CRUM v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] In a Christmas Eve shooting, Trivel Crum and Deondre Jones killed Javion Grandberry and seriously injured Mandel Bedenfield Jr. Crum was charged with and convicted of murder, attempted murder, unlawful carrying of a handgun, and criminal recklessness; he was also alleged and found to have used a firearm in committing his offenses. The trial court sentenced Crum to 155 years of incarceration. Crum now appeals, raising two issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support Crum's convictions for murder, attempted murder, and criminal recklessness, as well as the firearm enhancement;

2. Whether Crum's sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the early morning hours of December 24, 2023, Javion, Javion's cousin Derrick, and Bedenfield were at the 19th Hole, a bar in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Crum, Jones, Jhamore Morris, Joel Miller Jr., and Dionte Stubbs were also there. When the 19th Hole closed at approximately 3:00 a.m., Javion, Derrick, and Bedenfield were in the parking lot near their silver Chevrolet Impala discussing needing to get gas; they left in the Chevrolet, with Javion in the driver's seat, Derrick in the front passenger's seat, and Bedenfield seated behind Javion. Meanwhile, Crum and his four friends left in a black Lincoln MKX and a black Ford Explorer.

[4] Crum and his friends pulled into the Shell Gas Station just down the road from the 19th Hole and parked the Lincoln and Ford side-by-side at the side entrance. At 3:08:30 a.m., the Ford was driven to the Shell Gas Station's front entrance and parked there—effectively blocking it. The Lincoln drove to an adjacent intersection and waited. As the Chevrolet approached the Shell Gas Station's front entrance at 3:08:40 a.m., it was blocked from entering by the Ford. At 3:08:46 a.m., the Lincoln pulled up alongside the Chevrolet's driver's side, and shots were fired from the Lincoln into the Chevrolet. Javion slumped over almost immediately, and Bedenfield felt multiple bullets hit him. Derrick attempted to steer the Chevrolet, and it eventually stopped on a grassy bank across the street from the Shell Gas Station. The Lincoln and Ford drove away. Javion suffered a gunshot wound to the back of his head that ultimately proved fatal. Bedenfield suffered gunshot wounds to his upper left arm, head, abdomen, right thigh, and groin. Derrick was not shot.

[5] As law enforcement investigated, they secured surveillance videos from the 19th Hole, the Shell Gas Station, three nearby businesses, and a traffic camera. A video from the Shell Gas Station showed the Ford blocking the front entrance, the Chevrolet approaching that entrance, the Lincoln pulling up alongside the Chevrolet, and the Chevrolet careening through the Shell Gas Station parking lot before coming to rest across the street. Also in that video, multiple muzzle flashes can be seen from inside the Lincoln.

[6] Once Crum was detained, law enforcement was able to seize his cell phone. Upon searching Crum's cell phone, law enforcement found pictures that were taken shortly before the shooting of Crum with guns. Law enforcement also discovered that shortly after the shooting, Crum had been searching the internet for information regarding the shooting. For instance, at approximately 7:49 a.m. on December 24, Crum viewed a local news article about the shooting. On December 25, Crum used Google Chrome to search “man killed fort wayne indiana yesterday,” Ex. Vol. II at 187, 201. In the days thereafter, Crum repeatedly viewed local news articles about the shooting and searched public.courts.in.gov/mycase, themostwanted.net/Indiana/Allen, and other websites for his own name and Jones's name. On December 28, Crum searched for Javion's Facebook profile and related content such as “#justiceforjay.” Ex. Vol. III at 3; Tr. Vol. IV at 172–74. At the time of Crum's searches, Javion's name was not publicly disclosed; it was not until early January 2025 that Javion's name was disclosed. On December 30, Crum used Google Chrome to search “what are the elements of murder in Indiana.” Ex. Vol. II at 200.

[7] On January 6, 2024, Crum was arrested. At that time, he had a handgun in his possession. The State charged Crum with one count of murder,¹ two counts of attempted murder as Level 1 felonies,² one count of unlawful carrying of a handgun as a Level 5 felony,³ and one count of criminal recklessness as a Level 6 felony ⁴ ; the State also alleged that Crum used a firearm in committing a felony ⁵ .

[8] At trial, Fort Wayne Police Department Detective Nicholas Lichtsinn testified the muzzle flashes seen in the Shell Gas Station surveillance video came from both the front and back of the Lincoln, indicating two people inside the Lincoln were shooting at the Chevrolet at the same time. While the jury was watching one of the videos of the 19th Hole's parking lot, Detective Lichtsinn testified that video showed Jones getting into the driver's seat of the Lincoln and Crum getting into the passenger side. A forensic biologist from the Indiana State Police Laboratory testified that DNA found on the Lincoln's rear passenger door handle was 150 times more likely to have come from Crum than an unknown individual.

[9] The jury convicted Crum as charged and found Crum had used a firearm in committing a felony. The trial court sentenced Crum to a total of 155 years of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support Crum's Murder, Attempted Murder, and Criminal Recklessness Convictions as well as His Firearm Enhancement

[10] Crum argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his convictions for murder, attempted murder, and criminal recklessness, as well as the firearm enhancement.⁶ Our standard of review for such a claim is as follows:

“A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1065, 1066 (Ind. 2015)). This Court reviews only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences therefrom, and will reverse only where it is shown that “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Teising [v. State], 226 N.E.3d [780,] 783 [(Ind. 2024)].

Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090–91 (Ind. 2025). We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. Id. at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783).

[11] Crum argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence establishing that he was in the Lincoln and that he was one of the shooters. The case against Crum presented no direct evidence identifying him as one of the two shooters. Nobody testified that they saw Crum commit the crimes; rather, the State built its case on circumstantial evidence.

In a circumstantial case, no single piece of evidence in isolation—no “smoking gun”—is offered to persuade the jury to convict. Yet a jury may be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, by looking at “a web of facts in which no single strand may be dispositive.” Kriner v. State, 699 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. 1998). Indeed, the “evidence in the aggregate may point to guilt where individual elements of the State's case might not.” Id. ․ [W]hen presented with a sufficiency challenge[,] we look at the “whole picture” without taking a “divide-and-conquer approach” to individual pieces of evidence. See McGrath v. State, 95 N.E.3d 522, 529 (Ind. 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176–77 (Ind. 2022).

[12] Here, the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict show that Crum and Jones were the only two people who got into the Lincoln before leaving the 19th Hole, and during the shooting, multiple muzzle flashes came from two locations in the Lincoln. Crum's DNA was found on the rear passenger side door handle of the Lincoln. Crum also began searching for news on the shooting mere hours after it occurred, and in the days that followed, he searched for his own name on websites that provide information on criminal cases and arrest warrants. By finding Crum guilty as charged, the jury clearly believed the web of evidence demonstrating Crum was one of the two shooters, and we cannot second guess that judgment, see Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1090 (quoting Teising, 226 N.E.3d at 783). We therefore cannot say the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Crum's convictions for murder, attempted murder, and criminal recklessness, as well as his firearm enhancement.

2. Crum's Sentence Is Not Inappropriate Under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[13] Crum argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to independently review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 855–56 (Ind. 2024) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020)). That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we] find[ ] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020)).

[14] Our Supreme Court has explained our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) as follows:

“[O]ur constitutional authority to review and revise sentences boils down to our collective sense of what is appropriate,” Cramer [v. State], 240 N.E.3d [693,] 698 [(Ind. 2024)] (quoting Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 165 (Ind. 2017)), an act that, importantly, is reserved for “exceptional” cases, id. (citing Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 241 (Ind. 2015)). Determining a sentence's appropriateness thus “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 985.

Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092.

[15] Additionally, the defendant bears the burden of proving that “his or her sentence has met the inappropriateness standard of review.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1092 (quoting Cramer, 240 N.E.3d at 698). And because sentencing “ ‘is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference,’ a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail “unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character ․” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)).

[16] In reviewing the defendant's sentence, “we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court,” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014), and we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count,” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 122 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). Similarly, a defendant “need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts” so long as “one of the prongs weighs heavily in favor” of revising the defendant's sentence. Id. at 126–27 (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)) (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127 (citing Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220).

[17] A trial judge may impose any sentence within the statutory range without regard to the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Ind. 2007), as amended (July 10, 2007), decision clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494). Here, Crum was convicted of and sentenced on one count of murder, two counts of attempted murder as Level 1 felonies, one count of unlawful carrying of a handgun as a Level 5 felony, and one count of criminal recklessness as a Level 6 felony. Crum was also found to have used a firearm in committing a felony.

[18] “A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a) (emphasis added). On his one murder conviction, the trial court sentenced Crum to 60 years executed at the DOC. “[A] person who commits a Level 1 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and forty (40) years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b) (emphasis added). On his two Level 1 felony convictions, the trial court sentenced Crum to 35 years executed at the DOC on each count, resulting in a total of 70 years.

[19] “A person who commits a Level 5 felony (for a crime committed after June 30, 2014) shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (emphasis added). On his one Level 5 felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Crum to 5 years executed at the DOC. “A person who commits a Level 6 felony ․ shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 1/212) years, with the advisory sentence being one (1) year.” I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) (emphasis added). On his one Level 6 felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Crum to 2 years executed at the DOC.

[20] A person who “knowingly or intentionally use[s] a firearm in the commission of an offense” may be sentenced to “an additional fixed term of imprisonment of between five (5) years and twenty (20) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-11(g). On his firearm enhancement, the trial court sentenced Crum to 18 years executed at the DOC. The trial court ordered all of Crum's sentences to run consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of 155 years executed at the DOC.

[21] Where, as here, the trial court deviated from the advisory sentence, one factor we consider is “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)), as amended (May 26, 2023). We also consider whether the offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality.” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[22] This was not just a shooting; it was an orchestrated execution. Crum and his friends intentionally ambushed Javion, Derrick, and Bedenfield at the Shell Gas Station by having the Ford block the entrance thereto and then having the Lincoln pull up alongside them when they had nowhere to go. Crum and Jones then fired numerous rounds at Javion, Derrick, and Bedenfield before fleeing the scene. Javion died. Bedenfield was seriously injured. Derrick somehow made it out physically unharmed. There is nothing about Crum's offenses here that demonstrate restraint, regard, or lack of brutality.

[23] In considering the character of the offender, “we engage in a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities,” T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (citing Aslinger v. State, 2 N.E.3d 84, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), clarified on other grounds on reh'g), including whether the defendant has “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character,” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[24] In the six years preceding Crum's sentencing in this case, he amassed several juvenile adjudications and convictions for violent crimes, including battery and resisting law enforcement. In 2018, when he was 15 years old, Crum was adjudicated a delinquent in Illinois for aggravated battery. Less than one year later, while on probation in Indiana in the aggravated battery cause, Crum was adjudicated a delinquent in Indiana for dangerous possession of a firearm. As a result of that adjudication, he was unsuccessfully discharged from probation and committed to the Indiana Boys School. Less than 10 days after arriving at the Boys School, Crum cut off his anklet and absconded from supervision, resulting in him being adjudicated a delinquent for escape, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. Crum was also determined to be a violent offender, and he was recommitted to the Boys School. In July 2020, Crum was discharged from the Boys School.

[25] In June 2021, Crum was charged with battery resulting in serious bodily injury and criminal recklessness, both as a Level 5 felonies;⁷ he was convicted of the criminal recklessness charge, which concerned Crum shooting a firearm into a building. That same month, Crum was charged with two counts of resisting law enforcement and one count of criminal recklessness, all as Level 6 felonies;⁸ he was convicted of the resisting law enforcement charge that involved him resisting by using a vehicle and causing serious bodily injury. Crum was on probation in these two causes when he murdered Javion and attempted to murder Bedenfield and Derrick.

[26] Based on the serious nature of Crum's offenses and his history of violence, we cannot say that Crum has produced compelling evidence demonstrating that the nature of his offense or his character renders his sentence inappropriate. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d 119; Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 855–56.

Conclusion

[27] In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence to support Crum's convictions for murder, attempted murder, and criminal recklessness, as well as firearm enhancement; and Crum's sentence is not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1(1), 35-41-5-1(a).

3.   I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(b).

4.   I.C. § 35-42-2-2(a).

5.   I.C. § 35-50-2-11(b)(1).

6.   Crum does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for unlawful carrying of a handgun.

7.   Crum's offenses in this cause occurred on April 26, 2021, and were initially addressed in a juvenile delinquency petition, but the cause was transferred to adult court. In the delinquency petition, the State alleged Crum had committed dangerous possession of a firearm, criminal recklessness, and battery resulting in serious bodily injury.

8.   Crum's offenses in this cause occurred on April 28, 2021—just two days after the offenses in the criminal recklessness cause, see supra n.7—and were initially addressed in a juvenile delinquency petition, but the cause was transferred to adult court. In the delinquency petition, the State alleged Crum had committed seven offenses: (1) resisting law enforcement, (2) criminal recklessness, (3) dangerous possession of a firearm, (4) carrying a handgun without a license, (5) possession of marijuana, (6) driving without a license, and (7) reckless driving.

Felix, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.