Matthew Nowlan, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Matthew Nowlan appeals his sentence after being convicted of several counts of child molesting. He asks us to revise his forty-six-year aggregate sentence, with four years suspended to probation, under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Finding that Nowlan's sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] When she was twelve years old, C.M. lived with her mother (Mother); her stepfather, Nowlan; her stepbrother, H.N.; and two younger half-siblings born to Mother and Nowlan. Mother's job required her to travel out of state, and most weeks she was away on business from Monday through Thursday. When she traveled, Mother would leave C.M., H.N., and the two younger children in Nowlan's care.

[3] One night when Mother was away, Nowlan entered C.M.’s room while she slept. After waking C.M., he told her he was jealous of her boyfriend “[b]ecause he got to kiss [her] and hold [her] hand and do things that a couple would do.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 99. C.M. could smell alcohol on his breath. Nowlan rubbed her bottom lip with his thumb and tried to kiss her. She “scream[ed] for him to get out and to leave [her] alone and to stop touching [her].” Id. at 100. She continued screaming for “a hefty amount of time” until he finally left. Id.

[4] C.M.’s screams woke H.N., but he did not immediately come to her aid because he was afraid of his father. Eventually, he came to check on her, and she told H.N. what happened. However, she did not tell Mother when she returned from her business trip because she “was afraid that [Mother] would not believe [her].” Id. at 102.

[5] About two weeks later, while Mother was traveling, Nowlan, who had been drinking, came into C.M.’s room again. He asked her about her upcoming thirteenth birthday party and placed his hand on her thigh before tickling her. He then placed both hands underneath her shirt and groped her breasts. She tried to push Nowlan away and repeatedly “scream[ed] for him to leave [her] alone, to get out, to stop touching [her]” until he finally left. Id. at 105. When Mother returned, C.M. did not tell her about what happened because she “was still terrified that [Mother] wasn't going to believe [her]” Id. at 107.

[6] One month later, after C.M. had turned thirteen, Nowlan again entered her room while she slept. This time, Mother was home. He asked C.M. about her boyfriend and placed his hand on her thigh. He then asked her “if [she] knew what masturbation was and if [she] knew what [her] clit was.” Id. at 108. She responded with disgust, but Nowlan, undeterred, asked if “he could show [her].” Id. She tried to flee, but Nowlan cornered her between the bed and the wall. He then “pushe[d] his arm ․ against [her] chest[,] [ ] force[d] his hand down [her] pants[,]” and inserted his finger into her vagina. Id. at 112. C.M. “scream[ed] as loud as [she] could, and [ ] threatened to call the cops on him if he kept coming near [her].” Id. at 114. Nowlan replied “that nobody would believe [her]. That he's a military man, he's loyal, that nobody's going to believe [her] because of that.” Id.

[7] H.N., who again had heard C.M.’s screams for help, came to check on her after Nowlan left. As with the two prior incidents, C.M. did not tell Mother what happened because she “was still afraid[ ] [Mother] would never believe [her].” Id. at 115.

[8] Two months later, Nowlan entered C.M.’s room for the fourth and final time. Mother was again traveling. Nowlan, who was drunk, asked C.M. “if [she] knew[ ] what a boner was.” Id. at 116. He then grabbed her hand, pulled his underwear down, and forced her to touch his penis. She screamed, “wriggl[ed] to try and get out of his grip[,]” and was eventually “able to maneuver [her] body enough ․ to be able to kick him and he let[ ] go.” Id. at 118-19. Before leaving, he said “that nobody would ever believe [her] if [she] told them. That [she's] just a little girl.” Id. at 119. H.N. had again heard C.M.’s screams.

[9] In the years that followed, C.M. told Mother on several occasions what Nowlan had done. In one instance, when a representative of the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) came to speak with C.M., Mother warned her that “if [she] told them what happened, [ ] [she] would be ruining [Nowlan's] life and [ ] would be ruining [her] two [ ] little sister's [sic] lives.” Id. at 127. Fearing what Mother told her would be true, C.M. did not disclose to DCS that Nowlan had sexually abused her.

[10] One month after speaking with DCS, C.M. moved out of Mother and Nowlan's house to live with her biological father and stepmother. She eventually told her stepmother what Nowlan had done, and her stepmother contacted a victim's advocacy center who reported Nowlan to law enforcement. After a subsequent criminal investigation, the State charged Nowlan with one count of Rape, as a Level 3 felony;¹ two counts of Child Molesting, both as Level 4 felonies;² and one count of Child Molesting, as a Level 1 felony.³

[11] At trial, a jury found Nowlan guilty as charged. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court, with the agreement of the parties, declined to convict Nowlan on the Level 3 felony rape conviction, but entered judgments of conviction on the remaining counts. The court sentenced Nowlan to serve thirty years in the Indiana Department of Corrections on the Level 1 child molesting count and eight years on each count of Level 4 child molesting counts—six years of which were to be executed and the remaining two years suspended to probation. The court further ordered Nowlan to serve each sentence consecutively. Nowlan now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Nowlan argues that his forty-six-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate and asks us to revise it “to a short period of incarceration and probation” pursuant to our authority under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellant's Brief at 10. Under Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence if we find “ ‘that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.’ ” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)).

[13] We show the trial court “considerable deference” when reviewing a sentence under Rule 7(B). Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). We will not revise a sentencing decision absent “ ‘compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).’ ” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). The burden is on the defendant to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id.

[14] We note that Nowlan's arguments on appeal focus entirely on his character, and he does not contend that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses. While our Supreme Court clarified in Lane v. State that the nature of the offense and the character of the offender are separate prongs of the Rule 7(B) analysis and a “defendant need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both[,]” the Court “reiterat[ed] ․ that, to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger[.]” 232 N.E.3d 119, 126, 127 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)) (emphasis in original).

[15] In considering Nowlan's character, “we engage in a broad consideration of [his] qualities[.]” Burkhart v. State, 259 N.E.3d 347, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)) trans. denied. This includes whether he has demonstrated “substantial virtuous traits or persistent example of good character[.]” Id. (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[16] To support his claim of good character, Nowlan points to several letters he submitted at sentencing “attest[ing] to [his] positive work through church and his commitment to his family.” Appellant's Br. at 8. He further contends that he “has a very limited criminal history, having been convicted of check deception, resisting law enforcement, and public intoxication nine [ ] years” before he first molested C.M. Id. at 9. These arguments are nearly identical to those made by the defendant in Borroel v. State, where

Borroel faced a maximum sentence of fifty-eight years for the offenses, but he was sentenced to only forty-five. Although Borroel has no prior criminal history and witnesses spoke highly of him at the sentencing hearing, we are not persuaded that these demonstrate good character sufficient to warrant revision of Borroel's sentence.

241 N.E.3d 8, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied.

[17] Here, Nowlan faced a maximum aggregate sentence of seventy-four years, as the statutorily authorized maximum sentence on his Level 1 felony conviction was fifty years and the maximum sentences on his two Level 4 felony convictions were twelve years each. I.C. §§ 35-50-2-4(c), 35-50-2-5.5. We agree with the reasoning of the court in Borroel that because Nowlan's forty-six-year aggregate sentence with four years suspended to probation is well below the maximum seventy-four year penalty the court could have imposed, Nowlan's letters vouching for his character and reiterating what he characterizes as a limited criminal history are insufficient to persuade us that he has a good character warranting a sentence reduction.

[18] Nowlan further argues that he “served his country in the military” and as a result “suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder” (PTSD). Appellant's Br. at 9. But we note that Nowlan intimidated C.M. into silence for years by telling her that “nobody would believe [her]” because “he's a military man[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 114. We see no reason why Nowlan should be allowed to evade the consequences of his actions by abusing his status as a veteran, only to now argue that his sentence should be reduced because of his military service. Additionally, at sentencing the trial court found “no evidence that ․ [Nowlan] was suffering from [PTSD] at the time of these offenses[,]” and, in any event, we agree with the State that Nowlan has failed to show a “causal relationship between PTSD and committing a sex offense on a child.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 176; Appellee's Br. at 16.

[19] Nowlan's failure to prove that the nature of his character warrants revision of his sentence is particularly glaring considering the nature of his offenses. “Our analysis of the ‘nature of the offense’ requires us to look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense.” Borroel, 241 N.E.3d at 18 (quoting Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1181-82 (Ind. 2020), reh'g denied). We may also consider whether the defendant's offenses were an abuse of “ ‘a position of trust’ with the victim.” Id. (quoting Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 202 (Ind. 2021)). Here, Nowlan's crimes were exceedingly brutal and heinous. He molested C.M. on multiple occasions, each time paying little attention to her screams of protest and attempts to fight and flee. He also violated his position of trust as C.M.’s stepfather, having been entrusted with her care by Mother while she traveled for work.

[20] Moreover, Nowlan's crimes caused significant harm to C.M. At sentencing, C.M. testified that Nowlan's actions “led [her] into a deep depression” and that she “tried to take [her] own life to escape the pain he caused [her].” Tr. Vol. 3 at 163. She further explained that

since the first time [Nowlan] came into my room and put his hands on me, I have washed my body over a thousand times, scrubbing so hard I have made my skin raw. But nothing seems to wash the fingerprints off my skin․ I had severe nightmares of the things [he] did to me and [ ] it got to a point where I couldn't shut my eyes without having flashbacks of the things [he] put me through.

Id. These facts strongly weigh against decreasing Nowlan's sentence. See Chastain v. State, 165 N.E.3d 589, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (declining to revise sentence where the victim testified “that she ha[d] suffered long-term harm as a result of the molestation, especially because the crime was unreported for many years”), trans. denied.

[21] We also note that Nowlan committed his crimes in the presence of his minor child, H.N., who on several occasions heard C.M.’s screams for help and came to check on her after the fact. Our Supreme Court has held that the commission of a crime within earshot of a minor child may be considered as an aggravating circumstance at sentencing. Crawley v. State, 677 N.E.2d 520, 522 (Ind. 1997); see also Cloum v. State, 799 N.E.2d 84, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the trial court properly considered as an aggravating factor that defendant shot and killed his wife while minor children were upstairs and defendant's oldest teenage daughter immediately came down and witnessed the aftermath of the shooting.). Here, H.N.’s mother ⁴ testified at the sentencing hearing that “Nowlan's actions were not only horrific against [C.M.] ․ [but] also traumatized [H.N.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 167.

[22] We agree with the trial court that the “emotional impact [of Nowlan's crimes] was significant, not only on the victim of the specific sex offenses, but on the family outside of ․ the victim, including her brother.” Id. at 176. Accordingly, we do not find that the sentence imposed by the court is an outlier in need of revision.

Conclusion

[23] In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Nowlan's sentence is not inappropriate. We affirm.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).

4.   H.N. died by an apparent suicide at the age of nineteen after testifying at Nowlan's trial but before sentencing, so at the sentencing hearing his mother gave a victim impact statement on his behalf.

DeBoer, Judge.

Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur. Altice, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.