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IN RE: the Matter of T.M. (Child in Need of Services), M.M. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem
MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] M.M. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's determination that her minor child, T.M. (“Child”), is a child in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born to Mother in September 2019.1 Mother has two older children that were removed from her care due to allegations of substance abuse and domestic violence. Child was diagnosed with sickle cell anemia soon after birth and began receiving treatment at Riley Hospital's Sickle Cell Clinic (the “Clinic”). Due to her diagnosis, Child requires frequent medical treatment and has approximately ten prescription medications that must be taken regularly. Child has been the subject of two prior CHINS cases filed in September 2019 and May 2021 due to allegations that included medical neglect. Child was adjudicated a CHINS as to Mother in both cases, the cases were successfully closed, and Child was ultimately reunified with Mother.
[3] After Child missed several medical appointments in more recent years, the Clinic provided Mother with a social worker, Genese Parker, as part of her care team to help support Mother and Child and “remove barriers so that it [would be] easier to be able to provide medical care to [Child].” Transcript Volume II at 26. Parker's main objective was “trying to get [Child] to appointments on a consistent basis,” so she had several conversations with Mother and provided her with written “expectations” as part of a “care contract” that Mother signed in November 2023. Id. at 27. However, Mother and Child continued to miss appointments, with Mother giving excuses such as “car trouble” or “just forgetting that the appointment was happening or needing to go to work[.]” Id. at 28. Accordingly, Parker “ended up having to file a report” with the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) because “of numerous missed appointments.” Id.
[4] In August 2024, DCS received a report from the Clinic regarding Child alleging medical neglect. DCS Assessment Family Case Manager Edel Senefeld (“FCM Senefeld”) went to the home of Child's maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) because Mother had listed that home as her address. Grandmother advised FCM Senefeld that Mother and Child did not live with her and that she did not know where they were living. FCM Senefeld eventually spoke to Mother, and Mother claimed she was instructed not to give Child some of her medications, and she further claimed that she missed several appointments because she also has sickle cell anemia and was often sick. Mother claimed to be living with Grandmother despite Grandmother's denial and told FCM Senefeld, “Well, my driver[’s] license has that address, so you have to count that as my address.” Id. at 41. FCM Senefeld attempted to visit Mother at Grandmother's home on at least eight subsequent occasions but was not able to do so because Mother repeatedly asked to reschedule the visits, giving excuses such as she lost her keys, illness, and work. FCM Senefeld aided Mother in scheduling an appointment for Child at the Clinic on October 3, 2024, after Child had been treated at the hospital on at least two occasions for seizures. Mother failed to appear for the appointment and later told FCM Senefeld that she overslept and did not have a ride.
[5] On October 3, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS. Specifically, DCS alleged that Mother was neglecting Child's medical needs and had unstable housing. The court held a combined initial and detention hearing on October 4, 2024, after which it entered an order detaining Child. Child was placed with the same foster family she had been placed with during a prior removal.
[6] The court held a factfinding hearing on January 16, 2025. Mother arrived late to the hearing. Counsel appeared on her behalf. DCS presented the testimony of Parker, Megan Matthes, a physician assistant with the Hematology and Oncology Department at Riley Hospital, Family Case Manager Davia Duncan (“FCM Duncan”), Ashley Taylor, a visitation supervisor with Alliance for Life, Grandmother, Home-based Caseworker Algernon Alexander, and FCM Senefeld. Matthes explained the severity of Child's sickle cell disease and that she needed to be seen at the Clinic every two to four months, and sooner if there has been “a hospital visit” due to complications. Id. at 13. Matthes explained the different medications Child had been prescribed to treat her disease and the importance that Child take those medications. When asked, “[H]ave those medications been regularly filled for [Child],” Matthes responded, “No, they have not.” Id. at 15. Matthes further testified that she could tell “from [Child's] labs” that she had not been regularly receiving her medication. Id. at 16. Parker testified regarding Mother's “pattern” of missing multiple scheduled appointments for Child at the Clinic which caused Parker to eventually file a report with DCS. Id. at 35. FCM Duncan testified that Mother had not attended Child's medical appointments during the pendency of the CHINS case, had a history of not administering Child's medication, and did not visit Child when Child was hospitalized for five days. On February 12, 2025, the court issued its order adjudicating Child a CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing on February 28, 2025, the court entered a dispositional decree ordering Mother to participate in reunification services including home-based case work and therapy, random drug screens, and a substance abuse assessment.
Discussion
[7] Mother asserts that the trial court clearly erred in adjudicating Child a CHINS. In reviewing a trial court's determination that a child is in need of services, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses and consider only the evidence which supports the court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286-1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied. As no statute expressly requires formal findings in a CHINS factfinding order and because neither party requested them under Ind. Trial Rule 52(A), we apply the two-tiered standard of whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment to any issue covered by the findings, and we review any remaining issues under the general judgment standard pursuant to which a judgment “will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We will reverse a CHINS determination only if clearly erroneous. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). A decision is clearly erroneous if the record facts do not support the findings or if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.
[8] Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 provides:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
The statute does not require a court to wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when the child is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id.
[9] Mother first argues that the court abused its discretion in admitting, over her general hearsay objection, DCS Exhibit 3, which consisted of Child's “Medication Fill History” from the Riley Hospital pharmacy. Exhibits Volume I at 59-63. DCS offered the exhibit during Matthes's testimony indicating that Mother failed to provide Child with her necessary medications. Following Mother's hearsay objection, and specifically her objection that Matthes did not have “personal knowledge” of the information contained in the exhibit or “who prepared it,” Transcript Volume II at 18, DCS elicited testimony from Matthes establishing that the exhibit was part of Child's electronic medical record, that it was a true and accurate depiction of those records, that Matthes has access to the records, and that she relies upon those records in her treatment of Child.
[10] Mother challenges three of the trial court's findings which she claims relied on the exhibit, asserting that “[a]dmissible evidence does not support the findings that [Mother] failed to provide T.M. with her medication” and “[b]ecause findings 10, 15, and 25 were based on inadmissible [hearsay] evidence ․ they were clearly erroneous.” Appellant's Brief at 1l (emphasis omitted). Finding 10 states, “The reason for the social worker on [Child's] medical team was out of the team's concern for [Child] not attending the necessary medical appointments and was not obtaining [Child's] medications.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 66. Finding 15 states, “Mother has failed to maintain [Child's] medications as prescribed by [Child's] medical team.” Id. Finding 25 states, “It is not currently possible for [Child] to be returned home to Mother because of her consistent failure to ensure [Child] makes it to appointments and gets her medications filled.” Id.
[11] The admission of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. D.B.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 20 N.E.3d 174, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Evidentiary rulings of a trial court are afforded great deference on appeal and are overturned only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We will reverse the trial court's decision regarding the admission of evidence only when the decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. In re L.T., 145 N.E.3d 864, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). It is well established that errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 834.
[12] Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In re K.R., 154 N.E.3d 818, 820 (Ind. 2020) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c)). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls under a recognized exception. Ind. Evidence Rule 802. These exceptions are enumerated in Ind. Evidence Rule 803.
[13] Although DCS argues that the exhibit was admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception provided by Ind. Evidence Rule 803(6) which refers to “Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity,” we need not address this argument as any error in the admission of the exhibit was harmless. Matthes testified without objection that Child's medications were not regularly refilled and that she could tell from Child's lab results that she was not receiving her medications. Admission of hearsay evidence is not grounds for reversal where it is merely cumulative of other evidence admitted. Matter of A.F., 69 N.E.3d 932, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331-332 (Ind. 1996)), trans denied. Because the challenged findings are supported by evidence that was cumulative of the exhibit, we cannot say that reversal is warranted on this basis.
[14] Mother further maintains that the evidence presented does not support the trial court's conclusion that Child is a CHINS. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court's CHINS adjudication, there is ample evidence that Child's physical condition is seriously endangered as a result of Mother's failure to ensure Child's medical needs are met and that Child requires care that is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. DCS presented evidence that five-year-old Child has been diagnosed with a serious illness that requires frequent medical treatment, and she has approximately ten prescription medications that must be taken regularly. While in Mother's care, Child missed numerous medical appointments, failed to take her medication, and had two hospitalizations due to Mother's failure to comply with Child's treatment plan. In addition, DCS presented evidence that Mother lacks stable housing. In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say that the court's CHINS adjudication is clearly erroneous.
[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[16] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1. Child's biological father is deceased.
Brown, Judge.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-JC-772
Decided: September 23, 2025
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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