Andre V. Powell, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Andre Powell appeals his habitual offender enhancement following a jury trial. He raises one issue for our review, which we restate as the following two issues: whether the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting a case manager's testimony as to his date of birth, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support his habitual offender enhancement. Finding no fundamental error and the evidence sufficient, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 8, 2024, Powell was placed in the Elkhart Community Corrections work release facility. He was released from the facility on an employment pass at about 7:57 a.m. on March 28. Powell was supposed to return to the facility by 1:00 p.m. the same day. He failed to return, and the facility staff was unable to contact or locate him. On April 2, at around 2:30 a.m., Elkhart Police Department Sergeant Jeremy Snow located and detained Powell while investigating a report of a suspicious person. Eventually, Powell provided Sergeant Snow with his true name and date of birth.

[3] The State charged Powell with Level 6 felony failure to return to lawful detention and with being a habitual offender. A bifurcated jury trial commenced on July 22. During the Level 6 felony phase of the trial, the State called two witnesses: Sergeant Snow and Powell's community corrections case manager, Allison Hazen. Hazen identified Powell in open court and testified to Powell's date of birth and the last four digits of his social security number. The transcript indicates that Hazen provided Powell's identification information from her memory and without reviewing any record while she was on the stand. Sergeant Snow also identified Powell in court and testified to Powell's name and date of birth. The State admitted Powell's community corrections records as Exhibits 1 and 1A, which included the work release contract that Powell signed and his full name, date of birth, social security number, address, identifying physical characteristics and photograph. Powell made no objections to the admission of any of this testimony or Exhibits 1 and 1A. The jury found Powell guilty of the Level 6 felony.

[4] During the habitual offender phase of the trial, the State recalled Hazen as a witness. Hazen again verified Powell's date of birth and testified that she reviewed Powell's criminal history. Without objection from Powell, the State admitted the certified court records for Powell's three prior unrelated felony convictions as State's Exhibits 2, 3, and 4. The prior convictions were for Class B felony burglary in February 2013, Level 6 felony theft in January 2023, and Level 6 felony theft in February 2024. Hazen testified that the records were consistent with Powell's criminal history and verified that each record contained his identifying information. Specifically, the records included Powell's name, date of birth, address, physical description, and the dates of each offense's charge and conviction. At the conclusion of this phase, Powell moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. The jury found that Powell was a habitual offender.¹ Powell now appeals his habitual offender adjudication.

Discussion and Decision

I. Fundamental Error

[5] Powell contends that a fundamental error occurred surrounding the “identification testimony” admitted during his trial. Appellant's Br. p. 22. The State initially responds that Powell has waived appellate review of this issue by failing to present a cogent argument. Specifically, the State alleges that Powell provided a standard of review for fundamental error but failed to cite to relevant authority to support his argument or “even directly indicate what ‘identification testimony’ he is challenging.” Appellee's Br. p. 10. We agree that Powell's supporting authority is lacking and that his argument regarding the grounds on which he raises fundamental error is unclear.

[6] However, in the fundamental error sections of his brief and reply brief, Powell discusses Hazen's testimony as to his date of birth, which she provided during the first phase of his trial. Powell expresses that “there were no follow-up questions from the prosecutor as to how [Hazen] knew the date.” Appellant's Br. p. 22. From this and Powell's brief in general, the State assumes that Powell is alleging Hazen lacked personal knowledge to testify to his date of birth and, therefore, the court's admission of that testimony constituted fundamental error. Although we decline to make the same argument on Powell's behalf, we find no fundamental error in the court's admission of Hazen's testimony.²

[7] “A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence and we will disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 675 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011)). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. Where, as here, the defendant fails to object to the admission of evidence at trial, the issue is waived for review absent fundamental error. Id. at 678.

[T]he fundamental error exception is extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process. The error claimed must either make a fair trial impossible or constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. This exception is available only in egregious circumstances.

Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

[8] Hazen testified that she was Powell's community corrections supervising case manager. She also testified that she spoke to Powell during his placement in the facility, including when she reviewed his work release contract and the work release rules with Powell. Powell signed this contract—which included his date of birth. Based on her role as Powell's case manager and the opportunities she had to speak with Powell, the court could have reasonably inferred that Hazen learned of Powell's date of birth directly from him. Because the court's decision to admit Hazen's testimony was not against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting her testimony and no fundamental error occurred.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] Powell contends the evidence was insufficient to adjudicate him a habitual offender. Our standard of review is well settled:

For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted). To adjudicate Powell a habitual offender, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had been convicted of three prior unrelated felonies, and, because he was alleged to have committed a prior unrelated Level 6 felony, that not more than ten years had elapsed between the time he was released from imprisonment, probation, or parole for at least one of the three prior unrelated felonies and the time he committed the current offense. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(d) (2023).

[10] Here, the State admitted certified court records of three prior unrelated felonies that showed convictions for: (1) Class B felony burglary in February 2013; (2) Level 6 felony theft in January 2023; and (3) Level 6 felony theft in February 2024. Powell notes that the documents’ authenticity was not challenged at trial, and he does not challenge them on appeal; he also does not challenge the timing component between his release from the prior unrelated felonies’ sentences to the time he committed the current offense. Rather, he argues the supporting evidence linking him to those records was insufficient.

[11] “To adjudicate a defendant [a] habitual offender, the State must sufficiently connect the defendant to the prior felony convictions alleged in the information.” Lyons v. State, 244 N.E.3d 471, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Further,

there must be supporting evidence to identify the defendant as the person named in the documents. This proof of identity may be in the form of circumstantial evidence. If the evidence yields logical and reasonable inferences from which the finder of fact may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that it was [the] defendant who was convicted of the prior felony, then a sufficient connection has been shown.

Id. (quoting Payne v. State, 96 N.E.3d 606, 611-12 (Ind. Ct. App.) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. granted, 102 N.E.3d 287, and trans. vacated, 99 N.E.3d 624 (Ind. 2018)).

[12] Powell points out that the State did not present any photographs, fingerprints, or an expert witness who knew of the prior felonies to connect Powell to the prior felonies. Although Powell cites to several cases where such evidence was found to be sufficient to connect the defendant to prior felonies, Powell provides no authority asserting that such evidence is mandatory. Still, Powell contends that Hazen's testimony was insufficient because she could have learned Powell's date of birth from the records she reviewed. We disagree.

[13] Here, the State's Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 contained certified copies of the Chronological Case Summary (CCS), plea agreement, and sentencing order for each of Powell's three prior unrelated felonies. Together, the documents contained the name Andre Powell or Andre V. Powell and one, unvarying date of birth. And each CCS contained the name Andre V. Powell, the same date of birth, and a physical description of the defendant. The State presented supporting testimony from Hazen and Sergeant Snow who both identified the person in the courtroom by the name Andre Powell and provided his date of birth, which matched the name and date of birth in the certified records. Hazen also confirmed that she reviewed Powell's criminal history when he was placed at the work release facility and that his criminal history was consistent with the certified records. Because the documents and the testimony of both witnesses contain identical data, the State demonstrated a sufficient connection between the documents and Powell to yield a logical and reasonable inference from which the trier of fact could determine it was Powell who was convicted in the prior unrelated felonies. See id. at 473. Powell's habitual offender adjudication is, therefore, affirmed.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his brief, Powell discusses a Motion to Correct Error and a Motion to Correct Erroneous Sentence that he filed with the trial court after his conviction. Appellant's Brief p. 9. Neither Powell nor the State raise any issues on appeal based on these motions.

2.   In addition to addressing fundamental error as to Hazen's testimony, the State addresses, on its own, that the court did not commit fundamental error by admitting the certified records of Powell's prior felonies. Because Powell does not raise a fundamental error argument regarding the certified records, we do not address that issue.

Scheele, Judge.

Judges Foley and Kenworthy concur. Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.