Henry Douglas Johnson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Henry Douglas Johnson appeals his conviction following a jury trial for battery by means of a deadly weapon, as a Level 5 felony. Johnson raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it instructed the jury. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2023, Joseph Guillen lived at his girlfriend's house. Johnson is the ex-husband of Guillen's neighbor. At some point, Johnson yelled a “racial slur” and other “vulgar” language at Guillen's daughters. Tr. Vol. 1 at 64-65. On another occasion, Guillen saw Johnson “pounding” on his neighbor's door while the neighbor was “telling him to leave.” Id. at 66. Guillen “told [Johnson] to leave the lady alone” and called the police. Id.

[3] On April 2, Guillen drove to a gas station to purchase drinks and snacks for his daughters and girlfriend. When he arrived, he saw Johnson, whom he knew by face but not by name, in his car. Guillen parked his car and began to walk toward the entrance to the gas station. Johnson began “yelling at” Guillen. Id. at 69. Johnson yelled: “The next time I go to my girlfriend's house, you need to mind your own f**king business.” Id. at 70. Guillen told Johnson to “leave [him] the hell alone” and walked into the store. Id. As Guillen walked into the store, Johnson was still “yelling and screaming,” and he was “being vulgar.” Id.

[4] After Guillen had purchased his items, he walked out of the store. Johnson was “yelling and screaming and being vulgar from the minute [Guillen] got out of the store.” Id. at 71. Guillen walked to the front passenger side of his car and placed his purchases inside. After he placed the items on the seat, he “turned around to go to [his] seat” and observed that Johnson had moved his car to “in front of” Guillen's in a way that “blocked” Guillen in. Id. at 71, 73. Guillen walked around the back of his car toward the driver's side door, and Johnson continued “yelling and screaming and cursing at” Guillen. Id. at 72.

[5] At that point, before Guillen was able to get into his car, Johnson exited his car and approached Guillen while continuing to yell. Guillen noticed that Johnson “had a blue shiny object in his hand that was kind of ser[r]ated looking,” which Guillen thought was “a weapon.” Id. at 73. Guillen “moved back a little,” but Johnson “kept approaching” him. Id. at 75. Guillen then moved to get into his driver's seat, but Johnson “tried to stab” him with the knife. Id. When Guillen saw Johnson “go [to] swing” the knife, Guillen “backhanded” him. Id. The two proceeded to “scuffle” in the parking lot, and Johnson “chas[ed]” Guillen with the knife. Id. at 76. Johnson cut Guillen twice during the altercation. After he felt the second cut, Guillen told Johnson: “Hey, you swing at me one more time and I'm going to hurt you.” Id. at 77. Johnson then returned to his car and left the gas station.

[6] Guillen got into his car and followed Johnson while calling 9-1-1. Guillen provided officers with Johnson's license plate number and a description of Johnson. Guillen then stopped following Johnson and returned home on the advice of officers. Sometime thereafter, officers found and arrested Johnson. During a search, officers found a knife in Johnson's pocket. Officers then presented Guillen with a photo array, and Guillen identified Johnson as the person who had attacked him. Later testing revealed that Guillen's DNA was on Johnson's knife.

[7] The State charged Johnson with one count of battery by means of a deadly weapon, as a Level 5 felony. The court then held a two-day jury trial on Johnson's charge. During the trial, Guillen testified to the events that had occurred at the gas station. And, in his defense, Johnson testified that Guillen was the aggressor, that Guillen had hit him in the face first, and that he drew his knife only after Guillen had hit him.

[8] At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the State proposed the following jury instruction on self-defense:

It is an issue whether the defendant acted in self-defense. A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.

A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a duty to retreat, only if he reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself.

However, a person may not use force if:

1. He is committing a crime that is directly and immediately connected to the confrontation.

2. He provokes a fight with another person with intent to cause bodily injury to that person; or

3. He has willingly entered into a fight with another person or started the fight, unless he withdraws from the fight and communicates to the other person his intent to withdraw and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the fight.

To prevail on a claim of self-defense, the defendant must show:

1. That he was in a place where he had a right to be,

2. That he did not provoke, instigate or participate willingly in the violence, and

3. He had a reasonable fear of imminent death or great bodily harm․

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 70.

[9] The instruction was largely based on the pattern instruction but also included language about how a defendant can “prevail in the claim of self-defense and what the defendant must show[.]” Tr. Vol. 1 at 211. Johnson objected and asked to “stick to the pattern” instruction. Id. The State responded that the proffered instruction would “assist the jurors” because “it's very highly relevant” as the State “intend[ed] to argue that [Johnson] did provoke or instigate and participate willingly in this fight.” Id. at 211-12. Johnson then argued that the proposed instruction created “a little bit of confusion” and “undue burden on the defense by creating a barrier[.]” Id. at 212. The court granted the State's request because the first part “does follow the pattern” and because the second part “is an accurate statement of the law and will aid the jury[.]” Id. The court then instructed the jury accordingly.

[10] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Johnson guilty. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Johnson to five years, with three years executed at the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Johnson contends that the trial court abused its discretion and denied him a fair trial when it instructed the jury. “Instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and we review its decision only for an abuse of discretion.” Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. 2013). “The trial court abuses its discretion ‘when the instruction is erroneous and the instructions taken as a whole misstate the law or otherwise mislead the jury.’ ” Keller v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1205, 1208 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 484-85 (Ind. 2015)).

[12] On appeal, Johnson argues that the instruction given by the court was “self[-]contradictory and confusing.” Appellant's Br. at 7. In particular, he contends that the terms “serious bodily injury” and “bodily injury” were defined but that “great bodily harm” was not and that, as a result, the jurors would not “be able to tell” if self-defense is justified “to prevent serious bodily injury or because of reasonable fear of great bodily injury or fear of imminent death[.]” Id. at 9. He further argues that the statute on self-defense, Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2, “says nothing about there having to be a reasonable fear of imminent death before force can be employed” and that it “says nothing about fear of great bodily harm being a condition for the exercise of the right of self[-]defense.” Id. at 10.

[13] However, we need not decide whether there was any error in the jury instruction. It is well settled that “any error in instructing the jury is subject to a harmless error analysis.” Lawson v. State, 199 N.E.3d 829, 838 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “An error is to be disregarded as harmless unless it affects the substantial rights of a party.” Id. And “[e]rrors in the giving or refusing of instructions are harmless where a conviction is clearly sustained by the evidence and the jury could not properly have found otherwise.” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind. 2001). Stated differently, an “instruction error will result in reversal when the reviewing court cannot say with complete confidence that a reasonable jury would have rendered a guilty verdict had the instruction not been given.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And, in this case, we can say with certainty that the jury's verdict would have been the same had the challenged language of the State's instruction not been given.

[14] To prevail on a claim of self-defense, the defendant must show that he was in a place where he had a right to be; did not provoke, instigate, or participate willingly in the violence; and had a reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. See Simpson v. State, 915 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Here, even if we were to credit Johnson's version of the events from his testimony, it is clear that he participated willingly in the violence. Indeed, according to Johnson, he and Guillen exchanged words, during which time Guillen asked Johnson: “Why don't you get out and talk to me like a man.” Tr. Vol 1 at 187. And Johnson acknowledges that, in response, he “pulled up to” Guillen and got out of his car. Id. He further acknowledged that he “walk[ed] up to” Guillen. Id. at 188. And Johnson admitted that, once Guillen hit him in the face, he “pulled out that knife and cut him.” Id.

[15] In other words, even if Guillen had been the instigator of the fight, Johnson willingly participated in it by driving to Guillen's car, approaching Guillen, and pulling out his knife to cut Guillen. Johnson's own testimony negated his claim of self-defense. As such, the verdict would have been the same even without the challenged portion of the State's instruction, and any error in the instruction of the jury was harmless.

Conclusion

[16] Any error in the instruction of the jury was harmless. We therefore affirm Johnson's conviction.

[17] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Judges Tavitas and Kenworthy concur. Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.