BAKER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After completing the executed portion of his sentence for sexual misconduct with a minor, Jorden Baker was placed on probation. He was ordered, among other things, to complete sex offender treatment, comply with all sex offender registration requirements, and refrain from committing new criminal offenses. After Baker was discharged unsuccessfully from his treatment program, local police discovered he no longer lived at the principal residential address listed on his offender registration. The State charged Baker with a new offense—failure to register—and separately petitioned to revoke his probation. The court found Baker violated his probation and revoked his 1,080-day suspended sentence. Baker appeals the determination that he violated probation and the resulting sanction. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2021, Baker pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor. The court sentenced him to 1,877 days, with 310 days executed in the Indiana Department of Correction, 487 days in community corrections served on home detention, and 1,080 days suspended to probation.

[3] After completing his prison and community corrections commitments, Baker reported to probation in November 2022. His probation required him to register as a sex offender and “comply with all other registration requirements,” to complete a sex offender treatment program, and to refrain from committing new crimes. Exhs., p. 7. At the time, Baker lived with his grandmother on West 29th Street in Connersville (Grandmother's house). Baker listed this address as his principal residence on the sex offender registry. Soon after, Baker obtained a modification of his probation conditions to permit contact with his minor sister, allowing him to visit his mother's residence on North Eastern Avenue in Connersville (Mother's house). Baker also added this address to the sex offender registry under “other residential addresses.” Id. at 28. However, Baker continued to reside at Grandmother's house.

[4] Baker then enrolled in sex offender treatment but struggled to comply with the terms of the program. His probation required that he not miss any sessions without prior approval or a doctor's note, but Baker missed nine sessions over the course of his enrollment. At one point, he was discharged from treatment based on his failure to pay program fees, though he was later readmitted after paying his past-due amounts. But even with this second chance, Baker's attendance issues persisted. After attending a session on August 20, 2024, he no-showed three weeks in a row, and on September 17, 2024, he was discharged unsuccessfully from the program.

[5] Then, on September 18, 2024, Detective Joey Laughlin conducted a compliance check at Baker's registered address—Grandmother's house. Baker was not present, and his grandmother reported that she had not seen him in two or three weeks. Baker had been kicked out of Grandmother's house and his belongings were moved to Mother's house. As a result of this discovery, Baker was charged with failure to register as a sex offender, a Level 6 felony. The State then petitioned to revoke Baker's probation, alleging three violations: (1) failure to attend and actively participate in sex offender treatment; (2) commission of a new criminal offense (failure to register); and (3) failure to notify probation of an address change within 24 hours.

[6] At the fact-finding hearing on the petition to revoke, Baker testified in his own defense. He admitted that he had “sidelined [his] classes” and had “not been too ready to just go.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 44. He claimed he was working to save up for his own place to live, which he stated was “a little bit more important.” Id. Baker also claimed he told probation about his address change but “felt no need” to update his principal residence on the sex offender registry, as he believed having Mother's house listed under “other residential addresses” was sufficient. Id. at 47-48.

[7] At the close of evidence, the State withdrew its third allegation—failure to inform probation of a change in address. However, the trial court found Baker violated probation based on the other two allegations: his failure to attend sex offender treatment and his commission of the new offense of failure to register. The court then revoked all 1,080 days of Baker's suspended sentence. Baker appeals the revocation and resulting sanction.

Discussion and Decision

[8] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). Accordingly, we review probation revocations for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Phipps v. State, 177 N.E.3d 123, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188).

[9] Baker claims the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) finding that he violated probation by committing the new crime of failure to register; and (2) revoking his entire suspended sentence as the resulting sanction. Unpersuaded by either argument, we affirm.

I. The Trial Court Properly Found Baker Violated Probation

[10] Though Baker disputes the finding that he committed a new offense, the trial court revoked his probation based also on a second, independent violation: failure to attend and actively participate in the sex offender treatment program. Baker does not challenge this finding, and “[p]roof of any one violation is sufficient to revoke a defendant's probation.” Figures v. State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). This essentially renders any error in the finding of an additional violation harmless. See id. (holding that trial court erred in determining defendant violated probation by committing new crime, but error was “harmless” because revocation was supported by two other unchallenged violations); Ind. Trial Rule 61 (providing that error in proceedings must be disregarded if it does not “affect the substantial rights” of parties). Still, we find the evidence supports the trial court's determination that Baker also violated probation by committing a new offense.

[11] “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a probation revocation, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing the evidence or judging witnesses’ credibility.” Figures, 920 N.E.2d at 272 (citing Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008)). We affirm a revocation “[i]f there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that a defendant has violated any terms of probation.” Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 639-40. When the State alleges a probation violation based on a new offense, it must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the offense. Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[12] Baker was charged with violating Indiana Code § 11-8-8-17(a)(1), which provides that a sex or violent offender who knowingly or intentionally “fails to register when required to register under this chapter ․ commits a Level 6 felony.” Though Baker recognizes the State presented evidence that he no longer lived at Grandmother's house, he claims it “did not prove that [he] had failed to register as a sex offender.” Appellant's Br., p. 8. Baker argues that the record showed he was in fact registered, and a failure to live at his principal registered address would support only a violation of a different subsection, § 11-8-8-17(a)(5)¹ , which was not charged here.

[13] Baker views his conduct too narrowly, not recognizing that he more fundamentally failed to provide his current principal address on the registry. Indiana Code § 11-8-8-8 sets forth a list of information that must be provided as part of offender registration, including a “principal residence address.” After Baker moved out of Grandmother's house, his registration no longer included a valid principal residence address. With this required information missing, Baker was effectively not registered. See Rose v. State, 232 N.E.3d 1179, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (upholding conviction for failure to register as sex offender under § 11-8-8-17 because offender failed to include on registry his social media usernames, which is information required under § 11-8-8-8).

[14] That Baker's new address (Mother's house) was listed on the registry under “other residential addresses” was insufficient. Exhs. p. 28. Offenders are required to provide three addresses in their registration: (1) a “principal residence address”; (2) an “other address” where the offender “spends more than seven (7) nights in a fourteen (14) day period”; and (3) a mailing address, if different from the principal residence address. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(a). This language plainly differentiates between types of addresses and requires reporting of each, rather than treating them as alternatives. Baker provides no argument as to how this statute could be interpreted to support his position.

[15] Furthermore, Indiana Code § 11-8-8-8 requires offenders to report any change in required information to local law enforcement “no later than seventy-two hours after the change.” Ind. Code § 11-8-8-8(c). The record here shows that Baker failed to do just that. Detective Laughlin testified that when he went to Baker's listed principal residence address (Grandmother's house) on September 18, 2024, Baker had not lived there for two or three weeks—far longer than the 72 hours allowed under the statute to report the change. That Baker may have notified his probation officer of his change in address is irrelevant. The requirement to provide updated contact information to the probation department was a condition of his probation separate and distinct from the obligation to properly register as a sex offender.

[16] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court erred in determining that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Baker committed the offense of failing to register as required.

II. The Imposed Sanction Was Not An Abuse of Discretion

[17] After finding a probation violation, the trial court “may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:” (1) continuing probation, with or without modification; (2) extending the probationary period for up to one year beyond the original probationary term; or (3) ordering execution of all or part of the suspended sentence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3-(h). We review a trial court's sanctioning decision for an abuse of discretion. Slater v. State, 223 N.E.3d 298, 306-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188).

[18] Baker argues the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his entire suspended sentence of 1,080 days. He claims that his sanction was too harsh, emphasizing that he attended 41 treatment sessions while missing only 9, successfully completed his initial incarceration and home detention, and had no prior petitions to revoke. Though Baker attempts to characterize his violations as minimal, he fails to persuade us that the trial court's selection of sanction was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[19] The required sex offender treatment was designed to address the underlying conduct that led to his conviction and yet Baker missed nearly 20 percent of the sessions. He acknowledged that he “sidelined [his] classes,” “let it take a back burner,” and did not make treatment a priority over work. Tr. Vol. II, p. 44, 51. Though he cites to general “family drama” and “unstable housing” that he dealt with around this time, Baker fails to explain how it impacted his ability to attend the court-mandated sessions. Appellant's Br., p. 9. Nor does he explain why instead of seeking permission to miss sessions when needed, he no-showed three weeks in a row leading up to his final discharge from the program. Additionally, that final discharge was Baker's second from the program, reflecting a pattern of inconsistent compliance with his probation requirements.

[20] Baker's argument also ignores that the trial court imposed its sanction based on not just one violation, but two. As previously discussed, the trial court determined that the State sufficiently proved Baker committed the new criminal offense of failing to register as a sex offender. Given the foregoing, and considering our deferential standard of review, we find that Baker has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's sanctioning decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.

Conclusion

[21] The trial court did not err in finding Baker violated his probation—both by committing the new offense of failure to register and by failing to attend and actively participate in his required sex offender treatment program. Nor did the court abuse its discretion by imposing the resulting sanction of revoking Baker's entire 1,080-day suspended sentence.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This subsection provides that an offender who knowingly or intentionally “does not reside at the sex or violent offender's registered address or location” commits a Level 6 felony. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17(a)(5).

Weissmann, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.