Shannon V. Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Shannon V. Smith (“Smith”) appeals following the revocation of her direct placement on home detention with community corrections, where the trial court revoked the balance of Smith's previously suspended sentence and ordered her to serve that time in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Smith presents two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the balance of Smith's previously suspended sentence and ordering that time executed in the DOC; and

II. Whether Smith was deprived of the right to due process because the trial court allegedly applied a “zero tolerance policy” in revoking the placement.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In January 2023, Smith entered into a plea agreement with the State, pleading guilty to the following five counts: (1) Level 3 felony dealing in methamphetamine; (2) Level 5 felony possession of methamphetamine; (3) Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance; (4) Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe; and (5) Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Pursuant to the agreement, Smith would receive concurrent sentences resulting in an aggregate sentence of eight years in the DOC. The agreement further specified that the parties “recommend[ed] and request[ed]” that the DOC place Smith in its Recovery While Incarcerated program (“RWI”), and if Smith successfully completed the program, the trial court would “consider modification of [Smith's] sentence.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28. Smith pleaded guilty and was sentenced in accordance with the agreement.

[4] In August 2024, Smith petitioned to modify her sentence, alleging she successfully completed RWI and made other progress while incarcerated, including taking on leadership roles. The trial court then modified Smith's sentence, ordering that “[t]he balance of [Smith's] executed sentence ․ shall be served on Posey County Community Corrections.” Id. at 109. The trial court specified that “[a]s a special condition of th[e] modification, [Smith] shall undergo a substance abuse evaluation at a facility approved by [c]ommunity [c]orrections and shall follow any and all recommended treatment.” Id. at 110.

[5] Smith was placed on home detention with electronic monitoring on September 12, 2024. When placed on home detention with community corrections, Smith signed a document acknowledging the rules and conditions of her placement, including that “non-compliance with any rules or conditions” may result in a petition to revoke being filed “with the potential for detention or termination from th[e] program.” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 3. The document specified that “[g]oing outside the interior living area of [the] residence without ․ staff approval [was] prohibited,” emphasizing that there were “no automatic privileges outside the residence.” Id. at 4 (emphasis removed). The document added that leaving the residence or any other permitted location “without ․ authorization or failing to depart from, return to, or arrive at a specified location at a certain time or within a time period imposed by [community corrections] [was] a violation.” Id. Changes to Smith's schedule had to be “made 24 hours in advance” and could “come only from [community corrections] staff,” with the caveat that “[l]eaving a message ․ d[id] not grant or imply approval” for a change in schedule. Id. at 5. Among the other requirements was that Smith “promptly provide a valid copy of all of [her] prescriptions[.]” Id. at 3.

[6] Smith signed a separate document concerning the community corrections disciplinary policy. That document set forth lists of major violations and minor violations, noting that there would be “progressive discipline” for minor violations but that three minor violations or a major violation might lead to a petition to revoke. Id. at 10. Major violations included “unauthorized absence,” “being at [an] unapproved place while on an approved absence,” and “[f]ailing to attend and/or abide by the rules, regulations, etc.[,] of counseling, treatment, residential facilities, etc.[,] whether ordered by the [Trial] Court or by Community Corrections staff due to program violations.” Id. at 9.

[7] On November 25, 2024, community corrections notified the trial court it was placing Smith in jail for three days because Smith “had multiple unapproved leaves and unauthorized stops while on an approved pass” and this was “the third sanction for this reoccurring violation.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 113. Community corrections undertook the temporary change in placement “to allow [Smith] to correct her behavior prior to referring the matter” for the filing of a petition to revoke Smith's placement with community corrections. Id.

[8] On January 21, 2025, the State filed a petition to revoke Smith's placement. The petition contained an affidavit from Smith's community corrections case manager, Brooke Uhde (“Uhde”), who averred that Smith violated the conditions of her placement on multiple occasions. Specifically, it was alleged that in the four or so months since Smith was placed on home detention, Smith had committed four “Major Rule Violation[s]” by (1) having an unauthorized absence; (2) being at an unapproved place while on an approved absence; (3) recommitting, continuing to commit, or failing to correct conduct deemed to be a Minor Violation after being sanctioned or warned by staff for the conduct; and (4) “[f]ailing to attend and/or abide by the rules, regulations, etc.[,] of counseling, treatment, residential facilities, etc.[,] whether ordered by the [Trial] Court or by Community Corrections staff due to program violations.” Id. at 117. The State concurrently sought a warrant for Smith's arrest.

[9] Smith was arrested. An initial hearing was held with a fact-finding hearing scheduled for March 5, 2025. At the fact-finding hearing, Uhde testified that on October 9, 2024—at which point Smith had been placed with community corrections for less than one month—Smith was scheduled out for a pass to three locations, but “went to other places that she was not supposed to go while she was scheduled out for that pass.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 7. Uhde spoke with Smith about the conduct and “revoked all of [Smith's] pro-social passes at that time,” which meant that Smith “wasn't allowed to have extra things to do, like if she wanted to go out to eat or go see somebody in Evansville[.]” Id. About one month later, on November 5, 2024, Smith left without first obtaining permission. Smith would later explain that she went to help at a recovery house. Uhde testified that Smith would unilaterally leave to go to a location without obtaining permission, communicating “after the fact” about where she was going and what she was doing. Id. at 8. Uhde explained that Smith's conduct “was still unapproved because [community corrections] didn't know she was going there and ․ didn't have knowledge of it.” Id. Uhde testified that, due to Smith's unauthorized conduct on November 5, 2024, Uhde prepared an incident violation report and Smith was given twenty-four hours of community service as a sanction for violating the conditions of her placement.

[10] Uhde further testified that, on November 22, 2024, Smith went to an elementary school in Mount Vernon. Smith “said that her ride had to stop by there on their way to work.” Id. at 10. The following day, Smith “went to an address on West 2nd Street without permission.” Id. At that point, Smith was detained in jail for three days under the “Detention Rule.” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 13. Smith was returned to community corrections and placed on what community corrections called a “zero tolerance policy,” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 10, under which Smith “could not have any further violations or a petition to revoke would be submitted.” Id. at 10–11. This was explained to Smith, and an incident report was prepared that reflected the implementation of the policy. The incident report, which Smith signed, contains a description of Smith's conduct, including that “[Smith] said that she knew that she was not supposed to go anywhere without approval but did not know what to do.” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 13.

[11] On January 16, 2025, Smith “did not attend her Empowerment Behavioral Services group session,” where the group session had been part of Smith's treatment. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 11. Smith's failure to attend the group session led to the filing of the petition to revoke. There was evidence that Smith went to the address on West 2nd Street without permission because her mother had been watching her cousin's kids at a residence there, but her mother was in the hospital and Smith needed to watch the kids. There was also evidence that Smith missed the group session because she had overslept. Smith testified that she overslept because she was taking a new medication. In general, Smith asserted that she had been “very honest” about her whereabouts. Id. at 22. Uhde pointed out that Smith did not report that she was on the new medication until the issue arose and Smith missed the required group session. Uhde acknowledged that Smith had not previously missed that group meeting, was being screened regularly, and those screens had not tested positive.

[12] The State argued in favor of revoking Smith's direct placement, arguing that the State would “have liked to see [Smith] take her [c]ommunity [c]orrections after being modified a little more seriously.” Id. at 33. The State argued that Smith “was a little too nonchalant about things as she went forward” and that Smith's approach “seemed to be, well, I'll just notify [community corrections] after the fact.” Id. at 34. The State pointed out that Smith had been on community corrections “for three or four months” and yet Smith had multiple violations. Id. The State noted that, although it was not the case that Smith “reoffended and committed a new crime,” revocation was warranted due to the “continuous and repetitive violations” of the conditions of Smith's direct placement. Id.

[13] The trial court decided to revoke Smith's direct placement and order Smith to serve the balance of her previously suspended sentence in the DOC. The court explained: “The problem that we have here is we just have a lot of little straws that keep building up[.]” Id. at 39. The court noted: “[I]f you only had one missed class, I don't think we'd be sitting here, to be honest with you.” Id. The court added that, although it was “proud of [Smith] for staying sober,” id., Smith's violations involved “a lot of little things that just ke[pt] adding up” and that, “when you read it on paper, it just really looks like [Smith] took advantage of the system ․ once [she] w[as] out,” id. at 40. The trial court acknowledged that Smith identified extenuating circumstances and had generally stayed in touch with community corrections about her unapproved whereabouts, but the court noted that if Smith knew she was required to obtain approval, “the honest thing” would have been to wait to obtain approval. Id. Smith now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] Smith challenges the revocation of her direct placement with community corrections where the trial court ordered Smith to serve the balance of her previously suspended sentence in the DOC. Smith does not dispute that she violated conditions of her direct placement; instead, she argues that revoking the balance of her suspended sentence was too harsh of a sanction and that, in revoking, the trial court essentially applied an unfair “zero tolerance policy” that deprived her of the right to due process. We address each issue in turn.

I. Revocation Decision

[15] Placement on community corrections—like placement on probation—serves as an “alternative[ ] to commitment to the DOC” and is “made at the sole discretion of the trial court.” Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Indeed, this type of alternative placement “is a matter of grace and not a right.” Id. Indiana Code section 35-38-2.6-5(b) specifies that if a person on community corrections “violates the terms of the placement, the prosecuting attorney may request that the court revoke the placement and commit the person to the county jail or department of correction for the remainder of the person's sentence.” We review the revocation of placement on community corrections for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. See Puckett v. State, 183 N.E.3d 335, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. In applying this deferential standard, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. See id.

[16] Smith argues that “the trial court's imposition of the harshest possible outcome”—i.e., revocation of the balance of the previously suspended sentence—was an abuse of discretion because of the allegedly “minor nature” of her violations. Appellant's Br. p. 11. Smith also argues that there were “abundant mitigating circumstances.” Id. In general, Smith characterizes her violations as merely “missteps,” id., that were part of an “early adjustment period,” id. at 9. Smith claims that she ultimately “corrected her behavior, maintained perfect sobriety, engaged fully in treatment, secured employment, and remained compliant with her rehabilitative obligations.” Id.

[17] Regardless of the nature of the violations, it is undisputed that Smith violated the conditions of her direct placement on more than one occasion, engaging in conduct that program documents classified as major violations. Indeed, during her relatively short time on community corrections, Smith committed the major violation of having an unauthorized absence from her home. She also committed the major violation of being at an unapproved place while on an approved absence, traveling to stores that were not on her list of approved locations. Furthermore, Smith committed an additional major violation by failing to attend a group session that was part of her treatment programming. Smith failed to attend the group session after she was placed on a “zero tolerance policy,” following discussions about the ramifications of noncompliance. In general, the record reflects that Smith was initially cavalier about the requirement that she obtain approval before traveling to certain locations, with Smith letting community corrections know about her whereabouts after the fact. As a result of this conduct, Smith initially faced less-severe sanctions from the community corrections department. When Smith ultimately failed to attend a group session that was part of her treatment programming, Smith claimed she overslept due to a recent change in medication. It is notable, however, that Smith failed to communicate any change in medication to community corrections, despite it being a condition of her placement to “promptly provide a valid copy of all ․ prescriptions[.]” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 3.

[18] In short, the decision to revoke Smith's placement was consistent with the facts and circumstances. Indeed, based on Smith's pattern of noncompliance with the terms of her placement over a relatively short period, the trial court could readily conclude that Smith exhibited an inability or an unwillingness to engage in the kind of prompt, proactive communication necessary to remain in the community. Thus, under the facts and circumstances, the decision to revoke Smith's placement on community corrections was not an abuse of discretion.

II. Due Process

[19] Smith claims she was deprived of due process because the trial court “fail[ed] to meaningfully consider substantial mitigating evidence” and “improperly appl[ied] a ‘zero tolerance’ policy to revoke” her placement on community corrections. Appellant's Br. p. 2. Smith further asserts that the court failed to “adequately consider[ ] [her] rehabilitation and good-faith efforts, rendering the revocation fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 10. Smith directs us to Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 2008), for the general proposition that “trial courts cannot simply ignore or cut off a defendant's mitigating evidence on the premise that any violation automatically equals revocation.” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Notably, however, in Woods the trial court refused to let the defendant explain why he violated his probation, telling the defendant that any explanation did not matter because a policy of strict compliance was in effect. See Woods, 892 N.E.2d at 638. Here, however, Smith was permitted to testify about the circumstances of her violations and Smith's counsel was permitted to argue that the mitigating evidence warranted a less-severe sanction than revocation.

[20] Smith acknowledges that, “unlike in Woods, [she] was allowed to testify and her counsel was permitted to argue[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 15. Smith nonetheless maintains that Woods is analogous because “the end result shows that the court gave no consideration to her evidence.” Id. Indeed, Smith maintains that “substantial mitigating evidence was presented at the revocation hearing, but the trial court failed to meaningfully incorporate it into its sanction decision.” Id. at 15. Smith lists evidence favorable to her position, including evidence that she maintained her sobriety, voluntarily attended more recovery meetings than required, “adjusted her behavior by walking to approved locations rather than relying on rides after earlier transportation-related infractions,” and missed a group session as “the result of an unforeseen medication side effect, not willful noncompliance.” Id. Smith argues that the trial court's comments “reveal that it focused primarily on the sheer number of early infractions and failed to engage with the significant evidence that [Smith] had corrected her conduct, remained sober, maintained employment, and complied with treatment obligations after her initial adjustment period.” Id. We disagree.

[21] The record reflects that the trial court thoughtfully considered the record and commended Smith on her sobriety, remarking that it thought Smith's case “hurt[ ]” the court “the most” because it did not want Smith “going back somewhere where [she was] going to have a lot of pressure to do things that [she had] really worked hard not to do.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 39. The trial court also acknowledged Smith's perspective about the nature of the violations involved, stating: “I understand everything that you told me here today and what your thought process is.” Id. at 38. The trial court ultimately noted that it was tasked with making a “really, really difficult decision[.]” Id. at 40. The record at hand does not indicate blind adherence to a “zero tolerance policy” as Smith suggests, but instead a careful, individualized consideration of Smith's progress and suitability to placement on home detention. Indeed, in the end, the trial court considered Smith's proffered mitigating evidence but gave that evidence little weight, electing to instead give more weight to Smith's habitual disregard of the rules of her placement. For these reasons, we conclude that Smith did not establish a deprivation of due process in the fashioning of a sanction.

Conclusion

[22] The trial court did not abuse its discretion or offend Smith's right to due process in revoking Smith's direct placement on community corrections and ordering Smith to serve the balance of her previously suspended sentence in the DOC.

[23] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Judges Kenworthy and Scheele concur. Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.