Amy Gillikin, Appellant-Defendant v. Janice Mandla Mattingly, et al., Appellees-Plaintiffs (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Amy Gillikin appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to set aside a $250,000 default judgment entered against her for defamation, which was based on a scathing Google review that she posted online about Janice Mandla Mattingly and Mattingly's law firm, Janice Mandla Mattingly, P.C., D/B/A Carmel Family Law (collectively, Mattingly). Gillikin presents several issues on appeal of which we find the following restated issue dispositive: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it refused to set aside the default judgment under Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8)?

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In June 2024, Mattingly and Gillikin did not personally know each other, but Mattingly represented the former spouse of Gillikin's fiancé in a pending legal matter involving child custody and parenting time. Around the middle of that month, Gillikin posted a review on Mattingly's Google review page. In the post, Gillikin described Mattingly as a corrupt attorney and a monster, who exploits abused children for her own monetary gain, and who would soon be disbarred. Gillikin suggested that Mattingly colludes with the Hamilton County magistrates, among others, and that Mattingly knows that her clients continue to abuse their children. She concluded her post: “We pray that the Attorney General can stop this racket before anymore children are affected by her unethical conduct.” Appellant's Appendix at 12.

[4] On June 27, 2024, Mattingly filed a verified complaint for damages against Gillikin based on, among other things, defamation per se. Mattingly sought judgment “in the amount sufficient to compensate Plaintiffs for the damages they have suffered as a result of Defendant's conduct” and “punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish Defendant, Amy Gillikin, and to discourage her and others from similar conduct in the future[.]” Id. at 10.

[5] Despite being personally served on June 30, Gillikin did not respond to the complaint. Accordingly, on July 25, Mattingly filed a verified motion for default judgment. Regarding damages, she set forth in her motion:

7. The communications Defendant published about Plaintiffs were defamatory per se; therefore, Plaintiffs do not need to prove damages.

8. Based on knowledge and belief, at least fifty percent (50%) of Plaintiffs’ business is generated from those who have searched Google. Moreover, the clients who engage Plaintiffs [sic] services after a Google search often refer clients to Plaintiffs. The damage to Plaintiffs is significant.

9. Plaintiffs believe that the defamation will potentially have an impact on their business for twelve (12) to eighteen (18) months.

10. Plaintiffs believe an appropriate award of damages is Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000).

Id. at 14. The next day, the trial court entered judgment against Gillikin and awarded Mattingly $250,000 in damages.

[6] On August 7, 2024, twelve days after being defaulted, Gillikin, by counsel, filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. She cited two grounds for relief: T.R. 60(B)(1), which addresses excusable neglect, and T.R. 60(B)(8), which addresses broader equitable considerations. Citing Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Car-X Assoc. Corp., 39 N.E.3d 652 (Ind. 2015), Gillikin specifically argued that she was entitled to equitable relief under T.R. 60(B)(8) because she had a meritorious defense (among other things, that the statements were true), the damages award was substantial/excessive, and setting aside the judgment would not prejudice Mattingly.

[7] The hearing on the T.R. 60(B) motion was held on December 9, 2024, before Magistrate Erin Weaver. During her testimony, Gillikin acknowledged that she was personally served with the complaint and claimed that she reached out to her attorney that same day about the lawsuit. Gillikin testified that she was shocked, having “never been involved in the courts before”, and that her attorney told her that he would “take care of this.” Transcript at 5. At that point, Mattingly objected and argued: “The fact that she contacted her attorney and her attorney did not file an appearance or file an answer is not relevant to today․. Whatever happened between the date she was served on June 30th and ․ the Default Judgment was entered, it's irrelevant.” Id. at 6. Gillikin's attorney responded that such evidence was relevant to the issue of excusable neglect. The trial court, however, indicated that because Gillikin was personally served she could not establish excusable neglect and thus she needed to “move on to your meritorious defense if you've got one.” Id. at 8.

[8] Gillikin's attorney then turned to the damages award and asked Gillikin: “Do you agree in the amount of $250,000 damages?” Id. Mattingly objected, arguing “this is irrelevant in defamation per se.” Id. The court sustained the objection, and Gillikin's attorney responded:

Your honor, I should have at least some ability to ask some questions and build a case. Pursuant to [Ind.] Trial Rule 55, which is another rule just like the case law I cited, a default judgment, it's defamation per se which presumes damages but it still has to be reasonable. There should be a damages hearing at minimum. That's Trial Rule 55․. If the Court doesn't want to listen, I understand. But I can then ask a third question and talk about meritorious defense if the Court would allow it. But I would like to ask the question about does she agree with damages so I can argue in other venues whether Trial Rule 55 should apply to this proceeding, but I'd leave it to the Court's discretion.

Id. at 8-9. The court directed counsel to turn to Gillikin's meritorious defense.

[9] Gillikin then testified that everything in the Google review that she posted was true – “it's fact” – and that she was “looking forward to prove it all true.” Id. at 10. Gillikin began to explain, “I have multiple colleagues, multiple senators, prior prosecutors”, but Mattingly raised a hearsay objection. Id. Without ruling on the objection, the court emphasized that Gillikin should have responded to the complaint. Then noting that the motion to set aside indicated that the review was only posted for a week, the court stated, “I just Googled it and I just found it.” Id. at 11. Gillikin, however, assured the court that she had taken it down.

[10] At the conclusion of the brief hearing, the court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to brief the T.R. 55 issue. In her post-hearing brief, Gillikin cited case law and argued that a hearing was required under T.R. 55(B) to assess the appropriate amount of damages, as damages were unliquidated. Mattingly responded that T.R. 55(B) grants a trial court discretion to hold a hearing on damages and that such a hearing was not needed in this case because damages for defamation per se are presumed and “the verified argument and reasoning for the requested monetary damages [were] set forth in Plaintiff's Verified Motion for Default Judgment.” Appellant's Appendix at 30.

[11] On December 27, 2024, the trial court summarily denied Gillikin's motion to set aside the default judgment. Gillikin now appeals.

Standard of Review

[12] A trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment is entitled to deference and will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014).

However, the trial court's discretion should be exercised in light of the disfavor in which default judgments are held. Indiana law strongly prefers disposition of cases on their merits. And any doubt of the propriety of a default judgment should be resolved in favor of the defaulted party.

Id. (cleaned up).

Discussion & Decision

[13] On a motion to set aside a default judgment, the burden is on the movant to show sufficient grounds for relief under T.R. 60(B). Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at 758. Here, Gillikin asserted two independent grounds: excusable neglect under T.R. 60(B)(1) and equitable reasons under T.R. 60(B)(8). Both grounds required Gillikin to “allege a meritorious ․ defense.” T.R. 60(B).

[14] We first address whether Gillikin alleged a meritorious defense to the defamation action. Her defense was that the statements she made in the post were true, and she testified as such and that she looked forward to proving it all true at a trial on the merits. When she attempted to provide the basis for her belief that the statements were true, she was cut off by Mattingly with an improper hearsay objection and then the court redirected the parties to Gillikin's procedural failure to respond to the complaint. In any case, Gillikin asserted a meritorious defense, as “[t]ruth is an absolute defense to a claim of defamation.” Lloyd v. Kuznar, 180 N.E.3d 353, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. And her testimony, despite its self-serving nature, was sufficient to clear the low bar of making a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense. See id. at 364-65 (observing that “a party seeking relief from a default judgment must state a factual basis for his purported meritorious claim or defense, but at this initial stage such a showing is not governed by the rules of evidence” and that self-serving testimony or sworn averments of the movant are sufficient) (quoting Logansport/Cass Cnty. Airport Auth. v. Kochenower, 169 N.E.3d 1143, 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). Contrary to Mattingly's claim on appeal, Gillikin was not required at this stage to provide evidence that proved the truth of the defamatory statements. See Kochenower, 169 N.E.3d at 1147 (“The moving party need only state the factual basis for his alleged meritorious claim or defense. That statement need not rise to the level of admissible or persuasive evidence.”).

[15] We now turn to Gillikin's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default judgment based on T.R. 60(B)(8).¹ In Huntington Nat. Bank, the Supreme Court determined that even though Huntington had failed to establish excusable neglect under T.R. 60(B)(1), Huntington was still entitled to show that the denial of its motion to set aside was not just and reasonable under the circumstances. 39 N.E.3d at 653.

[16] Under T.R. 60(B)(8), a trial court has discretion to set aside a default judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” other than reasons set forth in certain other subsections of the rule. The burden is on the movant to show that relief is both necessary and just. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 39 N.E.3d at 658. The equitable considerations under T.R. 60(B)(8) are broad and may include things like the strength of the meritorious defense, the amount of money involved, the minimal prejudice to the non-movant if the action is reinstated, and the promptness in which the movant filed the motion to set aside. See Huntington Nat'l Bank, 39 N.E.3d at 658; Lloyd, 180 N.E.3d at 364.

[17] Our Supreme Court has cautioned:

[T]he important and even essential policies necessitating the use of default judgments—maintaining an orderly and efficient judicial system, facilitating the speedy determination of justice, and enforcing compliance with procedural rules—should not come at the expense of professionalism, civility, and common courtesy. An extreme remedy, a default judgment is not a trap to be set by counsel to catch unsuspecting litigants and should not be used as a gotcha devi[c]e when an email or even a phone call to the opposing party inquiring about the receipt of service would prevent a windfall recovery and enable fulfillment of our strong preference to resolve cases on their merits.

Huntington Nat. Bank, 39 N.E.3d at 659; see also Lloyd, 180 N.E.3d at 363.

[18] In Lloyd, this court reversed the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment, holding that Lloyd was entitled to relief under T.R. 60(B)(8). We explained:

Equity considerations [ ] support setting aside the default judgment entered against Lloyd. Courts should consider the degree of financial harm to the defaulted party when deciding whether to set aside a default judgment. Fields v. Safway Group Holdings, LLC, 118 N.E.3d 804, 810-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. Here, the trial court awarded Kuznar over $600,000 in damages because Lloyd sent one allegedly defamatory email to a subset of university employees. That a judgment of this magnitude was rendered against Lloyd without her appearing to contest it supports setting the judgment aside.

Lloyd, 180 N.E.3d at 364.

[19] Here, just over a month after Gillikin posted the allegedly defamatory Google review and only twenty-five days after service of the complaint and summons, Mattingly sought a default judgment against Gillikin and damages of $250,000. This was the quintessential gotcha maneuver, which worked when the very next day the trial court granted Mattingly's motion and awarded $250,000 without holding a hearing.

[20] Gillikin quickly sought to set aside the judgment, filing her motion twelve days after the default judgment was entered. At the hearing on Gillikin's motion, Gillikin testified that everything she stated in the review was a fact, thus asserting the meritorious defense of truth. Gillikin also challenged the amount of damages and the fact that a hearing was not held to determine the reasonableness of the $250,000 requested by Mattingly in the motion for default judgment. Gillikin argued that because the damages sought by Mattingly were not liquidated or for a sum certain, the trial court should have held a hearing on damages. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Love, 944 N.E.2d 47, 53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that because damages were unliquidated – not a sum certain or able to be reduced to fixed rules and mathematical precision – trial court erroneously entered the $225,000 damages award along with the default judgment without holding a damages hearing); Stewart v. Hicks, 395 N.E.2d 308, 312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming, on the basis of T.R. 60(B)(8), trial court's setting aside of $50,000 award entered in a default judgment without a hearing where damages were unliquidated).

[21] Given the meritorious defense, the magnitude of the damages award issued without a hearing,² the promptness in which Gillikin sought to set aside the default judgment, and the lack of any demonstrated prejudice to Mattingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default judgment on equitable grounds under T.R. 60(B)(8). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to set aside the default judgment, instruct the trial court to vacate the default judgment, and remand for further proceedings before a different judicial officer,³ as requested by Gillikin.

[22] Judgment reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mattingly does not address Gillikin's T.R. 60(B)(8) argument, which Gillikin expressly raised below and on appeal. Where an appellee fails to respond to an issue raised by an appellant, it is akin to failing to file a brief, and we may reverse on the appellant's showing of prima facie error on that issue. Evansville Auto., LLC v. Labno-Fritchley, 207 N.E.3d 447, 454 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

2.   We recognize Mattingly's argument that the trial court was not required to hold a hearing under the specific circumstances of this case. Regardless of whether a hearing was strictly required, which we do not decide, we certainly question the fairness of awarding $250,000 in unliquidated damages without a hearing for a single online review that was posted and removed within about a week.

3.   While we do not agree with Gillikin that Magistrate Weaver was constitutionally required to sua sponte recuse herself, we observe that some of Magistrate Weaver's actions during the very brief hearing were problematic. She abruptly stopped Gillikin from presenting evidence related to excusable neglect, prevented inquiry into the reasonableness of the damages award, and conducted a sua sponte Google search of the alleged defamatory statement during the hearing.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Judges Pyle and DeBoer concur. Pyle, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.