Rachael Doss, Appellant-Defendant v. Benjamin Ramseier and Timothy Ramseier, Appellees-Plaintiffs (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Rachael Doss pro se appeals a trial court order both requiring the removal of a fence she erected on the property of her neighbors, Benjamin and Timothy Ramseier, and awarding the Ramseiers surveyor and attorney fees. Among other violations of the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure, Doss's brief lacks the cogency necessary for appellate review. We therefore find her appellate claims waived and affirm.

Facts

[2] This case arises from a boundary dispute between neighboring property owners: Doss and the Ramseiers. In May 2023, Doss erected a chain link fence that encroached upon the Ramseiers’ property. When Doss refused the Ramseiers’ requests to remove the encroaching fence, the Ramseiers sued her for trespass and sought an order requiring the fence's removal.

[3] After a bench trial, the trial court issued a November 2024 order with the following pertinent findings:

4) The Doss section of chain link fencing and posts encroach upon the Ramseier property as clearly shown by the survey and pin settings completed by Chastain and Associates, LLC, consulting engineers survey.

5) Doss was a provided copy of the survey and could visibly see the survey pin as set by Chastain. Doss has refused to remove the subject fencing despite repeated requests by Ramseier.

6) Doss did not offer any evidence refuting the Ramseier survey.

Appealed Order, pp. 1-2. Based on these findings, the trial court ordered Doss to remove the fence and awarded the Ramseiers $2,925.80 in survey fees and $12,830.31 in attorney fees, for a total judgment against Doss of $15,756.11.

[4] Doss appealed pro se but struggled to comply with basic requirements of appellate procedure. She repeatedly failed to make payment arrangements with the court reporter for transcript preparation, which has resulted in there being no transcript for her appeal. Her initial brief was also defective, and though eventually cured, her non-defective brief was not timely filed. As a result, this Court dismissed Doss's appeal. But she successfully moved to have it reinstated.

[5] Though Doss's appeal is now properly before us, her brief fails to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure in ways that prevent appellate review of her claims. Finding Doss's claims are waived, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Discussion and Decision

[6] “It is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This means they are “bound to follow” the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure and “must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Id. at 983-84. Where a litigant's noncompliance with our Appellate Rules is “so substantial as to impede our consideration of the issues, we may deem the alleged errors waived.” Id. at 984.

[7] Doss has failed to comply with our Appellate Rules in several critical respects. First, her brief violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(6). That rule requires the appellant's brief to include a “Statement of Facts” section that “describe[s] the facts relevant to the issues presented for review.” Ind. App. R. 46(A)(6). The rule also requires the facts to be “supported by page references to the Record on Appeal or Appendix.” Id. Doss's Statement of Facts contains a numerical list of nine factual assertions without citation to the record or her appendix, making it impossible for this Court to understand the assertions’ relevance or to verify their accuracy. For example, Doss asserts without context or citation: “There is a conflicting 2006 order ․ in which Judge Barbara Bruno marked the west boundary of the Doss property.” Appellant's Br., p. 7.

[8] Second, Doss's brief violates Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). That rule requires the appellant's brief to include an “Argument” section that “contain[s] the appellant's contentions [as to] why the trial court ․ committed reversible error.” Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8). The rule also requires each contention to be “supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.” Id. Doss's Argument section consists largely of unsupported, conclusory assertions. For example, without citation to the record or legal authority, she claims: “The trial court lacked jurisdiction to render an order that conflicts with a prior Division 4 order”; and “City approvals and easement rights have been unconstitutionally disregarded by the trial court.” Appellant's Br. p. 8.

[9] Where she does mention legal authority, Doss fails to explain its application. For example, without any legal analysis, she states: “Under Indiana Code §§ 32-23-1 and 32-24-1-3, private property does not extend full control over areas designated for public utility and municipal use.” Id. She also similarly asserts: “Appellate precedent, including City of Muncie v. Pizza Hut of Muncie, Inc. and Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, support the legal principle that city right-of-way orders take precedence of conflicting county order.” Id.

[10] Third, Doss's Argument section lacks the cogency necessary for appellate review. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) requires an appellant's contentions to be “supported by cogent reasoning.” “We demand cogent argument ․ because it promotes impartiality in the appellate tribunal.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “A court which must search the record and make up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Id.

[11] Doss's contentions seem to rest on the theory that she obtained various city approvals for the placement of her fence. But she fails to explain how such approvals, even if obtained, would authorize her to encroach on her neighbors’ property or how the trial court erred in relying on a professional survey showing the encroachment. Moreover, without a transcript, we cannot determine whether the trial court heard evidence regarding these alleged city approvals or whether such approvals actually existed.

[12] “We will not ․ address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984. Given Doss's noncompliance with our Appellate Rules, we find Doss has waived her claims for appellate review. See K.S. v. D.S., 64 N.E.3d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“A party waives any issue for which it fails to develop a cogent argument or support with adequate citation to authority.”). We therefore affirm the trial court's November 2024 order.

Weissmann, Judge.

Judges Bradford and DeBoer concur. Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.