DAVIS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In October of 2022, the State charged Jiheamdayauna Davis with, inter alia, Level 5 felony battery, alleging that Davis had touched his ex-girlfriend, W.D., “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.” A jury trial commenced in December of 2024, and, after the jury began its deliberations, it sent a question to the trial court regarding the definition of “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.” The parties defined the words in consultation with the trial court and sent the agreed-upon definitions back to the jury. Davis now contends that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the jury the supplemental instruction, and that because the trial court did not indicate whether Davis was present during the discussions, reversible error occurred. Davis has failed to show that he was not present during the discussions, and we conclude that any error in giving the instruction at issue was invited. We therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On October 17, 2022, the State charged Davis with two counts of Level 3 felony rape, Level 5 felony battery, Level 6 felony strangulation, and Level 6 felony intimidation. The battery charge alleged that Davis had touched his ex-girlfriend, W.D., “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, by strangling her resulting in serious bodily injury, that is: loss of consciousness[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 32–33. A jury trial commenced on December 16, 2024, and both W.D. and Davis testified. Before the parties’ closing statements, the trial court took a recess, after which recess the trial court indicated, “Mr. Davis is there in person and by counsel; State's here by counsel.” Tr. Vol. III p. 131. After the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court took another recess.

[3] At some point after the jury began its deliberations, it sent the question, “What is the definition of in a rude, insolent, or angry manner?”. Tr. Vol. III p. 160. The trial court went back on the record to address the question but did not indicate who was present. The trial court indicated to the parties that it could tell the jury to reread the instructions, asking, “[W]hat do you want me to do?” Tr. Vol. III p. 161. The State indicated it had “no objection to just saying we cannot provide a definition.” Tr. Vol. III p. 162. Davis's counsel, Kailey Ruggiero, indicated that she would look to Westlaw.

[4] After the trial court and parties discussed possible definitions, the trial court stated, “So I wrote rude equals offensively impolite or ill-mannered. Insolent equals showing a rude and arrogant lack of respect, and angry equals strong feeling of displeasure or hostility.” Tr. Vol. III p. 164. The trial court then asked, “Ruggiero, are you okay with that?” Tr. Vol. III p. 164. Ruggiero responded, “Yes.” Tr. Vol. III p. 164. The State also agreed to the definitions. The trial court gave the supplemental instruction to the bailiff and took a recess at 2:32 p.m., resuming from the recess at 2:34 p.m., and stating, “Mr. Davis here in person and by counsel; State's here by counsel.” Tr. Vol. III p. 165.

[5] The jury found Davis guilty of all charges except intimidation. The trial court vacated the strangulation charge due to double-jeopardy concerns and sentenced Davis to an aggregate term of eight years, with all but time served suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the jury the supplemental instruction containing the definition of “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner,” arguing that the definitions provided were “incomplete” and that the trial court had not used the “proper procedure” in providing the instructions. Appellant's Br. pp. 15, 16.

We review a trial court's manner of instructing the jury for an abuse of discretion. To determine if a trial court abused its discretion, we consider (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions that are given. Jury instructions are to be considered as a whole. A trial court acts within its discretion if it denies a request that would likely confuse the jury.

Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 267–68 (Ind. 2023) (internal citations and quotation omitted).

[7] Davis contends that the trial court's “reliance on Google” for the definitions was “at least questionable” and that, “[s]ince the definitions were in the last instruction received by the jury and not inserted in a natural and logical position amongst the other instructions, it emphasized the minimal level of rudeness, insolence and anger that was required to convict[.]” Appellant's Br. pp. 17, 18. The Indiana Supreme Court has concluded that in providing a supplemental instruction to the jury, the trial court “must reread the entire set of final instructions in the presence of the jury and parties,” and where a new instruction is supplied, “it should not be inserted first or last, where it would stand out, but it should rather be assigned a natural and logical position amongst the other instructions.” Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 198 (Ind. 2021) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, Davis did not object to the substance of or manner in which the supplemental instruction was provided. In fact, Davis acknowledges that he “did not object to the supplemental instruction and instead agreed to its content and sending it back to the jury room.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo that the supplemental instruction was provided in error, Davis invited it.

[8] The invited-error doctrine generally precludes a party from obtaining appellate relief for his own errors, even if those errors were fundamental. A party invites an error if it was part of a deliberate, well-informed trial strategy. This means there must be evidence of counsel's strategic maneuvering at trial to establish invited error. Mere neglect or the failure to object, standing alone, is simply not enough. And when there is no evidence of counsel's strategic maneuvering, we are reluctant to find invited error.

Miller v. State, 188 N.E.3d 871, 874–75 (Ind. 2022) (internal citations, brackets, and quotations omitted).

[9] Ruggiero did not merely fail to object to the definitions, she was an active participant in providing the supplemental instruction; she agreed with some definitions and objected to others, and in the end, she explicitly agreed to the definitions which the trial court ultimately provided to the jury. Furthermore, to the extent that Davis contends that the trial court should have simply reread the instructions with no further comment, we note that the trial court indicated to the parties that it could tell the jury to reread the instructions, asking, “[W]hat do you want me to do?” Tr. Vol. III p. 161. The State indicated that it did not “have any objection to just saying we can't provide a definition[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 162. Ruggiero could have indicated the same but did not. Without deciding the merits of Davis's claims, we conclude that because his counsel was so involved, any error which might have come from either the definitions or the manner in which the definitions were provided, was invited.

[10] Davis additionally appears to argue that, although his counsel agreed to the challenged supplemental instruction, because it is “not clear” from the record that he was present during the discussions, we must reverse. We disagree. Davis “has the burden of establishing the record necessary to his claim,” Hernandez v. State, 761 N.E.2d 845, 852 (Ind. 2002), and he has failed to show that he was not personally present when the supplemental instruction was discussed. In fact, the record supports an inference that Davis was present. The trial court indicated before the jury retired to deliberate that Davis was “in person and by counsel[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 131. After the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court took a recess but asked the parties to “hang around for a few minutes just in case they have a question right away and then 10 or 15 minutes.” Tr. Vol. III p. 160. The trial court then took recess but returned on the record an hour later to answer the jury question at issue.

[11] Though the trial court did not indicate who was present at that time, it took another recess immediately after the supplemental instruction was provided to the jury, and just two minutes later, returned on the record for another jury question, acknowledging that Davis was “in person and by counsel[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 165. Because we conclude that Davis has failed to point to anything in the record suggesting that he was not present when the supplemental instruction was discussed, we reject his argument that the trial court's supplemental instruction (approved by his counsel) constituted reversible error.

[12] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.