Max Healey, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Max Healey appeals following his conviction of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine.¹ Healey presents two issues, which we restate as:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence that he committed dealing in methamphetamine; and

2. Whether his sentence was inappropriate based on the nature of the offense and his character.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November 2023, Detective Jordan Corral of the Huntington City Police Department worked with a confidential informant (“CI”) to arrange a controlled buy at a house where the CI had purchased methamphetamine from Healey in the past (the “Market Street House”). The CI called Healey and scheduled the controlled buy for November 20, 2023 (the “First Buy”). On that day, Detective Corral and another officer searched the CI, equipped him with audio and video recording equipment, and gave him $450 in cash. Detective Corral then drove the CI to the Market Street House. The CI entered the house and returned to Detective Corral with a white substance in a bag, later determined to be 27.9 grams of methamphetamine. The CI told Detective Corral that he bought the methamphetamine from Healey. Detective Corral and the other officer searched the CI following the controlled buy.

[3] The CI contacted Healey again, this time via text messages and phone calls, and scheduled a second controlled buy for November 26, 2023 (the “Second Buy”). On that day, Detective Corral and another officer searched the CI, equipped him with audio and video recording equipment, and gave him $500 in cash. Detective Corral drove the CI to the Market Street House. The CI went to the door of the house, and Healey answered the door. The CI gave Healey the buy money, and Healey handed the CI a white powdery substance in a disposable shower cap. The CI returned to Detective Corral and gave him the shower cap containing the white substance, which was later determined to be 27.92 grams of methamphetamine. Detective Corral and another officer searched the CI following the buy.

[4] Based thereon, the State charged Healey with two counts of Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine – Count I was based on the First Buy and Count II was based on the Second Buy. The State also alleged Healey was a habitual offender.² Healey's jury trial began on February 12, 2025. The jury returned a not guilty verdict for Count I and a guilty verdict for Count II. Healey admitted he was a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Healey to an aggregate sentence of thirty-seven years incarcerated: twenty-five years for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine with a twelve-year enhancement for being a habitual offender.

Discussion and Decision

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[5] Healey argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove he committed dealing in methamphetamine.³ When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, we must accept the fact-finder's determination of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Young v. State, 244 N.E.3d 950, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. We will overturn a conviction only if no fact-finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024).

[6] First, Healey contends the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction of Count II because “the evidence that supports Count I and Count II was almost exact in nature” and “thus there is a contradiction created as the same insufficient evidence [used to support Count I] was used to support Healey's conviction for Count II.” (Br. of Appellant at 16.) As noted above, the jury returned a not guilty verdict for Count I and a guilty verdict for Count II. We have long held that “[j]ury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable.” Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). Therefore, the fact that the jury entered different verdicts for the two charges is not a ground for reversal. See, e.g., Myers v. State, 221 N.E.3d 694, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (the alleged inconsistency between not guilty verdict for battery and guilty verdict for neglect of a dependent was not subject to appellate review), trans. denied.

[7] Healey next argues the State did not present sufficient evidence he committed Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine because the State did not present evidence that he was the person who sold methamphetamine to the CI. To prove Healey committed Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, the State had to present sufficient evidence he knowingly or intentionally delivered over ten grams of methamphetamine. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(e)(1).

[8] At trial, the CI testified he arranged the Second Buy with Healey via text message and phone calls. The State entered into evidence screenshots of the text messages and the call logs showing the CI's communication with Healey. The CI testified Healey opened the door when he arrived at the house, he handed Healey the buy money, and Healey gave him methamphetamine. The State introduced a recording from the surveillance equipment that the CI was wearing, which showed Healey handing the CI a white substance packaged in a disposable shower cap that the CI subsequently delivered to Detective Corral.

[9] A reasonable juror could conclude from this evidence that Healey was the one who sold methamphetamine to the CI in the Second Buy, and Healey's argument that someone else sold the methamphetamine is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See Young, 244 N.E.3d at 963 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses). Based on the facts most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence Healey committed Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine. See, e.g., Hale v. State, 875 N.E.2d 438, 445 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding evidence sufficient to support dealing in cocaine conviction based on a controlled buy during which Hale gave the buyer cocaine in exchange for money), trans. denied.

2. Inappropriate Sentence

[10] Healey argues his sentence is inappropriate based on the nature of his offense and his character. He specifically contends his twenty-five-year sentence for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine is inappropriate, but our focus in evaluating an inappropriate sentence claim is on “the forest – the aggregate sentence – rather than the trees – consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Thus, we examine whether Healey's thirty-seven-year sentence is inappropriate.

[11] Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence “if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, [we find] the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.

Our review is deferential to the trial court's decision, and our goal is to determine whether the appellant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. We consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence [is] inappropriate.

George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. A defendant need not prove a sentence is inappropriate given both the defendant's character and offense, but “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024).

[12] “When considering the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence for the crime.” McHenry v. State, 152 N.E.3d 41, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). When a sentence deviates from the advisory sentence, “we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The sentence for a Level 2 felony ranges from ten to thirty years with an advisory sentence of seventeen and a half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-8(i), a trial court “shall sentence a person found to be a habitual offender to an additional fixed term that is between ․ eight (8) years and twenty (20) years, for a person convicted of murder or a Level 1 through Level 4 felony[.]” The trial court sentenced Healey to an aggregate term of thirty-seven years: twenty-five years for Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine enhanced by twelve years because Healey was a habitual offender, which is midway between the advisory and maximum sentence that the trial court could have imposed.

[13] Healey argues his sentence is inappropriate because the “nature of his offense is not the most egregious ․ [and therefore does not] demand the elevated sentence” he received. (Br. of Appellant at 19.) He claims the State did not show he caused specific harm to any particular victim, and that the 27.92 grams of methamphetamine he sold “was not much over the threshold amount of ten (10) grams.” (Id.) Our Indiana Supreme Court has held drug offenses are not victimless crimes because “distributing or possessing even small amounts of drugs threatens society.” State v. Timbs, 169 N.E.3d 361, 373 (Ind. 2021). Additionally, Healey's claim that he sold only a small amount over the legal threshold for his crime is incorrect - he sold nearly three times the amount required for his conviction. Based thereon, we conclude Healey's sentence was not inappropriate based on the nature of his offense. See, e.g., Shinkle v. State, 129 N.E.3d 212, 217-8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (holding defendant's sentence not inappropriate based on the nature of his crime when he sold more methamphetamine than required for the offense), trans. denied.

[14] “When considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant's criminal history.” Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Healey acknowledges his lengthy criminal history, which includes eight misdemeanor and six felony convictions for crimes ranging from Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended to Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine. His criminal history also includes six probation revocations. Healey nevertheless contends his sentence should be shorter because he waived a jury trial at the habitual offender phase, he has health issues, he has multiple children, and he obtained his GED. In addition, Healey asserts he has “obvious drug and alcohol addiction issues.” (Appellant's Br. at 20.)

[15] We find Healey's arguments unavailing. Healey's guilty plea to the habitual offender allegation was pragmatic, as evidenced by his extensive criminal history, which would have been used to prove he was a habitual offender. See Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding guilty plea not mitigating when the evidence is strong, such that pleading guilty is “merely pragmatic”), trans. denied. Healey has not indicated how his health issues would worsen while incarcerated or how his incarceration would affect his children. While we acknowledge Healey's recognition of his addiction issues and his commitment to his education, they do not illustrate “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” that would warrant a reduction in his sentence. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Therefore, Healey's sentence also is not inappropriate based on his character. See, e.g., Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018) (holding Robinson's criminal history outweighed any mitigators and therefore his sentence above the advisory was not inappropriate). We affirm Healey's sentence.

Conclusion

[16] The State presented sufficient evidence Healey committed Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, and Healey's sentence was not inappropriate based on the nature of his offense and his character. Accordingly, we affirm.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(e)(1).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(b).

3.   Healey does not appeal his adjudication as a habitual offender.

May, Judge.

Judges Mathias and Bradford concur. Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.