Jerad Wells, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Jerad Wells appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to correct error after the court granted summary judgment in favor of Dexter Axle Company LLC and dismissed Wells’ claim. Wells’ claim against Dexter Axle alleged premises liability for his injuries resulting from a fall. Concluding that the court neglected to consider Indiana's Comparative Fault Act ¹ while rendering its decision, we reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] These are the facts as developed thus far on summary judgment. On January 4, 2023, Dexter Axle requested the delivery of materials from Metal Technologies in Auburn to Dexter Axle's plant in Albion. Dexter Axle contracted with JAT of Fort Wayne to make this delivery. Wells had worked for JAT as a driver since December 2021 and was the dedicated driver for the route between Metal Technologies and Dexter Axle's facility in Albion. Wells made the requested delivery on January 4, 2023.

[3] Dexter Axle's loading dock was unmanned, and though covered, was exposed to the elements. A delivery driver was required to pull their delivery truck into the receiving dock, exit their truck, walk to a four-rung ladder, climb the ladder, open a door while standing on the ladder, enter the building, provide the paperwork for the delivery, exit the building through the same door, close the door while standing on the ladder, and then finish climbing down the ladder. Wells made deliveries there as frequently as five times a day for nearly a year and complained to the staff at Dexter Axle about the condition of the ladder. More specifically, Wells notified Dexter Axle that the ladder “was dirty or wet and slippery and that the design of the ladder made it especially difficult to get out of the door and down the ladder.” Appellant's App. Vol. 3, p. 17. Dexter Axle took no action.

[4] On January 4, Wells pulled the JAT delivery truck into Dexter Axle's receiving dock for the second time that day. He exited his truck, climbed the ladder, opened the door, and provided the delivery paperwork. After completing the paperwork, he exited the door at the top of the ladder and began to climb down. Wells fell down the ladder and was injured.

[5] Wells filed a complaint against Dexter Axle on September 28, 2023, alleging that Dexter Axle caused his fall which resulted in his injuries. Dexter Axle moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dexter Axle, relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343A Known or Obvious Dangers, and the Supreme Court's holding in Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991), to conclude that Wells’ claims should be dismissed because he knew of the danger, complained about the danger, and the danger occurred. Appendix Vol. 3, pp. 33-34. The court also denied Wells’ motion to correct error. Wells now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Appellate courts “generally review a trial court's ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion.” Santelli v. Rahmatullah, 993 N.E.2d 167, 173 (Ind. 2013). And “the trial court's decision [is afforded] ‘a strong presumption of correctness.’ ” Id. (quoting Walker v. Pullen, 943 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Ind. 2011)). Here, the trial court's decision, denying the motion to correct error, was in review of its entry of summary judgment in favor of Dexter Axle, and its dismissal of Wells’ complaint. Thus, we must decide whether the trial court erred when it granted Dexter Axle's motion for summary judgment.

[7] “We review a summary judgment ruling by applying the same standard as the trial court: if the evidence shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.” Lorenz v. Anonymous Physician #1, 51 N.E.3d 391, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Just as the trial court does, we resolve all questions and view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, so as to not improperly deny that party its day in court. Sorrells v. Reid-Renner, 49 N.E.3d 647, 650 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc., 9 N.E.3d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2014)). “Evidence sufficient to support a verdict is not required” to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Siner v. Kindred Hosp. L.P., 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1189 (Ind. 2016). “Indiana's distinctive summary judgment standard imposes a heavy factual burden on the movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact on at least one element of the claim.” Id. at 1187. And the standard presents a “high bar” for summary judgment movants to clear. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014)

[8] Wells’ action against Dexter Axle is a negligence claim. “A plaintiff must establish three elements in order to recover on a negligence theory: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant's breach.” Countrymark Cooperative, Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “A defendant is entitled to summary judgment by demonstrating that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff's claim.” Id.

[9] Dexter Axle does not dispute that at the time in question it owed a duty to Wells as a business invitee. Appellee's Br. p. 16. Instead, it argues that Wells failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it breached its duty to Wells and contends that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because of the language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 343 and 343A(1).

[10] Under common law, “[t]he question of whether a duty to exercise care arises is governed by the relationship of the parties and is an issue of law within the province of the court.” Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 369 (Ind. 1990). “If a duty of care exists, the determination of whether a breach of duty occurred is a factual question requiring an evaluation of the landowner's conduct with respect to the requisite standard of care.” Id. As a result, summary judgment is “ ‘rarely appropriate’ ” in negligence cases. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Tibbs v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ind. 1996)). “This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id.

[11] In Burrell, the Supreme Court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343 (1965), which defines the duty owed an invitee by the premises owner as follows:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

569 N.E.2d at 639-40. And Section 343A(1) (1965), which is to be read in conjunction with Section 343, provides that: “A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”

[12] Wells argues that the trial court erred because the “open and obvious” doctrine “does not afford Dexter Axle Co. complete immunity” from the harm Wells suffered on its premises. Appellant's Br. p. 7. And Wells claims that the trial court's decision allows Dexter Axle “to circumvent Indiana's Comparative Fault Act.” Id. Dexter Axle maintains that the court's decision is properly made under the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 343 and 343A analysis. Appellee's Br. p. 12. And Dexter Axle disputes whether a breach of duty occurred because Wells’ complaints about the ladder were generalized and there were no reported incidents involving the ladder. Id. at 13. It also questions that it should have anticipated the harm. Id. Furthermore, it argues that the issue of comparative fault is waived because Wells did not explicitly refer to the Act when responding to the motion for summary judgment.

[13] We address the waiver argument first. “The Comparative Fault Act, [Indiana Code section 34-51-2 et seq. ], applies generally to damages actions based in fault that accrued on or after January 1, 1985.” Mendenhall v. Skinner and Broadbent Co., Inc., 728 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. 2000). “The primary objective of the Act was to modify the common law rule of contributory negligence under which a plaintiff was barred from recovery where he was only slightly negligent.” Id. “The Act seeks to achieve this result through proportional allocation of fault, ensuring that each person whose fault contributed to cause injury bears his or her proportionate share of the total fault contributing to the injury.” Id. Therefore, unless an exception to the applicability of the Act is available, the Act always applies in actions based on fault brought to recover damages for injury or death to a person or harm to property that accrued after January 1, 1985. Ind. Code § 34-51-2-1(a) (1998). None of the exceptions apply here and the applicability of the Comparative Fault Act is not waived.

[14] Here, the designated evidence reflects that Wells knew about the condition of the ladder and complained “[a]t least three times” prior to his fall to Dexter Axle staff about the difficulties involving its use. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 94 (Wells deposition). He alerted them that “it wasn't very safe going up and down.” Id. In particular, if delivery drivers whose trucks were parked in other bays were ascending the ladder when the truck in the bay closest to the ladder was pulling away, it “was a little unsettling.” Id. He complained that the ladder “was too close to the trailer,” and that “when coming out the door, the only way to shut it is to, like, hold onto the handle while you're going down the stairs[.]” Id. at 95. He also complained that closing the door while descending the ladder was made even more difficult if it was a windy day.

[15] And the designated evidence reflects that Wells “was forced to use the ladder every time [he] would deliver to [Dexter Axle] as it was the only entrance into the shipping area.” Id. at 230 (Wells’ Answers to First Set of Interrogatories). Dexter Axle does not dispute that the ladder “was the only entrance in the loading dock to the shipping area.” Id. at 67 (Dexter Axle's Brief in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment; Statement of Undisputed Material Facts) (internal quotations omitted). And Dexter Axle does not dispute that Wells complained about the condition of the ladder. Id. at 68. However, Dexter Axle maintains that there were no prior reported falls or injuries associated with the ladder, thus they could not have anticipated Wells’ injury.

[16] The record reflects genuine issues of material fact as to at least the following: (1) Dexter Axle's knowledge of the risk posed by the ladder; (2) whether Dexter Axle should have expected Wells to climb the ladder despite the danger; and (3) whether Dexter Axle's actions or inaction constituted a breach of its duty. On one hand, Wells argued that he knew about the condition of the ladder and complained about it, but Dexter Axle did nothing to make his access between the shipping area and the loading area safer. Moreover, he says he had no choice but to use the ladder. On the other hand, Dexter Axle contends that “[i]n the ten years leading up to [Wells’] fall, there were no reported falls or injuries associated with the ladder.” Id. at 67. And it argues that it “had no reason to anticipate that Mr. Wells would fall from this fixed, four-rung industrial ladder located in a covered loading dock.” Appellee's Br. p. 12. It continues with the argument that there were no prior reported injuries associated with the ladder.²

[17] “[T]he comparative knowledge of a possessor of land and an invitee is not a factor in assessing whether a duty exists, but is properly taken into consideration in determining whether such duty was breached.” Smith v. Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242, 243 (Ind. 2003). “Whether a duty of care has been breached is only a question of law when the facts are undisputed and only one inference can be drawn from them.” Winfrey v. NLMP, Inc., 963 N.E.2d 609, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The facts of this case do not lead to but one inference. “[T]he question of whether the duty of care to an invitee has been breached involves several determinations regarding what was reasonable under the circumstances of the case.” Id. “Questions of what is reasonable under the circumstances are generally best left to the jury.” Id.

[18] And “ ‘[f]ault apportionment under the Indiana Comparative Fault Act is uniquely a question of fact to be decided by the jury.’ ” City of Crawfordsville v. Price, 778 N.E.2d 459, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting McKinney v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 597 N.E.2d 1001, 1008 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied). As we noted in Robbins v. McCarthy, “at some point the apportionment of fault may become a question of law for the court. But that point is reached only when there is no dispute in the evidence and the factfinder is able to come to only one logical conclusion.” 581 N.E.2d 929, 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied. In our view, the record does not permit such a conclusion. The trial court independently determined that Wells was more than fifty percent at fault in this case when it granted Dexter Axle's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Wells’ claim. That conclusion is apparent despite the lack of explicit language to that effect. The fault apportionment was improperly determined by the court on summary judgment here.³

[19] Because the trial court erred by granting summary judgment, we must reverse and remand this matter to the trial court.

Conclusion

[20] The trial court erroneously granted summary judgment where there were genuine issues of material fact. Consequently, we reverse and remand.

[21] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana's Comparative Fault Act is codified at Indiana Code chapter 34-51-2 (1998).

2.   Dexter Axle relies on this Court's decision in Podemski v. Praxair, Inc., 87 N.E.3d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. However, Podemski is distinguishable, in part, because it does not include a discussion of the Comparative Fault Act. See Converse v. Elkhart General Hosp., Inc., 120 N.E.3d 621 (Ind Ct. App. 2019) (distinguishing Podemski and known and obvious dangers in its discussion of application of Comparative Fault Act in summary judgment appeal). And Paul v. Menard, Inc., No.1:20-cv-02292-RLM-MG, 2022 WL 5244441, *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 6, 2022) is inapposite because it involves the federal summary judgment standard, which requires the nonmovant to provide competent evidence in rebuttal to affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial. Consequently, we find these cases unhelpful to our resolution here.

3.   Wells argues that the ladder was in violation of IOSHA requirements, and, as such, suggests Dexter Axle's knowledge of the danger posed by the ladder. We need not address this claim in order to resolve the issues on appeal.

Crone, Senior Judge.

Judges Bailey and Foley concur. Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.