K.C. (Mother) and R.L. (Father), Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.C. (Mother) and R.L. (Father) (collectively, Parents) appeal the involuntary termination of their parental rights to A.L. (Child). Parents challenge the trial court's conclusions that the conditions that led to Child's removal would not be remedied, the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to Child's well-being, and termination was in Child's best interests. Because the uncontested findings clearly and convincingly support the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In September 2020, West Virginia Child Protective Services investigated a report that Mother and Father neglected five other children (Siblings) in their care. The report included allegations of domestic abuse, that Mother had untreated mental illness and substance abuse issues, and that Mother was being evicted due to the home's condition. A West Virginia court “adjudicated [Parents] as abusive and neglectful parents” and ordered Parents to complete a parental fitness and psychological evaluation, submit to drug screens, and participate in services. Father's App. Vol. II p. 53. Parents completed an evaluation but did not participate in services and moved to Muncie, Indiana, in April 2021. After Parents stopped participating in the case, the West Virginia court issued an order terminating Parents’ rights to Siblings in May 2021 (the West Virginia Court Order).

[3] After Parents moved to Muncie, they resided in a home that Mother believed she co-owned. In February 2022, Child was born to Parents. The Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) first became involved with Parents in April 2023, when it investigated a report that another sibling of Child died while co-sleeping with Parents. During the investigation, Parents tested positive for methamphetamine. DCS staff conducted an in-person assessment and noted the unclean and poor conditions of the home. DCS took no further action after Parents cleaned the house and passed a second drug screen. The home was foreclosed and sold in a tax sale in September 2023, but Parents continued to live there with Child.

[4] On March 26, 2024, DCS Family Case Manager (FCM) Allen Brown investigated a report that Child, then two years old, was staying at the home which lacked heating, running water, and electricity. FCM Brown spoke to Father who confirmed that the house lacked electricity and running water. Father also revealed that the family did not have any food and that Mother and Child were staying at the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA). Law enforcement from the Delaware County Sheriff's Office later informed FCM Brown that deputies took Mother and Child to the YWCA after they observed the condition of the house.

[5] FCM Brown attempted to contact Mother, but she was uncooperative. On April 9, DCS filed a motion to compel conduct to see Child and Mother. The following day, DCS, the Delaware County Health Department (DCHD), and law enforcement visited the home. Father greeted the group at the front door, retreated into the home for a few minutes, and then returned. At the same time, Mother “jogg[ed]” out the back door and through the back yard while carrying Child. Father's Ex. Vol. I p. 28. Law enforcement stopped Mother and asked why she was not staying at the YWCA. Mother revealed that she returned to the home with Child five days ago. Child was covered in dirt and mud, smelled strongly of urine, and appeared to have bedbug bites. Mother confirmed the marks were bedbug bites and claimed Child was bitten during their stay at the YWCA.

[6] Parents permitted the group to enter the house to inspect its conditions. Urine, animal feces, and excessive waste were observed throughout the home. The group also observed open rodent poison within reach of Child and a large hole in the kitchen floor leading into the crawlspace. DCHD staff observed numerous structural and plumbing issues. While Mother initially claimed they did not own any pets, four dogs were found in the home. And there was no bed for Child. When Mother was later asked whether she thought the conditions of the home were appropriate, she stated that the family was living in a tent in the backyard or in the garage and using a firepit for heat.

[7] DCHD condemned the property and deemed it unsuitable for habitation. When DCHD told Mother they would need to vacate the premises, she stated that she and Child would move into a tent at a nearby reservoir. DCS removed Child from the home and placed him in foster care. Muncie Animal Control also removed the dogs from the house. Parents were later charged with neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony, based on Child living in deplorable conditions.

[8] On April 11, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was in Need of Services (CHINS) due to Child's unhygienic presentation, the deplorable conditions of the home, Mother indicating she and Child would move into a tent after the property was condemned, and DCS's prior involvement with Parents in 2023. On April 12, the trial court continued Child's placement in foster care. On June 5, Parents stipulated that Child was a CHINS and the trial court adjudicated Child the same.

[9] On June 19, DCS filed a motion requesting the trial court find reasonable efforts to reunify Parents with Child were not required pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4)(C) (2023).¹ DCS attached the West Virginia Court Order to its motion. The trial court granted the State's motion on June 22 and found reasonable efforts to reunify Parents with Child were not required because the West Virginia court terminated Parents’ rights to Siblings. See id. As a result, Parents were not ordered to participate in any services. DCS withdrew its motion to compel conduct on July 26. The trial court later modified Child's permanency plan to termination of the parent-child relationships and adoption. DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ rights to Child on September 30.

[10] Despite not being required to do so, DCS extended some services to Parents. Father and Mother briefly attended a parental engagement class but otherwise did not participate in any services. Parents also attended supervised visitation with Child. On multiple occasions, FCM Randii Brown attended the visits and asked Parents to submit to drug screens.² Parents submitted to multiple drug screens in 2024. Father tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine in April and June. Mother and Father both tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine in November. Thereafter, Parents refused to submit for any other drug screens.

[11] After their home was condemned, Parents experienced homelessness for several months. Parents stayed with friends and stayed at one apartment for brief periods of time. In October, Parents received housing assistance through a United States Housing and Urban Development (HUD) program that paid for one year of rent and utilities at another apartment. After Parents obtained housing assistance, DCS repeatedly admonished them to establish the financial means to maintain the apartment once the year-long grant from HUD expired.

[12] FCM Brown visited the apartment twice: once in October when Parents moved in, and again in January 2025. She photographed the unsanitary conditions of the apartment: rotten food was left out, the floor was littered with trash and debris, and there were stacks of dirty dishes in the kitchen sink. Mother told FCM Brown that the home became messy because Mother had been sick for “two or three days” and was unable to clean. Tr. Vol. II p. 182. FCM Brown believed the mess and unsanitary conditions in the apartment were “more significant” and “definitely way older than just a couple days.” Id. Father provided no explanation for why he had not cleaned the apartment.

[13] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing across multiple days: December 5, December 11, January 13, 2025, and January 27. FCM Brown and Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) Amy Mansfield-Jones testified that termination of parental rights was in Child's best interests. Mother and Father both acknowledged that the conditions of the home were problematic but denied that Child was unsafe when living at the home. Mother admitted that she had taken to social media on multiple occasions to complain about the West Virginia case, Indiana DCS, Indiana law enforcement, DCHD staff, and the judge presiding over the trial court.

[14] Parents also testified about the efforts they claimed to be making to address their substance abuse issues and their ability to provide sanitary, safe, and stable housing. Parents informed the trial court that they were attending Recovery Café, a programming network which provides participants with activities and classes to aid in “life skills” development and “recovery from ․ substance abuse, mental health [issues] ․ domestic violence,” and other issues. Id. at 222, 223. Recovery Café did not drug screen Parents, but Parents were allowed to participate in the network's programming if they attended a weekly group meeting. Mother testified that she began attending in July. Father said he first began attending in May or June before ceasing participation and restarting in November. Father claimed that he was attending intensive outpatient treatment with Meridian Services on Wednesday and Thursday mornings. He also represented that he worked at a pallet factory Mondays through Fridays but did not provide any evidence of his employment.

[15] Child's foster mother testified about Child's current placement and development. When Child was first placed in foster care he screamed a lot, did not play well with others, would hit and bite other children, hit his head on objects, and did not sleep well. She also observed several instances of Child's food insecurity: Child constantly went to the refrigerator looking for food, would steal food from other children's plates, and tried to eat dog food on multiple occasions. Shortly after his removal from Parents’ care, Child was diagnosed with mixed expressive-receptive language delay due to cognitive and speech delays. Child's foster mother also testified that Child had acclimated to his current placement and played appropriately with other children. Child slept better and was making progress with potty training. Child also began attending occupational and speech therapy. A speech language pathologist from Lutheran Hospital observed improvement in Child's cognitive development and vocabulary since he began participating in therapy.

[16] Parents consistently engaged in visitation services and visited Child once a week. However, Child's foster parents observed Child would regress after visitations and engage in self-harming and aggressive behavior by pounding his head into the ground or being hostile with other children. Child would not sleep well on visitation days and would need to be held and rocked to stay asleep.

[17] DCS introduced into evidence the West Virginia Court Order and Parents’ psychological evaluation reports written by Dr. Barbara Nelson in connection with that case in 2021. Dr. Nelson also testified about her prior recommendations and Parents’ lack of progress in addressing issues she identified. She believed Parents lacked insight into their behaviors due to untreated mental health issues. She opined Mother's “borderline personality disorder traits” and Father's “anti-social” features led them to blame others for their circumstances and avoid accepting responsibility for their actions. Id. at 111, 112.

[18] Dr. Nelson recommended that Parents seek licensed therapy for their substance abuse and mental health issues, maintain appropriate housing, submit to drug screens, and provide a copy of her report to any professional working with Parents. She gave both Parents poor prognoses for improvement based on their unwillingness to accept responsibility during the West Virginia case and the Indiana case. Dr. Nelson did not believe Recovery Café’s services would be sufficient in addressing Parents’ substance abuse issues or mental health needs because it did not provide licensed treatment. Parents also testified that they could take Child to his occupational and speech therapy sessions if he was in their care. FCM Brown expressed doubt about Parents’ ability to consistently take Child to these appointments.

[19] The trial court did not find Father's testimony about his employment and intensive outpatient treatment credible, noting Father claimed to work Mondays through Fridays but also claimed to attend intensive outpatient treatment on Wednesday and Thursday mornings. It also found Parents continued to shift blame rather than accept responsibility, as evidenced by Mother's posts on social media. The trial court concluded Parents’ inability to provide safe and stable housing for Child was unlikely to be remedied. The trial court also concluded that continuing the relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, and termination of the relationships was in Child's best interests.

[20] Mother and Father separately appealed the termination of their parental rights to Child. We granted a motion to consolidate appeals. This decision follows.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[21] We recognize “[a] parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g. denied. Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.

[22] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.

In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Any unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true by this Court. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 609 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[23] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege and prove, in relevant part:

the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

***

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)-(4) (2024). In addition, DCS must allege and prove:

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3) (2024).³

[24] DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2 (1997). If the trial court finds the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a) (2012).

II. Termination of Parental Rights

A. Remedying Conditions

[25] Parents do not challenge the trial court's findings of fact, so we accept them as true. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d at 609 n.2. Similarly, Parents do not challenge the CHINS court's conclusion that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification were not required under Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6(b)(4)(C). Rather, Parents challenge whether sufficient evidence existed to support the trial court's conclusions that (1) the conditions resulting in removal would not be remedied and (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to Child's well-being. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive, “the trial court need only find that one of the three requirements of that subsection has been established by clear and convincing evidence.” In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. The remedying issue, therefore, is dispositive.

[26] In reviewing a trial court's conclusion that conditions will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis: first, “we must ascertain what conditions led to [Child's] placement” and second, “we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (citations and quotation marks omitted). As recently stated in In re A.L.:

It is well-established that “[a] trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” In judging fitness, a trial court may properly consider, among other things, a parent's substance abuse and lack of adequate housing and employment. The trial court may also consider a parent's failure to respond to services. “[H]abitual patterns of conduct must be evaluated to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.”

223 N.E.3d 1126, 1138-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (internal citations omitted) (brackets in original), trans. denied. A trial court's review is not limited to the conditions which formed the initial basis for a child's removal, “but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside of the home.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[27] Here, Child was removed due to Parents’ inability to provide Child with a safe, stable, and hygienic home. The Muncie home lacked heat, electricity, and running water. It was also in deplorable conditions with rotten food, urine, animal feces, and waste throughout it. Additional hazards to Child were present including a large hole in the kitchen floor and rat poison within reach of Child. When the property was condemned, Mother initially indicated she would live in a tent with Child at a nearby reservoir.

[28] In determining whether the conditions that led to Child's removal and continued placement outside the home would be remedied, the trial court adopted its findings from an October 2024 review hearing, including: Parents have not complied with Child's case plan; Parents “have not enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental obligations[;]” Father's App. Vol. II p. 58; Parents did not have stable housing, refused to drug screen, and did not demonstrate that they have maintained sobriety. The trial court also found:

2. The Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the removal of the child will not be adequately remedied by the parents. Parents have not demonstrated their ability to maintain housing after the grant paid housing expires.

3. Although Father testified he was employed, he has failed to provide a paystub to the Court or DCS. Father testified that he worked daily Monday through Friday, but contradicted his testimony by claiming to exercise two hours of supervised visitation on Monday and three days per week for three hours at Meridian. This would make full-time employment during the hours he claimed unlikely. The Court finds his testimony is not credible.

Id. at 58-59.

[29] Parents argue the conditions that resulted in Child's removal, the unsafe and unsanitary conditions at the Muncie home, have been remedied since the property was condemned and Parents now have a new apartment. However, DCS clearly and convincingly demonstrated that Parents had a pattern of unstable housing and failure maintaining a safe and clean living space. First, Mother's home in West Virginia was maintained in such poor conditions that she faced eviction in 2020. Second, the Muncie home was observed in deplorable conditions in 2023 when DCS first became involved with Parents. A year later, the house was in such an unsanitary state that the DCHD condemned the home and deemed it unsuitable for habitation. Rather than clean the house or have Mother and Child continue to stay at the YWCA, the family would live in a tent in the backyard or in the garage. Finally, FCM Brown observed the conditions at Parents’ apartment deteriorated in the short time between October 2024 and January 2025. When asked about the conditions of the apartment, Mother claimed she was simply unable to clean the apartment for two or three days. FCM Brown later testified that she believed the mess was “more significant” and “way older than just a couple days.” Tr. Vol. II p 182. The trial court properly considered Parents’ pattern of failing to maintain a clean and safe living space when it concluded the conditions that led to Child's removal were unlikely to be remedied.⁴ See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing In re C.M., 675 N.E.2d 1134, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).

[30] Further, the trial court not only addressed the original reasons for removal but also the reasons for Child's continued placement outside the home. See A.I., 825 N.E.2d at 806. Parents have a long history of substance abuse—Parents rights to Siblings were terminated by West Virginia in 2021 due to their drug use, Mother was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 2021, and Parents tested positive for methamphetamine in 2023 when DCS investigated the death of another sibling of Child. Parents continued to struggle with sobriety during the pendency of this case, testing positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine as late as November 2024. The trial court properly considered Parents’ failure to adequately address their substance abuse as one of the reasons for Child's continued placement outside the home. See In re J.L., 919 N.E.2d 561, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

B. Best Interests

[31] Parents also contend the trial court erred in concluding that termination was in Child's best interests. In determining best interests of a child, “trial courts must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” In re Ma.H, 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (citations omitted), cert. denied. “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency[,]” as “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Id. (citations omitted). We have previously held that “the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[32] Here, FCM Brown and CASA Mansfield-Jones both testified that termination is in Child's best interests. And, as explained above, Parents have not shown that the reasons for Child's removal will be remedied. Based on these facts alone, we could affirm the trial court's conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationships was in Child's best interests.

[33] Even so, Parents argue that termination is not in Child's best interests because they have an established bond with Child, which was demonstrated through visitations going well. However, Child would regress after visits and would self-harm, struggled to sleep, and acted aggressively towards other children. Child's foster parents were addressing Child's aggression, trouble sleeping, and symptoms of food insecurity, and his expressive-receptive language delay. Parents claim they could continue taking Child to his therapy appointments, but FCM Brown expressed doubt about Parents’ ability to consistently do so. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests. We affirm.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6 was substantially amended effective July 1, 2024. DCS's motion cited to the then-effective version of the statute.

2.   FCM Randii Brown maintained contact with Parents and Child throughout most of the case. Subsequent references to “FCM Brown” refer to FCM Randii Brown and not FCM Allen Brown.

3.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was substantially amended effective March 11, 2024. While Father cites to the prior version of the statute, DCS and the trial court cited to the then-effective version of the statute. We do the same.

4.   While not challenging the trial court's findings of fact, Parents argue Dr. Nelson's 2021 report and testimony were unreliable because she last worked with Parents in 2021. They also challenge the trial court's determination that they were unlikely to remedy their substance abuse issues because Parents were participating in Recovery Café and Father claimed he was attending intensive outpatient treatment. Finally, Parents dispute the trial court's conclusion that they would not be able to financially maintain the apartment because they had a year-long grant from HUD and Father claimed to work at a pallet factory. These arguments invite us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.