IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.B. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] The Bartholomew Circuit Court terminated L.B.’s (“Mother's”) parental rights to C.B. (“Child”) and Mother appeals. Mother raises three issues on appeal:

I. Whether the trial court's conclusion that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in the Child's best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence,

II. Whether the trial court's conclusion that the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and,

III. Whether the trial court had good cause to exclude Child from the termination fact-finding hearing.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Mother was Child's foster parent for almost two years before she adopted Child in 2021. In July 2023, Mother contacted DCS because she felt that Child posed a threat to the safety of the other children in her home. Child had been engaging in escalating, violent behaviors and began to engage in sexually maladaptive behaviors. In addition to physically fighting with his siblings, Child had thrown a brick at a sibling's head and had held a sibling under water while they were swimming in a pool. He had also attempted to set fire to a mattress in his bedroom.

[4] Child's participation in psychiatric and therapeutic services had no effect on his increasingly aggressive and violent behavior. He required twenty-four-hour supervision in order to protect himself and his siblings from injury and to prevent destruction of property.

[5] On July 11, Mother transported Child to the Bartholomew County DCS office and told DCS that Child, who was twelve years old, was no longer welcome in her home. DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS the next day.

[6] DCS unsuccessfully attempted to find relative placement for Child. Child had two separate foster placements but was removed from those placements at the foster parents’ requests because of Child's behaviors toward the other children in their homes and aggression toward family pets. Eventually, Child was placed in a qualified residential treatment program.

[7] Child underwent a psychological evaluation, and the report was issued on October 25. The psychiatrist determined that Child has a mild intellectual disability and suffers from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and conduct disorder. The psychiatrist reported that Child had experienced significant trauma in his early life before he was adopted by Mother. Finally, the psychiatrist believed that the best placement for Child would be a therapeutic foster home without any other children because Child needs a family who can provide constant supervision.

[8] After fact-finding hearings were held on October 20, December 14, and January 11, 2024, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6. Child remained placed in residential treatment. Mother did not comply with Child's case plan or participate in services because she did not intend to reunify with Child. Mother was allowed six hours of parenting time per week with Child but only saw Child one day per month. Mother believed that spending additional time with Child would confuse him.

[9] DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's rights on September 11.¹ And the trial court held the fact-finding hearing on that petition on February 13, 2025. Child's Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) believed that Child's behaviors had improved, and Child was ready to be placed in a therapeutic foster home. The CASA believed that Child's continued relationship with Mother was “hindering his ability to move on.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 25. The family case manager acknowledged that DCS has not identified a therapeutic foster placement or pre-adoptive home for Child, but DCS's plan for Child remained adoption. Mother argued that her parental rights should remain intact until DCS is able to place Child in a pre-adoptive home.

[10] On March 14, the trial court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. In support of its order, the court made the following findings of fact pertinent to the issues presented in this appeal:

35. DCS believes it is in the best interests of the Child to be adopted because the recommendations from [Child's residential treatment program] indicate that [Child] is capable of thriving in a home-like setting with the right caregiver and the right set of services in the home. [Child] needs permanency and not to be institutionalized. [Child] will have more opportunities to find a pre-adoptive home with parental rights terminated. [Child's] behaviors increase when he had had visits with Mother, which puts [Child] at risk of disrupting any future pre-adoptive placement should Mother's parental rights remain intact. Mother's continued involvement in this case causes confusion and further disruption for [Child]. Her involvement has not helped [Child] move on from the home he thought was permanent. To keep parental rights intact would make it difficult for [Child] to find a permanent home and could confuse [Child] as to what role Mother would be playing in his life.

* * *

40. [Mother] is unwilling to meet her parental responsibilities as [Child's] Mother. Her husband voluntarily terminated his parental rights to [Child]. He is unwilling to fulfill his parental responsibilities to [Child]. [Mother] has indicated to this Court, to [Child], and to the rest of the team that [Child] will never be permitted to return to their home. The Court understands Mother's rationale for her position, she had other children in the home and bringing [Child] back into her home would put those children in danger. It would be contradictory to the welfare of [Child] and the welfare of society to continue to raise and nurture him as an institutionalized child. [Child's] recommendations from his evaluation at [his residential treatment program] indicate that he can thrive in a home-like setting with the right caregiver willing to meet [Child's] therapeutic needs. [Mother] is not willing to meet her parental responsibilities.

Id. at 26-27. The court also found that DCS is not required to present evidence of who will adopt Child and that DCS's plan for Child to be adopted is satisfactory for his care and treatment.

[11] Mother now appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to Child.

Standard of Review

[12] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the juvenile court's decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the court's judgment. Id. In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[13] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the juvenile court's findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the court's termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[14] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of society's most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship by requiring DCS to prove the requisite statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence. DCS is required to allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for [the] care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).

[15] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a child's very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the child's emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parent's custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).

DCS Has a Satisfactory Plan for the Care and Treatment of Child

[16] First, we consider Mother's argument that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it has a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child.

Indiana courts have traditionally held that for a plan to be “satisfactory,” for the purposes of the termination statute, it need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated. A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find suitable parents to adopt the children. In other words, there need not be a guarantee that a suitable adoption will take place, only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive parent. Accordingly, a plan is not unsatisfactory if DCS has not identified a specific family to adopt the children. Part of the reason for this is that it is within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to determine whether an adoptive placement is appropriate.

In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted), trans. denied.

[17] Here, DCS acknowledged that it had not taken significant steps toward placing Child with a therapeutic foster family or pre-adoptive home. At the fact-finding hearing, Child's CASA opined that Child is “ready for discharge” from his therapeutic residential placement. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 25. Child's behaviors had improved significantly, but he will need constant supervision by his therapeutic foster family. DCS wanted to “see more consistent positive behaviors” from Child before attempting to find a foster family placement for him. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 75-76. DCS acknowledged that finding an adoptive home for Child will be difficult but plans for Child to be adopted.

[18] DCS had understandably not taken any significant action toward Child's adoption while it was providing services for him in his therapeutic residential placement and while Mother's parental rights were still intact. And DCS presented evidence of the steps it will take to attempt to find Child a suitable adoptive home. DCS only needed to show a plan to attempt to have Child adopted, see In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007, and it presented evidence sufficient to meet that burden.

Termination of Mother's Parental Rights is in Child's Best Interests

[19] Next, we address Mother's argument that the trial court's conclusion that terminating her parental rights is in Child's best interests is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. To determine what is in a child's best interests, a court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality of the evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A parent's historical inability to provide “adequate housing, stability, and supervision,” in addition to the parent's current inability to do so, supports finding termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. Id.

[20] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child. See In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). And the recommendations of the family case manager and court-appointed special advocate to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. Id.

[21] Mother acknowledges that she does not desire reunification with Child. However, because DCS has not identified an adoptive family for Child, she argues that “stripp[ing] him of the only long-standing emotional bond he had ․ creat[ed] the risk of additional trauma rather than stability.” Appellant's Br. at 10.

[22] Mother unquestionably shares a bond with Child. And the parties presented conflicting evidence whether Mother's continued presence in Child's life was harming him. Child enjoys his visits with Mother, and Mother appropriately communicates and engages with Child.

[23] However, Child's CASA, who has been assigned to Child for two years and has visited with him every two weeks, believed that Child's continued relationship with Mother “could be hindering his ability to move on.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 25. Child also had spikes in his negative behaviors following two therapeutic visits with Mother, where Mother discussed with Child that he would not be allowed to return to Mother's home. Id. The family case manager believed that terminating Mother's parental rights would provide Child with more opportunities to find an adoptive home and Mother's continued involvement in Child's life causes further disruption. Finally, Mother does not challenge the trial court's finding that maintaining her parental rights “would make it difficult for [Child] to find a permanent home and could confuse [Child] as to what role Mother would be playing in his life.” Id. at 26.

[24] DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Mother's arguments to the contrary are simply requests to reweigh the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, which we will not do.

Good Cause to Exclude Child from the Fact-Finding Hearing

[25] In CHINS and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, a trial court may exclude the child “from any part of any hearing for good cause shown upon the record.” Ind. Code § 31-32-6-8. In this case, the trial court's order from the CHINS fact-finding hearings established that Child appeared at the October 20, 2023, fact-finding hearing. The trial court then excluded Child “for good cause from the two remaining settings of the Fact Finding.” Ex. Vol. 3, p. 46. The court also appointed counsel for Child.² Id. at 47. In the termination proceedings, the court excluded Child for good cause in its initial hearing order and in its order terminating Mother's parental rights. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 13, 15. The court should have provided, but did not provide, a particularized reason for excluding Child for good cause in both the CHINS and the termination proceedings. See In re E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 919 (Ind. 2025).

[26] However, Mother did not challenge Child's exclusion from the CHINS or termination proceedings in the trial court. She raises the issue for the first time on appeal, and, therefore, Mother has waived her claim of error. See In re E.P., 20 N.E.3d 915, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied; see also In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016) (holding that a party may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, if it is raised for the first time on appeal).

[27] Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court did not ignore Child's right to be present during the termination proceedings. The court excluded him for good cause. Although the court did not provide a particularized reason for excluding Child, on the record before us, it is reasonable to conclude that the trial court believed that Child's presence during the proceedings would cause him additional trauma and adversely affect his behavior. Moreover, to the extent that Mother claims that the trial court would have benefited from Child's testimony concerning his relationship with Mother, we observe that Mother could have called Child as a witness, but she did not do so.

[28] Mother waived this claim of error; but even if she had not, under these particular facts and circumstances we would not conclude that the court's failure to provide a particularized reason for excluding the Child for good cause would be reversible error.

Conclusion

[29] DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests and that DCS has a satisfactory placement for Child's treatment and care. And Mother waived her claim that the trial court erred when it failed to provide a particularized reason for excluding Child from the proceedings for good cause. We therefore affirm the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

[30] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's adoptive father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to Child on November 19, 2024.

2.   The circumstances in this case are not analogous to those in In re E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 919 (Ind. 2025), where the subject child of the CHINS proceedings was never issued a summons to appear and the court did not exclude the child for “good cause.” Here, the only procedural error in the CHINS and termination proceedings is that the court did not give a particularized reason for the “good cause” finding.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.