry did the same as a police officer in Edinburgh. Tr. Vol. II pp. 198-99. At the station, Officer Embry read Burton his Miranda rights and asked if Burton wanted to speak with him; Burton declined.

[7] On January 2, 2024, an undercover police officer entered the jail posing as an inmate to elicit a confession. Burton told the officer “[the news] say I pulled a gun on a cop.” Ex. Media Vol. State's Ex. 4, 00:27-00:33.² The undercover officer asked, “Did the mother****er deserve it?” Id. at 00:34-00:36. Burton responded “Yeah, I think so,” but later stated “it might have been overboard” and “everyone has been really nice.” Id. at 00:36-00:51.

[8] Edinburgh law enforcement selected Franklin Police Department Detectives Jeffrey Dawe and Adam Joseph to “re-interview” Burton with a “softer” approach. Tr. Vol. II pp. 248-49. On January 3, Detectives Dawe and Joseph conducted an interview with Burton and introduced themselves as detectives from Franklin. As part of his interview strategy, Detective Dawe falsely represented that he was in a new “kind of role” as an “independent” “outreach [ ] liaison” for incarcerated individuals intending to represent themselves. Ex. Media Vol. State's Ex. 6, 00:20-1:00.³ Detective Dawe continued this investigative tactic and indicated his job was to get resources to Burton, including a video of the incident. Detective Joseph never claimed to be a liaison. Neither revealed to Burton that their real purpose was to conduct another interview.

[9] Detective Dawe read Burton his Miranda rights and asked if Burton understood the advisement. Burton responded, “Yeah. Or no, I comprehend it. I don't understand it.” Id. at 3:30-3:40. Detective Dawe stated it was a “procedural thing that I have to do before I discuss anything ․” and Burton replied, “I'm not interested in making a statement or anything like that.” Id. at 3:22-3:27. Detective Joseph asked Burton if there was anything he wanted to talk about; Burton stated there was nothing. When Burton asked if he could see the information Detective Dawe had, the detective replied, “I'm sure down the road.” Id. at 7:44-7:47. The detectives continued to ask Burton if there was anything he wanted to discuss, with Burton continuing to decline and stating “Okay. Well, I don't want to waive my rights, so I guess we can't talk.” Id. at 8:00-8:06.

[10] At one point, Detective Joseph clarified that Burton did not have to sign the acknowledgment of rights and could instead verbally acknowledge his understanding and later invoke his rights. Burton discussed his interpretation of the words “understand” and “comprehend” in the “day-to-day world and in the legal system.” Id. at 8:55-9:20. The detectives clarified they were asking Burton if he comprehended his rights. Burton then asked, “So what do you want to ask me?” Id. at 10:50-11:00. The parties then discussed Burton's personal beliefs in further detail and Burton's desire to apologize to Officer Embry for some “mean things” he said. Id. at 14:18-14:21.

[11] The conversation turned to the incident on December 27, 2023. Detective Dawe opined that the dash camera video appeared to show Burton's rifle malfunctioning and not firing. Burton replied, “Thankfully[,]” and noted the rifle was functioning but the safety switch was on. Id. at 34:00-34:15. Burton revealed that he turned the rifle to examine it because he “was curious” why it did not fire. Id. at 46:50-47:02.

[12] On January 4, 2024, the State charged Burton with attempted murder. At his initial hearing, Burton informed the trial court he intended to represent himself. The trial court found Burton knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, but later appointed standby counsel to aid Burton should he “have a question during the trial, [or if] other things [ ] come up.” Tr. Vol. II p. 32.⁴ On May 20, Burton represented himself at a jury trial with standby counsel present. A mistrial was declared the following day because the jury was unable to reach a verdict.

[13] A pretrial conference for the second trial was held on June 5 in anticipation of the second trial scheduled for June 24. During the conference, Burton requested a transcript of the first trial. The following exchange occurred:

The Court: Well there's no way that's going to be prepared in time.

Mr. Burton: Oh okay.

The Court: Not in time, and not being aware of why you would want it, I just, we just don't prepare transcripts just to do it. We do it when someone requests it, when someone pays for it. But if they're asking the Court to pay for it, there has to be a substantial reason to do it.

Mr. Burton: It would help the defense significantly in preparing there, and in proving their defense for the next trial.

The Court: Well it can't be ready in that period of time.

Mr. Burton: Okay.

The Court: [The Court reporter has] other appeals that she's working on. So I'm just, at this point, I have to deny that based on the fact it can't be ready in time.

Mr. Burton: Okay.

The Court: All right?

Mr. Burton: Yeah.

The Court: So are you going to be prepared to go on June 24th?

Mr. Burton: Yes.

Id. at 50. Burton neither sought alternative devices to a transcript nor requested a continuance.

[14] During the second jury trial, the State introduced a recording and transcript of his statements to Detectives Dawe and Joseph. Burton did not object, and the evidence was admitted. The jury found Burton guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced Burton to an aggregate forty-five years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[15] Burton alleges the trial court committed both structural error and fundamental error. Ordinarily, a party must object to a trial court's ruling and state the reasons for the objection to preserve a claim for review. Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018) (citing Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013)). “A party's failure to object to an alleged error at trial results in waiver, also known as ‘procedural default’ or ‘forfeiture.’ ” Id. (quoting Bunch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1285, 1287 (Ind. 2002)). “When the failure to object accompanies the party's affirmative requests of the court, ‘it becomes a question of invited error[,]’ ” which forbids a party from taking advantage of an error that he commits or invites. Id. (quoting Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014)).

[16] However, a waived claim is reviewable if it results in fundamental error. Id. “An error is fundamental if it made a fair trial impossible or amounted to a clear violation of basic due-process principles.” Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2021). Fundamental error is “ ‘extremely narrow’ and encompasses only errors so blatant that the trial judge should have acted independently to correct the situation[,]” without prompting by defense counsel. Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652 (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002)). “[F]undamental error in the evidentiary decisions of our trial courts is especially rare.” Merritt v. State, 99 N.E.3d 706, 709-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. A constitutional violation does not automatically create fundamental error. Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind. 1987). The appellant bears the burden of proving that a fundamental error occurred. Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ind. 1994).

[17] Structural error is “a limited class of fundamental constitutional error[ ]” that requires automatic reversal without the need to show prejudice. Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 653 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Structural errors “affect ‘the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.’ ” Id. (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991)). These errors may result “when it threatens an interest other than protecting the defendant against wrongful conviction” or if “the precise effect of the violation cannot be ascertained.” Id. (emphasis in original). Structural errors are not exempt from the invited-error doctrine. Id at 655.

II. Transcript Request

[18] Burton argues the court's denial of his request for a transcript was reversible error for two reasons: (1) it violated his right to equal protection as an indigent defendant; and (2) it eroded the integrity of the judicial process and undermined the fairness of his second trial, resulting in presumed prejudice and structural error. The State contends no error occurred because the trial court denied Burton's request for a transcript due to timing issues, not because of his financial status or his need for the transcript.

[19] “Principles of fundamental fairness entitle an indigent defendant to an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly within the adversary system.” Scott v. State, 593 N.E.2d 198, 199 (Ind. 1992) (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 (1985)). We review a trial court's decision on a defendant's request for public funds to aid in his defense for an abuse of discretion. Schuck v. State, 53 N.E.3d 571, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). It is well established that “the State must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners[,]” particularly including a transcript if needed for an effective defense or appeal. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 (1956)). Appellate courts review two factors in determining whether a transcript is needed: “(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and (2) the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.” Id. at 228.

[20] The State contends, however, that Britt is inapplicable because the trial court did not make an indigency finding before Burton requested the transcript. While we agree that Britt is inapplicable, we do so for other reasons. First, neither Britt nor Griffin pointedly address whether formal indigency findings must be made before a defendant may request aid from public funds; rather, both cases address issues with defendants that are generally referred to as indigent. Seemingly, whether that finding must be made first was not at issue, and we need not address that here to reach our result. Second, Britt focuses on whether the grant of a transcript is appropriate based on a defendant's need, not indigency. In any event, the court's denial of Burton's request here was based on timing, not on need or indigency.

[21] When Burton requested a transcript of the mistrial during the June 5 pretrial conference, the trial court denied the motion because the transcript could not be prepared in time for the trial on June 24. We have previously held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it denied a transcript request based on timing. See Hurt v. State, 367 N.E.2d 1109, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (“The advisable procedure for [the defendant] to have followed would have been to move for a copy of the prior transcript before the commencement of the retrial and to move for a continuance until the transcript or a substantial equivalent could be prepared.”); see also Davidson v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1077, 1085 (Ind. 1990) (affirming the denial of a motion for transcripts of suppression hearings based on the immediacy of the trial date and the necessity of a lengthy continuance to prepare the transcripts). While Burton timely requested a copy of the transcript prior to the second trial, he did not follow our guidance in Hurt to request a continuance when the trial court cited timing to fulfill the request as reason for its denial. The trial court did not err in denying Burton's request for a transcript when it could not be completed in time for the second trial.

[22] Even if the trial court did err in denying Burton's request, such error was not structural. Burton fails to overcome the high hurdle of structural error: he has not demonstrated that the court's denial of his transcript request undermined the judicial process itself or called into question public confidence in the courts. Indeed, structural error does not create fundamental unfairness in every case. See Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 653. Rather, if any error occurred, it was invited by Burton.

[23] Although we acknowledge that trial courts should be mindful of self-represented litigants’ challenges, pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as all other litigants. Kelley v. State, 166 N.E.3d 936, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The decision to request a continuance for trial preparation is a matter of trial strategy. Black v. State, 7 N.E.3d 333, 338 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Here, Burton chose to proceed pro se and, as such, he was responsible for determining how to proceed when faced with a timing constraint. He had clear options including moving for a continuance, exploring alternatives, or proceeding without a transcript. And he was afforded the opportunity to exercise any of those options when the trial court asked Burton if he would be prepared for trial on June 24 after it denied his request for a transcript. Burton responded affirmatively and did not move to continue the trial until after the transcript could be completed. Burton, therefore, invited any error that resulted from the trial court's denial of Burton's request for a transcript of the mistrial.

III. Burton's Statements

[24] Burton contends the trial court erred when it admitted statements he made to Detectives Dawe and Joseph for two reasons: (1) his waiver was involuntary due to Detective Dawe's role deception; and (2) the detectives did not scrupulously honor his clear and unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent. Ordinarily, we review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Risinger v. State, 137 N.E.3d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. However, our review here is limited to fundamental error because Burton failed to object to the admission of his statements at trial. See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011).

A. Police Deception

[25] Burton first argues that his waiver was involuntarily made because Detective Dawe deceived Burton about his role as an independent liaison. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides defendants the right against self-incrimination. “To protect that right, police officers must advise citizens in custody that they have the right to remain silent prior to questioning.” Kelly v. State, 122 N.E.3d 803, 806 (Ind. 2019) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966)). Statements made by a defendant during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless they were preceded by a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights. Risinger, 137 N.E.3d at 296.

[26] We look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if a waiver is made voluntarily and is not the product of “violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant's free will.” Ringo v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ind. 2000) (citation omitted). Other factors to consider are whether the defendant was fully advised of his Miranda rights, whether the defendant understood them, whether the defendant was a mature individual of normal intelligence, and whether the defendant was interviewed for an inordinate amount of time. Kahlenbeck, 719 N.E.2d 1213, 1217-18 (Ind. 1999).

[27] Citing to Edwards v. State, 412 N.E.2d 223, 227 (Ind. 1980), Burton claims law enforcement cannot use deception in obtaining a waiver of rights. However, our Supreme Court has consistently held that police deception does not automatically vitiate a Miranda waiver or subsequent confession. Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Ind. 1999); Kahlenbeck, 719 N.E.2d at 1217; Miller v. State, 770 N.E.2d 763, 767 n.5 (Ind. 2002); Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2004). Instead, police deception is one factor weighing against the State when determining the totality of the circumstances. Clark, 808 N.E.2d at 1191.

[28] In Edwards, the defendant was brought into an interview room for questioning. Before the interview began, a woman stood outside the door and “said in a voice loud enough for [Edwards] to hear: ‘Yes, that's the man.’ ” 412 N.E.2d at 224. Edwards proceeded to waive his rights and confess. The Edwards Court was concerned about the deceptive eyewitness lineup evidence overcoming Edwards’ free will and calculus about whether to waive his rights because it is an effective tactic of tricking the defendant into thinking there is “now no doubt about the guilt of the [defendant].” Id. at 392 (internal quotations omitted). Ultimately, our Supreme Court held that law enforcement's evidence-based deception about eyewitness evidence rendered Edwards’ waiver and confession involuntary. Id. at 393.

[29] Burton argues that Detective Dawe's deception about his role was more “egregious” than the evidence-based deception in Edwards because it was intended to “trick” Burton into thinking he did not need to assert his Miranda rights. Appellant's Br. p. 24. We are unconvinced.

[30] While Detective Dawe claimed he was an independent liaison, he initially introduced himself and Detective Joseph as detectives with the Franklin Police Department. Thus, Burton was fully aware at the outset of the interview that he was speaking with two law enforcement officers in a custodial setting. Detective Dawe stated he could get resources to Burton but never represented himself as Burton's sole means of obtaining discoverable information. When Burton asked if he could see the information in Detective Dawe's file, the detective responded, “I'm sure down the road.” Ex. Media Vol. State's Ex. 6 at 7:44-7:47. The record indicates Burton was then twenty-eight years old and an individual of normal maturity and intelligence. Throughout the interview, Burton remained calm and selectively engaged in conversational topics with the detectives. Although Burton initially stated he did not “understand” his rights, he quickly clarified that he had a different legal interpretation of the word “understand” and did “comprehend” his rights. Id. at 3:30-3:40. Detective Dawe's misrepresentation about serving as an independent liaison did not demonstrate that law enforcement had considerable evidence of his guilt like the defendant in Edwards.

B. Invocation of Right

[31] Burton also contends law enforcement failed to scrupulously honor his invocation of his right to remain silent. As the Indiana Supreme Court has held:

An assertion of the Miranda right to remain silent must be clear and unequivocal. In determining whether a defendant has asserted this right, the statements are considered as a whole. Mere expressions of reluctance to talk do not invoke the right to remain silent. This Court has held several times that raising doubts or expressing concern about continuing followed by continued dialogue do not unambiguously assert the right to remain silent.

Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 682 (Ind. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Determining whether a defendant invokes his right to remain silent is an “intensely fact-sensitive” inquiry. Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 514 (Ind. 1997). Law enforcement must scrupulously honor a defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent. Risinger, 137 N.E.3d at 298.

[32] In support of his argument, Burton points to our opinion in Risinger. There, Risinger stated he was “done talking” because he felt like he was “getting pestered[.]” Risinger, 137 N.E.3d at 299. We reversed and held that law enforcement failed to scrupulously honor Risinger's invocation of his rights. Burton argues his statements—“I'm not interested in making a statement” and “I don't want to waive my rights”—are similarly unambiguous and the detectives failed to scrupulously honor his invocation of his right to remain silent. However, unlike Risinger, Burton continued to engage in conversation with Detectives Dawe and Joseph across a variety of topics. In addition, Burton asked the detectives what they wanted to ask him, inviting a continued dialogue and demonstrating he did not desire to remain silent. Burton, therefore, did not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent where he first expressed doubt about making a statement but then continued to engage in further dialogue. See Clark, 808 N.E.2d at 1190; Wilkes, 917 N.E.2d at 682-83; Haviland, 677 N.E.2d at 514.

C. Fundamental Error

[33] Finally, Burton argues that because Detective Dawe utilized role deception to obtain his Miranda waiver and ignored his invocation of his right to remain silent, the court committed fundamental error by admitting the statements he made to the detectives. As stated above, the extremely narrow fundamental error exception applies only when an alleged error “either ‘make a fair trial impossible’ or constitute ‘clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.’ ” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Clark, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)). “[O]ur task in this case is to look at the alleged misconduct in the context of all that happened and all relevant information given to the jury—including evidence admitted at trial, closing argument, and jury instructions—to determine whether the misconduct had such an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury's decision that a fair trial was impossible.” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (emphasis in original), abrogated on other grounds by Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068 (Ind. 2025).

[34] While Detective Dawe may have misled Burton about his role as an independent liaison, he did not fabricate or misrepresent any statements Burton made during the interrogation. Rather, Burton's confession to Detective Dawe was recorded and provided to the trier of fact verbatim. The type of “fabrication of evidence” or “willful malfeasance” on the part of the detectives that would make a fair trial impossible is absent here. Cf. Hayworth v. State, 904 N.E.2d 684, 699 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (a detective's misleading statements in an affidavit and the lack of corroboration of a criminal informant's statements made a fair trial for the defendant impossible). The trial court, therefore, did not commit fundamental error by admitting Burton's statement. Likewise, because Burton continued to engage in dialogue with law enforcement after he expressed doubt about making a statement, there was no constitutional violation of his right to remain silent. Thus, the statements were lawfully obtained, and the trial court's admission thereof did not constitute fundamental error.

[35] Burton also argues Detective Dawe's deception targeted Burton's exercise of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Even assuming Burton is correct that his constitutional rights were violated, the mere presence of a constitutional violation does not, in and of itself, amount to fundamental error. See e.g., Wilson, 514 N.E.2d at 284; see also Coleman v. State, 750 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ind. 2001) (holding an erroneous admission of a defendant's confession is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when it is cumulative of other evidence).

[36] However, we are not persuaded by Burton's proposition that Detective Dawe's role deception created a distinct constitutional violation requiring different Miranda analysis. Burton relies primarily on two cases to make his argument: Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-36 (1975), which established the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968), which notes it is “intolerable” for a defendant to have to surrender one constitutional right to effectuate another. Appellant's Br. p. 29. Yet, Faretta does not address police conduct during custodial interrogations, and Simmons addresses whether a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing—not his statements made during an interrogation—could be used against him at trial.

[37] Burton provides little authority for his proposition that Detective Dawe's misrepresentation somehow “connect[ed] the fairness of the future proceedings to the decision to talk[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 30. Detective Dawe did not tell Burton that “he must waive his rights to assure access to legal resources and discovery” as a pro se litigant. Id. He did not represent himself as Burton's only means of obtaining information about the case and told Burton that he would be able to see what was contained in Detective Dawe's file “down the road.” Ex. Media Vol. State's Ex. 6 at 7:44-7:47. Detective Dawe's misrepresentation was not so coercive as to overwrite Burton's will or undermine the fairness of the criminal justice system and Burton's future trial. Cf. Bond v. State, 9 N.E.3d 134, 140 (Ind. 2014) (holding that officer telling defendant he would not have a fair and impartial jury due to his race undermined the future fairness of the trial and was unduly coercive, rendering Bond's subsequent waiver and confession involuntary).

[38] We are, thus, unconvinced that fundamental error occurred here. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.

[39] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   State's Exhibit 3 is the footage from Officer Embry's body-worn camera.

2.   State's Exhibit 4 is an audio recording of Burton's conversation with the undercover police officer.

3.   State's Exhibit 6 is a video recording of Detectives Dawe and Joseph's interview with Burton.

4.   The trial court did not make a finding that Burton was indigent when it appointed standby counsel. However, the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) indicates “indigent counsel” was appointed at this time. App. Vol. II p. 6.

Scheele, Judge.

Judges May and Weissmann concur. May, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.