HAWORTH v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Charles Dale Haworth, Jr., repeatedly molested a child while babysitting her. He also took numerous sexually explicit pictures and videos of the child, both by herself and with him. Haworth pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, Level 5 felony child exploitation, and Level 6 felony possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to serve fifteen years.

[2] On appeal, Haworth asks this Court to exercise its power to revise his sentence. Concluding that he has not met his burden of showing his sentence should be reduced, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Haworth lived in Richmond, Indiana. He babysat several children, including M.W. and her siblings. In August 2022, when M.W. was fifteen years old, M.W.’s mother called the police, reporting that M.W. had disclosed that Haworth had molested her.

[4] During an interview with police officers, M.W. said that Haworth had penetrated her vaginally and anally with his penis. He wore a “rubber” during vaginal sex. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 13. M.W. further said that after she turned fifteen, Haworth bought her an Xbox entertainment system but required her to perform oral sex on him in exchange. She also said that he made her wear tight black shorts when he babysat her and her siblings. When they were alone, he made her wear white shorts that were even shorter, with a portion of the crotch cut out. In addition, Haworth bought a vibrator for M.W., which he kept at his apartment.

[5] M.W. told the officers that Haworth made her take the vibrator and his phone into the bathroom, out of sight of her siblings, and record a video of herself masturbating. She also said that he took sexually explicit photos and videos of her. Officers seized Haworth's phone via search warrant. A forensic exam revealed sixty-one gigabytes of data. Most of the data consisted of pornography, and most of the pornography consisted of: (1) sexually explicit photos and videos of M.W., or (2) photos and videos of Haworth and M.W. engaged in oral sex and vaginal intercourse. Some of the photos and videos were recorded in Haworth's apartment, but others were taken in a car, at an auto repair shop, or at a weigh station on a nearby interstate highway. Haworth saved explicit videos and photos of M.W. to his phone's storage on multiple occasions between June 18, 2022, and July 21, 2022.

[6] During a police interview, Haworth admitted he had engaged in sexual misconduct with M.W. Specifically, he admitted to requiring her to perform oral sex on him four times but denied engaging in vaginal intercourse. Haworth acknowledged M.W. was a child, stating that he began a sexual relationship with her when she was fourteen. In addition, he acknowledged creating sexually explicit photos and videos of M.W., both of her alone and with him. Haworth told the officers he thought the photos and videos were “erotic and thrilling.” Id. at 15. Finally, he admitted that in July 2022, he sent a photograph of M.W.’s vagina to another person via the Telegram app.

[7] In February 2023, the State charged Haworth with Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, Level 5 felony child exploitation, and Level 6 felony possession of child pornography. In September 2024, one month before trial was scheduled to begin, he pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The trial court accepted Haworth's guilty plea and imposed a fifteen-year sentence. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Haworth argues that his sentence should be reduced. Article 7, section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes the Court to review and revise sentences. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) implements this authority, stating that the Court may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”

[9] Sentencing review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is deferential to the trial court's decision, and “we avoid merely substituting our judgment” for that of the trial court. Nicholson v. State, 221 N.E.3d 680, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Instead, the main purpose of review under Appellate Rule 7(B) is to “attempt to leaven the outliers.” Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018). “We may look at any factors appearing in the record when assessing the nature of the offense and character of the offender.” Zamilpa v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1079, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[10] “The burden of proving a sentence is inappropriate falls to the defendant.” Hall v. State, 252 N.E.3d 455, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “[W]e reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019).

[11] “When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. At the time Haworth committed his offenses, the advisory sentence for a Level 4 felony was six years, with a maximum of twelve years and a minimum of two years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). For a Level 5 felony, the advisory sentence was three years, with a maximum of six years and a minimum of one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). And the advisory sentence for a Level 6 felony was one year, with a maximum of two and a half years and a minimum of six months. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (2019).

[12] The trial court sentenced Haworth as follows: (1) nine years for the Level 4 felony; (2) six years for the Level 5 felony; (3) and two years for the Level 6 felony. The court ordered Haworth to serve the sentences for the Level 4 and Level 5 felonies consecutively, with the sentence for the Level 6 felony served concurrently with the other two, for a total executed sentence of fifteen years. Haworth's sentence is short of the maximum of twenty and one-half years.

[13] “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the nature, extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990. Haworth, who was almost four times as old as M.W., repeatedly sexually abused her while babysitting her, betraying her trust. He required M.W. to submit to vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse. In addition, Haworth took photographs and videos of his molestations of M.W., as well as sexually explicit pictures and videos of her by herself, acquiring a large database of child pornography in the process. Haworth also made her record herself while she masturbated in his bathroom using a vibrator he had purchased. Her siblings were nearby, in another room. And he shared a picture of M.W.’s vagina with an unidentified person, potentially resulting in retransmission of that photo.

[14] There is no dispute that Haworth knew M.W. was a child because he admitted to officers that he began molesting her when she was fourteen. He gave her an Xbox for her fifteenth birthday but required her to perform oral sex on him in exchange for the gift. He had many chances to reconsider his extensive criminal course of conduct, but he chose to continue. Thus, we conclude the nature of his offenses justifies sentences above the advisory.

[15] Turning to the character of the offender, our analysis “involves a broad consideration of a defendant's qualities, including the defendant's age, criminal history, background, past rehabilitative efforts, and remorse.” Dean, 222 N.E.3d at 990-91. Haworth was fifty-six years old at sentencing. He has a minor criminal history, consisting of one conviction of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct in 1991. But “a defendant's lack of criminal history may be properly rejected as a mitigating circumstance where there is other evidence of criminal behavior.” Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Here, although the State charged Haworth with only one count of each of the three offenses, the record reflects he committed each offense multiple times over a span of months, repeatedly molesting M.W., taking explicit photos and videos of her, and amassing a collection of child pornography. His record of uncharged misconduct outweighs his formal criminal record.

[16] Haworth points to his guilty plea, which he entered without the benefit of a plea agreement. “[A] guilty plea is not inherently considered a significant mitigating circumstance.” Primmer v. State, 857 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis in original), trans. denied. A guilty plea's significance may be reduced if it is entered “after the State has already expended significant resources” or if “there was substantial admissible evidence of the defendant's guilt.” Id.

[17] Here, in addition to Haworth's confession to police officers, the State discovered numerous photos and videos depicting M.W. in the nude or engaging in sexual conduct, by herself and with Haworth. Considering these items, along with M.W.’s statements, there is substantial evidence of his guilt. In addition, Haworth pleaded guilty one month before trial, over a year and a half after the State had filed charges and expended time and resources on the case. As a result, Haworth's guilty plea is not strong evidence of a positive character.

[18] Haworth also cites his poor mental health, noting that he has struggled with severe depression for years and that he was sexually abused by relatives as a child. When weighing whether a defendant's mental illness should be considered a mitigating factor, courts consider four factors, including “ ‘the extent of any nexus between the disorder or impairment and the commission of the crime.’ ” Addis v. State, 212 N.E.3d 183, 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Weeks v. State, 697 N.E.2d 28, 30 (Ind. 1998)). The State does not deny that Haworth has been diagnosed with depression, but at sentencing Haworth presented no evidence of a nexus between his mental illness and his offenses. As a result, we cannot conclude his depression rendered him less culpable for his offenses. See Addis, 212 N.E.3d at 187 (defendant failed to demonstrate a nexus between his autism spectrum disorder and his convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor). And as for Haworth's childhood, the Indiana Supreme Court has “previously held that evidence of a difficult childhood is entitled to little, if any, mitigating weight.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (Ind. 2013).

[19] Finally, Haworth asks us to consider his apology at sentencing. We accord substantial deference to a trial court's evaluation of a defendant's remorse. Hollins v. State, 145 N.E.3d 847, 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. The trial court views and hears the defendant's apology and demeanor first-hand and is “better able to assess the defendant's credibility.” Id.

[20] Haworth told the trial court that living with his criminal conduct “eats [him] up” and may be contributing to his chronic health problems. Tr. Vol. II, p. 47. He also said, in allocution: “I can apologize, but apologies don't change anything. But I do apologize. Apologies won't change the fact that it happened.” Id. at 52. The trial court, in imposing the sentence, said, “I find your apology to be hollow. I find it to avoid accountability, and instead it conveys a fatalistic resignation, rather than a genuine desire for atonement[.]” Id. at 62. We defer to the trial court's assessment, and we cannot conclude that Haworth's apology reflects positively on his character in a meaningful amount. In sum, Haworth has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses or his character.

Conclusion

[21] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[22] Affirmed.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Vaidik, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.