BANKS v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] In February 2000, Vincent Edward Banks pleaded guilty to one count of Class D felony auto theft. In 2021, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea. The post-conviction court denied Banks’ petition. He appeals, arguing that his guilty plea was invalid because of his attorney's poor performance. Concluding that the post-conviction court did not err, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 1999, the State charged Banks with Class D felony auto theft. In the charging information, the State accused him of “knowingly or intentionally exert[ing] unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of Debra Barlow and Anthony Barlow with intent to deprive [the Barlows] of the vehicle's value or use[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 85.

[3] The following facts are taken from the probable cause affidavit, which the post-conviction court admitted into evidence at Banks’ request. Debra Barlow reported to the police that her car had been stolen from a location in East Chicago, Indiana, on July 22, 1999. On July 24, an officer with the Gary Police Department was on patrol and attempted to pull over a car, which was later determined to be the Barlows’ stolen car. The car's left rear window was broken, which indicated to the officer that the car may have been stolen.

[4] When the officer turned on his vehicle's lights and siren to signal the car to stop, the car's driver, later identified as Banks, accelerated and attempted to get away. During the pursuit, Banks and a passenger jumped out of the car while it was still moving and fled on foot. The officer chased Banks to a house, where he requested backup after Banks entered. Several officers searched the house and found Banks hiding between a mattress and box springs. After the officers arrested him, one of them examined the car and discovered its steering column had been damaged.

[5] Banks was represented by counsel in the criminal case. Banks and the State negotiated a plea agreement. In exchange for Banks pleading guilty as charged, the State agreed he would serve a two-year sentence. In the agreement, which Banks personally signed, he agreed that he had discussed the case with his attorney and had been advised “as to any possible defense” he might have. Id. at 82. In addition, a “Stipulated Factual Basis” was attached to the plea agreement and incorporated by reference. Id. at 124. Among other statements, the stipulation provided, in relevant part:

3. That on July 24, 1999 Vincent Banks was driving a 1989 Oldsmobile on 5th Avenue near Pennsylvania Street in Gary, Lake County, Indiana.

4. That a police officer noticed a back window broken out and that the driver of the Oldsmobile made a sharp turn onto 5th Avenue at which point the officer activated his overhead lights and siren.

5. That Vincent Banks refused to stop this vehicle until he reached Georgia Street where he and the passenger in the front seat bailed out of the moving car.

6. That the 1989 Oldsmobile that Vincent Banks was driving belonged to Debra and Anthony Barlow who had reported it stolen from the train station in East Chicago on July 22, 1999.

7. That Vincent Banks knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of Debra and Anthony Barlow with the intent to deprive them of the use or value of that vehicle.

Id. Banks personally signed the stipulation.

[6] At the guilty plea hearing, Banks told the court that he was satisfied with his attorney's advice and representation. Banks also acknowledged that he had signed the stipulation that was attached to the plea agreement. He also said he was pleading guilty because he had committed the charged offense. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed the previously-negotiated sentence of two years. Banks did not appeal.

[7] In 2021, Banks filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court scheduled a hearing, at which Banks’ original attorney testified. After the hearing, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which the court determined that Banks had failed to meet his burden of proof. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Banks argues the post-conviction court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. “Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence.” Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019). The petitioner has the burden of establishing the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5).

[9] Banks appeals from a negative judgment and “must show that ‘the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the postconviction court.’ ” Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 282 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 597 (Ind. 2001)). “The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).

[10] We evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel using the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “The defendant must prove: (1) counsel rendered deficient performance, meaning counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as gauged by prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e., but for counsel's errors the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1280 (Ind. 2019). In the context of guilty pleas, if a petitioner claims that counsel overlooked or impaired a defense, “the petitioner must show that a defense was indeed overlooked or impaired and that the defense would have likely changed the outcome of the proceeding.” Oliver v. State, 843 N.E.2d 581, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. Failure to establish either of the two elements of the ineffective assistance standard will cause the claim to fail. Hamilton v. State, 233 N.E.3d 461, 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

[11] “A strong presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Mullis v. State, 256 N.E.3d 567, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. “Counsel's performance is presumed effective, and a petitioner must offer strong and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption.” Id.

[12] Banks claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because the State failed to allege a sufficient factual basis to support the charge of auto theft, and his counsel should have alerted him to the weakness in the State's case. He argues that without this information from counsel, his guilty plea was invalid.

[13] A trial court cannot enter a judgment of conviction after a defendant's guilty plea unless the court determines “that there is a factual basis for the plea.” Ind. Code § 35-35-1-3(b) (1984). “A factual basis may be established by relatively minimal evidence about the elements of the crime from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant is guilty.” Graham v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1091, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), aff'd on rehearing, 947 N.E.2d 962 (2011). “[T]he standard for a sufficient factual basis to support a guilty plea is less rigorous than that required to support a conviction.” Id.

[14] The charging information alleged that Banks committed Class D felony auto theft by “knowingly or intentionally exert[ing] unauthorized control over [the Barlows’ car] with intent to deprive [the Barlows] of the vehicle's value or use[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 85. In the signed stipulation that was incorporated into the plea agreement, Banks admitted that the police caught him driving the Barlows’ car two days after they reported it stolen, and that he had “knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of Debra and Anthony Barlow with the intent to deprive them of the use or value of that vehicle.” Id. at 124. Banks further agreed that one of the car's back windows was broken out at the time. His factual stipulations established every element of the charged offense.

[15] Banks claims that appellate court decisions at the time he was charged held that, to establish a conviction for Class D felony auto theft, the State was required to prove that he had exclusively possessed the car since the theft. He cites Shelby v. State, 875 N.E.2d 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied; Trotter v. State, 838 N.E.2d 553 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); and Buntin v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) in support of his claim, but we disagree with his reading of those cases. In each case, the police found the defendant in possession of a stolen car several days after the theft. The Court reversed each defendant's auto theft conviction because the mere unexplained exclusive possession of a stolen car, after a certain period of time has elapsed, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for theft. See Shelby, 875 N.E.2d at 386; Trotter, 838 N.E.2d at 558; Buntin, 838 N.E.2d at 1190-91. But even in that circumstance, the State may present “additional evidence tending to support the defendant's conviction[,]” such as evidence of exclusive possession from the time of the theft or evidence of knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. Shelby, 875 N.E.2d at 385. In Shelby, Trotter, and Buntin, the State failed to present evidence of exclusive possession or other corroborating circumstances.

[16] By contrast, in Gibson v. State, 533 N.E.2d 187, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), the Court stated that Gibson's unexplained, exclusive unauthorized control over a stolen vehicle was insufficient to support the conviction for auto theft because two days had elapsed since the theft. But the Court determined that the State had presented other evidence sufficient to sustain Gibson's conviction, including that: (1) the car's ignition had been tampered with; (2) he was found in possession of a screwdriver, which could be used to operate the ignition; (3) he refused to identify himself; and (4) he alleged that he had not been inside the stolen car, but an officer had watched him drive it. Id. at 189-90.

[17] In Banks’ case, even if his unexplained, exclusive unauthorized control over the Barlows’ car two days after the theft, standing alone, was insufficient to establish a factual basis for the charge, the State presented other evidence. One of the car's rear windows had been smashed, which the officer believed was evidence that the car may have been stolen. Banks did not pull over when the officer signaled with his lights and siren but attempted to evade him. When that failed, Banks and his passenger jumped out of the car and fled on foot. Banks entered a house and hid between a mattress and box springs, where officers later found him. And the steering column of the car had been tampered with. This is sufficient evidence to establish a factual basis that Banks knew he was using another person's vehicle without permission and was depriving that person of its use or value. See id. (evidence showed Gibson knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over the vehicle with the intent to deprive the owner of its use).

[18] Banks’ claim of ineffective assistance fails on the question of deficient performance, or impairing a defense, because there was a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea. See Oliver, 843 N.E.2d at 591-92 (petitioner failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with guilty plea; there was sufficient factual basis to support conviction, and counsel negotiated plea agreement that benefitted client), trans. denied. As a result, we need not address the prejudice element of the ineffective assistance standard. The post-conviction court did not err in denying Banks’ petition.

Conclusion

[19] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

[20] Affirmed.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.