IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of L.S. and A.S. (Minor Children) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.S. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her minor children, L.S. and A.S. [collectively, “the Children”], arguing that the trial court's termination order was clearly erroneous. Finding no clear error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and L.J. (“Father”)¹ are the parents of L.S., born February 5, 2014. Mother is also the parent of A.S., born August 26, 2016, whose father is unknown.

[3] Mother has an extensive history with the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS). In December 2011, DCS filed petitions alleging that two of Mother's other children, M.A. and Z.S., were children in need of services (CHINS) after M.A. suffered severe burns while in Mother's care. That case concluded with reunification in March 2013.

[4] In February 2013, DCS filed a CHINS petition related to another of Mother's children, Za.S, alleging medical neglect. Mother's parental rights as to Za.S. were involuntarily terminated, Za.S. was adopted, and his case was closed in May 2016.

[5] In February 2014, Mother tested positive for cocaine and THC when she gave birth to L.S., prompting DCS to file CHINS petitions related to M.A., Z.S., and L.S. That case concluded with reunification in June 2016.

[6] In May 2017, DCS found an emergency detention was warranted for M.A.,² Z.S., L.S., and A.S., and it removed them from Mother's home. DCS filed CHINS petitions after Mother reported to law enforcement that she had been physically attacked by her boyfriend, who lived with Mother and her children. At the detention hearing, the trial court affirmed its order removing the children from Mother's care.

[7] A fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petitions was held in August 2017. Mother admitted that A.S. was a CHINS and waived fact-finding as to Z.S. and L.S. She further admitted that she was “in the process of obtaining stable and consistent housing and therefore, the coercive intervention of the Court [was] necessary.” Exhibits Vol. 1 at 36. The trial court found that Z.S., L.S., and A.S. were CHINS and the permanency plan was reunification.

[8] The trial court's dispositional order in October 2017 provided that Z.S., L.S., and A.S. would remain in DCS's custody, but it gave DCS the authority to permit Mother “increased parenting time, up to and including” a temporary in-home trial visitation (TTV) “upon positive recommendations from DCS,” the Guardian ad Litem (GAL), “and service providers.” Id. at 50. At the same time, the court entered a parental participation order requiring Mother to engage in certain services, including a home-based therapy program, a home-based case management program referred by the DCS Family Case Manager (FCM), and “home[-]based counseling through [the organization] Adult and Child.” Id. at 51. Mother was also required to have parenting and domestic violence assessments and to “complete all services and recommendations made as a result” of those assessments. Id. The court “advised [Mother] ․ that failure to participate as required ․ can lead to the termination of the parent-child relationship[.]” Id. at 49.

[9] Between October 2017 and July 2019, Mother made slow progress toward reunification. Upon reviewing Mother's lack of progress, in November 2018, the trial court suspended Mother's visitation and ordered her to present evidence “to verify that she [was] participating in and progressing with her mental health treatment.” Id. at 68. Although the trial court had previously ordered Mother to sign a release of information enabling DCS to communicate with and receive information from Mother's mental health providers, the record is unclear whether Mother ever complied with that order.

[10] In January 2019, the trial court allowed Mother to engage in therapeutically supervised visitation with the children. At a review hearing in July, the court noted that “Mother is participating in community services and her visits go well. There are no safety concerns for Mother when the children are with her.” Id. at 86. Over DCS's objection, the court ordered the “placement of [Z.S., L.S., and A.S.] in-home with [M]other” on a TTV. Id. at 87.

[11] Z.S., L.S., and A.S. had been in Mother's care for less than two weeks when A.S., then three years of age, was shot in the hand. Mother claimed A.S. was walking “to the gas station to get something to drink and a drive by shooting occurred[.]” Transcript Vol. 4 at 40. But according to FCM Melissa Vortice:

I've heard several stories. One story was they were in the home and people came into the home and whoever ․ was watching A.S., used him as a shield․ I was told by A.S. that he picked up the [ ]no-[ ]no meaning a gun. Then I was told that they were going to corner store [sic] to retrieve something to drink and it was a random drive by.

Id. at 14.

[12] After the shooting, DCS again removed Z.S., L.S., and A.S. from Mother's care due to the emergency and, at a subsequent detention hearing, Mother “acknowledge[d] that her boyfriend [was] dangerous and ․ that where she live[d] [was] not safe.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 93. Mother further “agree[d] that her children should be temporarily removed from her care[.]” Id.

[13] After the failed TTV, DCS returned L.S. and A.S. to the care of their foster mother, Ashley Hutchinson (“Foster Mother”).³ For several months, both Children “suffered from night terrors and had trouble sleeping” and “would wake up multiple times during the night screaming and crying[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 158. L.S. was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

[14] Through early 2020, DCS continued to offer Mother opportunities to visit with the Children. But during a permanency hearing in January 2020, the trial court noted that “Mother has often been late to visits, or she has cancelled or otherwise missed visits with the children.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 106. It further found that “[t]his matter has been open since May of 2017 and no service provider is recommending that these children be returned to the care of [ ] Mother[.] ․ Mother [has not] completed services designed to enhance [her] ability to parent” and “has not shown that she is compliant with her needed mental health treatment.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court modified the permanency plan from reunification to adoption.

[15] Mother had limited contact with the Children from Spring 2020 through mid-2023. During these three years, she moved back and forth between Indianapolis and Atlanta—remaining away for months at a time. While she was out of state, she failed to maintain consistent contact with the Children. However, Mother did complete various DCS assessments during this time, including a Parent/Family Functioning Assessment that indicated she “put[ ] her needs before her children.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 103.

[16] Mother's limited contact with the Children coincided with a marked improvement in their mental health. When Foster Mother talked to the Children about the possibility of resuming visits with Mother, they reacted negatively to the idea. A.S., for example, went “back to bedwetting or having accidents.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 161. L.S. was “extremely anxious and concerned about why he had to go to parenting time” and asked whether the resumption of visitation “would mean that he would be leaving” Foster Mother's care. Id. at 161.

[17] Mother eventually obtained stable housing and became somewhat cooperative with home-based case management services. Mother's other children, including Z.S. and three additional children born during the pendency of these proceedings, were returned to Mother's care at various points in 2021 and 2022. However, DCS, the GAL, and service providers working with the Children did not recommend that they return to Mother's care, as Mother required a psychological evaluation and further therapy to equip her to address the Children's significant mental and emotional health needs after A.S. was shot.

[18] In February 2023, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights (TPR), alleging, among other things, that there was a reasonable probability that: (1) the conditions resulting in the Children's removal from Mother's home would not be remedied and (2) continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children's well-being. Even so, DCS continued to offer Mother services and, in March 2023, held a Child and Family Team Meeting (CFTM) to develop a plan for Mother to have therapeutically supervised parenting time with the Children.

[19] As a part of that plan, Mother resumed contact with the Children in mid-2023 by sending them letters and photographs. Then, in late 2023, Mother participated virtually in two of L.S.’s therapy sessions. At the first of these sessions, L.S. asked Mother “why he couldn't be adopted.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 221. Mother became “emotionally upset and ․ defensive[.]” Id. Because of Mother's combative behavior during the first session, L.S. was “very nervous” before and during his second therapy session. Id. at 222. Mother again became emotional and combative at the second session and accused L.S.’s therapist of coaching him on what to say. After that session, L.S.’s therapist recommended that Mother not participate in any additional joint therapy with L.S. because her behavior detrimentally affected L.S.’s mental health.

[20] At a permanency hearing in December 2023, the trial court acknowledged that L.S. “did not do well during the virtual parenting time sessions,” but still ordered that the Children engage in therapeutically supervised parenting time in person with Mother. Ex. Vol. 1 at 167. The court also found that “Mother has been cooperative and compliant in some services but DCS has no information about her participat[ion] in individual therapy.” Id. It ordered “that the plan remain adoption” but continued services for Mother and the Children “thereby essentially creating a concurrent plan of reunification” and adoption. Id. at 168.

[21] Mother participated in three therapeutically supervised visits with the Children between December 2023 and March 2024. According to Mother, the first and second visits went reasonably well, and the Children were excited to see her after having limited contact for several years. But in the following weeks, Mother cancelled several scheduled visits which negatively affected the Children's mental and emotional health.

[22] At the third and final supervised visit in March 2024, Mother did not engage with the Children and instead expressed “clear signs of discontent” to the service providers about the status of the TPR proceedings. Tr. Vol. 2 at 168-69. When one service provider informed Mother that it was not appropriate to discuss the court case during visitation and attempted to redirect her to engage with the Children, Mother pulled out her cell phone and began recording the providers. As the visit continued, Mother became increasingly upset and emotional, with A.S. later describing that Mother “went crazy” and “just started yelling[.]” Id. at 142. The service providers ended the visit early.

[23] After the third visit, the Children's service providers recommended Mother's parenting time be suspended altogether until she received additional mental health treatment. In April 2024, the trial court suspended Mother's parenting time, finding that continued visitation “[was] contrary to the health, well-being and safety of the [C]hildren[.]” Ex. Vol. 1 at 212.

[24] The trial court conducted a five-day bench trial on the TPR petitions in August and September 2024. Throughout the trial, Mother

regularly had emotional reactions or outbursts which led to her requests to take breaks from the proceedings. Mother's counsel requested and the Court granted that Mother be permitted to leave the courtroom during testimony without stopping the proceedings due to the frequency of her reactions and outbursts. Mother was unable to effectively regulate her emotions and behaviors during the course of the proceedings and was visibly triggered by statements made by her child, [L.S.], and by other witnesses to the extent that she would verbally interrupt or physically leave the courtroom.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 63.⁴

[25] FCM Vortice testified that she was concerned about how reunifying Mother and the Children would affect the Children given “the length of time that they've been separate[d.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 79. Given the strong bond the Children had formed with Foster Mother and her willingness to adopt them,⁵ FCM Vortice recommended that Mother's parental rights be terminated so the Children could be adopted by Foster Mother.

[26] A.S.’s therapist testified that Mother is unable to meet A.S.’s therapeutic needs. She recommended that A.S. remain with Foster Mother and explained that she “did not feel it was appropriate for him to be placed with” Mother. Id. at 145. She further testified that continuation of the parent-child relationship would not be beneficial for A.S. because he needed permanency after the years-long CHINS and TPR proceedings.

[27] A trauma-focused therapist for L.S. testified that L.S. “needs stability and permanency and security,” and the length of time his case remained open has been “tremendously damaging” for him. Id. at 235; Tr. Vol. 3 at 22. She further explained that if L.S. was returned to Mother's care, Mother would not be able to meet his “mental and emotional needs[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 23.

[28] The Children's behaviorist agreed that it was best for the Children to remain with Foster Mother given “the length of time that this case has taken place and where the boys [were.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 173. According to their behaviorist, Mother was “[r]eluctant [and] hostile” when he recommended that she engage in further therapy and parenting education. Id. at 172.

[29] The GAL testified that Mother “fights service providers ․ more than she fights to get the services that she needs to better herself so that she could be a better parent for her children.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 89. The GAL observed that both Children “are very opposed” to reunifying with Mother and they need “stability and permanency” instead of the lengthy CHINS and TRP proceedings. Id. at 88-89. Because the proceedings had been pending for nearly eight years with little progress, the GAL testified that she believed no further “engagement in services at this point by [Mother] ․ would end in a successful reunification[.]” Id. at 136.

[30] Following the TRP hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother's parental relationship with the Children. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Standard of Review

[31] Parental rights are precious and are afforded federal and state constitutional protection. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 641-42 (Ind. 2014). But they are not absolute and may be terminated when parents “are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh'g denied. Termination is “a last resort” that is “available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1151-52 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1136 (Ind. 2010)).

[32] We review a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights “with great deference.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 640. We will “not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility.” V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143 (quoting I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132). Rather, we look only to the evidence and any reasonable inferences that support the judgment and “give ‘due regard’ to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses firsthand.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (quoting I.A., 934 N.E. 2d at 1132).

[33] Where, as here, “a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law,” we will affirm unless the findings or judgment are clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). Because a trial court's findings in a TPR proceeding “must be based upon clear and convincing evidence[,]” on appeal “we review the trial court's judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1132 (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). We accept any unchallenged findings as true and will affirm “if the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment[.]” Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

2. Termination

[34] We begin our review of the appealed termination order by noting that of the 108 detailed findings of fact the trial court entered in its order, Mother challenges only findings 23, 36, and 60.⁶ See Appellant's Brief at 26-28. Because we find that the unchallenged findings are sufficient to affirm the trial court's judgment, we need not determine whether the three findings Mother challenges are erroneous and instead focus our analysis on the unchallenged findings. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“Because there is evidence sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate findings on the elements necessary to sustain the judgment, we hold that the erroneous finding was merely harmless surplusage that did not prejudice Mother and, consequently, is not grounds for reversal.”), trans. denied.

[35] To succeed on the TPR petitions, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 (the “TPR statute”) required DCS to prove:

(A) that ․

(i) [t]he child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree ․ [;]

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside of the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child[;]

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023) (amended 2024).⁷

[36] DCS had to prove these elements “by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’ ” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642 (quoting I.C. § 31-37-14-2). “Clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that ‘the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the child's very survival.’ ” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Ind. 1992)). Instead, “it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that ‘the child's emotional and physical development are threatened’ by the respondent parent's custody.” Id. (quoting Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234).

[37] On appeal, Mother challenges only whether the trial court clearly erred in concluding that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Children's removal from Mother's home will not be remedied; (2) there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children; and (3) termination is in the best interests of the Children. Accordingly, we address only those elements.

A. Remediation

[38] In arguing that DCS failed to prove that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will not be remedied, Mother asserts that she “completed services and demonstrated she could remedy the circumstances that resulted in the [C]hildren's removal from her care.” Appellant's Br. at 32. When reviewing whether conditions that led to the Children's placement outside the home will not be remedied, we initially determine what conditions led to the removal of the Children. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. Then we examine “ ‘whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. (quoting I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1134).

[39] Mother contends that the Children “were removed [in May 2017] because [she] was involved in an incident of domestic violence.” Appellant's Br. at 31. And because “there were no additional complaints of domestic violence related issues” throughout the case “and [she] completed a domestic violence assessment that did not recommend additional classes[,]” Mother argues that she “demonstrated she could remedy the circumstances that resulted in the [C]hildren's removal from her care.” Id. at 31-32.

[40] We disagree. DCS first removed M.A., Z.S., L.S., and A.S. from Mother's home on emergency detention after Mother reported that she had been the victim of domestic violence. But in determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to the Children's removal will not be remedied, we “may consider not only the basis for a child's initial removal from the parent's care, but also any reasons for a child's continued placement away from the parent.” In re K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317, 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re D.K., 968 N.E.2d 792, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). Moreover,

[t]he court may also consider the parent's habitual patterns of conduct, as well as evidence of a parent's prior ․ history of neglect [and] failure to provide support[.] ․ Additionally, the court may consider any services offered by the DCS to the parent and the parent's response to those services.

D.K., 968 N.E.2d at 798.

[41] There is ample evidence that throughout the pendency of these proceedings, Mother's failure to resolve her mental health issues was the primary reason for the Children's continued placement outside of her care. In fact, the trial court noted in in finding 83 of the termination order—which Mother does not challenge on appeal—that “[s]ince 2017, the DCS, GAL, child and family team, and [ ] CHINS Court have recognized Mother's need to participate in individual therapy and have identified her untreated or undertreated mental health needs as a barrier to recognizing, understanding, and meeting the needs of the Children.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 73.

[42] Furthermore, Mother does not challenge finding 40, where the trial court reasoned that she refused to cooperate with DCS's efforts to help her obtain the services she needed to reunite with the Children:

Throughout the CHINS case, DCS has held between 40 and 60 CFTMs with [Mother]. CFTMs with [Mother] are difficult and arduous. She is antagonistic, does not listen to feedback or recommendations, and is accusatory with the Team, especially the GAL. [Mother] verbally threatened to kill the GAL in 2020 while they were both attending [ ] a ․ court proceeding[.] ․ [Mother] has had adequate opportunities to understand the concerns and requests of the Team, including the request and the CHINS Court's orders for her to complete a psychological evaluation and individual therapy through DCS, or in the alternative, to sign releases of information regarding independent treatment, however, she has failed to do so.

Id. at 63.

[43] Nor does Mother challenge finding 58, which provides that despite her claims that she was receiving independent mental health treatment from non-DCS affiliated providers, Mother failed to supply DCS or the court with proof that she executed the necessary releases or any information regarding her mental health treatment:

The FCM, GAL, and Team have consistently impressed upon Mother that she is both ordered to complete therapy and that the service will enhance her ability to address her own mental health needs as well as parent the Children and understand and provide for their emotional needs. Similarly, the Team has encouraged Mother to provide the Court ordered releases of information for any therapy services she is independently completing and to invite her independent providers to CFTMs. Mother has not done so. In the time immediately preceding the trial of this matter, FCM Vortice still offered to provide therapy referrals for Mother if she was willing to participate with the service. The benefits of a DCS therapy referral or an executed release of information regarding independent therapy services to [Mother] would be that DCS and the Team would get reports and could assess Mother's progress in the service and her provider could participate in CFTMs as well as the CHINS proceeding. Mother has declined the DCS referrals and has failed to execute releases of information or involve an independent service provider in the CFTMs or CHINS hearings.

Id. at 67-68.

[44] Critically, Mother does not challenge the trial court's determination in finding 65 that she has untreated or undertreated mental health conditions which compromise her ability to care for the Children:

Despite the lack of documentary evidence presented by any party regarding Mother's mental health diagnoses or treatment, the Court, based upon the testimonial evidence and its observations of Mother's demeanor and behavior during the trial, concludes that Mother has untreated or undertreated mental health conditions which have a significant impact on her behavioral health and interactions with other people, most significantly, the Children. Mother is unable to effectively control her emotions and reactions, which compromises her ability to understand and assist the Children in processing their trauma history with Mother and feel safe in her presence. [Mother] has resisted and refused all efforts by DCS to provide her with a psychological evaluation and therapy to address her mental and behavioral health needs in order to meet those had by the Children. While Mother has refused to provide DCS and the Team with evidence of her participation in independent therapy, even if she is receiving the same, the treatment has not been sufficient to address Mother's own conditions to the extent necessary for her to safely parent the Children and meet their needs.

Id. at 69. And Mother does not challenge finding 66 where the court found that she failed to “engage in the Court ordered psychological evaluation and therapy to address her own mental health and behavioral needs as well as to understand, appreciate, and meet the needs of the Children.” Id.⁸

[45] These unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's placement outside of Mother's care will not be remedied. As such, we need not address Mother's argument that the trial court erred in concluding that “additional delays would pose a threat to the children's well-being[.]” Appellant's Br. at 35; see In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, and [ ] the court is required to find that only one prong of subsection 2(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.”), trans. dismissed.

B. Best Interests

[46] Mother further argues that “the termination of [her] parental rights was not in either child's best interests.” Appellant's Br. at 31. “In determining what is in the best interests of the child[ren], the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence.” A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224. This determination requires the trial court to “subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child[ren] involved.” Id.

[47] “Central among these interests is children's need for permanency” because “children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” In re Ma.H, 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019) (quoting E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648), cert. denied. Under this principle, “[t]he trial court need not wait until the child[ren are] irreversibly harmed such that [their] physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224.

[48] In In re A.D.S., a panel of this Court affirmed a trial court's conclusion that termination was in the children's best interests when the children's FCM and GAL “both supported termination of [the mother's] parental rights and supported adoption by the [c]hildren's current caregivers.” 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Additionally, the mother had failed to remedy her “issues with substance abuse and domestic violence” that “pose[d] a risk to the safety of the [c]hildren.” Id. Though these considerations alone supported the trial court's best interests analysis, the panel further reasoned that

the [c]hildren have suffered from a lack of permanency and ․ have improved while residing with their current, pre-adoptive caregivers [for several years]. The [c]hildren have bonded and attached with their caregivers and termination, allowing for a subsequent adoption, would provide them with the opportunity to be adopted into a safe, stable, consistent and permanent environment where all their needs will continue to be met, and where they can grow.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

[49] Likewise, in the present case, FCM Vortice, the GAL, and the Children's mental health providers all supported the termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption by Foster Mother. We take particular note of the fact that the underlying proceedings spanned nearly eight years with little progress toward reunification, and we agree with the GAL that the Children need “stability and permanency[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 89. We also agree with DCS that the “Children should not have to wait endlessly to have a secure, stable, and safe environment in which to live.” Appellee's Br. at 36.

[50] For these reasons, we conclude that the totality of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[51] The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact support the conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the Children's placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied, and the totality of the evidence supports the court's conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Children's best interests. As such, we affirm.

[52] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father's parental rights as to L.S. were terminated in the same proceedings as Mother's. Because Father does not participate in this appeal, we primarily confine our discussion to those circumstances that relate to Mother.

2.   M.A.’s case was closed after a temporary custody order placed her with her father.

3.   Z.S., who DCS placed elsewhere, was later returned to Mother's care. Her case was closed in early 2021 after Z.S. “blew all of her placements for behavioral issues and other issues and there was [ ] nowhere else to place her[.]” Transcript Vol. 3 at 98.

4.   On appeal, Mother does not challenge the trial court's findings as to her “behavior and demeanor during the trial[,]” so we accept the trial court's observations as true. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 63; see also Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“We accept unchallenged findings as true.”).

5.   Foster Mother filed a petition to adopt the Children in February 2020.

6.   Specifically, Mother challenges the following findings:23. Between January 2020 and mid-2023, no meaningful or sustainable progress was made by either Mother or [Father] toward reunification with [the Children]․ Mother's contact with the Children during this time was limited. She moved from Indianapolis to Atlanta, Georgia and back three different times for months each time. She had no consistent contact with [the Children] when she was in Georgia.* * *36. Following the Detention Hearing and removal of the Children from Mother's care after [A.S.’s] shooting in August 2019 through mid-2023, and through the Covid-19 pandemic and Mother's multiple moves between Indiana and Georgia, Mother had very limited and inconsistent contact with the Children. In March 2023, DCS convened a CFTM, including counsel for parties, to discuss getting therapeutically supervised parenting time re-started consistently between Mother and the Children and a plan for the same was developed by the Team. The therapists working with the Children and the Team recommended that family therapy between Mother and the Children not begin until the Children's therapists recommended the same. No such recommendation was ever made by either therapist.* * *60. DCS and the Team are unable to verify Mother's participation in therapy or medication management or assess her progress with therapeutic services due to Mother's decision to not involve any therapist with whom she may be working or provide necessary releases of information.Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 60, 62, 68. We observe that Mother's challenges to these findings are either unavailing or are simply requests for us to reweigh evidence. But, for the reasons outlined below, even assuming these three findings are erroneous, the trial court's unchallenged findings are sufficient to support its judgment.

7.   Effective March 11, 2024, the requirements under section (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), and (b)(2)(C)-(D) of the TPR statute were modified and rewritten as Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(2)-(3), (d)(2)(A)-(B), and (d)(3)-(4) (2024) (amended 2025). Though the appealed termination order was issued in November 2024, the trial court applied the 2023 TPR statute but did not explain why it did so. See Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 80 (citing I.C. § 31-35-2-4 (2023)).On appeal, Mother presents no argument that the trial court should have applied the 2024 TPR statute. Nonetheless, without any explanation, Mother's brief cites and analyzes the 2024 version. See Appellant's Brief at 28-30 (quoting I.C. § 31-35-2-4 (2024)). For its part, DCS—without citation to supporting authority—asserts that “[b]ecause the termination petitions in this case were filed in 2023 before the effective date [of the 2024 amendments], the changes to the statute do not apply here.” Appellee's Br. at 21 n.4.Because Mother did not raise this issue on appeal and failed to present any cogent argument that the trial court erred in applying the 2023 version, we assume, without deciding, that the court correctly applied the 2023 TPR statute. See Martin v. Brown, 129 N.E.3d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Failure to present a cogent argument results in waiver of the issue on appeal.”).

8.   Mother contends that her failure to alleviate her unresolved mental health conditions should be charged to DCS because DCS did not “make reasonable efforts to assist [her] with [ ] reunification” since “DCS, [the] GAL[,] and providers continued to deny family therapy between Mother and the children[.]” Appellant's Brief at 33. But Mother does not challenge the trial court's observation in finding 25 that since 2017 “[t]he CHINS Court reviewed parenting time orders at hearings and continuously found that DCS had made reasonable efforts to provide the family with services.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 60 (emphasis added). And we again note that Mother does not challenge the trial court's finding that she “has resisted and refused all efforts by DCS to provide her with a psychological evaluation and therapy to address her mental and behavioral health needs in order to meet those had by the Children.” Id. at 69. Even assuming that Mother is correct that DCS failed to offer family therapy, it would not change our analysis given Mother's refusal of all efforts by DCS to address her mental and behavioral health needs.

DeBoer, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur. Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.