IN RE: S.S. (Child in Need of Services) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] S.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's determination that her minor child, S.S. (“Child”), is a child in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Mother in September 2013. Mother has an extensive criminal history involving both violence and illegal drug use, and Child has been the subject of multiple CHINS adjudications and removals from Mother's care due to Mother's drug use. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights in 2016 and 2021, with DCS ultimately moving to dismiss those cases. The most recent CHINS case under cause number 86C01-2002-JC-6 was closed with Child's reunification with Mother, noting that Mother would continue to be monitored “through services already in place.” Exhibits Volume III at 195.

[3] In the early morning hours on January 3, 2025, Boone County Sheriff's Deputy Matthew Elder conducted a “high risk traffic stop” on a vehicle driven by Mother after receiving a report of “a reckless driver ․ tailgating, swerving between lanes, and [running] a red light on North US 52 in Boone County.” Transcript Volume II at 6-7.¹ Deputy Elder observed that Mother had glossy eyes, difficulty following instructions, and odor “consistent with ․ an alcoholic beverage” coming from her breath. Id. at 7. Mother admitted to Deputy Elder that “she had been drinking while she was at work and that she had consumed three or four shots of Vodka or Tequila.” Id. at 8. Deputy Elder administered a portable breathalyzer test to Mother that indicated a .194 result, which is “over double the legal limit.” Id. When Mother realized she “may be going to jail, she referred to the situation as stupid.” Id. at 9. At some point, Mother revealed that Child “was home alone” at her residence in Crawfordsville and that “she didn't have anybody” to check on Child. Id. Deputy Elder noted that Mother “didn't seem overly concerned” about leaving Child home alone overnight or for another “fourteen to sixteen hours” due to her arrest, but was more concerned about her “electronic smoking device and where her vehicle was.” Id. at 16. Deputy Elder made a call to DCS to check on Child.

[4] DCS Family Case Manager William Ambrose (“FCM Ambrose”) received a report that Mother had been arrested for Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated, so he went to Mother's residence, arriving just after 6:00 a.m. When FCM Ambrose arrived, eleven-year-old Child was home “without any adult caregivers.” Id. at 26.² FCM Ambrose observed that the house was “a bit messy” and that there “were several pets ․ six dogs and two cats” and a “strong animal odor.” Id. Although Child “said he had a phone,” the phone did not work because it “did not have service” as “there was no internet service” at the home. Id. at 27. FCM Ambrose removed Child from the home because “he was left alone without a primary care giver.” Id.

[5] During the following DCS assessment, Mother was uncooperative. Child revealed that he had not been enrolled in school for two years but instead did workbooks at home. Mother claimed she had been homeschooling Child but admitted that the home did not have internet service and that he had “not been technically enrolled” in any program for at least the last year. Id. at 30. FCM Ambrose asked for Child's homeschool records, but Mother did not provide them. FCM Ambrose obtained a drug screen from Mother which was positive for Suboxone for which Mother had a prescription. FCM Ambrose was concerned with Child's safety in light of Mother's repeated absences from the home and her alcohol use.

[6] DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS on January 7, 2025. The court held factfinding hearings on February 7 and 28, 2025. DCS presented the testimony of Deputy Elder, Boone County Sheriff's Deputy Christopher Reid, FCM Ambrose, Laura Whalen, Mother's sister and Child's current placement, and Family Case Manager Holley Pike (“FCM Pike”). FCM Ambrose testified that he was concerned that Child was being left alone overnight and further that Child had no way to contact anyone in an emergency. Whalen testified that Mother left Child home by himself at night while she was working. Whalen also testified that Child had been placed with her during prior CHINS adjudications. She noted that Child had been attending school while in her care and was “excelling.” Id. at 47. FCM Pike testified that Mother had been unwilling to share Child's homeschool records with DCS. She stated that she believed the coercive intervention of the court was necessary because Mother had “refused to cooperate” with DCS and DCS had not “been able to confirm [Child's] education” and “there are concerns for a sober caregiver and he was left alone overnight.” Id. at 59.

[7] Mother testified on her own behalf and also presented the testimony of her neighbor, Charles Marquees, and her friend, Michael Taylor. Mother testified that she works approximately three nights per week from 9:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m. at a “club in Lafayette[,] Danzers.” Id. at 76. She stated that her neighbor, Marquees, “can see out of every window of his trailer clearly [Mother's] residence so if there were a fire, or if there were anything going on he would easily be able to um, step in and do something.” Id. at 80. Mother stated that she did not “have any concerns leaving [Child] alone at home while [she is] at work” because she has “a lot of safety measures in place” due to Marquees's presence, and “[Child is] pretty mature.” Id. Marquees testified that his trailer was about “forty feet” away from Mother's, that he was “in a wheelchair,” that he would “keep an eye on [Child]” when he was outside in the yard sometimes, that he had never been asked to look out for Child at night, and “[t]hat's all [he really know[s].” Id. at 101. Taylor testified that Mother called him at 5:30 a.m. on January 3, 2025, after “she had gotten pulled over for a DUI and wanted [him] to go ․ pick up [Child] and bring him to [his] house.” Id. at 67. Taylor stated that he lives around thirty-five minutes away from Mother and that Child was gone by the time he arrived at Mother's home. Id. at 68.

[8] On March 10, 2025, the court entered its order adjudicating Child a CHINS. Specifically, the court found that Mother “has consistently left [Child] home alone overnight while she is at work,” “was charged with Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated,” and “has failed to provide [Child] with appropriate supervision.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 2.³ Accordingly, the court concluded that the “coercive intervention of the Court is necessary due to Mother's failure to provide appropriate care and supervision for [Child].” Id. Following a dispositional hearing on March 24, 2025, the court entered a dispositional decree ordering Mother to participate in reunification services.⁴

Discussion

[9] Mother asserts that the trial court clearly erred in adjudicating Child a CHINS. In reviewing a trial court's determination that a child is in need of services, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence which supports the court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286-1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. As no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS factfinding order and because neither party requested them under Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment to any issue covered by the findings, and we review any remaining issues under the general judgment standard pursuant to which a judgment “will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if clearly erroneous. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.

[10] Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 provides:

A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[11] The statute does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when the child is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id.

[12] Mother argues that “[t]here does not appear to be an age designated for when a child can be left home alone or when a child can stay somewhere overnight without supervision.” Appellant's Brief at 11.⁵ She claims that this case simply involves the State's disagreement with her “assessment regarding an 11-year-old child's ability to be left home alone for seven hours, two to three nights a week,” and that DCS “failed to show how leaving [Child] home alone has seriously endangered [Child] to the point of state intervention.” Id.

[13] Mother's assertions are merely a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence in her favor, which we will not do. DCS presented evidence that Child was repeatedly left home alone late at night without adult supervision and without any means of contacting anyone in the case of an emergency. The evidence further indicated that Mother, an admitted recovering methamphetamine and opiate addict, was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and denied being at fault for choosing to drive with a breath alcohol content more than twice the legal limit to drive. DCS also presented evidence that Mother was not supplying Child with necessary education, as Mother admitted she lacked internet service for over a year and was unable to enroll Child in any educational program, and Mother refused to cooperate with DCS in providing documentation of Child's prior homeschool participation. This evidence is sufficient to show by a preponderance that Child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of Mother to supply Child with necessary supervision or education.

[14] As Mother denied that Child needed any overnight supervision and denied that she was failing to supply Child with necessary education, the court's determination that Child needs care that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court, is also supported by the evidence. As noted above, a court need not wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. A.H., 913 N.E.2d at 306. In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the court's CHINS adjudication is clearly erroneous.

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Deputy Elder testified that Mother “was ordered out of the vehicle as part of a high risk traffic stop because ․ she took several minutes to actually pull over with a large number of, marked law enforcement vehicles behind her. Um, so as a safety precaution we conducted a high risk stop.” Transcript Volume II at 7.

2.   An officer from the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department also arrived to conduct a welfare check on Child.

3.   The trial court also found that Child's father “has an extensive criminal history and is currently incarcerated at the Tippecanoe County Jail.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 2.

4.   Mother did not include the dispositional decree in the Appellant's Appendix.

5.   To the extent Mother relies on criminal cases involving the State's burden of proof in obtaining a conviction for the crime of neglect of a dependent, we find those cases inapposite.

Brown, Judge.

Judges Felix and Scheele concur. Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.