IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of D.C. (Minor Child) and K.C. (Father) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] K.C.’s parental rights as to D.C. (Child) were involuntarily terminated based, in part, on the trial court's conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that: (1) the conditions that caused Child to be placed out of Father's care upon removal would not be remedied, and (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being. Father seeks reversal of the termination of his parental rights on grounds that such conclusions are erroneous. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born on March 18, 2021, to parents R.P. (Mother) and K.C. (Father) (collectively “Parents”). On October 3, 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition to approve an Informal Adjustment (IA) as to Child while he resided with Mother and Mother's boyfriend. Father did not participate in the IA but participated in supervised parenting time for three hours each week pursuant to his and Mother's divorce decree. Father's visits were supervised by his mother, the Child's paternal grandmother. Father's parenting time restrictions were related to a domestic violence finding against Father in the divorce case.

[3] In March 2023, DCS extended the IA, and Child began physical therapy through First Steps to address significant delays in his gross motor development. Upon working with Child, the physical therapist recommended that Child also participate in developmental and occupational therapy. Child was eventually diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder with accompanying language impairment and Global Development Delay.

[4] In June 2023, DCS petitioned to terminate the IA and find that Child was a child in need of services (CHINS). Child was removed from Mother's home the next day due to “long-term neglect and lack of basic parenting skills/engagement and developmentally appropriate interaction.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 77. Child was placed in foster care rather than with Father because DCS had concerns about Father's understanding of Child's special needs and he did not have appropriate housing at the time. There was also concern about the history of domestic violence between Mother and Father. After a hearing, the trial court found Child to be a CHINS.

[5] The trial court entered its dispositional decree on September 5, 2023, and continued Child's placement in foster care. After completing a parenting assessment, Parents were referred to a multitude of services. Over the life of this case, Father engaged in individual therapy, couples therapy with Mother, home-based casework, supervised visitation, a psychiatric evaluation, and an intelligence test. Father's home-based casework assisted him with skills such as financial literacy, parenting, understanding developmental milestones, time management, appropriate boundaries, and recognizing Child's special medical needs. He often struggled to retain the information covered in these sessions and required material to be repeated over multiple meetings in order to grasp the lessons.

[6] Father consistently attended his individual therapy sessions with David Schlegal, with whom he began meeting in December 2023. Schlegal found that Father had trouble generalizing skills and applying them to hypothetical situations. He also had difficulty independently identifying issues to address in therapy. In couples therapy with Mother between October 2023 and February 2024, their therapist, Ian Perrotte, observed that Father struggled with sexual boundaries and displayed difficulty retaining the material they discussed.

[7] Father's supervised visits with Child continued throughout the case; however, their visits were supervised by a DCS supervisor rather than Father's mother upon the initiation of the CHINS case. In September 2023, his visits were increased from every other week to once a week, but he requested that they be reduced back to every other week in March 2024. Father continuously showed up to these visits prepared and ready to engage with Child, but he consistently required correction and redirection in his parenting and interactions with Child. Father struggled to understand Child's particular developmental needs and how to address his behaviors. He never progressed beyond supervised visitation.

[8] Concerned about Father's lack of progress despite his consistent engagement in services, DCS referred him to Dr. Amanda Pfeffer for a psychological and sexual behavior assessment. The assessment was conducted in May 2024 and included topics such as Father's sexual history, relationships, social history, parenting, employment, criminal history, and cognitive skills.

[9] During the assessment, Father expressed to Dr. Pfeffer that he had “no clue” what Child's specific needs were in light of his autism and delay. Exhibits Vol. 1 at 56. Dr. Pfeffer also conducted an intelligence test which revealed that Father has an IQ of 67, which is “extremely low.” Exs. Vol. 1 at 62; Transcript Vol. 2 at 204-05. She diagnosed Father with Intellectual Disability Mild and noted that, while his disability is unlikely to worsen, it will not improve, and Father will likely need continuous support with basic adult tasks like money and household management. Tr. Vol. 2 at 205, 208-09. As a result, she recommended that he engage in individual behavioral therapy, parenting education, and case management services. Dr. Pfeffer found that, “[w]ith regards to independent ability to provide as a parent, [Father] is ill-equipped to do so.” Exs. Vol. 1 at 72. She explained that

[t]here is general agreement in the literature that IQ alone is not necessarily predictive of parental adequacy. The majority of the literature supports [that] a case-by-case judgment of ability is needed to determine if an individual with Intellectual Disability can provide effectively, safely, and adequately as a parent. Factors that influence parental ability for individuals with Intellectual Disability include level of adaptive behavior impairment (which is in the low to average ranges for [Father]), level of social support (which is limited for [Father]), level of motivation (which appears questionable for [Father] given his participation and compliance with services however noted ongoing struggles to comprehend, lack of self-reported knowledge as to the needs of his child, and minimal progress reported in services thus far) ․ [Father] is going to need ongoing and long-term support in order to parent[.]

Id. at 72-73.

[10] DCS petitioned to involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights on June 3, 2024.¹ A fact-finding hearing was held in October 2024 at which the trial court heard testimony from Father, the family case manager (FCM), and service providers. The trial court entered its order on December 4 terminating Father's parental rights, concluding that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's placement out of Father's care would not be remedied or that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Child's well-being. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 74. Father appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] The termination of parental rights is subject to a high bar because “the parent-child relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” In re Z.B., 108 N.E.3d 895, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest “in the care, custody, and control” of their children. Id. (quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147). Nonetheless, “a trial court must subordinate the interest of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination.” In re K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Termination of parental rights “is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened.” Id.

[12] In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove that termination is in the child's best interests, that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child, and in pertinent part, that one of the following is true:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), (3), (d)(3), (4) (2024). Given the fundamental interest at issue, DCS must prove these elements “upon clear and convincing evidence.” I.C. § 31-37-14-2.

[13] If the trial court finds DCS's allegations to be true, it must order the termination of the parent-child relationship and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(c). Owing significant deference to the trial court's “unique position to assess the evidence,” we review its findings and conclusions only for clear error. K.T., 137 N.E.3d at 326; Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A review for clear error requires that we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether those findings support the judgment. Z.B., 108 N.E.3d at 900. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. Lastly, we accept any unchallenged findings of fact as true. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[14] Father asserts that only two of the trial court's conclusions were clearly erroneous: (1) that there is a reasonable probability that conditions resulting in Child's placement outside of Father's home will not be remedied; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. Because Father does not challenge any of the trial court's findings, we accept them as true.

[15] To determine whether it was unlikely that Father would remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's placement outside his care, we first identify the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement. K.T., 137 N.E.3d at 326. Next, we consider “whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)). The trial court was required to judge Father's fitness to care for Child at the time of the termination hearing as well as consider any “habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent ․ and the parent's response to those services, as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.” Id. In this respect, DCS only had to prove “that there is a reasonable probability that [Father's] behavior will not change.” Id. (quoting In re Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[16] Father contends that the only basis for the trial court's conclusions was his intellectual disability. We acknowledge that, standing alone, a parent's mental or cognitive disability is not sufficient for the termination of parental rights. See Z.B., 108 N.E.3d at 902; see also In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1147 (Ind. 2016). However, the parent's disability may still be considered by the trial court where “parents are incapable of or unwilling to fulfill their legal obligations in caring for their children.” Z.B., 108 N.E.3d at 902 (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992)). We also note that “the purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.” Id. (quoting Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234).

[17] In this case, the trial court was permitted to consider Father's intellectual disability in its determination because there was evidence it rendered him incapable of taking care of Child. Specifically, Father's inability to adequately understand or meet Child's heightened needs was a legitimate concern cited by DCS in its decision to place Child in foster care rather than with Father, and it was not alleviated by Father's participation in a plethora of services.

[18] The trial court found that “[t]he Child's special needs will require additional intervention and services on an ongoing basis. Meeting his needs will be a more complex endeavor than for a neurotypical, normally developing Child.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 81. It further found that “[t]here were ongoing, observed concerns regarding Father's ability to understand the Child's developmental needs[ ] and verbal/non-verbal cues.” Id. at 80. Both his FCM and his service providers witnessed Father's struggle to meet Child's needs at visits. In Father's own words, he has “no clue” how often Child needs to see a dentist or a doctor, how he would transition Child from foster care into his care, or what Child's special needs are. Exs. Vol. 1 at 56; Tr. Vol. 2 at 45.

[19] Moreover, looking beyond Child's particular needs, Dr. Pfeffer testified that Father will likely always require external support to manage his day-to-day activities and parent Child. The trial court specifically found that “[Father] will need ongoing support to manage complicated tasks of parenting” and his “need for support will only increase as tasks of parenting become more complex.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 81; see Z.B., 108 N.E.3d at 902 (upholding termination of Mother's parental rights and noting that “for the rest of her life, Mother would likely struggle with managing aspects of day-to-day life”). While his need for additional support does not render him necessarily incapable of parenting, the trial court also found that

Father has not historically had significant support in providing for the Child's needs. Despite having visits supervised by his mother under his [divorce decree], Father did not have the ability or support to take steps to ensure the Child's safety when the Child was subjected to significant neglect, was not receiving adequate medical care, and was displaying notable developmental delays.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 81-82. Father challenges none of these findings, and the absence of support directly impacts his ability to meet his own and Child's needs.

[20] Furthermore, the trial court found that in many instances throughout Father's services and therapies, it was clear he had trouble retaining the information being taught and applying the skills being practiced that would equip him to care for Child. For example, the trial court found that “Father struggled to retain material presented in homemaker sessions. Material had to be repeated.” Id. at 80. He required consistent “direction and assistance in his attempts to maintain a budget and secure stable housing that would be appropriate for [Child]” and never progressed beyond supervised visits. Id. Notably, at one point the visits were increased to once a week, but Father subsequently asked that they be reduced back to every other week.

[21] We recognize that Father's service providers noted and testified to his consistent and committed engagement in his services. However, that does not negate the findings and the evidence showing he did not progress in those services enough to ever serve as safe placement for Child. Father participated in services for over a year without making the requisite progress, and the FCM and Dr. Pfeffer both testified that there are no additional services they believe would make a difference so as to equip Father to care for Child. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 132, 210. The trial court found that

[d]espite consistent participation in services for an extended period, the Court is clearly convinced that Father will not be able to meet the Child's daily needs on an ongoing basis. This is not due to a lack of love for the Child, but rather an ongoing lack of capacity to parent that services have not been able to address.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 82. Given this unchallenged finding and the record evidence of Father's lack of progress over the span of the case, it is reasonable to conclude Father's behavior is unlikely to change moving forward.

[22] Thus, it was not Father's cognitive disability alone that justified the trial court's conclusion, but rather a combination of findings related to Father's minimal progress in services, lack of understanding of Child's needs, and the impact his disability has on his ability to adequately care for Child.

[23] Based on the trial court's unchallenged findings, we hold it was not clearly erroneous for the court to conclude that there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child's placement outside of Father's care would not be remedied. Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) requires proof of only one of the scenarios listed in the statute, clear and convincing evidence of the reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's placement outside of Father's care would not be remedied is sufficient to support the trial court's decision. See A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158 n.6 (finding it unnecessary to address the trial court's “threat to the [child's] well-being” conclusion because there was sufficient evidence supporting the conclusion that the conditions causing the children's placement outside the home would not be remedied). Therefore, we do not address whether the trial court's conclusion regarding the threat to Child's well-being was clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[24] We conclude the trial court did not err in concluding that the conditions causing Child to be placed outside of Father's care were unlikely to be remedied. Therefore, we affirm.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   DCS also sought termination of Mother's parental rights, but Mother does not participate in this appeal.

DeBoer, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur. Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.