CAUDLE v. PRETORIUS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] In late 2024, Gregory Caudle filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate discharge from the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), and he named as respondents the Indiana Parole Board, two staff members of Putnamville Correctional Facility, and the Indiana Attorney General (collectively, “Respondents”). The Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Caudle was not entitled to discharge because his earliest possible release date was not until early 2029. The trial court granted that motion, and Caudle now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Caudle has been in and out of the DOC since late 1989, and he is currently incarcerated at Putnamville Correctional Facility. Caudle's sentences in three of his criminal causes are important here: (1) Cause 49G03-9708-CF-124368 (the “1997 Burglary Cause”), (2) Cause 49G06-0511-FB-200878 (the “2005 Burglary Cause”), and (3) Cause 49G03-1305-FB-030738 (the “2013 Burglary Cause”).

[4] In the 1997 Burglary Cause, Caudle was sentenced to a total of 16 years executed at the DOC—6 years for a burglary conviction plus 10 years for a habitual offender enhancement. In the 2005 Burglary Cause, Caudle was sentenced to a total of 23 years executed at the DOC—10 years for a burglary conviction, 3 years for a theft conviction, and 10 years for a habitual offender enhancement. Caudle's sentences in the 1997 and 2005 Burglary Causes were ordered to be served consecutively, but a postconviction court ¹ ordered Caudle's habitual offender sentence in the 2005 Burglary Cause should be served concurrently with his sentences in the 1997 Burglary Cause.

[5] On August 12, 2013, in the 2013 Burglary Cause, Caudle was sentenced to 38 years for burglary, 1 year for resisting law enforcement, and 20 years for a habitual offender enhancement. For Caudle's burglary sentence, 18 years were ordered to be served consecutively to his sentences in the 2005 Burglary Cause, and the remaining 20 years were ordered to be served concurrently with his sentences in the 2005 Burglary Cause. Caudle's resisting sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with his burglary sentence. Caudle's habitual offender enhancement was ordered to be served concurrently with his burglary sentence and with his sentences in the 2005 Burglary Cause.

[6] By March 4, 2019, Caudle had been discharged from all his sentences in the 1997 and 2005 Burglary Causes, and from his resisting law enforcement sentence in the 2013 Battery Cause. Caudle still had to serve 18 years for his burglary conviction and 2 years for his habitual offender enhancement in the 2013 Burglary Cause. After factoring in the credit time Caudle earned and lost for those two sentences, as of May 6, 2024, Caudle's earliest projected release date was January 6, 2029.

[7] On December 5, 2024, Caudle filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging his credit time had been miscalculated and he was entitled to immediate discharge from the DOC. In February 2025, Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Caudle's writ should be dismissed because he was not entitled to discharge based on his earliest possible release date being January 6, 2029. In support of this motion, Respondents designated a credit time report for all of Caudle's sentences; abstracts of judgment in the 1997, 2005, and 2013 Battery Causes; the postconviction order regarding Caudle's habitual offender sentences in the 1997 and 2005 Battery Causes; two change of commitment forms;² and a declaration from DOC's Director of the Sentence Computation/Release Unit explaining all these materials.

[8] Caudle subsequently filed his own motion for summary judgment, which the trial court deemed a response to Respondents’ motion. In support, Caudle designated the abstracts of judgment in the 1997, 2005, and 2013 Battery Causes; the sentencing order and part of his presentence investigation report in the 2013 Burglary Cause; the Chronological Case Summary for the postconviction cause and the order regarding Caudle's habitual offender sentences in the 1997 and 2005 Battery Causes; the two change of commitment forms; a Parole Board notice from 2009; two discharge certificates, one for each of his burglary convictions in the 1997 and 2005 Burglary Causes; and a declaration from himself explaining that the DOC had defrauded him into serving more time than necessary.

[9] The trial court concluded that Caudle's earliest possible release date was January 6, 2029, so it granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment and denied Caudle's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Respondents

[10] Caudle argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents.³ We review summary judgment decisions de novo, Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 384 (Ind. 2025) (citing Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)), which means we apply the same standard as the trial court, Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 615 (Ind. 2024) (citing Red Lobster Rests. LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159, 165 (Ind. 2024)). Summary judgment is proper only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003).

[11] We consider only those portions of the pleadings, depositions, and any other matters specifically designated to the trial court by the parties for purposes of the summary judgment motion. T.R. 56(C), (H). We resolve “[a]ll factual inferences and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue” in favor of the nonmovant. Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012)). In so doing, “we give careful scrutiny to make sure the non-movant's day in court is not improperly denied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P'ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016)).

[12] “The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Abbott, 183 N.E.3d at 1079 (emphasis in original) (citing Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 731 (Ind. 2015)). The movant “can make this showing when undisputed evidence affirmatively negates a required element” of the nonmovant's claim. Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind. 2022) (citing Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1187–88). Only if the movant meets this prima facie burden does the burden then shift to the nonmovant to “come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact.” Abbott, 183 N.E.3d at 1079 (citing Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003).

[13] Here, Respondents sought summary judgment on Caudle's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, so they had to show that Caudle was not being incarcerated illegally. See Ind. Code § 34-25.5-1-1 (“Every person whose liberty is restrained ․ may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered from the restraint if the restraint is illegal.”). Considering Respondents’ designated evidence in the light most favorable to Caudle demonstrates that Caudle's earliest projected release date is January 6, 2029. Respondents thus met their prima facie by affirmatively negating the alleged illegality of Caudle's current incarceration. This shifted the burden to Caudle to designate contrary evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact existed or that Respondents were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

[14] Except for his declaration, Caudle's designated evidence is the same as Respondents’ designated evidence or otherwise supports the conclusion that his earliest projected release date is January 6, 2029. In his declaration, Caudle claims that he has been “falsely imprisoned” and the victim of “fraud” due to (1) an alleged misunderstanding of the postconviction order, and (2) an alleged discrepancy regarding when Caudle was placed on parole for one of his sentences in the 2005 Burglary Cause. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 38. Although summary judgment may “be precluded by as little as a non-movant's mere designation of a self-serving affidavit,” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003, such an affidavit “may only preclude summary judgment when it establishes that material facts are in dispute, and not when an affidavit merely disputes a legal issue,” AM General LLC v. Armour, 46 N.E.3d 436, 441 (Ind. 2015) (emphasis in original). In light of Caudle's other evidence supporting rather than disputing Respondents’ designated evidence and arguments, Caudle's bare assertions of false imprisonment and fraud based on alleged errors that lack evidentiary support are not enough to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See id.

[15] Based on the foregoing, we cannot say the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents and denying Caudle's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Cause 49G06-0511-PC-200878.

2.   On July 7, 2009, the DOC issued a Change of Commitment Form to Caudle reflecting the postconviction court's order that his habitual offender sentences in the 1997 and 2005 Battery Causes were to be served concurrently. On February 3, 2025, the DOC issued a second Change of Commitment Form to Caudle after it discovered that it had incorrectly set Caudle's habitual offender sentence in the 2013 Burglary Cause to run consecutively to his sentences in the 2005 Burglary Cause, rather than concurrently as the trial court ordered.

3.   The State argues that Caudle has waived his appellate arguments by failing to present cogent reasoning and by failing to provide citations for every statement of fact and law. In light of our well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), we address the merits of Caudle's appeal.

Felix, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.