K.G., Appellant-Petitioner v. REVIEW BOARD OF INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.G. appeals the decision of the Review Board (Review Board) of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (DWD) to affirm an administrative law judge's (ALJ's) determination that she is not entitled to a waiver of liability for repayment of unemployment benefits to the DWD. However, she did not request preparation of the ALJ hearing transcript as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(5), and her Appellant's Brief lacks cogent reasoning, citations to the record, and supporting legal authority in violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). She has therefore waived appellate review of the Review Board's decision, and we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[2] At various points in 2021 and 2022, K.G. applied for and received state unemployment insurance (UI) and Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) benefits. To apply for these benefits, she submitted several vouchers to the DWD indicating that she was out-of-work despite being able and available to work full-time. But in early 2022, the DWD received information from K.G.’s employer that she was working part-time. A subsequent investigation revealed that from June to October 2021, K.G. was on leave of absence from her job and thus not eligible for unemployment.² Moreover, she had failed to report part-time hours she had worked throughout 2021 and 2022.

[3] After its investigation, the DWD issued two Determinations of Eligibility (DOEs) informing K.G. that she was not eligible for the benefits she had received during her leave of absence and because she failed to disclose part-time hours she had worked, the DWD had reduced or suspended her remaining benefits. In accordance with state and federal law, the DWD required that she return the overpaid benefits.³

[4] After unsuccessfully appealing the DOEs, K.G. applied for a waiver of liability.⁴ The DWD determined that she was ineligible for a waiver. She appealed that determination to an ALJ who conducted a hearing and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law reasoning, in part, as follows:

[K.G.] received regular [UI] and [FPUC] benefits in the amount of $10,260.00. [The DWD] determined that those amounts were overpaid. In order to determine whether repayment of the overpaid funds can be waived, the [ALJ] must first determine if such overpayment was the result of fault on the part of [K.G.]

The ALJ concludes [K.G.] is at fault for the overpayment of benefits as she failed to respond to a call or voicemail from a Claims Investigator asking her for information about her hours and wages, which is failure to respond to a claims investigator's inquiry and assessed as a fault under the policy.

[K.G.] was further at fault when she reported no hours worked and no wages earned on the weekly vouchers ․ even though she agreed she was working some limited hours and earning some wages as pay statements confirmed, which is failure to provide accurate information on a claim voucher for payment and is also deemed fault under the policy.

As [K.G.] was at fault, the ALJ is precluded from granting waiver of overpayment[.]

Appellee's Appendix Vol. 2 at 6.

[5] K.G. appealed further to the Review Board, which, after reviewing the record, adopted the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law and affirmed its judgment. She now appeals the Review Board's decision to this Court.

Discussion and Decision

[6] We begin by noting that K.G. has failed to present a cogent argument on appeal clearly identifying the legal and factual basis for her challenges to the Review Board's decision. Though she is proceeding pro se, we hold such litigants to the same standard as trained counsel and require them to follow procedural rules. Martin v. Hunt, 130 N.E.3d 135, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). This Court has repeatedly recognized that it “ ‘will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are ․ too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’ ” Spainhower v. Smart & Kessler, LLC, 176 N.E.3d 258, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 984 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[7] A charitable reading of K.G.’s brief suggests that she is attempting to make an appeal for sympathy (for example, by contending that she applied for unemployment only “to pay ․ out of pocket [for] medical insurance”), combined with a vague suggestion that her employer falsified evidence presented at the ALJ hearing. Appellant's Brief at 4. However, it is impossible for us to review the substance of these arguments because her brief does not identify the issues presented on appeal; express or develop a legal argument; or cite any case law, statutes, or portions of the record. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (providing that “[t]he argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning” and “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22”); App. R. 22(C) (providing that “[a]ny factual statement shall be supported by a citation to the volume and page where it appears in an Appendix, and if not contained in an Appendix, to the volume and page it appears in the Transcript or exhibits”).

[8] Moreover, to the extent K.G. challenges the ALJ's findings of fact, we cannot review that challenge because she did not submit an appendix or request preparation of the ALJ hearing transcript. See App. R. 50(A) (requiring appellant to include in their appendix “copies of [ ] those parts of the Record on Appeal that are necessary for the Court to decide the issues presented”); App. R. 9(F)(5) (providing that “[i]f the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding of fact or conclusion thereon is unsupported by the evidence ․, [they] shall request a Transcript of all the evidence”); see also I.C. § 22-4-17-12(b) (requiring that in every appeal from a Review Board's decision, “the [R]eview [B]oard shall, at the written request of the appellant ․ prepare a transcript of all the proceedings had before the [ALJ] and [R]eview [B]oard”) (emphasis added).

[9] Under these circumstances, we conclude that K.G. has waived appellate review of the Review Board's decision. See Price v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 2 N.E.3d 13, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that an issue was waived on appeal when the appellant's brief was “devoid of any cogent argument ․ or citation to relevant authority” related to the issue); Lifeline Youth & Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Installed Bldg. Prod., Inc., 996 N.E.2d 808, 814-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re Walker, 665 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. 1996)) (“[A]lthough not fatal to the appeal, failure to include a transcript works a waiver of any specifications of error which depend upon the evidence.”).

Conclusion

[10] Because K.G. waived her appellate arguments, we affirm the Review Board's decision.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2.   To receive unemployment benefits, Indiana law requires, among other things, that an unemployed individual be “(1) [ ] physically and mentally able to work; [and] (2) [ ] available for work[.]” Ind. Code § 22-4-14-3(b)(1)-(2).

3.   Under Indiana Code section 22-4-13-1, “[w]henever an individual receives benefits ․ to which [they are] not entitled ․ [they are] liable to repay the established amount of the overpayment.” I.C. § 22-4-13-1(a), (b). Likewise, federal law requires that if an individual receives FPUC benefits “to which they were not entitled, the State shall require [them] to repay the amounts of such” benefits. 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2).

4.   Indiana Code section 22-4-13-1(i) provides that “liability for repayment of benefits paid to an individual for any week may be waived upon the request of the individual if: (1) payment of the benefits was without fault of the individual, regardless of intent; and (2) repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience.” Similarly, the DWD may waive repayment of overpaid FPUC benefits “if it determines that--(A) the payment of such [benefits] was without fault on the part of [the recipient]; and (B) such repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience.” 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2).

DeBoer, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.