Hatem Aziz, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Hatem Aziz, also known as Hatem Metwaly Abdelaziz Ahmed (“Aziz”), appeals his sentence for Level 3 felony rape,¹ arguing the trial court abused its discretion by considering the age gap between Aziz and the victim and Aziz's past relationship with a younger woman when fashioning his sentence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In January 2022, forty-one-year-old Aziz was the executive chef at an Indianapolis restaurant where twenty-year-old M.S. was the hostess. On January 7, Aziz, M.S., front-of-house manager Elizabeth Luker, and other staff members were drinking at the restaurant bar after closing. When the group left to go to a piano bar, M.S. hesitated to join because she was under twenty-one years old and did not think the bar would let her in. Although M.S. had consumed alcohol before, she had never been to a bar. Aziz agreed to help her sneak in through the back door, so she went. Once inside, M.S. and Luker ordered an alcoholic drink at the bar; at some point Aziz replenished M.S.’s drink. After taking a few sips, M.S. felt “really ․ weird in my head, ․ very ․ disoriented,” and “dizzy.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 13. She later went to the bathroom and vomited. When the group left to go to Luker's apartment, M.S. needed help walking to the car.

[3] At the apartment, M.S. passed out on the couch while the rest of the group continued to drink. Luker noticed Aziz kept going over to the couch, touching M.S.’s hair, and trying to wake M.S. so she could “keep hanging out.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 174. M.S. did not wake. Eventually everyone but Aziz, Luker, and M.S. left. Aziz decided to stay the night on a chair downstairs next to the couch. Because “the way he was messing with [M.S.] ․ made [Luker] feel uncomfortable,” Luker stayed downstairs until she thought Aziz was asleep. Id. at 175. Luker then went upstairs to bed.

[4] M.S. woke up early the next morning wearing no clothes alongside Aziz, who was also naked. M.S. did not know where she was; she felt “scared,” “sore ․ all over,” and as though her eyelids were “really heavy” and she “couldn't move.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 16. She contacted a friend who took her to the hospital where she underwent a sexual assault examination. DNA collected from her genitalia, cervix, and anus all matched Aziz's DNA profile. In a text message Aziz sent M.S. on the morning of January 8, he wrote: “Don't fucking talk to me like ‘what’ and shit. Or I'll never fuck you again.” Ex. Vol. 1 at 14.

[5] The State charged Aziz with Level 3 felony rape, and a jury convicted Aziz as charged. At the sentencing hearing, Chasity Key, the mother of Aziz's son, testified on Aziz's behalf. Key testified she was twenty-one years old when she gave birth to their son. The trial court then observed, “so you would have been 19 when you started dating? Okay.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 210.

[6] In argument, the State advanced as a potential non-statutory aggravator the “predatory nature of this crime,” pointing in part to the twenty-one-year age gap between Aziz and M.S. Id. at 213. The State also noted the seventeen-year age gap between Aziz and Key.

[7] In sentencing Aziz, the trial court found as aggravators

the harm suffered by the victim in this matter was significant and ․ greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense․ The Court's also considering as an aggravator the fact that Mr. Aziz was in a position of authority over the victim in this matter. There's a significant disparity in their age. And despite Mr. Aziz’ statements that he didn't know her age, the evidence has demonstrated that he assisted in helping her sneak into a bar ․

The Court is also considering as an aggravator the fact that I don't think this is the first time that Mr. Aziz has engaged in pursuing very young women, based upon the evidence that's been presented today. Not that that's an indicator of a crime. Everyone's entitled to do what they do. But under the circumstances, I think it's ․ reasonable to say that Mr. Aziz ․ probably had some idea, at the very least, of potentially what could take place with a young, impressionable woman.

Id. at 222–23. The trial court found as mitigators Aziz's lack of criminal history and the hardship to his dependent son. The trial court then sentenced Aziz to ten years, with four years suspended and three of those to be served on probation.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Aziz.

[8] Aziz argues the trial court improperly considered the age disparity between Aziz and M.S. and the fact Aziz had a prior relationship with a younger woman when imposing his sentence. Because it is unclear “what sentence the trial court would have given if not for this improper aggravator,” Aziz asks that we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. Appellant's Br. at 11.

[9] We review a trial court's sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 269 (Ind. 2023). A trial court abuses its discretion at sentencing if it (1) fails to enter a sentencing statement; (2) relies on aggravating or mitigating factors unsupported by the record; (3) fails to find aggravating or mitigating factors that are supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) relies on reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1223 (Ind. 2008).

[10] A Level 3 felony conviction carries a sentencing range of between three and sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b) (2014). The trial court therefore imposed a slightly above-advisory sentence.

[11] Although certain statutes permit harsher punishments based on the age of the victim, Aziz notes none of those statutes apply here. See, e.g., I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(3) (2019) (permitting a trial court to consider as an aggravating factor that a victim is less than twelve years old or at least sixty-five years old). Aziz concludes the trial court's focus on age disparity when identifying aggravating circumstances “was based only on its paternalistic belief that the difference in age was morally wrong.” Appellant's Br. at 10.

[12] We disagree. When read as a whole, the trial court's sentencing statement indicates the court considered the predatory nature of Aziz's crime as an aggravating circumstance, and the age disparity as a contributing factor. Aziz was twenty-one years older than M.S. and though not her direct supervisor, was in a position of authority at her workplace. Aziz knew M.S. was underage when he sneaked her into the bar and replenished her drink. After a couple of hours of drinking together, M.S. got sick and passed out. Despite her vulnerable state, Luker observed Aziz repeatedly touching M.S.’s hair and trying to keep her awake. After everyone left or went to bed, he raped her while she was unconscious. In observing “I don't think this is the first time that Mr. Aziz has engaged in pursuing very young women,” the trial court acknowledged that alone is not a crime. Tr. Vol. 3 at 222. But under the circumstances presented here, the age disparity between Aziz and M.S. was indicative of the unequal power dynamic between them and therefore reinforced the predatory nature of the crime.

[13] Moreover, even if the trial court erred in identifying the aggravating factor about which Aziz complains, the trial court found a second aggravating circumstance, namely, the harm, injury or loss suffered by M.S. was greater than necessary to prove the elements of the offense. See id. (trial court observing “the emotional and mental trauma that [M.S.] has suffered as a result of these events has had a significant impact on her life and will continue to do so”). Aziz does not challenge this statutory aggravator on appeal, and as Indiana courts have often observed, “[a] single aggravating circumstance is enough to justify an enhancement or the imposition of consecutive sentences.” Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 172 (Ind. 1997). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Aziz to a slightly above-advisory sentence.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(2) (2014).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Foley and Scheele concur. Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.