SMOOT v. LOWE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Harold E. Smoot appeals the final determination of the full Worker's Compensation Board (“the Board”), which affirmed the Single Hearing Member's finding that Smoot did not qualify for worker's compensation benefits. Smoot raises one issue for our review, namely, whether the Board's determination was clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2020, Smoot was employed as a part-time cashier at Lowe's. Smoot had health conditions, including diabetes, and Lowe's provided “employment accommodations” to him, including “allowing him to take breaks when needed, allowing him to eat candy or snacks at the register while working to adjust his blood sugar levels,” and providing him with a “chair or stool to sit on while working as a cashier.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 4.

[3] On August 25, while working his job as a cashier, Smoot fell. He was taken by ambulance to a hospital, where he was diagnosed with and treated for “an intertrochanteric fracture of the left femur[.]” Id. at 3. Smoot underwent surgery, inpatient rehabilitation therapy, and outpatient rehabilitation therapy. Smoot filed a work injury claim with Lowe's, which Lowe's denied. Smoot then filed an application for adjustment of claim on December 31.

[4] On April 26, 2024, Smoot was deposed. During his deposition, he testified that the day of his fall was a “very busy day” and that he “didn't get relieved” for a break. Id. at 127. He also testified that, earlier in the morning, his blood sugar had dropped and he had started to feel “very weak and shaky.” Id. at 128. He testified that he ate some dried cherries, and “everything was fine.” Id. He then testified that he “didn't get to go” to lunch “when [he] needed to,” and his “low sugar came back[.]” Id. However, he testified that he did not ask for a break and that Lowe's “didn't tell [him he] couldn't” take one. Id. at 133. He then testified that he had leaned over to scan a barcode, used the item he was scanning as support because he “felt weak” and “didn't feel secure bending over that far,” and then “stumbled forward” and fell as he stood up. Id. at 143-44.

[5] The Single Hearing Member conducted a hearing on Smoot's application on October 3, 2024. During the hearing, the parties stipulated to the admission of Smoot's deposition; the Indiana Worker's Compensation First Report of Employee Injury, Illness form; and his medical records. The First Report of Injury form provided that Smoot was sitting on a stool “per work accommodations” and “stood up and fell[,]” causing a fracture. Id. at 7 (capitalization removed). The form further provided that Smoot “stated his blood sugar dropped,” which caused him to fall. Id. (capitalization removed). Among the medical records that were admitted was a “Trauma Flowsheet” from the hospital's emergency department. Id. at 9. According to that record, Smoot reported that he had “stood up to[o] fast and fell due to low sugar.” Id. at 9.

[6] Smoot also testified at the hearing. He reiterated that, after he ate his dried cherries on the morning of the fall, he started to feel “very weak and shaky” near lunchtime but that no one came to relieve him for his second break. Tr. at 16. And he again testified that he bent down to scan an item and fell when he stood back up. He acknowledged that Lowe's provided him with accommodations such as taking breaks “as needed” and eating at the register “if [he] needed to.” Id. at 23. And he admitted that he did not “ask anybody for a break that morning.” Id. at 25.

[7] Kathleen McNutt, Lowe's front-end department supervisor at the store where Smoot worked, testified that the day Smoot fell was an “average” Tuesday. Id. at 47. She also testified that she was called to the cash register where Smoot had fallen and that Smoot reported that “his blood sugar was low.” Id. at 48. She further testified that Smoot reported that he “felt light-headed” and had fallen when he “got up off the stool.” Id. at 50. McNutt then testified to Smoot's accommodations and that, “if he needed a break,” Lowe's would “let him take a break.” Id. at 52.

[8] Following the hearing, the Single Hearing Member entered the following findings of fact:

4. Prior to his fall, [Smoot] knew his blood sugar was crashing and testified that when he rose to an upright position, he became lightheaded and weak, which caused him to fall to the floor ․

5. [Lowe's] shift manager, Kathleen McNutt, testified that [Smoot] told her immediately after the incident that “his blood sugar was low and that is why he seemed uneasy when he stood up.”

* * *

9. The stipulated medical evidence reveals that [Smoot] provided emergency medical personnel with a similar history in that he stood up too fast and fell due to low blood sugar. [Smoot] also informed medical personnel that he did not eat lunch on time and was starting to feel “shaky” prior to the fall.

10. [Smoot] testified that he skipped his fifteen (15) minute break earlier in his shift and ate a snack at the cash register to keep his blood sugar regulated. However, he was late for his lunch break because the store was busy, and he could not close the register until someone came to relieve him. He testified that no one came to relieve him and that he was feeling shaky and knew his blood sugar was low prior to his fall.

11. [Lowe's] acknowledged that [Smoot] was late for his lunch break but insisted he was allowed to take breaks as needed, citing his employment accommodations at the time of hire. [Lowe's] allowed [Smoot] to take breaks as needed and permitted him to eat at the cash register if necessary to regulate his blood sugar because of his diabetes, which he did earlier in his shift on August 25, 2020.

12. [Smoot] did not inform any of his co-workers or supervisors that he was late for his lunch break, nor did he let anyone know that his blood sugar was crashing prior to his fall.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 3-4.

[9] The Single Hearing Member then concluded Smoot had “failed to meet his burden of proving that he sustained injury by accident in the course of and arising out of his employment” with Lowe's. Id. at 5. In particular, the Single Hearing Member determined that Smoot had failed to prove that his fall and resulting injury “were caused by his employment” because the “stipulated medical evidence is persuasive that [Smoot] became hypoglycemic due to his insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus which caused him to fall when he became lightheaded and weak.” Id. And the Single Hearing Member concluded that Lowe's “did not force [Smoot] to skip his morning break, nor did it require [Smoot] to take a late lunch on August 25, 2020,” but the “credible evidence” demonstrated that Lowe's “gave [Smoot] wide latitude to take breaks and eat on the job to avoid becoming hypoglycemic. [Smoot] did not fall because he was assisting a customer. Rather, his fall was caused by his own personal health condition rather than an employment related risk.” Id.

[10] Accordingly, the Single Hearing Member concluded that Smoot's injuries were “not compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act.” Id. The Board agreed with the Single Hearing Member's decision and, on March 26, 2025, adopted the Single Hearing Member's findings and conclusions. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Smoot contends that the Board erred when it concluded that his injury is not compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act (the “Act”). The purpose of the Act is to provide “compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment[.]” Ind. Code § 22-3-2-2. Smoot bore the burden of proving that he suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Bertoch v. NBD Corp., 813 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (Ind. 2004). “The Board is not obligated to make findings demonstrating that a claimant is not entitled to benefits; rather, the Board need only determine that the claimant has failed to prove entitlement to benefits.” Triplett v. USX Corp., 893 N.E.2d 1107, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (2009).

[12] When an appellate court reviews a worker's compensation decision, we are bound by the Board's factual determinations and may not disturb them “unless the evidence is undisputed and leads inescapably to a contrary conclusion.” Christopher R. Brown, D.D.S., Inc. v. Decatur Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 892 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Ind. 2008). “We examine the record only to determine whether there are any substantial evidence and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom to support the Board's findings and conclusion.” Id. We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Fitzgerald v. U.S. Steel, 892 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[13] Here, there is no dispute that Smoot's injury occurred “in the course” of his employment. He sustained his injury at his worksite during regular work hours. Rather, the sole dispute is whether Smoot met his burden to prove that his injury arose out of his employment. “An injury arises out of employment when a causal nexus exists between the injury or death and the duties or services performed by the injured employee.” DePuy, Inc. v. Farmer, 847 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. 2006) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). The “nexus is established when a reasonably prudent person considers the injury to be born out of a risk incidental to the employment, or when the facts indicate a connection between the injury and the circumstances under which the employment occurs.” Milledge v. The Oaks, 784 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind. 2003), superseded by statute in part on other grounds.

[14] Risks incidental to employment fall into three categories: (1) risks distinctly associated with employment, (2) risks personal to the claimant, and (3) risks neither distinctly associated with employment nor distinctly personal in character. Id. at 930. Risks in the first and third categories generally are covered by the Act. Id. However, risks personal to the claimant, including those “caused by a pre-existing illness or condition unrelated to employment,” are not compensable. Id. The question here is whether Smoot's risk of injury was personal to him, in which case his injury is not compensable.

[15] On appeal, Smoot acknowledges that he had preexisting conditions, including diabetes, that contributed to his fall and corresponding fracture. However, he contends that the Board clearly erred when it determined that his fall did not arise out of his employment because “[s]kipping a meal break while at work, for any reason, is incidental to employment.” Appellant's Br. at 13. In essence, he argues that, while he had a preexisting condition, the condition of his work environment—being too busy to take a break or eat lunch—also contributed to his injuries.

[16] However, there is substantial evidence that Smoot's preexisting diabetes caused his fall. Indeed, the First Report of Injury form provided that Smoot stood up and fell and that he had stated that “his blood sugar dropped.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 7 (emphasis removed). In addition, the Trauma Flowsheet from the hospital's emergency department noted that Smoot had reported that he “stood up to[o] fast and fell due to low sugar.” Id. at 9. And McNutt testified that, when she responded to Smoot's fall, Smoot reported that “his blood sugar was low” and that he had “felt light-headed” and fallen when he stood up from the stool. Tr. at 48, 50. Stated differently, Smoot's fall did not arise out of his employment as a cashier but was solely the result of his diabetes, low blood sugar, and personal decision not to avail himself of the accommodations provided to him that allowed him to take breaks and eat as needed.

[17] Based on that evidence, we conclude that the evidence is not undisputed and does not lead inescapably to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Board. It was Smoot's burden to prove that he was entitled to worker's compensation benefits, and, under these circumstances, the facts do not establish that his accident was compensable.

Conclusion

[18] The Board did not clearly err when it denied Smoot's claim for worker's compensation benefits. We therefore affirm the Board's determination.

[19] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.