T.W., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.W. was found to be a delinquent child for committing what, if committed by an adult, would be Level 3 felony child molesting. T.W. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile court's true finding, arguing that the victim's testimony was incredibly dubious. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Z.L. was born on August 10, 2014. T.W. was born on September 19, 2010. T.W.’s father was engaged to and lived with Z.L.’s grandmother (“Grandmother”).

[3] Between August 10, 2022, and September 28, 2024, Z.L. would stay with Grandmother “six [or] seven different weekends out of the year” while her mother was working. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. Occasionally during this period, T.W. would also sleep over at Grandmother's apartment when Z.L. was there. While at Grandmother's apartment, Z.L. and T.W. would hang out and play together in the living room. Z.L. and T.W. got along well and had never had any serious arguments.

[4] Beginning when Z.L. was seven years old, T.W. molested Z.L. multiple times by placing his penis in her anus. The molestations occurred when they were both staying at Grandmother's apartment. The last molestation occurred in September of 2024, when Z.L. was ten years old.

[5] On October 30, 2024, the State filed a delinquency petition, in which it alleged that T.W. had committed what would be Level 3 felony child molesting if committed by an adult. The matter proceeded to a fact-finding hearing, during which both Z.L. and T.W. testified, with Z.L. outlining T.W.’s repeated molestation of her and T.W. denying that he had molested Z.L. Following the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding, noting the following:

1. [T.W.] was under the age of 18 at the time the offense took place.

2. [Z.L.] testified that between August 10, 2022 and September 28, 2024, [T.W.] did knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with Z.L., a child under fourteen (14) years of age, to wit: 7–10 years of age.

3. [Z.L.] provided compelling testimony describing how [T.W.] intentionally performed sexual conduct with her over the course of a 2–3-year period when she was between the ages of 7–10 years old. Specifically, the witness testified that [T.W.] put his “private part” (later identified as his penis) in her butt. The witness reported that the most recent sexual conduct occurred earlier this year, around the end of September or early October. The witness provided specific details regarding where the conduct took place, the time of day it took place, what she was wearing, how it occurred, and statements made to her by [T.W.] after the conduct took place.

4. [T.W.] provided testimony denying these allegations and reported that he and Z.L. have never had any arguments and get along well. His testimony corroborated the location and environment in which Z.L. described the sexual conduct taking place.

5. The Court finds that Z.L.’s testimony is credible and the allegations are true beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 131–32. The juvenile court ordered that T.W., inter alia, be placed on supervised probation and undergo a psychosexual assessment and follow all recommendations.

Discussion and Decision

[6] T.W. contends that the State produced insufficient evidence to sustain his juvenile adjudication. The standard of review for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile adjudication is the same as for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an adult criminal conviction. A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence with respect to juvenile adjudications, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. K.D. v. State, 754 N.E.2d 36, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We look only to probative evidence supporting the adjudication and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the juvenile was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the adjudication, it will not be set aside. Id. The uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient by itself to sustain an adjudication of delinquency on appeal. J.D.P. v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1000, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)[, trans. denied].

D.W. v. State, 903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.

[7] In alleging that T.W. was a delinquent child for committing what would be Level 3 felony child molesting if committed by an adult, the State alleged that “[b]etween August 10, 2022 and September 28, 2024, said child did knowingly or intentionally perform or submit to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with Z.L., a child under fourteen (14) years of age, to wit: 8–10 years of age.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 97. Indiana Code section 35-42-4-3(a) provides that “[a] person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct [․] commits child molesting, a Level 3 felony.” In her testimony, Z.L. detailed several acts by T.W. which would constitute acts of molestation. For his part, T.W. contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's true finding because Z.L.’s testimony was incredibly dubious.

[8] “Appellate courts may impinge upon [the fact-finder's] function to judge the credibility of a witness [․] by applying the ‘incredible dubiosity’ rule.” Smith v. State, 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015). “Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremely hesitant to invade the province of the [fact-finder].” Id. “[T]o warrant application of the incredible dubiosity rule, there must be: ‘1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015)). Applying this rule to evidentiary challenges on appeal, “[w]e will reverse a conviction if the sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and there is no circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt.” Feyka v. State, 972 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “Application of the incredible dubiosity rule ‘is rare and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.’ ” Id. (quoting Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007)).

[9] The juvenile court found Z.L.’s testimony to be credible, noting that with regard to the most recent of the molestations, Z.L. “provided specific details regarding where the conduct took place, the time of day it took place, what she was wearing, how it occurred, and statements made to her by [T.W.] after the conduct took place.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 131–32. T.W. disputes the juvenile court's finding, claiming that Z.L.’s testimony was “uncorroborated and equivocal[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 11. We cannot agree.

[10] In support of his claim that Z.L.’s testimony was so incredibly dubious that it could not be believed, T.W. asserts that Z.L.’s testimony was not credible because she “was unsure how many times” the acts of molestation occurred, could not remember what movie she and T.W. had been watching or what she had been wearing before some of the earlier acts of molestation had occurred, did not describe T.W.’s penis, or what time of day beyond “at night” that the molestations occurred. Appellant's Br. p. 12. T.W. further claims that Z.L.’s testimony was not credible because she did not “know how many bumps” were on her “private part” when she reported the molestations to her mother. Appellant's Br. p. 12.

[11] For its part, the State asserts that “Z.L.’s testimony was not inherently contradictory or improbable or equivocal, nor was there any evidence that it was coerced.” Appellee's Br. p. 10. Z.L.’s initial disclosure of the molestations to her mother had been unprompted, occurring after Z.L. had noticed “bumps” on her “butt.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 37, 39. Z.L. had not disclosed the molestations to her mother prior to this “[b]ecause [she] was too scared.” Tr. Vol. II p. 39. Considering Z.L.’s testimony as a whole, we conclude that her descriptions of each of the molestations, which had occurred over a two-year period, revealed a knowledge of sexual matters beyond that of a normal ten-year-old, and she used age-appropriate terminology when describing her experiences.

[12] Z.L. testified that “sex” was “[w]hen a boy puts their private part into a girl's private part[,]” which includes her butt. Tr. Vol. II p. 29. Z.L. testified that T.W. had put his “private part” in her “butt” several times, beginning when she was seven. Tr. Vol. II p. 30. With respect to the last molestation, Z.L. had not seen T.W.’s “private part” because he had had her face turned away from him and “he was covering [her] mouth” with his hand so that she could not scream. Tr. Vol. II p. 34. While Z.L. initially indicated that she had not remembered what she had been wearing, she later remembered that she had been wearing underwear and pajamas. Z.L. did not remember exactly what time the molestation had occurred, only that it had been “nighttime” and dark outside. Tr. Vol. II p. 40. Z.L. stated that she had felt T.W.’s penis, which she described as having been “[h]ard” “go up [her] butt.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 41, 40. After the molestation had ended, Z.L. “went to the bathroom” to get away from T.W. and “was crying.” Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Z.L. testified that she had suffered pain during the molestations and that T.W. had instructed her “not to tell anyone.” Tr. Vol. II p. 35. The State was only required to prove that one act of molestation occurred, and, as it relates to Z.L.’s allegations against T.W., we conclude that, at the very least, Z.L.’s testimony regarding the final act of molestation was not so incredibly dubious as to warrant our intervention into the juvenile court's credibility determination.

[13] Z.L.’s testimony was consistent and not so inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. Z.L. clearly described multiple sexual encounters with T.W., using age-appropriate words and phrases, giving the most details when describing the most recent molestation. She testified that the other molestations had occurred at least once when she was seven, twice when she was eight, and once when she was nine. In outlining the sexual encounters with T.W., Z.L. consistently testified that, during each encounter, T.W. had turned her around to face away from him, covered her mouth to keep her from screaming, and penetrated her anus with his penis. She described T.W.’s penis as having been “hard.” Tr. Vol. II p. 41. We agree with the State that “[i]t does not run counter to human experience for a child victim who was molested anally from behind to have not seen the perpetrator ejaculate” or his penis. Appellee's Br. p. 11.

[14] T.W. does not point to any inconsistent statements made by Z.L., and, even if he had, we have previously concluded that a child victim's testimony was not incredibly dubious merely because the child victim had made some conflicting and inconsistent statements. Feyka, 972 N.E.2d at 393–94. Likewise, Z.L.’s inability to provide specific dates on which the molestations had occurred do not render her testimony incredible dubious. See Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (Ind. 2011) (“[T]ime is not of the essence in the crime of child molesting. It is difficult for children to remember specific dates, particularly when the incident is not immediately reported as is often the situation in child molesting cases.” (internal quotation omitted)). We cannot say that Z.L.’s testimony was incredibly dubious as she clearly and consistently testified to T.W.’s actions. T.W.’s sufficiency challenge is therefore nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See D.W., 903 N.E.2d at 968.

[15] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Bradford, Judge.

Judges May and Mathias concur. May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.