Achery Nailon, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Achery Nailon appeals his conviction and sentence for domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Nailon and Jacquisha Hunt were married in October 2023. On January 27, 2024, Hunt and Nailon drove in Hunt's Jeep from their house in Indianapolis to Warsaw, Indiana, where Hunt met with a person who worked for her home health care business to train the person to use a Hoyer lift. Following the meeting in Warsaw, Hunt and Nailon drove to visit Nailon's mother and then his father in South Bend. Nailon had an “attitude with” Hunt, stating that she “was playing in his face” and “was flirting and talking to [her] worker.” Transcript Volume III at 146. Nailon and Hunt left South Bend, traveled toward Indianapolis, and argued. Hunt told Nailon that she “was done with the marriage.” Id. at 151. Nailon “got pissed” and the tone of his voice “was aggressive.” Id. Nailon stopped at a gas station. Hunt exited the Jeep and told Nailon to exit the driver's seat and that she “wasn't getting back in the vehicle with him.” Id. at 153.

[3] Hunt “started walking towards the street callin’ [her] son.” Id. Nailon and Hunt “were both screaming at each other.” Id. at 155. Nailon pulled the Jeep in front of Hunt and exited the vehicle. Hunt entered the driver's seat and attempted to lock the passenger side door but, before she could do so, Nailon opened the passenger side door and entered the vehicle. Hunt told Nailon that she “wasn't driving [and] was just going to stay right there and just call the police.” Id. at 157. Nailon “was basically screaming” at Hunt that “he was basically going to kill [her].” Id. Hunt started driving toward Indianapolis. At one point, Nailon “grabbed [the] steering wheel, which made [Hunt] go over into the median,” and she recovered control of the vehicle and pulled over to the side of the road. Id. at 159. Hunt said that she was going to call the police, she and Nailon “started fighting over [her] phone” and “were tussling over the phone,” and Nailon ultimately obtained and turned off the phone. Id. at 161-162. Nailon told Hunt to start driving. Nailon “kept flicking” the “locks” of Hunt's hair, “saying what are you crying for?” Id. at 176. Nailon was “[k]ind of pushing [Hunt's] head to the side.” Id. When they arrived at Hunt's house in Indianapolis, Hunt saw her children in one of the windows and yelled to them to call the police. Nailon exited the Jeep, entered another of Hunt's vehicles, and drove away.

[4] The State charged Nailon with attempted murder as a level 1 felony, kidnapping as a level 3 felony, criminal confinement as a level 3 felony, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a level 4 felony, intimidation as a level 5 felony, criminal recklessness as a level 6 felony, pointing a firearm as a level 6 felony, and domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor.¹ The State filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts pursuant to Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) stating “[t]here is a history of abusive behavior from [Nailon] towards the victim, including allegations that he has pointed a firearm at her ․ on at least two (2) occasions prior to the alleged offenses.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 74. Nailon filed a motion in limine requesting that the court prohibit the State from introducing “[e]vidence alleging a history of abusive behavior by [Nailon] toward the complaining witness” and “[e]vidence that [he] threatened; battered; and/or pointed a firearm at the complaining witness at some time or place other than that alleged in the charging information herein.” Id. at 90-91.

[5] On October 24, 2024, the court held a hearing. The court stated “this is a hearing for the purpose of the State making an offer to prove.” Transcript Volume II at 110. Hunt testified that, after she and Nailon were married in October 2023, they had “more physical arguing ․ tussling ․ like physically pushing each other, grabbing.” Id. at 112-113. She testified that, approximately two weeks after they were married, she and Nailon had an argument, they “were tussling over his phone,” she hit him in the mouth, he bit her arm, and he “pulled out his gun,” pointed it at her, and “cocked it back.” Id. at 114, 116. She testified that, sometime after Christmas 2023, she and Nailon had an argument and Nailon “pulled a gun on [her].” Id. at 120. She also testified that, on New Year's Day 2024, she and Nailon argued, she “told him [that she] was done with this marriage,” and “that's the third time that he pulled a gun on [her].” Id. at 122. The court issued an order providing:

The matters about which [Hunt] testified on October 24, 2024, are relevant to matters other than [Nailon's] propensity to commit the acts that have been charged in this case. Specifically, the matters about which [Hunt] testified are relevant to showing the relationship between her and [Nailon], showing motive, and to prove the requisite mental state ․ of [Nailon]. Additionally, the probative value of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to [Nailon].

Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 106.

[6] In November 2024, the court held a jury trial. Hunt testified that, when she said that she was going to call the police, Nailon “took the gun out.” Transcript Volume III at 162. The prosecutor later asked, “was this the first time [Nailon] pulled a gun on you,” defense counsel objected based on Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b), and the court overruled the objection. Id. at 191-192. Hunt testified that Nailon had pulled a firearm on her three times prior to January 27, 2024. She indicated there were other instances during the relationship that he was physically or verbally abusive. She testified that the third time he pulled a firearm on her was on New Year's Day. When asked why she stayed with Nailon, Hunt replied “[b]ecause [Nailon] always called me, bugged me, and swore up and down that he was going to change, [ ] that he didn't mean anything ․ he was just upset. That he wanted to work on our marriage.” Id. at 195. She indicated that they went to counseling. The jury found Nailon guilty of domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor and not guilty of the other charges. At sentencing, the court stated that it considered the evidence at trial, noted that Nailon had a significant criminal history, and sentenced him to one year incarceration.

Discussion

I.

[7] Nailon argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his “prior bad acts.” Appellant's Brief at 15. The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). A trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is generally accorded a great deal of deference on appeal. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied.

[8] Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2) provides “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule 403 provides, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

[9] Specifically, Nailon asserts that, “while the evidence of [his] prior bad acts may have been offered for a permissible purpose ․, its probative value was outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice to [him].” Appellant's Brief at 17. He argues “the evidence supporting the domestic battery charge was scant,” “[t]he jury, given the acquittals on the other charges, did not credit [Hunt] or her story,” and “[t]he unfair prejudice Rules 403 and 404(b) are supposed to guard against (but did not in this case) form the most likely explanation for the incongruent verdicts.” Id. at 17-18.

[10] The standard for assessing the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is: (1) the court must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged act; and (2) the court must balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403. Boone v. State, 728 N.E.2d 135, 137-138 (Ind. 2000), reh'g denied; Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997). The evidence is inadmissible when the State offers it only to produce the “forbidden inference” that the defendant has engaged in other, uncharged misconduct and the charged conduct was in conformity with the uncharged misconduct. Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1235 (Ind. 2000). The trial court has wide latitude, however, in weighing the probative value of the evidence against the possible prejudice of its admission. Id. If evidence has some purpose besides behavior in conformity with a character trait and the balancing test is favorable, the trial court can elect to admit the evidence. Boone, 728 N.E.2d at 138. For instance, evidence which is necessary for the jury to understand the relationships between the victim, various witnesses, and the defendant may be admissible. See Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1270-1271 (Ind. 2002). Also, evidence which is relevant to the defendant's motive may be admissible. See Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2).

[11] Here, Nailon does not specifically argue that the challenged evidence was offered for an impermissible purpose under Rule 404(b). Indeed, Hunt's testimony regarding Nailon's prior acts of pulling a gun on her and other instances that he was physically or verbally abusive was relevant to understanding Nailon and Hunt's relationship and relevant to Nailon's motive, and the testimony was not merely evidence supporting the “forbidden inference” of Nailon's propensity to commit the charged acts. See Hatcher v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (Ind. 2000) (“The emergency protective order was relevant to motive and the history of Patton's relationship with Hatcher. As the State indicated, the existence of the protective order ‘goes to show the victim's fear, and the fact that they had difficulties.’ ”); Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 1997) (“the evidence of domestic violence was probative of the hostility between the parties”) (citing Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996) (“A defendant's prior bad acts are ․ usually admissible to show the relationship between the defendant and the victim.”); Elliott v. State, 630 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ind. 1994) (prior threats of violence admissible to show relationship between the parties and defendant's motive), reh'g denied; Price v. State, 619 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind. 1993) (prior bad acts against victim admissible “to show the relationship between the parties and appellant's motive”), reh'g denied).

[12] Further, the challenged testimony consisted of a small portion of Hunt's testimony before the jury,² and Hunt testified in detail regarding the extended argument and altercation and Nailon's actions on January 27, 2024. We cannot say that the admission of the challenged testimony violated Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) or that the testimony's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding evidence of prior domestic violence incident “demonstrated Davis's hostile relationship with [the victim] and was germane to prove his motive” and was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, noting “[t]he testimony and discussion regarding the contested evidence comprised only a short amount of time during the course of Davis's three-day trial”), trans. denied.

II.

[13] Nailon argues the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[14] Nailon asserts that the jury found him not guilty of attempted murder, kidnapping, criminal confinement, intimidation, criminal recklessness, pointing a firearm, and possession of a firearm, that “[n]ecessarily, when the jury found him not guilty of these charges, it discredited [Hunt's] testimony,” and that, “there was no evidence whatsoever against [him] outside [Hunt's] testimony.” Appellant's Brief at 14. He argues, “[e]ven if the jury did credit her testimony, it is difficult to see which part of her story would amount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the rude, insolent or angry touching.” Id.

[15] Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a) provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. A person engages in conduct intentionally if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so, and knowingly if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2. “Any touching, however slight, may constitute battery.” Matter of Hill, 144 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2020) (citation omitted).

[16] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[j]ury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable.” Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). “A trier of fact may believe one part of the testimony of a witness and disbelieve and reject another part.” Nelson v. State, 525 N.E.2d 296, 297 (Ind. 1988) (citation omitted). “A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012).

[17] Hunt testified that, at one point while she was driving to Indianapolis, she “just stopped talking” and “was praying.” Transcript Volume III at 176. She testified, “I have locks ․ he kept flicking my locks saying what are you crying for? You've been done worser [sic] than this.” Id. When asked, “[s]o, you said he kind of flicked your hair ․ did he touch you in any other way,” she testified, “Yeah. Kind of like pushing my head to the side like this.” Id. She also testified, “It [her phone] was under my lap on the driver's seat,” “I told him ․ I was going to call the police,” “we started fighting over my phone,” and “we were tussling over the phone. So, like, he tried to grab it from up under me. And I was grabbing him back.” Id. at 161-162.

[18] The jury was able to assess Hunt's credibility and her testimony. The State presented evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find Nailon guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor. See Cooper v. State, 831 N.E.2d 1247, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Morris’ testimony about what Cooper was yelling at K.S. supports the reasonable inference that when Cooper grabbed and struck K.S., she was touching him in an angry manner.”), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

III.

[19] Nailon argues that his sentence violates Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides, “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” This Court has held:

Determining the appropriate sentence for a crime is a function properly exercised by the legislature. Steelman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 152, 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992). This court will not disturb the legislature's determination unless there is a showing of clear constitutional infirmity. Id. In other words, we will not set aside a legislatively sanctioned penalty because it might seem too severe. Clark v. State, 561 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ind. 1990). Rather, a sentence may be unconstitutional by reason of its length, if it is so severe and entirely out of proportion to the gravity of offense committed as “ ‘to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of a reasonable people.’ ” Pritscher v. State, 675 N.E.2d 727, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Cox v. State, 203 Ind. 544, 549, 181 N.E. 469, 472 (1932)).

Teer v. State, 738 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied.

[20] In light of the evidence, we cannot conclude that Nailon's one-year sentence was so severe and out of proportion to the gravity of his domestic battery offense as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people. We find no violation of Article 1, Section 16.³

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Nailon's conviction and sentence.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The charging information for domestic battery alleged that, “on or about January 27, 2024 ․ Nailon did knowingly or intentionally touch [Hunt], a family or household member in a rude insolent or angry manner by hitting her and/or grabbing her hair ․” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 35.

2.   The challenged testimony of Hunt appears on four pages in the transcript, and Hunt's testimony spans approximately 117 pages. Nailon's jury trial lasted four days, with evidence presented on the second and third days.

3.   To the extent Nailon asserts the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, we have observed that trial courts are not required to articulate and balance aggravating or mitigating circumstances before imposing sentence on a misdemeanor conviction. We held that “abuse of discretion review of a sentence, which concerns a trial court's duty to issue a sentencing statement along with its findings of aggravators and mitigators, has no place in reviewing a misdemeanor sentence.” Stephenson v. State, 53 N.E.3d 557, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted). Thus, Nailon's abuse of discretion in sentencing claim is without merit. See id.

Brown, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur. Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.