STATE v. WILLIAMSON (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In March of 2022, the State charged Williamson with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. At the time, Williamson was incarcerated in West Virginia, serving a federal sentence. Although represented by counsel, Willaimson made a number of pro se filings in mid-to-late 2022 mentioning his right to a speedy trial, including a pro se motion to dismiss, which was denied. No filings were made by either party from November of 2022 to August of 2024, when the State attempted to have Williamson brought to Indiana to stand trial. The State finally served the arrest warrant on Williamson in November of 2024, and he moved to discharge, which motion the trial court granted. The State contends that the trial court erred in granting Williamson's motion for discharge. Because we agree, we reverse and remand for trial.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 2, 2022, the State charged Williamson with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On April 11, 2022, attorney Theodore Minch entered his appearance for Williamson. On September 13, 2022, Williamson sent a pro se letter to the trial court indicating that he was incarcerated in West Virginia and had an active warrant for his arrest from Indiana for the Level 4 felony charge. Williamson requested that the court “lift the warrant because its [sic] affecting my program” and stated that he wanted to have the case resolved. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 32. On September 20, 2022, Williamson submitted a pro se letter to the trial court stating that he was serving a fifty-seven-month federal sentence and had been incarcerated since February of 2021. Williamson requested that the trial court set the current matter for trial or dismiss the case.

[3] On October 5, 2022, Williamson submitted a pro se letter to the trial court stating that he was serving a fifty-seven-month sentence in a federal prison with three years of supervised release afterward. Williamson noted the pending charge in this case and that he has a right to a fast and speedy trial. Williamson acknowledged that he had “spoken with [his] lawyer Ted Minch” but indicated that Minch had “not been effective” and he had “not heard back from him.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 34. Williamson asked for a “trial (fast n Speedy) or for a dismissal.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 34. The trial court noted that it had received the letter and forwarded a copy to Minch and the prosecutor's office.

[4] On October 5, 2022, Williamson filed a pro se motion to dismiss. Williamson stated the case should be dismissed because he would not be able to properly defend himself after he was released from federal custody and the charge was preventing him from participating in various programming while he served his federal sentence. The trial court denied the motion. On October 7, 2022, Williamson, by counsel, filed a motion to recall the warrant for his arrest, which the trial court denied on October 11, 2022.

[5] On August 1, October 15, and October 31, 2024, the State petitioned the trial court for writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to be issued to the Federal Bureau of Prisons to produce Williamson for an initial hearing in this case, all of which were apparently issued. It seems that the final writ was successful in securing Williamson's return to Indiana, because, on November 25, 2024, the arrest warrant for Williamson was served, and an initial hearing was held on December 3, 2024. The trial court scheduled Williamson's jury trial for January 30, 2025.

[6] On January 5, 2025, Williamson moved to discharge pursuant to Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(C), the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 12, of the Indiana Constitution. On January 28, 2025, the trial court summarily granted Williamson's motion for discharge. The trial court denied the State's motion to correct error.

Discussion and Decision

[7] At the outset, we note that Williamson has not submitted an appellee's brief.

In such a situation, we do not undertake the burden of developing arguments for the appellee. Applying a less stringent standard of review with respect to showings of reversible error, we may reverse the lower court if the appellant can establish prima facie error. Prima facie is defined in this context as at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it. The purpose of this rule is not to benefit the appellant. Rather, it is intended to relieve this court of the burden of controverting the arguments advanced for reversal where that burden rests with the appellee. Where an appellant is unable to meet that burden, we will affirm.

State Farm Ins. v. Freeman, 847 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted, emphases in original).

[8] The State contends that the trial court erred in granting Williamson's motion for discharge. In evaluating a trial court's ruling on a Criminal Rule 4 motion for discharge, the standard of review is de novo when the issue is a question of law applied to undisputed facts. Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039 (Ind. 2013); see also Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. 2012) (“The speedy-trial issue today involves a pure question of law; accordingly, the appropriate standard of review is de novo.”).

I. Criminal Rule 4(C)

[9] The State contends that the trial court erroneously discharged Williamson pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C), which provides that a person must be brought to trial within “one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later[,]” excluding any period of delay caused by the defendant's act or motion for a continuance or delay attributable to court congestion. See Ind. Crim. Rule 4(C) (emphasis added). The State charged Williamson on March 2, 2022, and an arrest warrant was issued for him on that date. At the time, however, Williamson was incarcerated in a federal correctional facility in West Virginia and was not served with the arrest warrant until November 25, 2024. The Criminal Rule 4 period does not begin to run until the later of the filing of charges or the arrest of the defendant on those charges. Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 954 (Ind. 2016). Because Williamson was not arrested until November 25, 2024, the rule period did not even begin to run until that date, and thus, there was no violation of Criminal Rule 4(C), as his trial date was set well within the one-year limit. See Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 100 (Ind. 1998) (concluding that the Rule 4 period had begun on the date the defendant had been brought to Indiana, which was the equivalent of an arrest, not the date several months earlier on which the Indiana charge was filed), and Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 955 (Ind. 2016) (concluding that, while Griffith had been charged with an Indiana crime in 2012 while incarcerated in Kentucky, “Indiana did not actually arrest Griffith until March 11, 2013—when he was brought back within the state's ‘jurisdiction and exclusive control’ ”) (quoting Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 100 n.27).

[10] Moreover, regardless of the date of arrest, “Indiana has long held that Criminal Rule 4 does not apply when a person is incarcerated in a foreign jurisdiction.” Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Brown v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. 1986), and Smith v. State, 267 Ind. 167, 368 N.E.2d 1154 (1977)). Because Williamson was incarcerated in a federal facility in West Virginia, Rule 4(C) was not implicated during this period of time. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 954 (“If the defendant is jailed outside Indiana when charged, arrest occurs once he is returned to Indiana's ‘jurisdiction and exclusive control.’ ”) (citation omitted).

II. Right to a Speedy Trial

[11] The State also contends that, to the extent that the trial court may have concluded that Williamson's constitutional rights to a speedy trial had been violated, it erred in doing so. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United States Supreme Court set forth a balancing test to apply to alleged violations of a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A reviewing court balances the length of the delay, reasons for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 955. The same test is applied to speedy-trial claims pursuant to Article 1, Section 12, of the Indiana Constitution. Id. A delay of over one year is considered presumptively prejudicial in this context, Rivers v. State, 777 N.E.2d 51, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, so this factor weighs in Williamson's favor, and we move on to the other considerations.

[12] As for Williamson's assertion of his right to speedy trial, the first attempts to assert it occurred in September of 2022, when he sent three letters and a pro se motion to dismiss to the trial court. Because Williamson was represented by counsel, however, the trial court was not required to respond to his letters and did not. See, e.g., Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000) (“[O]nce counsel was appointed, Defendant spoke to the court through counsel. The trial court was not required to respond to Defendant's request or objection.”). The trial court also denied Williamson's motion to dismiss. Williamson did not file anything in the case between November of 2022 and January 5, 2025, when he moved for discharge. The State began taking measures to have Williamson returned to Indiana to face the charge against him in August of 2024, finally serving him with the arrest warrant in November.

[13] Moreover, while it is true that Williamson did mention his rights to a speedy trial in his letters, when it came to actually requesting relief, it was in the form of a motion to dismiss. We agree with the State that this is better evidence of a desire to have no trial at all than to have a speedy one. See U.S. v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A motion for dismissal is not evidence that the defendant wants to be tried promptly.”); Prihoda v. State of Texas, 352 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011) (moving for dismissal “shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one”). We also agree with the State that Williamson's failure to submit any motions for a speedy trial for over two years after his initial letters further undercuts his position. See Ballentine v. State, 480 N.E.2d 957, 959 (Ind. 1985) (taking into consideration that, although the defendant “did clearly assert his right by filing the demand to be returned for trial and specifically waived extradition[,] he did not renew his demand for a speedy trial at any time”). Put another way, even if it could be said that Williamson asserted his rights to a speedy trial for a while, he did not do so consistently. This factor weighs in the State's favor.

[14] As for the reason for the delay, it is Williamson's incarceration in West Virginia, where he is serving a federal sentence. From the time that Williamson alerted the trial court to his presence in the West Virginia federal facility in September of 2022 until the State first attempted to secure Williamon's presence in Indiana on August 1, 2024, approximately twenty-three months had elapsed. After Williamson's initial pro se filings and motion to dismiss, no filings were made by either party between November of 2022 and August of 2024. During that time, the record indicates that Williamson made no effort to be transferred to Indiana or waive extradition. On the other hand, the State did not actively pursue securing Williamson's return until August of 2024, although there does not seem to have been any active effort by the State to delay trial, either. All in all, we conclude that this factor weighs slightly in Williamson's favor. See Ballentine, 480 N.E.2d at 959 (concluding that the reasons for the two-and-one-half-year delay weighed slightly in favor of the State when there had been fifteen months during which the defendant had been “resting in silence” and there had been no indication of any purposeful effort by the State to delay trial).

[15] Finally, we consider the most important factor, whether Williamson has been prejudiced by the delay, and, if so, to what extent. “[P]rejudice[ ] is assessed in light of three interests which the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Lee v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (Ind. 1997) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Defendants have “the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice [․] to prove a speedy trial deprivation.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The prejudice prong is the most significant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.

[16] Here, there was no oppressive pretrial incarceration because Williamson was already in federal prison. See McCarthy v. State, 176 N.E.3d 562, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (finding that there was no danger of oppressive incarceration to prejudice the defendant where “he was being held on a separate” charge in another county for most of the time); see also Lewicki v. Emerson, 103 F.4th 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2024) (because of the defendant's other cases, “little of [his] time in custody can be attributed to the delayed trial of the attempted-robbery charge”).

[17] As for minimizing the anxiety of the accused, Williamson claimed that the pending charge in this matter had affected his ability to participate in various programs while serving his federal sentence. Williamson, however, did not present any evidence at the hearing to support this contention and has therefore failed to carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice on this basis. See Ballentine, 480 N.E.2d at 959–60 (concluding that a defendant serving a sentence in Mississippi claiming that an Indiana charge had affected his ability to earn additional good-time credit or sentence reductions and prevented him from participating in a work-release program had failed to demonstrate that was the case during the hearings on his motions to dismiss); see also Danks v. State, 733 N.E.2d 474, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting speedy trial claim because, although sixteen months “of the delay was fairly attributable to [․] the State's tardiness” in bringing the case to trial, the defendant had failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay), trans. denied.

[18] Finally, and most importantly, there is no indication that Williamson's defense will be impaired by the delay. Minch entered his appearance shortly after the instant case was filed, which means that Williamson has had the opportunity to prepare his trial defense. Moreover, while it is true that “[d]elay may cause prejudice when evidence is lost or memories fade[,]” Lewicki, 103 F.4th at 474, Williamson has not made an argument along these lines, much less established that anything like this has occurred. For example, Williamson has not alleged “that any witnesses necessary for the defense were lost because of the delay or that there was any lapse of memory by any witness which prejudiced the defense.” Ballentine, 480 N.E.2d at 959. We conclude that Williamson has not established any prejudice resulting from the delay in his prosecution, so this most important factor favors the State. Id. at 960. On the whole, we conclude that the balance of the Barker factors favors the State, particularly Williamson's failure to establish prejudice. We reverse the trial court's grant of Williamson's motion for discharge and remand for trial.

[19] We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.