Irfan Syed, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Irfan Syed was convicted, for acts committed against his wife, I.S., including two counts of Level 5 felony strangulation, Level 5 felony domestic battery with bodily injury to a pregnant woman, Level 6 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child less than sixteen years old, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Syed to an aggregate three-year sentence, all of which was suspended to probation. On appeal, Syed contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence, some of his convictions violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy, and the sentence entered in relation to the Level 6 felony domestic battery count exceeded the statutory limit. For its part, the State concedes that the conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy and that the sentence entered for the challenged Level 6 felony count exceeded the statutory limit. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Syed and I.S. were married, pursuant to an arranged marriage, on July 24, 2019, after which I.S. moved to the United States to live with Syed. I.S. became pregnant in August or September of 2019, and later gave birth to the couple's first child, a daughter. By May of 2021, Syed and I.S. had moved to a home on Tuscany Lane in Indianapolis.

[3] On May 8, 2021, I.S. and Syed were packing clothes in preparation to visit her family in New Jersey when I.S. made a “mistake” while packing. Tr. Vol. II p. 127. Syed became “enraged” and slapped her on the back “really hard.” Tr. Vol. II p. 127. I.S. began crying and “corrected [her] mistake.” Tr. Vol. II p. 127. “[A]fter a while when [Syed's] hands were also burning from how hard he [had] hit [I.S., Syed] said, ‘sorry, I apologize. I shouldn't have hit you so hard. I could have told you nicely[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 127. I.S. and Syed finished packing their bags and went to New Jersey.

[4] On April 30, 2022, the second-to-last night of Ramadan, I.S., who was pregnant with the couple's second child, did not go to evening prayers, instead choosing to stay home and care for their daughter and prepare for a festival the next day. When Syed returned home, he asked I.S., “why didn't you come to the prayer? All your friends came, and you did not come.” Tr. Vol. II p. 128. I.S. attempted to defuse the situation by asking Syed, “wouldn't there be any prayer tomorrow?” Tr. Vol. II p. 128. Syed responded that his sisters were “aware of the Islamic rules and regulations[,]” to which I.S. responded, “[o]h, your sisters are really nice.” Tr. Vol. II p. 129. Syed accused I.S. of “mocking his sisters.” Tr. Vol. II p. 129. He then grabbed I.S. by the neck with both hands and dragged her over to a wall, which he pushed her against while strangling her. Syed “placed his hands on [I.S.’s] neck really tight[,]” rendering her unable to breathe. Tr. Vol. II p. 131. I.S. then began slapping her. I.S.’s and Syed's daughter was present when Syed strangled and slapped I.S.

[5] On May 2, 2022, while I.S. was still pregnant, Syed became angry when he believed that I.S. had not cooked his breakfast quickly enough. Syed threw four or five plates on the floor, breaking them. He then picked up a shard of one of the plates and threatened to stab I.S., telling her, “why don't you listen to me? Uhm, why don't you go to India, just go somewhere. Just don't be here. I don't want you here and I want to kill you and after killing you, I will kill our daughter and then I will kill myself too.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 132–33. I.S. eventually convinced Syed to calm down.

[6] On May 15, 2022, while I.S. was still pregnant, Syed accused I.S. of purposefully failing to dry his laundry. When I.S. claimed that she had merely forgotten, Syed said “you are arguing with me” and “don't argue with me. Shut up bi[***.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 135. Syed then closed his fist and struck I.S. “on the head.” Tr. Vol. II p. 135. He brought his closed fist down on the top of her head “[l]ike a hammer.” Tr. Vol. II p. 136. After hitting her, Syed put both of his hands around I.S.’s neck and strangled her, making it difficult for I.S. to breathe.

[7] On May 22, 2022, Syed drove I.S. and their daughter to a Chicago-area Airport so that I.S. and their daughter could visit relatives in New Jersey. While driving, Syed accused I.S. of taking his daughter away from him, telling her that he would never forgive her. When I.S. stated that it was Syed who wanted I.S. and their daughter to leave, Syed told her to “shut up” and started driving erratically, threatening to wreck the vehicle. Tr. Vol. II p. 138. Syed dropped I.S. and their daughter off at the airport and they flew to New Jersey without further incident.

[8] Upon arriving in New Jersey, I.S. informed her family of Syed's actions. Two days later, Syed spoke to I.S.’s uncle on the telephone and, at some point during the conversation, told I.S.’s uncle that “the people close to his heart is [sic] his family members. So, if anybody talks about them, I'm going to see them. I'm going to talk to them, I'm going to punish them or abuse them[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 149. Syed further indicated that he “can't hear anything negative about” his family but expressed that he had asked God for “forgiveness for raising a hand on” I.S. Tr. Vol. II pp. 153–54.

[9] Syed filed for divorce on August 18, 2022, requesting sole custody of the couple's daughter. That same day, I.S. reported Syed's actions to police in New Jersey. A few weeks later, I.S. filed a report with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department and Detective Jason Ross was assigned to the case. In speaking with Detective Ross, I.S. detailed Syed's actions and provided him with a recording of the telephone call between Syed and her uncle.¹

[10] On March 17, 2023, the State charged Syed with two counts of Level 5 felony strangulation, Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman, three counts of Level 6 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony domestic battery, Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, and two counts of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. At trial, the recording of the telephone call between Syed and I.S.’s uncle was admitted over Syed's objection. The trial court admonished the jury that the recording was being admitted for context and that I.S.’s uncle's statements were not being admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. Later, the jury submitted a number of questions, one of which was directed to Detective Ross and read “[d]id the translation provided by Lt. Khan line up with the instances/accounts that [I.S.] filed with your department?” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 187. After discussing the question with the parties, the trial court engaged Detective Ross in the following exchange:

[The Court]: What was transcribed, is that what prompted you to continue with the case?

[Det. Ross]: She had basically described what the contents of what the recording was; uh, I needed to confirm that before we could go forward.

[The Court]: So, was the translation provided by Lieutenant Khan without saying what it is, but did it line up with the incidents or accounts that [I.S.] stated?

[Det. Ross]: I mean, I hate to call that but the summary I was provided by Lieutenant Khan was I guess interpretation than a direct word for word translation. I received some notes after that; I do not believe there were specific dates attached to the recording itself, if that's what you are asking?

[The Court]: Okay, so what I am asking is was the translation provided by Lieutenant Khan; was that in line with [I.S.] translated on the stand?

[Det. Ross]: Yes.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 213–14.

[11] The jury found Syed guilty of all but two of the intimidation charges. At sentencing, the trial court vacated one of the Class A misdemeanor battery charges due to double jeopardy concerns. The trial court sentenced Syed to an aggregate three-year sentence, all of which was suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[12] The admission of evidence is a matter that we generally “leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259–60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Id. at 260. “We will not reweigh the evidence and will resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court's ruling.” Schnitzmeyer v. State, 168 N.E.3d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Furthermore, “we will not reverse the decision to admit or exclude evidence if that decision is sustainable on any ground.” Carpenter v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1075, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

A. Exhibit 1

[13] Syed contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 1, the recording of the telephone call between him and I.S.’s uncle, claiming that the evidence was irrelevant or, alternatively, unfairly prejudicial. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Ind. Evidence Rule 402. A trial court, however, “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of” unfair prejudice. Evid. R. 403.

The risk of unfair prejudice relates to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest making a decision on an improper basis. Because all relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial in a criminal prosecution, the weighing test under Evidence Rule 403 boils down to a balance of probative value against the likely unfair prejudicial impact the evidence may have on the jury. Furthermore, we afford our trial courts wide latitude in weighing probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice.

Cobb v. State, 222 N.E.3d 373, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal quotations, brackets, and ellipses omitted), trans. denied. “A trial court's evidentiary rulings are presumptively correct, and the defendant bears the burden on appeal of persuading us that the court erred in weighing prejudice and probative value under Evid. R. 403.” Rivera v. State, 132 N.E.3d 5, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied.

1. Whether Exhibit 1 was Relevant

[14] “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Evid. R. 401. “Evidence of motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime.” Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal brackets and quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[15] In claiming that Exhibit 1 was not relevant, Syed asserts that the State failed to tie it to one of the charged crimes. For its part, the State argues that it sufficiently tied Exhibit 1 to Counts III and IV, which charged Syed with Level 5 felony strangulation and Level 6 felony domestic battery. Count III alleged that, on or about April 30, 2022, Syed, “knowing that [I.S.] was pregnant did, in a rude, insolent or angry manner, knowingly apply pressure to the throat or neck of [I.S.] in a manner that impeded normal breathing or blood circulation[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31. Count IV alleged that, on or about April 30, 2022, Syed,

being at least eighteen (18) years of age, did knowingly touch [I.S.], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner and [Syed] committed said offense in the presence of a child less than 16 years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense[.]

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31.

[16] With respect to the altercation that occurred on April 30, 2022, I.S. testified that Syed had become enraged, accused her of mocking his sisters, slapped her, and choked her. During the telephone call that was recorded and admitted as Exhibit 1, Syed had explained to I.S.’s uncle that his “family members are close to his heart. They are the ones he care [sic] about the most and if anybody say anything bad ․ he's going to be violent. Be raising [a] hand.” Tr. Vol. II p. 143. I.S. explained that Syed's comment had been made in reference to his assertion that she had mocked his sisters on April 30, 2022. The trial court found that the State had sufficiently tied Syed's comments about his family to Counts III and IV. Syed's statements provided a motive for committing Counts III and IV, i.e., perceived disrespect of his family. As such, given the evidence that Syed had battered and strangled I.S. after accusing her of mocking his family, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Exhibit 1 was relevant.

2. Whether Exhibit 1 was Unfairly Prejudicial

[17] Syed alternatively argues that even if Exhibit 1 was relevant, it was unfairly prejudicial. Specifically, he claims that “[t]he jury had to be confused about what the evidence proved or how to treat the evidence.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. “Relevant evidence is not inadmissible merely because it is prejudicial[.]” Robinson v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1269, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

Because the bar for unfair prejudice, rather than mere prejudice, is high, courts err on the side of admissibility and consider whether there is risk that a jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.

Schnitzmeyer, 168 N.E.3d at 1045 (internal citation and quotation omitted). “Evaluation of whether the probative value of an evidentiary matter is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a task best performed by the trial court.” Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[18] We agree with the State that Exhibit 1 was highly probative as to Syed's motive for committing two of the charged offenses. Again, “[e]vidence of motive is always relevant in the proof of a crime.” Davis, 186 N.E.3d at 1212 (internal brackets and quotation omitted). In addition, the trial court admonished the jury as to the limited use of Exhibit 1. Syed has failed to convince us that there was a risk that the jury would substantially overestimate the value of Exhibit 1 or that Exhibit 1 would arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 1 into evidence.

B. Question from the Jury

[19] Syed also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in altering a question from the jury to effectively allow Detective Ross to give impermissible vouching testimony pursuant to Evidence Rule 704(b).² Syed acknowledges, however, that he did not object to the jury's question or the trial court's rephrasing of the question below and, as a result, must prove fundamental error. For its part, the State argues that the trial court did not commit error, much less fundamental error, in this regard.

[20] The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. This exception is available only in egregious circumstances.

Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). “Fundamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred; it is not meant to provide a second bite at the apple for defense counsel who ignorantly, carelessly, or strategically fail to preserve an error.” Gavin v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1038, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). “Harm is not shown by the fact that the defendant was ultimately convicted; rather harm is found when error is so prejudicial as to make a fair trial impossible.” Sampson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 985, 992 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).

[21] At the conclusion of Detective Ross's testimony, a juror submitted the following question that seemingly related to Exhibit 1: “[d]id the translation provided by Lt. Khan line up with the instances/accounts that [I.S.] filed with your department?” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 187. During a sidebar, the trial court determined, with no objection from either party, that it would “rephrase [the question] so it's not a hearsay question.” Tr. Vol. II p. 213. The following exchange then occurred between the trial court and Detective Ross:

[The Court]: What was transcribed, is that what prompted you to continue with the case?

[Det. Ross]: She had basically described what the contents of what the recording was; uh, I needed to confirm that before we could go forward.

[The Court]: So, was the translation provided by Lieutenant Khan without saying what it is, but did it line up with the incidents or accounts that [I.S.] stated?

[Det. Ross]: I mean, I hate to call that but the summary I was provided by Lieutenant Khan was I guess interpretation than a direct word for word translation. I received some notes after that; I do not believe there were specific dates attached to the recording itself, if that's what you are asking?

[The Court]: Okay, so what I am asking is was the translation provided by Lieutenant Khan; was that in line with [I.S.] translated on the stand?

[Det. Ross]: Yes.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 213–14.

[22] Syed claims that the trial court's ultimate wording of the question effectively vouched for I.S.’s truthfulness, which he asserts “invaded the province of the jury[ ]” and “deprived [him] of a fair trial.” Appellant's Br. p. 27. We disagree. As the State argues, the question “did not improperly ask for vouching.” Appellee's Br. p. 32. We agree with the State that

[t]he question did not ask whether [I.S.]’s translation of the phone call was truthful; it asked whether her translation was consistent with Lieutenant Khan's description or translation of the call. While the jury could have drawn an inference that the consistency of the translations meant that [I.S.] was credible, the jury still had to draw that inference on their own.

Appellee's Br. p. 32.

[23] While Exhibit 1 was relevant to prove Syed's motive for committing at least two of the charged offenses, the case against Syed did not hinge on the admission of Exhibit 1 or I.S.’s translation of the call. I.S. testified about multiple physical encounters with Syed, describing each in sufficient detail to support the jury's determination that Syed had committed the charged acts. Despite Syed's claims to the contrary, review of the record does not suggest that I.S.’s credibility was seriously in doubt. I.S.’s testimony was consistent and unwavering, providing evidence that Syed had committed the charged offenses. Thus, even if the challenged line-of-questioning had amounted to vouching testimony, it would not constitute fundamental error. See Sampson, 38 N.E.3d at 992–93 (rejecting defendant's fundamental error argument relating to alleged vouching testimony because the victim's testimony described the charged conduct, was consistent, and did not waiver). Given I.S.’s consistent testimony describing Syed's acts relating to each of the charged offenses, Syed's fundamental error argument fails.

II. Double Jeopardy

[24] “Substantive double jeopardy claims come in two principal varieties: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute but harms multiple victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims.” Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 247 (Ind. 2020). The Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020), implicates the former scenario and its decision in Wadle implicates the latter. We review questions relating to double jeopardy de novo. Id. at 237.

[25] Wadle set forth a multi-step analysis to evaluate substantive double jeopardy claims that arise when, as here, a single criminal act implicates multiple statutes with common elements. The first step is to determine whether the statutes, either explicitly or by unmistakable implication, allow for multiple punishments. If the statutes allow for multiple punishments, there is no double jeopardy violation, and our inquiry ends. If the statutes are unclear, we apply our included-offense statutes. If either offense is included in the other, either inherently or as charged, we then consider whether the defendant's actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. If the facts show only a single crime, judgment may not be entered on the included offense.

Garth v. State, 182 N.E.3d 905, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (internal citations and quotation omitted), trans. denied.

A. Counts I and II

[26] Syed contends that his convictions for Counts I and II violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. In Count I, Syed was charged with Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. In Count II, he was charged with Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. Both Counts related to actions occurring “[o]n or about May 8, 2021[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31. The State concedes that conviction on both of these Counts violates the prohibition against double jeopardy, noting that “[t]he domestic battery and battery statutes do not clearly permit multiple punishments[;]” as charged, “battery was an inherently included offense of domestic battery[;]” and the convictions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose and continuity of action to constitute a single transaction.” Appellee's Br. pp. 23, 24, 25.

[27] Although the battery and domestic battery Counts were charged at the same level, the lowest possible level battery is a Class B misdemeanor while the lowest possible level domestic battery is a Class A misdemeanor. Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1, 35-42-2-1.3. “When the defendant is found guilty of both the included offense and the greater offense, the trial court may not enter judgment and sentence for the included offense.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 255–56. As such, to remedy the double jeopardy violation, we vacate Syed's Class A misdemeanor battery conviction in Count II while leaving in place his Class A misdemeanor domestic battery conviction in Count I. On remand, the trial court is instructed to vacate Syed's conviction on Count II.

B. Counts III and IV

[28] Syed also contends that his convictions for Level 5 felony strangulation (Count III) and Level 6 felony domestic battery (Count IV) violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. The parties agree that the domestic battery and strangulation statutes do not clearly permit multiple punishments. Because we agree, we proceed to step two.

[29] In A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (Ind. 2024), the Indiana Supreme Court clarified, with respect to step two, that

assessing whether an offense is factually included, a court may examine only the facts as presented on the face of the charging instrument. This includes examining the means used to commit the crime charged, which must include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense. Step 2 has core constraints: it does not authorize courts to probe other facts, such as evidence adduced from trial. The factually included inquiry at this step is thus limited to facts on the face of the charging instrument.

(Internal emphases and quotations omitted). The Court noted that the question of whether two charges are “included” with respect to step two could be dependent on how the charges are charged by the prosecution and held that “[d]ouble jeopardy outcomes should not turn solely on the facts the prosecutor elects to include or exclude in the charging instrument.” Id. at 1069. Thus, “where ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another ․ courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant's favor, and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 2.” Id.

[30] In this case, the State charged Syed with Count III, alleging that Syed “knowing that [I.S.] was pregnant did, in a rude, insolent or angry manner, knowingly apply pressure to the throat or neck of [I.S.] in a manner that impeded normal breathing or blood circulation of [I.S.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31. The State also charged Syed with Count IV, alleging that Syed “did knowingly touch [I.S.], a family or household member, in a rude, insolent, or angry manner and [Syed] committed said offense in the presence of a child less than 16 years of age, knowing that the child was present and might be able to see or hear the offense.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31. Both Counts related to actions occurring “[o]n or about April 30, 2022[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 31.

[31] Syed claims that

[t]he two offenses are factually included because within the charging information ambiguities exist as to whether the strangulation offense is factually included in the domestic battery offense. It is conceivable that the act of touching [I.S.] in a manner tha[t] interrupted her normal breathing or blood circulation was the same means used to commit the domestic battery offense. Thus, an ambiguity in the charging information exists and creates a presumptive double jeopardy violation.

Appellant's Br. p. 25. Given that we cannot look to the evidence presented at trial to support each charge at this point, see A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1068–69, we must agree and, consequently, move on to step three.

[32] In step three, we “must ask whether the defendant's actions were so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 (internal quotation omitted). “If the facts show two separate and distinct crimes, there's no violation of substantive double jeopardy, even if one offense is, by definition, ‘included’ in the other.” Id. at 235. Two offenses do not constitute a single transaction if the offenses are “two distinct chargeable crimes to which the continuous crime doctrine does not apply.” See Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1221 (Ind. 2015) (holding that defendant's convictions for battery and criminal confinement did not violate continuous crime doctrine where defendant pinned victim to the wall with a plastic tote and then smashed the victim's head against cabinet).

[33] Given the facts presented at trial, we conclude that Syed's actions reflected two distinct chargeable crimes. With respect to Count III, the evidence at trial indicated that Syed, knowing that I.S. was pregnant, had “dragged [I.S.] to the wall and placed his hands on [her] neck really tight that [she] couldn't breathe.” Tr. Vol. II p. 131. With respect to Count IV, the evidence at trial indicated that after strangling I.S., Syed continued to hold her against the wall and, in the presence of their young daughter, “began slapping” I.S., accusing her of “mocking [his] sisters.” Tr. Vol. III p. 131. The evidence proved that Syed committed two separate and distinct crimes, with the strangulation occurring prior to the battery. Since Syed committed two separate and distinct chargeable acts, the continuous crime doctrine does not apply. See Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1220 (rejecting the notion that the continuous crime doctrine may be judicially extended to two distinct criminal offenses). As a result, his convictions for Count III and Count IV did not constitute a double-jeopardy violation.

C. Counts VII and IX

[34] Syed contends that his convictions for Level 5 felony domestic battery with bodily injury to a pregnant woman (Count VII) and Level 5 felony strangulation (Count IX) also violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. We reach the same conclusions with respect to steps one and two as we did with Counts III and IV, and move on to step three.

[35] With respect to Count VII, the evidence at trial indicated that after accusing I.S. of purposefully failing to complete certain housework then arguing with him about it, Syed “closed his fist and” struck I.S. on “the top of [her] head.” Tr. Vol. II p. 135. I.S. described Syed's act as having brought his closed fist down on her head “[l]ike a hammer.” Tr. Vol. II p. 136. I.S. had been seated on a futon at the time of the battery. As for Count IX, the evidence at trial indicated that after Syed had struck I.S. in the head, he “pulled [her] hair and strangled [her] with both [of] his hands[,]” leaving her unable to breathe. Tr. Vol. II p. 136.

[36] As was the case with Counts III and IV, the evidence relating to Counts VII and IX proved that Syed committed two separate and distinct crimes, with the battery occurring prior to the strangulation. Again, the continuous crime doctrine does not apply to separate and distinct chargeable acts. See Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1220. As a result, his convictions for Count VII and Count IX did not constitute a double-jeopardy violation.

III. Sentencing Error

[37] “Sentencing decisions rest within the discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Mitchell v. State, 184 N.E.3d 705, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). The maximum sentence for a Level 6 felony is “two and one-half (2 1/212) years[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Syed contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Syed to a term of three years in relation to his conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery under Count IV. The trial court's error appears to be a scrivener's error as the trial court's oral sentencing statement reflected that it had imposed a two-and-one-half-year sentence for Count IV, but its written sentencing order indicated a three-year sentence. On remand, we instruct the trial court to enter a sentence for Count IV that is in accordance with Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b).

[38] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Syed and I.S.’s uncle spoke in Urdu. The call was later translated into English by Indianapolis Police Lieutenant Javed Khan.

2.   Evidence Rule 704(b) provides that “[w]itnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.”

Bradford, Judge.

Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur. Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.