HOWARD v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Rafiki Beyete Howard appeals his convictions for dealing in a narcotic drug and dealing in methamphetamine as level 2 felonies, two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as level 4 felonies, possession of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor, and maintaining a common nuisance as a level 6 felony. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On August 28, 2023, West Lafayette Police Officer Brandon Bonnell conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle after determining that it was traveling twenty miles over the posted speed limit. Officer Bonnell approached the passenger side of the vehicle, and Howard, the driver, provided his address and said, “someone's breaking into my house.” Transcript Volume II at 125. Officer Bonnell confirmed that the address was in Lafayette and asked the West Lafayette dispatch to relay the information of a possible burglary in progress to the Lafayette Police Department.

[3] Lafayette Police Officer David Chapman received the dispatch that a West Lafayette officer had stopped someone who “had been going to their house which was being actively burglarized.” Id. at 137. Officer Chapman was familiar with Howard because he conducted a traffic stop involving him about two years earlier during which Howard disclosed that he had been in prison in Illinois for seventeen years. At the residence, Officer Chapman observed that the storm door was partially open, the handle was broken, the “soft-closed piston” which “makes the door close soft” was broken and hanging, and “there was bolt damage to the door.” Id. He asked for other officers to contain the area, began looking around the outside of the house to determine if any windows had been broken, and heard “something inside that led [him] to believe that somebody was inside the house still.” Id. at 138. At that time, Officer Chapman treated the location as a crime scene, and he “assumed based on what [he] had seen and what [he] had heard that there was somebody still inside.” Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 17-18.

[4] After other officers arrived, Officer Chapman opened the door, “made announcements,” and “realized that there was a dog in a cage near that door.” Transcript Volume II at 138. Officer Chapman and other officers entered the residence and maneuvered through the house to “clear it.” Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 19. While he was clearing the living room, Officer Chapman observed a damaged television, a surveillance system that “looked like it had been torn from the wall,” and “some type of liquid that kind of smelled like bleach had been thrown all over.” Id. at 20. As he moved through the house, Officer Chapman announced, “Lafayette Police, make yourself known.” Id. at 28.

[5] Officer Chapman moved down a hallway and entered a bedroom containing a television box “with the lid open” which was “completely opened.” Id. at 20. As Officer Chapman “was coming around to clear that closet [he] looked in that box,” Transcript Volume II at 140, “just stuck [his] head over the top of it and looked,” “never touched the box or manipulated anything to adjust [his] view,” Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 20, and observed a “pistol with a drum magazine – a big circular magazine with the drum pointed up and some heat-sealed bag” he thought had ammunition in it. Transcript Volume II at 140. When he observed the firearm, Officer Chapman thought that a crime had been committed because Howard had disclosed his “criminal history” to him during the prior traffic stop. Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 29.

[6] Officer Chapman then contacted Officer Bonnell and spoke with him and Howard. Officer Chapman told Howard that the surveillance unit had been pulled from the wall and it smelled like bleach everywhere. He also asked Howard for consent to enter and take photographs. Howard said no and told him to wait until he arrived. Officer Chapman indicated “we can also go for a search warrant.” Id. at 22. Howard “just said okay,” and the conversation ended. Id. at 22-23. Howard did not further contact Officer Chapman on that date.

[7] Officer Chapman applied for a search warrant. In the probable cause affidavit, Officer Chapman asserted that he observed the handgun in the box, he was familiar with Howard's criminal history, and that criminal history records showed that Howard was convicted in 2005 of kidnapping and kidnapping with a firearm in Cook County, Illinois, was sentenced to nineteen years in the Illinois Department of Correction, and had a felony conviction for resisting law enforcement on March 10, 2020. He also asserted that he believed Howard would be precluded from possessing any firearms under federal and Indiana law due to his prior felony convictions. The trial court issued a search warrant related to any firearms. Officer Chapman and other officers searched the house.

[8] Officer Chapman subsequently filed a supplemental probable cause affidavit indicating that, during the search of the residence pursuant to the initial search warrant, a number of drug-related items were found, and he requested an amended search warrant. The trial court issued an amended search warrant related to firearms as well as controlled substances. In addition to the firearm in the television box, law enforcement also discovered a firearm tucked between a mattress and a bedframe, two digital scales, a small knotted bag containing a brown rocklike substance, a small knotted bag with pills, some loose pills, marijuana, a heat sealer with the number 420 on it,¹ heat-seal bags, torn corner bags, documentation with Howard's name, and a photo scan of Howard's Indiana identification card.

[9] The State charged Howard with: Count I, dealing in a narcotic drug as a level 2 felony; Count II, possession of a narcotic drug as a level 3 felony; Count III, dealing in methamphetamine as a level 2 felony; Count IV, possession of methamphetamine as a level 3 felony; Count V, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a level 4 felony; Count VI, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a level 4 felony; Count VII, possession of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor; and Count VIII, maintaining a common nuisance as a level 6 felony. The State also alleged that Howard was an habitual offender.

[10] On November 14, 2024, Howard filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. On November 26, 2024, Howard filed a Clarified Motion to Suppress Evidence alleging that “the granted warrant and search” violated his rights. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 75.

[11] On December 3, 2024, the court held a hearing. Howard's counsel argued that “[t]here was no reason to look into the T.V. box.” Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 10. He also argued that, after finding the weapon, officers had no reason to conduct a background check to determine that Howard was not allowed to possess a weapon. He acknowledged that he was “not challenging the entry in the house” and that “[o]fficers were allowed to go into the house because [Howard] said that officers could go into the house.” Id. at 12.

[12] The State presented the testimony of Officer Chapman and another officer who assisted in the search. After the presentation of the evidence, the court found that the officers conducted a protective sweep, they “had every right to do so,” and the gun was in plain view. Id. at 47. It also found that Officer Chapman recalled the prior traffic stop with Howard, who had an unusual name, where Howard had admitted serving time in prison in Illinois for seventeen years which was “likely the result of a felony conviction, not a misdemeanor,” and that Officer Chapman had “reasonable suspicion to believe that [Howard] was illegally in possession of” the handgun. Id. at 48. The court entered an order denying Howard's motion to suppress.

[13] During the trial, the State presented the testimony of multiple witnesses including Officer Chapman. Officer Chapman identified State's Exhibit 10 as video from his body camera, and the court admitted it without objection. Howard's counsel objected to the admission of photographs showing the interior of the television box and photographs taken during the searches based on his previous objections. The court admitted the exhibits over the objections. The jury found Howard guilty as charged. In the second phase of the trial, Howard waived the right to a jury trial with respect to certain elements of the charges and his status as an habitual offender. The court found him guilty of Counts V and VI and found him to be an habitual offender. The court found that Count II merged into Count I and that Count IV merged into Count III. The court sentenced Howard to an aggregate sentence of twenty-eight years with four years suspended to probation.

Discussion

[14] Howard argues that the search of the television box was not justified. He asserts that the box was pushed up against a wall, it was not positioned such that the items in it would be in plain view, and Officer Chapman described walking over to the box and peering in it, and only then did he observe the firearm. He argues that the incriminating nature of the weapon was not readily apparent and that “[i]t is only if an individual has a disqualifying prior felony (like Howard) that possession of a firearm becomes a criminal offense.” Appellant's Brief at 18. He asserts that, “[a]lthough Officer Chapman stated that he had some recollection of a prior interaction with [him] and a belief that [he] might have a prior disqualifying criminal conviction, that does not mean that it was immediately apparent that possession of the weapon by [him] was a criminal offense.” Id. He also argues that the basis for the initial search warrant was Officer Chapman's observation of the firearm in the television box which was evidence that was illegally obtained and that, “if the first warrant is defective, the second warrant cannot stand.” Id. at 22.

[15] The State argues that Howard incorrectly describes Officer Chapman's discovery of the firearm as the product of a “search” and asserts that Howard cites no authority for the proposition that officers conducting a lawful sweep “must avert their eyes from contraband lying in plain view in open boxes and containers.” Appellee's Brief at 9.

[16] To the extent Howard phrases the issue as whether the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress, “[w]here a defendant does not perfect an interlocutory appeal from a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, but objects to the admission of the evidence at trial, the issue on appeal is more appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence at trial.” Danner v. State, 931 N.E.2d 421, 426 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied; see also Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013).

[17] Generally, we review the trial court's ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We reverse only when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997), reh'g denied. We may affirm a trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence if it is sustainable on any basis in the record. Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998), reh'g denied. We review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure, but we give deference to a trial court's determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008); see also Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (holding that the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we consider de novo). In ruling on admissibility following the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court considers the foundational evidence presented at trial. Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1001. If the foundational evidence at trial is not the same as that presented at the suppression hearing, the trial court must make its decision based upon trial evidence and may consider hearing evidence only if it does not conflict with trial evidence. Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 n.1 (Ind. 2014). It also considers the evidence from the suppression hearing that is favorable to the defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial. Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1001.

[18] The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.² If the search is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016).

[19] Generally, the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement allows police to warrantlessly seize an object if they “are lawfully in a position from which to view the object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if [police] have a lawful right of access to the object.” Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 991 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 245 (Ind. 2002) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-137, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990))), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1125 (2022). It “stands for the premise that objects which are in plain view of an officer who rightfully occupies a particular location can be seized without a warrant and are admissible as evidence.” Id. at 991-992 (quoting Sloane v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied).

[20] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “police may enter private property to protect that property when they reasonably believe the premises have recently been or are being burglarized.” Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290, 301 (Ind. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 926, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). “Of course, any search conducted because police reasonably believe a burglary is in progress or has just occurred is limited to areas in which an intruder could reasonably conceal himself.” Id. “Officers may not use the situation as an excuse to conduct a general search for evidence,” and “[a] search beyond the exigencies presented would violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

[21] We note that Howard does not challenge the initial entry into his residence. The record reveals that Officer Chapman received a dispatch regarding an active burglary and arrived at the residence of Howard, who he knew had been in prison in Illinois for seventeen years. Officer Chapman observed damage to the storm door and heard “something inside that led [him] to believe that somebody was inside the house still.” Transcript Volume II at 138. While clearing the house, Officer Chapman entered a bedroom containing a television box “with the lid open” that was “completely opened.” Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 20. As Officer Chapman “was coming around to clear that closet [he] looked in that box,” Transcript Volume II at 140, “just stuck [his] head over the top of it and looked,” “never touched the box or manipulated anything to adjust [his] view,” and observed a pistol. Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 20. When he observed the firearm, Officer Chapman thought that a crime had been committed because Howard had disclosed his criminal history to Officer Chapman during the earlier traffic stop. The video from Officer Chapman's body camera shows the small room in which the television box was found and Officer Chapman's limited movement in that room. The firearm in the television box was in plain view. We also note that Officer Chapman was familiar with Howard's lengthy incarceration in Illinois, he did not seize the firearm immediately after viewing it, and he subsequently completed a probable cause affidavit with details of Howard's criminal history which led to the issuance of a search warrant. We cannot say that reversal is warranted. See generally Bryant, 660 N.E.2d at 301 (holding that the totality of the circumstances revealed that exigent circumstances justified the search and the reasonable belief that a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred, and the officers “searched no more area than was reasonably necessary” and still discovered marijuana plants in plain view, and concluding that the admission of evidence found during the search was not erroneous).

[22] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Howard's convictions.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Lafayette Police Officer Evan McCain testified that the number 420 is a “significant number or series of numbers in the marijuana culture.” Transcript Volume II at 193.

2.   On appeal, Howard does not cite Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution or provide an independent analysis of the Indiana Constitution. Thus, we do not address any claim under the Indiana Constitution. See Abel v. State, 773 N.E.2d 276, 278 n.1 (Ind. 2002) (holding that because the defendant presented no authority or independent analysis supporting a separate standard under the state constitution, any state constitutional claim is waived).

Brown, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.