IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.N. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] J.N. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's involuntary termination of his parental rights to four of his children (collectively, “Children”). Father raises two issues on appeal: (1) Are certain of the trial court's findings supported by the evidence? and (2) Did the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) present sufficient evidence to support the trial court's termination decision? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and H.N. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) were married when each of their four children—J.N. (born in July 2018); M.N. (born in July 2019); B.N. (born in August 2020); and R.N. (born in January 2022)—were born.¹ J.N. and M.N. were adjudicated children in need of services (“CHINS”) in 2019, and B.N. was adjudicated a CHINS in 2021. The CHINS proceedings were closed in May 2022, and the children were reunified with Parents.² Father said he did not remember what prompted the CHINS proceedings.

[3] Stemming from an incident during those first CHINS proceedings, Father pleaded guilty in August 2022 to Level 6 felony intimidation,³ admitting he made threats against a DCS worker. He was sentenced to eighteen months in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), suspended except for four days. Within a week of Father's guilty plea and sentencing, the State filed a notice of probation violation.

[4] In October 2022, DCS initiated the underlying CHINS proceedings following an allegation of a “domestic violence situation between Mother and Father inside the home in front of the children.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 28. The CHINS petition alleged Parents “have failed to provide [Children] with a safe and stable home free of domestic violence.” Ex. Vol. at 46. Parents appeared at the initial hearing and denied the allegations of the CHINS petition. The trial court entered a no contact order between Parents, and Children continued to reside with Mother.

[5] In early November, Father admitted to violating his probation in the intimidation case. By agreement, his probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve 543 days on work release.

[6] Parents appeared at the scheduled CHINS factfinding hearing in late November and withdrew their earlier denials. The trial court adjudicated Children CHINS and set a dispositional hearing for January 2023. Parents did not appear for the dispositional hearing and their whereabouts were unknown. The trial court issued warrants for their arrest and ordered Children to be detained when they were located. As part of the dispositional order, the trial court ordered Father to “not return to, or reside in, the children's place of residence” and refrain from direct or indirect contact with Children until further order of the court. Id. at 57. Father was also ordered to contact the Family Case Manager (“FCM”) weekly; notify the FCM within five days of any change in address, household composition, employment, or telephone number; ensure Children are not removed from Madison County for more than seventy-two hours without the FCM's consent; maintain suitable housing; complete family preservation, parenting, and domestic violence assessments and complete all recommendations from those assessments; obey the law; and follow all terms of any existing probation order.

[7] In March, DCS learned the entire family was in California. Father had fled to California from work release and Mother brought Children to California to be with him despite the no contact orders. Children were removed from Parents on an emergency basis, returned to Indiana, and placed in foster care. The trial court later issued a detention order confirming it was in Children's best interests to be removed from Parents’ care, granting wardship of Children to DCS, and continuing Children's placement in foster care. The court ordered there to be no visitation between Father and Children pending further order of the court.

[8] Because Father had fled from work release, the State filed a charge of Level 6 felony failure to return to lawful detention and alleged he violated his probation in his intimidation case. In April, Father admitted he violated his probation and was ordered to serve 415 days in the DOC. He was released in September. In November, Father pleaded guilty to the failure to return charge and was sentenced to twelve months,⁴ with the sentence to be served on home detention. The trial court also ordered Father to pay a fine and costs, plus $4,705 in restitution to the Madison County Extradition Fund, finding Father had the ability to pay the amounts assessed.

[9] DCS offered Father a batterer's intervention course, a parenting assessment, and home-based casework to assist with housing stability and finding a legal source of income. Father did not participate in services during his incarceration. Once released, rather than participating in the DCS-offered batterer's intervention program, Father on his own found a course “for the prevention of aggressive anger” and submitted a certificate of completion to DCS. Id. at 192. DCS’ goal in referring Father to a batterer's intervention program was for Father to learn his triggers and how to deescalate “his own situations,” but soon after completing the aggressive anger program, Father became angry and punched out a window in a relative's car resulting in a criminal mischief charge. Tr. Vol. 2 at 35. Father could not complete the parenting assessment because the assessment required participation in visits, and the court order still prohibited Father from visiting with Children.⁵ Father stayed at a hotel when he was released to home detention and worked “underneath the table” for a construction/landscaping business. Id. at 106.

[10] In April 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights to Children.⁶ The factfinding hearing began in June and concluded in September. When Father testified in September, he was living with his cousin and four other adults but admitted he did not have stable, independent housing for himself and Children. Father was still working for the construction/landscaping business on a cash basis, so he had no paystubs. He testified his income varied from $800 to $2,000 weekly, depending on the weather. Father said his boss could vouch for his employment and would assist him in obtaining housing, but Father did not call his boss as a witness or offer an affidavit from him to corroborate employment. Father deflected blame for the most recent DCS involvement with the family, claiming there was no domestic violence between him and Mother. He said Mother “made all that up” because she had a drug addiction and got mad at him when he did not give her money to pay for her addiction. Id. at 100. He also claimed he had never hit or threatened a woman. Father and Children last had contact in March 2023 when they were all in California. When asked what he thought was in Children's best interests, Father said, “I would like to have an opportunity to visit with them and go from there and show them that I can ․ financially take care of my kids.” Id. at 131. Father thought if he were given another two to three months, he could find housing and support Children “even if I have to push the mom away and do it on my own.” Id. at 130–31.

[11] The FCM testified Father had not kept in contact with him as ordered, had not provided evidence of a “legal source of income,” had not “internalized the teachings” of the aggressive anger course he completed, and had a pending criminal case for criminal mischief. Id. at 34, 38. The FCM also noted it was “unclear” if Mother and Father were together at the time of the termination hearing, but “currently there is another child on the way that is [Father's] and [Mother's].” Id. at 34. The no contact order between Parents was still in place. See id. at 30 (Father's counsel stating his review of the records showed the no contact order had not been altered).

[12] The FCM stated it was harmful for children to be in the child welfare system, and it was important for them to have stability. The FCM recommended termination of Father's parental rights because he could not provide Children with that stability.

[13] As for Children, they were in three pre-adoptive homes. M.N. and B.N. had returned to the foster placements they were in during the first CHINS proceedings. J.N. and R.N. were placed in separate foster homes initially and had moved around some, but J.N. had recently joined R.N. in his placement. The FCM testified there was “a little ․ physical aggression” between J.N. and R.N. after they were placed together. Id. at 54. R.N. had “some issues with biting” that had been under control but recurred after J.N. was placed with him. Id. at 52. J.N. had a difficult time being in school “without becoming physically aggressive towards his peers,” did not have “proper coping skills,” and “retaliate[ed] in anger.” Id. at 46–47. DCS was trying to find a therapist to work with both J.N. and R.N. and their placement was committed to giving them the support they need. M.N. and B.N. were having a “tough time going to preschool.” Id. at 49. But M.N. was in a transitional program to help with emotional maturity and academic issues and to prepare her for kindergarten. Children have regular sibling visits arranged by DCS, and M.N. and B.N. also have play dates arranged by their placements. There were occasional behavior issues during and after the visits, but Children's court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) testified she spends “a considerable amount of time with them at their sibling visits ․ observing them together and separately” and they were acclimating well. Id. at 76.

[14] The CASA acknowledged J.N. was “having a little bit of a harder time” than the other children. Id. at 76. Between the June and September hearings, J.N. had an incident at school where “he dragged a little girl out of the classroom by her hair and was punching her.” Id. at 72. He was “taken to an intake ․ for five to six days” and prescribed medication by a psychiatrist. Id. The CASA noted J.N. and R.N.’s placement was “focusing on getting [J.N.] to a stable healthy place.” Id. at 77. The CASA testified:

[C]hildren have been exposed to a lot of trauma․ [T]his is the second CHINS case [and] we see it very much so in the children's various behaviors․ [E]ven more so in [J.N.], the oldest child, who has no doubt observed the most․ [H]is behaviors are focused on other female children, and it is the team's observation that ․ this is likely due to something he has observed toward another female.

Id. at 78.

[15] The CASA did not believe “holding off ․ this case for six months” would make any difference in Father's ability to safely parent Children, especially because his recent criminal activity “would lead me to believe that ․ domestic violence is still a concern.” Id. at 78–79. In sum,

CASA's recommendation would be that the Judge grant TPR ․ so that these children can be out of the system ․ and have consistency for the rest of their life and get support to work through these traumas and not have[—]as much as [FCM] and I have loved getting to know these kids[—]to not have people coming in and out ․ and just have a normal ․ childhood in which they can grow and excel and be loved and feel safe and ․ be healthy.

Id. at 89.

[16] The trial court made factual findings and determined DCS proved: (1) there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children, (2) termination was in Children's best interests, and (3) there is a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Children's removal from or placement outside Father's care and custody will not be remedied. The trial court ordered Father's parental rights terminated.

Standard of Review

[17] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). That said, “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[18] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must prove there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child and termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3) (2024). DCS must also allege and prove the existence of one or more statutory circumstances warranting termination. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(1)–(12). DCS alleged the following circumstance warranted termination in this case:

That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3).⁷

[19] If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and “shall enter findings of fact” supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c) (1998); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997) (burden of proof). As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses for ourselves but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment. Id. at 642. We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and second, whether those findings support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We will set aside the trial court's findings of fact and judgment only if they are clearly erroneous. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

The trial court's findings are supported by the evidence.

[20] A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). But erroneous findings do not warrant reversal if they amount to mere surplusage and add nothing to the trial court's decision. Bell v. Clark, 653 N.E.2d 483, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), adopted on appeal, 670 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind. 1996); see also In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding an erroneous finding was “merely harmless surplusage” when the unchallenged findings “provide[d] ample support for the trial court's ultimate conclusion”).

[21] Father challenges the following findings as unsupported by the evidence:

31. Father failed to comply with several of the CHINS court's order[s], including those to

a. Contact the case manager each week;

b. Notify the case manager of changes in address, household composition, and employment within five (5) days;

c. Maintain suitable housing for the children;

d. Obey the law;

e. Acquire and maintain a secure, stable and legal income.

* * *

42. Father reports he is working under the table ․ for six months but acknowledges that he has no independent documentation that he is actually working.

43. Father failed to bring any witness to substantiate that he is employed.

* * *

63. M.N. is doing well in the placement home.

64. [M.N.] is working on emotional maturity issues and is in a transitional kindergarten so she will be ready to engage in standard kindergarten next year.

* * *

76. [M.N. and B.N.] have play days and other communication often between the two pre-adoptive placements.

77. [R.N. and J.N.] are currently placed with [A.W.].

78. Since [J.N. and R.N.] have been reunited in a home, [R.N.] has had some reversion into biting, but DCS is pursuing therapy for [R.N.] on this issue.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 18–20.

[22] As to finding 31, Father disputes he failed to comply with the court's orders in the CHINS proceeding.⁸ First, he claims he had contact with the FCM, “[a]lthough he did not contact his case manager weekly[.]” Appellant's Br. at 11. He also claims he told the FCM where he was living when the FCM asked. Yet in making these arguments, Father essentially concedes he did not contact the FCM weekly or apprise the FCM within five days of changes in address as ordered by the CHINS court. As for Father's employment, there is evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Father did not have a secure, stable, and legal income. Even accepting Father's assertion he was working at a landscaping company, his income varied significantly depending on the weather. Further, Father testified he was “working underneath the table” so he did not have paystubs or other proof of employment. Tr. Vol. 2 at 106. The FCM interpreted this to mean Father was paid in cash and not taxed and therefore “the employment he says he has isn't legal.” Id. at 41.

[23] As to findings 42 and 43, Father argues the criminal court's finding in his failure to return case that he had the ability to pay restitution for his extradition from California “confirms his being employed.” Appellant's Br. at 11. Evidence in the record supports the trial court's findings. Father testified he was “working underneath the table” and had no pay stubs or evidence besides his own word that he was working. Tr. Vol. 2 at 106. Further, the criminal court's determination in November 2023 that Father had the ability to pay restitution is not necessarily evidence of employment at all, let alone evidence of employment nearly a year later.

[24] With respect to the adequacy of the permanency plan for Children, findings 63, 64, 76, 77, and 78 are supported by the evidence. See id. at 76 (CASA testifying Children are “doing great”); 90 (M.N.’s placement testifying about the reasons for not putting her in kindergarten although she is eligible and efforts to improve her emotional maturity); 77, 92, 96 (testimony about M.N. and B.N.’s interaction); 53 (FCM testifying about J.N. and R.N.’s placement); and 54–55 (FCM testifying about R.N.’s habit of biting and efforts to provide play or behavioral therapy). Father alleges there is evidence that paints “a far less idyllic picture.” Appellant's Br. at 10. But consideration of the contradictory evidence Father points to would require us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642.

[25] Father has not shown that any of the challenged findings are clearly erroneous.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[26] Next, Father argues the findings and evidence do not support the trial court's conclusions that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Children's removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied or that termination is in their best interests.⁹ Other than the findings discussed above (all of which are supported by evidence of record), Father does not challenge the trial court's other seventy-eight findings. We accept unchallenged findings of fact as true, In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied, and if the unchallenged findings together with the findings supported by the record clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm, Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

Remedy of Conditions

[27] To determine whether there is a reasonable probability conditions will not be remedied, trial courts engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. First, the trial court ascertains what conditions led to Children's placement outside the home, then it determines whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. When making this decision, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643. But the trial court must balance any recent improvements against a parent's habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. The evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change. C.C., 153 N.E.3d at 348.

[28] In this case, Children were removed because Parents failed to provide Children with a home free from domestic violence. Father claimed there was no domestic violence between him and Mother and said he had never hit or threatened a woman. On appeal, he notes Mother consented to Children's adoption and therefore, “it would be most unlikely that the parents were still together.” Appellant's Br. at 15. He alleges the “possibility of future domestic violence between the parents would be purely speculative under the facts of this case.” Id. But Father and Mother were married when R.N. was born in 2022 and there is no evidence they have since divorced. Although there is a no contact order between them that has been in place since October 2022, they were together in California in early 2023. The FCM testified Father and Mother were expecting a child together at the time of the termination hearing, and Father said if he was given more time, he could support Children, “even if I have to push the mom away and do it on my own.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 131. A reasonable inference from this evidence is that their relationship and the threat of domestic violence between them has not ended. Moreover, Father's aggression was not limited to Mother. Father has a battery conviction from 2018; he was convicted of intimidating a DCS worker during the first CHINS proceedings; and during these proceedings, he was charged with criminal mischief after he became angry and punched a window out of a relative's car. The trial court found Father's assertion he had never hit or threatened a woman was at odds with his guilty plea in the intimidation case. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19 (finding 54). And the trial court explicitly found Father did not benefit from the anger management program he chose for himself. See id. at 18 (finding 28).

[29] In addition, the trial court found “[t]here is no point during the underlying CHINS cases that [Father] made significant progress toward reunification.” Id. at 20–21 (finding 82). When determining whether the conditions resulting in removal will be remedied, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the offers of help from DCS. In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). As already noted, Father did not participate in any services DCS offered, did not maintain contact with the FCM, and was unable to visit with Children after their removal. Courts may also consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. Id. Father has a history of violent criminal behavior that continued during these proceedings even after he completed an aggressive anger course. There was a prior CHINS case for three of the children that ended mere months before the underlying CHINS case was initiated. And Father offered no evidence of steps he had taken to improve his and Children's situations, such as obtaining adequate housing or employment or participating in services designed to enhance his parenting skills. To the extent Father offered testimony showing himself in a positive light, the trial court found his “demeanor while testifying ․ detracts from his credibility as a witness as he minimizes or completely fails to acknowledge his shortcomings and reasons the children are not with him.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 19 (finding 55). We defer to the trial court's credibility determinations. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. These findings establish a reasonable probability Father's behavior will not change.

[30] Father argues Children “had not been harmed in the past” and there is no “basis to speculate they would be harmed in the future[.]” Appellant's Br. at 14. It is true there is no evidence Children were physically harmed while in Parents’ care. But both the FCM and the CASA noted Children had been exposed to trauma during their young lives. Three of the four children had been removed from Parents previously and placed in foster care. Children exhibit aggressive behavior, especially J.N, who acted violently toward a girl in school. The CASA testified such behavior was likely due to modeling behavior they had observed. The court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [his or] her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 649 (Ind. 2015) (citation omitted).

[31] The findings support the trial court's conclusion that conditions leading to Children's removal and continued placement outside Father's home will not be remedied.

Best Interests

[32] Although Father does not plainly challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Children's best interests, he does cite caselaw addressing best interests.¹⁰ In recognition of the serious interest at stake here, we briefly address this conclusion.

[33] When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, courts look to the totality of the evidence and “must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. A child's need for permanency is a central consideration, and they “cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Recommendations of the FCM or CASA, in addition to evidence that conditions will not be remedied, are enough to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[34] The trial court found Children “have been involved in the child welfare system on this occasion beyond the one-year window contemplated by the Indiana legislature for parents to achieve reunification with their children.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 20 (finding 80). Further, this is not the first involvement three of the children have had with DCS. The FCM and the CASA both testified Children need stability and termination would be in their best interests as it would allow them to move forward with consistency and support. The need for permanency is an insufficient reason on its own to terminate parental rights where a parent has a relationship with the child and has taken positive steps toward reunification. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1152 (Ind. 2016). But Father had not visited with Children in over a year—and was prohibited by court order from doing so—and had not taken any positive steps toward reunification.

[35] The FCM's and CASA's testimony, coupled with the evidence discussed above, support the trial court's conclusion that termination was in Children's best interests.

Conclusion

[36] The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous and clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother consented to Children's adoption, did not participate in the termination factfinding hearing, and does not participate in this appeal. As much as possible, we have limited the facts to only those pertinent to Father.Father also has four children with his first wife. They reside with his parents but have not been involved in CHINS or termination proceedings.

2.   R.N., born during the CHINS proceedings, was not adjudicated a CHINS.

3.   The charge was filed in March 2021 while the first CHINS cases were active.

4.   With credit time, Father had to serve 207 days.

5.   The CHINS court had a hearing on visitation after Father was released from DOC but declined to start visits. The no contact order also remained in place.

6.   DCS also sought termination of Mother's rights, but as mentioned above, she executed consents for the Children's adoption and did not participate in the termination hearing.

7.   In the petition to terminate parental rights, DCS alleged an additional circumstance (I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)—child has been removed for a certain amount of time but parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances resulting in removal) but dismissed it before the termination hearing.

8.   Father does not claim error in the trial court's findings that he did not maintain suitable housing for Children or obey the law.

9.   Father does not claim error in the trial court's conclusion that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children.

10.   The State notes Father “appears” to challenge this conclusion and addresses it in its brief. Appellee's Br. at 26.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.