Rodrigo Haynes, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Rodrigo Haynes was charged and convicted of a new crime while on probation, the trial court revoked 900 days of his probation and ordered him to serve this term in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Haynes appeals, arguing the trial court's revocation was an abuse of discretion. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On September 15, 2015, Haynes pled guilty to Class B felony burglary and Class B felony robbery for crimes he committed in 2013. He was sentenced to a total of twelve years, with eight years executed in the DOC and four years suspended to probation.

[3] Haynes was released from the DOC early, beginning his probation on February 28, 2017. In December 2017, Haynes was arrested and charged in Nevada for felony robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and grand larceny of a motor vehicle. He was convicted of these felony charges and served a seven-year sentence in The Nevada Department of Correction.

[4] In January 2018, while Haynes awaited trial in Nevada, the State petitioned to revoke his probation, alleging he failed to abide by the following conditions of his probation:

• Report to his probation officer.

• Pay $530.00 in probation fees.

• Pay certain fines, costs, and fees totaling $283.00.

• Maintain or seek employment.

• Notify probation officer of a change of address.

• Refrain from committing other criminal offenses, as he had been arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada for robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and grand larceny of a motor vehicle.

[5] In January 2025, following Haynes's release from custody in Nevada, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the State's probation revocation petition. The State introduced evidence of Haynes's criminal history, which consisted of the Nevada conviction, a 2011 conviction for Level D felony theft, and a 2009 conviction for Level B felony robbery. Additionally, Hayne's probation officer testified that his probation should be revoked. Haynes admitted to the alleged violations, testified on his own behalf, and requested that the trial court “terminate [him] from probation unsatisfactorily” so he could move closer to family in another state or, alternatively, keep him on probation but allow him to transfer it to another state. Transcript at 29.

[6] In light of the evidence, the trial court revoked 900 days of what remained of Haynes's four-year suspended sentence and credited him seventy-seven days for time served. Haynes appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Haynes argues the trial court's probation revocation was an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

[8] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)) trans. denied. The trial court has the discretion to determine the conditions of probation, and revocation is permitted when those conditions are violated. Benitez v. State, 199 N.E.3d 811, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “Once a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 581 (quoting Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188). Thus, we review the trial court's probation violation determinations and sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances[.]” Benitez, 199 N.E.3d at 813.

[9] Probation revocation requires two steps. Id. First, the trial court determines whether the probationer violated the terms of their probation. Id. If it finds there has been a violation, the court then determines whether revocation is warranted. Id. Should the trial court find a probation violation, it may impose any of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).

[10] Haynes asserts that, “in light of [his] admission, rehabilitation, and need to support his family, the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked 900 days of his previously suspended four [ ] year sentence.” Appellant's Brief at 11. We disagree.

[11] While a probationer must be provided with the opportunity to present mitigating evidence suggesting revocation is not warranted, Ripps v. State, 968 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), the trial court is not required to balance aggravating and mitigating factors when determining the appropriate sentence upon finding a probation violation. Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Moreover, evidence of a single violation of the terms of probation is sufficient for revocation. Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582. “[S]o long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing[,] ․ the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Crump v. State, 740 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied).

[12] Here, Haynes does not claim the hearing was conducted improperly, and the evidence shows it was done according to Indiana law. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3. Instead, he argues that the revocation was not justified in light of his admission to the violations, his remorse, and his efforts toward rehabilitation. Like in Killebrew, the trial court here “was aware of these circumstances but nevertheless found that in light of [his] criminal history and the serious nature of the crimes he [ ] committed,” revocation was warranted. 165 N.E.3d at 582. Haynes was given the opportunity to present his mitigating evidence, and the court was at liberty to weigh it against the evidence of Haynes's criminal history presented by the State.

[13] Haynes committed additional felonies while on probation, and the fact that he served the time duly owed for committing those crimes does not mean the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. As stated above, probation is a “matter of grace” to which no individual is entitled. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. Haynes is asking that we reweigh the evidence presented to the trial court, and we decline to do so in light of our standard of review.

[14] The commission of a new crime is a violation of probation, and the court was well within its discretion to revoke a portion of Haynes's suspended sentence and order that it be executed in the DOC.

Conclusion

[15] Haynes has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in revoking part of his suspended sentence. Therefore, we affirm.

[16] Affirmed.

DeBoer, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur. Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.