Lester J. Scott, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Lester J. Scott, Jr., appeals his convictions for domestic battery resulting in injury to a pregnant woman, a Level 5 felony, criminal confinement, a Level 6 felony, and intimidation, a Level 6 felony. He claims that the trial court erred in admitting evidence at trial of a prior uncharged battery that involved him and the victim, that recordings of jail telephone calls were improperly admitted, and that the trial court did not afford adequate weight to his mental health diagnosis as a mitigating circumstance at sentencing. Scott also maintains that his twelve-year aggregate sentence was inappropriate.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] J.M. and Scott began dating in 2021, and in February 2024, J.M. became pregnant with Scott's child. In June 2024, J.M. and Scott were living together in a second-floor apartment in Elkhart with J.M.’s six-year-old and six-month-old daughters.

[4] A few days before June 14, 2024, Scott and J.M. started to argue. At some point, Scott choked J.M., pushed her into the bedroom, and “flipped her over” the bed. Transcript Vol. II at 74. Scott eventually stopped choking J.M. when she was unable to breathe. Scott apologized and J.M. did not seek medical help or contact the police because she wanted to “save the relationship.” Id. at 132.

[5] On June 14, Scott and J.M. drove to a Popeye's restaurant with J.M.’s two children and purchased food to take home. During the ride home, Scott started to argue with J.M. about her older daughter's behavior. Scott was angry and wanted J.M. to “whoop” her. Id. at 84-85.

[6] After arriving at the apartment, Scott told J.M. to discipline the child “right then and there.” Id. at 86. J.M. refused, and Scott “kept getting louder and louder and everything just escalated.” Id. Although J.M. told Scott that she was going to leave, Scott stopped her and told her to “sit down and listen.” Id. at 87. Scott then threatened to “knock [J.M.’s] teeth out” and have people come to the apartment and steal her property. Id. at 87-88. Scott followed J.M. around the residence to keep her from leaving. Eventually, J.M. was able to open the front door and run out, carrying her six-month-old daughter. Scott followed and slammed the door on J.M., hitting her in the arm, leg, and side, causing her pain. The door also hit J.M.’s daughter. As J.M. fell onto the stairs, Scott grabbed her wig that was attached with a strong adhesive. Scott pulled “pretty hard,” and the wig came off, causing J.M. pain. Id. at 89, 93. J.M. got up, ran down the stairs, got into her car, and locked her and her daughter inside. She immediately called 911 and reported the incident.

[7] Scott approached J.M.’s vehicle, apologized, and tried to convince J.M. to return to the apartment. When J.M. refused, Scott attempted to open the car door. The apartment manager, who was nearby, approached and saw Scott pushing on the car and yelling. At that point, Scott ran back to the apartment.

[8] Police officers arrived shortly thereafter, and J.M. was “extremely upset, sobbing, and gasping.” Id. at 163. One of the officers took photographs of J.M.’s injuries to her leg and scalp. J.M. also told the officers that her side ached from where she was struck by the apartment door.

[9] When police officers encountered Scott, they told him that he was being arrested for confinement and domestic battery. Scott replied that he had done nothing wrong. The State ultimately charged Scott with domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman, a Level 5 felony, domestic battery in the presence of a child under 16 years of age, a Level 6 felony, criminal confinement, a Level 6 felony, domestic battery with a prior conviction, a Level 6 felony, and intimidation, a Level 6 felony.¹ The State further alleged that Scott was a habitual offender.

[10] In December 2024, while incarcerated in the Elkhart County jail, Scott called J.M. twice. During the first call, Scott told J.M. that he loved her and stated that she should not show up for his trial. During the second call, Scott told J.M. not to answer her door if someone was bringing a subpoena for her to testify and that the State would not do anything to her if she did not appear in court.

[11] Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to offer evidence under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) about the alleged battery incident that had occurred days before the June 14 incident. The State also filed notices of intent to offer evidence of the jail calls that Scott made to J.M. Scott subsequently filed a motion in limine to prohibit the State from offering evidence of uncharged crimes or bad acts under Evid. R. 404(b).

[12] The trial court indicated prior to jury selection that it would preliminarily allow evidence of the prior battery, but “ultimately it's going to depend on how the evidence develops as we proceed.” Transcript Vol. II at 9. As for the jail calls, the trial court indicated that it would revisit admissibility during trial, but it would be willing to give a limiting instruction if the calls were admitted.

[13] During the jury trial that commenced on December 10, 2024, Scott argued that evidence of the alleged prior battery was inadmissible because it had not been reported to police or otherwise documented, was not relevant to motive, and was more prejudicial than probative. The trial court overruled the objection. The trial court indicated that it would give a final instruction regarding the applicability of Evid. R. 404(b) evidence, to which Scott did not object. Thus, the trial court informed the jury that evidence of Scott's involvement in another crime was presented for the sole purpose of establishing Scott's motive.

[14] J.M. testified that Scott told her in the telephone calls to not show up for court, not to speak with the prosecutor, and not to answer the door if someone arrived with a subpoena. Scott did not object to her testimony. When Scott objected to the State's playing of the recorded calls for the jury, however, he argued that J.M.’s statements were hearsay and that the calls were unnecessarily cumulative. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted the recorded calls to be played for the jury.

[15] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Scott guilty as charged. The trial court, with the agreement of the parties, entered judgments of conviction only on domestic battery resulting in bodily injury on a pregnant woman, criminal confinement, and intimidation. Scott also admitted to being a habitual offender.

[16] A presentence investigation report (PSI) reflected that Scott had a juvenile history that included adjudications for theft and robbery, and adult misdemeanor convictions for disorderly conduct, interfering with a law enforcement animal, possession of marijuana, public nudity, and criminal trespass. Scott had also amassed felony convictions for illegal drug possession, theft, strangulation, battery against a public safety officer in two separate cases, and escape. The PSI further showed that Scott had violated the terms of his supervised probation on nine occasions and was on probation when he committed the instant offenses. Scott also admitted to the probation officer who prepared the PSI that he had been “written up” for fighting while incarcerated. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 73.

[17] During the sentencing hearing on January 5, 2025, Scott argued that his mental health history was a mitigating factor and that he was taking medication to address schizophrenia and anxiety issues. Scott also pointed out that he had undergone mental health treatment on at least one occasion.

[18] The trial court identified Scott's mental health issues and his admission to the habitual offender count as mitigating circumstances. The trial court listed Scott's juvenile and criminal history, probation violations, the failure to take advantage of prior opportunities for rehabilitation, and conduct while incarcerated as aggravating factors. It then determined that the aggravating circumstances significantly outweighed the mitigating factors, and sentenced Scott to six years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) for domestic battery, a Level 5 felony, that it enhanced by six years on the habitual offender count. As for the two Level 6 felony convictions—confinement and intimidation—the trial court imposed two-year sentences on each and ordered them to run concurrently with the domestic battery sentence, for an aggregate sentence of twelve years.

[19] Scott now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Prior Battery

[20] Citing Evid. R. 404(b), Scott argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the alleged battery that occurred several days prior to the June 14, 2024, incident. Scott maintains that this evidence was not relevant to motive, there was no medical evidence “or any other sort of testimony” offered to “ensure the credibility of [the] event,” and that the prejudicial impact of that evidence denied his right to a fair trial. Appellant's Brief at 14.

[21] In general, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Wanke v. State, 231 N.E.3d 878, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). The trial court abuses its discretion when its evidentiary ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or when the court misinterpreted the law. J.Q.R. v. State, 252 N.E.3d 919, 924 (Ind. 2025).

[22] Evid. R. 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,” but “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive.” For the evidence to be admissible under this rule, “there must be sufficient proof to enable a factfinder to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the prior acts occurred.” D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 224 (Ind. 2009) (discussing principles of conditional relevance under Ind. Evidence Rule 104(b)), (emphasis added). But even if the evidence fits into a permitted purpose and there is sufficient proof that the acts occurred, Ind. Evidence Rule 403 calls for excluding evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

[23] Hostility is a common motive for committing a crime, and evidence of motive is relevant in the proof of a crime. Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997); Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Additionally, where a relationship between parties is characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant's prior assaults and confrontations with the victim may be admitted “to show the relationship between the parties and motive for committing the crime.” Embry v. State, 923 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Evidence of a prior alleged battery where a defendant denies committing any violence toward the victim, is highly relevant to a motive to attack the victim. Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

[24] Here, the record shows that Scott denied committing the offenses, and he claimed that he had done nothing wrong. Those denials alone rendered the evidence of prior hostility highly probative. See id. Moreover, the fact that the prior incident was close in time to the charged offenses increased the relevance of the evidence. Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 221 (proximity in time is a relevant consideration).

[25] The trial court had evidence before it—J.M.’s testimony—that the prior battery occurred. And that evidence was relevant to show the hostility in the relationship and the motive it would have given Scott to attack J.M. on the date of the charged offenses. See Embry, 923 N.E.2d at 9. If credited by the jury, J.M.’s testimony would have been sufficient for it to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Scott committed the prior acts.

[26] Scott's argument regarding J.M.’s decision not to report the alleged battery and the lack of additional evidence to establish the credibility of the incident is essentially a claim that the trial court should have assessed the credibility of J.M.’s testimony and found it lacking. That, however, was not the trial court's function regarding admissibility. See D.R.C., 908 N.E.2d at 224. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Scott's prior alleged battery against J.M. on this basis.

[27] As for Scott's claim that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, we note that after determining the relevancy of the evidence, the trial court must then balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect under Evid. R. 403. Carr v. State, 255 N.E.3d 519, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “A trial court's discretion is wide on issues of relevance and unfair prejudice.” Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 176 (Ind. 2017) (citations omitted).

[28] The probative value of this evidence must have been substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect to preclude its admission. Evid. R. 403. Although evidence of a prior battery committed on J.M. was prejudicial, the probative value of the evidence was high. Thus, we cannot say that the prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. See, e.g., Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (the high probative value of prior assaults was not outweighed by prejudice). In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the prior alleged battery.

II. Jail Telephone Calls

[29] Scott claims that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence recordings of the two calls that Scott made to J.M. from jail. Scott maintains that playing the calls for the jury was prejudicial and merely cumulative of J.M.’s testimony.

[30] As discussed above, evidentiary decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. J.Q.R., 252 N.E.3d at 924. Here, we note that the calls had substantial probative value, inasmuch as evidence of a defendant's attempts to either suppress or manufacture evidence to “cover up” his crimes is relevant evidence of guilt. Kyle v. State, 54 N.E.3d 439, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The calls, when played for the jury, contained information about how Scott was requesting J.M. not to come to court and exerting pressure on her to allow him to return home.

[31] The calls were also not merely cumulative of J.M.’s testimony because they included information that J.M.’s testimony did not. For instance, J.M. testified that Scott called her and told her not to come to court, talk to the prosecutor, or answer the door if someone was bringing a subpoena. The recorded calls permitted the jury to hear Scott's tone of voice and other verbal qualities that the jury could have assessed in deciding what weight to afford the calls. The calls also contained Scott's repeated assertions that he could come home if J.M. did not testify, thus demonstrating that Scott was trying to pressure J.M. and make her feel guilty about his incarceration.

[32] Moreover, when evidence is offered to corroborate a witness's testimony, and that witness's credibility is a central issue in the case, that additional evidence is not merely cumulative. Troutner v. State, 951 N.E.2d 603, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. As Scott attacked J.M.’s credibility throughout the trial, the calls corroborated J.M.’s credibility and were not merely cumulative for this additional reason. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the calls to be played for the jury.

III. Sentencing; Mental Health As a Mitigating Circumstance

[33] Scott claims that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him when it did not consider the extent of his mental illness and give it appropriate weight as a mitigating factor. Claims regarding trial court sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 981 (Ind. 2020). An abuse of discretion only occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable deductions from those facts. Id.

[34] In sentencing, an abuse of discretion may be found in situations such as where a trial court omits mitigating factors that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). The relative weight given to an aggravating or mitigating factor, however, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. at 491.

[35] Here, while the trial court identified Scott's mental illness as a mitigating factor, Scott claims that the trial court failed to “give his mental health the weight it deserved.” Appellant's Brief at 22. Such a claim is not reviewable as an abuse of discretion and thus fails. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91; see also Nash v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1060, 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (defendant's argument that the trial court did not assign enough weight to his mental illness as a mitigating circumstance was not an issue available for appellate review), trans. denied.

IV. Inappropriate Sentence

[36] Scott argues that his twelve-year sentence is inappropriate under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). His sole contention is that his sentence must be revised in light of his character because the trial court failed to properly consider how his mental illness “played a part in the events.” Appellant's Brief at 25.

[37] We evaluate inappropriate sentence claims under the following well-settled standard of review:

We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. App. R. 7(B). Our role in reviewing a sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B) “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding principles for the trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “The defendant bears the burden of persuading this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate.” Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

“Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case.” Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

Belcher v. State, 138 N.E.3d 318, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[38] We note that the two prongs—nature of the offense and character of the offender—are “separate inquiries that we ultimately balance․ ” Turkette v. State, 151 N.E.3d 782, 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. While Scott's argument does not touch on the nature of the offenses, we will consider both prongs in our assessment. Id. at 1103.

[39] When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence for the crime. McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, “we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The sentence for a Level 5 felony ranges from one to six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6. The sentence for a Level 6 felony ranges from six months to two and one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7. Scott was sentenced to the maximum six-year penalty for domestic battery resulting in injury to a pregnant woman, a Level 5 felony, that was enhanced by six years on the habitual offender count. And for the Level 6 felonies, intimidation and confinement, Scott was sentenced to two years on each offense—one year above the advisory sentence. The trial court also ordered those sentences to run concurrently with the domestic battery sentence.

[40] Here, the evidence established that Scott's crimes were spurred by his anger over J.M.’s handling of her older daughter's discipline, a matter for which Scott had no responsibility. When J.M.—who was pregnant with Scott's child—attempted to de-escalate the situation, Scott responded by not letting her leave the apartment, slamming the door on her, and grabbing her in a way that caused her to fall on the stairs. His actions also endangered J.M.’s infant daughter, whom J.M. was holding. Scott pulled off J.M.’s wig, causing her pain, and he threatened to “knock out [her] teeth” and have people steal her valuable belongings. Transcript Vol. II at 87-88. The severity of Scott's offenses supports the sentence.

[41] When examining Scott's character, we consider a wide range of facts, including his age, criminal history, background, and past rehabilitative efforts. Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91, 100 (Ind. 2021). Scott told the probation officer who prepared the PSI that he “was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and anxiety.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 75. Scott also stated that he has had prior mental health treatment and currently takes medication to treat his conditions. The record was not otherwise developed regarding his mental health.

[42] Further, the PSI established that Scott has a juvenile history and a significant adult criminal history. Specifically, Scott has juvenile adjudications for theft and robbery, had those offenses been committed by an adult. As an adult, Scott has several prior misdemeanor convictions and felony convictions that include drug possession, strangulation, theft, battery against a public safety officer, and escape. Scott's notable adult and juvenile criminal history reflects poorly on his character. See, e.g., Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (explaining even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character). Moreover, Scott violated his probation several times, and he was on probation when he committed the instant offenses. All these factors are representative of Scott's poor character. Despite Scott's mental illness, given his extensive criminal history, his probation violations, and the fact that he committed the instant offenses while on probation, we cannot say that his twelve-year sentence is inappropriate under App. R. 7(B).

[43] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State amended the charging informations several times during the pendency of these proceedings.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur. Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.