Sean Dixon, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Sean Dixon appeals his conviction for murder,¹ arguing the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting allegedly hearsay testimony despite his lack of objection at trial. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 5, 2021, Lakesha Holston, her husband, and their four children were in a vehicle driving on Pendleton Pike in Indianapolis on their way to a fireworks store. Traffic was heavy. Holston was in the front passenger seat nursing her son as her husband drove. Meanwhile, Cameron Anderson was driving a Cadillac sedan in the opposite direction, moving toward Holston and her family. Anderson was traveling with another man in the passenger seat.

[3] Suddenly, Holston heard what sounded like a firecracker, so she turned to look at Anderson's vehicle. Holston realized she heard shots coming from an SUV directly behind Anderson's Cadillac. Holston saw the SUV's driver shooting a handgun at Anderson. Anderson's passenger fired back, striking the SUV's windshield. During the gunfight, a bullet traveled through Anderson's shoulder, severing his right carotid artery and larynx. The shooter in the SUV fled. After coming to a stop, Anderson managed to stumble toward the back of his Cadillac before collapsing. His injuries were fatal. Holston saw Anderson's lifeless body lying on the road.

[4] Detective Rhoton of the Lawrence Police Department arrived around ten minutes after the shootout. He spoke to Holston at the scene about the events leading to Anderson's death. She described the SUV shooter to the detective. Police identified Dixon as a suspect after speaking with Anderson's family. The next day, Detective Rhoton showed Holston a photo array of potential assailants. Holston identified Dixon as the shooter. Some days later police located the SUV at a mechanic shop where Dixon tried to get the windshield replaced. Dixon's wife was the registered owner of the SUV; his DNA was on water bottles police recovered from the vehicle. Cell phone records placed Dixon's phone near Pendleton Pike close to when the shooting occurred. Police did not locate the murder weapon.

[5] The State charged Dixon with Anderson's murder. Dixon, Holston, and Detective Rhoton all testified at Dixon's jury trial. Dixon admitted to driving the SUV on Pendleton Pike on the day and time of Anderson's murder. He denied any involvement in the attack and blamed the shooting on an unknown culprit. Although Holston could not recall her on-scene description of the shooter or identify Dixon as the perpetrator from the witness stand, she testified to the above events. She underscored she had felt confident during her initial identification. Detective Rhoton testified about his involvement in the investigation and his interview of Holston. In answer to the prosecutor's question about Holston's on-scene description of the shooter, Detective Rhoton responded:

She told me that she got a good look at him. She said that he was a black male, a little more heavier build, with long dreads.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 240. Dixon did not object to the statement.

[6] The jury found Dixon guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced him to sixty-two years in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Dixon fails to show fundamental error in his trial.

[7] Dixon claims the trial court erred in admitting Detective Rhoton's testimony about Holston's description of the shooter into evidence because it was inadmissible hearsay. But Dixon did not object to this testimony at trial. A party's failure to object to an alleged trial error results in waiver of that claim on appeal. Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 556 (Ind. 2019). But a party can raise an otherwise waived issue through a showing of fundamental error. See Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). The “fundamental error” exception to waiver is “extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Id. This “formidable standard ․ applies only where the error is so flagrant that the trial judge should have corrected the error on [his] own, without prompting by defense counsel.” Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2021). The appellant “faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to [his] rights as to ‘make a fair trial impossible.’ ” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)).

[8] Dixon failed to object to the admission of Holston's statement at trial and has waived the claim on appeal. See Batchelor, 119 N.E.3d at 556. Even so, he argues fundamental error occurred as Holston's statement was “inestimably important to the State's case.” Appellant's Br. at 10. “[F]undamental error in the evidentiary decisions of our trial courts is especially rare.” Merrit v. State, 99 N.E.3d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied; cf. Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (noting an error in ruling on a motion to exclude improperly seized evidence is not per se fundamental error).

[9] According to Dixon, because Holston was the only eyewitness who identified him as the shooter, “there was not overwhelming evidence of guilt ․ absent the erroneously admitted hearsay.” Appellant's Br. at 12. Yet, police recovered Dixon's DNA from water bottles found in the SUV. Cell phone company records placed his phone near Pendleton Pike around the time of the shooting. Dixon himself admitted to driving on Pendleton Pike when the shootout occurred. Holston testified to all she observed at trial. Although she could not identify Dixon as the perpetrator from the witness stand almost three years after the event, Holston emphasized she had felt confident during her initial identification: “I did it because this is who I strongly believed versus the other person[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 174. Detective Rhoton then testified to Holston's description of the shooter given on the day of the murder without Dixon's objection.

[10] Fundamental error presupposes the trial judge erred in performing a duty the law charges them with performing on their own. Rolston v. State, 81 N.E.3d 1097, 1103 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 679 (Ind. 2013)), trans. denied. An error “blatant enough” to require the trial court's intervention is “necessarily blatant enough to draw any competent attorney's objection.” Weedman v. State, 21 N.E.3d 873, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. But where the trial court could identify why an attorney might not object, “the error is not blatant enough to be fundamental.” Id. Here, the trial court could have determined Dixon's counsel did not object because she recognized a hearsay objection to Holston's statement could be overruled under an exception to the hearsay prohibition.² Under these circumstances, Dixon has not cleared the high hurdle of demonstrating admission of Holston's statement “[made] a fair trial impossible” or constituted “clearly blatant violations” of fundamental due process. Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002).

Conclusion

[11] Dixon fails to show the trial court committed fundamental error in the admission of evidence.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1) (2018).

2.   The State argues Holston's statement was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Because Dixon fails to demonstrate fundamental error, we need not decide whether the statement constituted an excited utterance. We simply note the trial court could have determined Dixon's counsel did not object because she recognized Holston's description of the shooter—made ten minutes after the shooting and just after Holston saw Anderson lying dead on the road—as an excited utterance and found no grounds to act on its own.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Judges Bradford and Pyle concur. Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.