Iram Raphael Simpson, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Iram Raphael Simpson, Jr. appeals his convictions for Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Level 5 felony theft following a jury trial. Simpson raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence the deposition testimony of a witness in lieu of her live testimony at trial.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded certain evidence from trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 22, 2023, Simpson was staying at Melysa Ledman's apartment. Simpson and Ledman had an “on and off situationship” at that time. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 188. During the evening, while Ledman was downstairs, Simpson was alone in Ledman's upstairs bedroom. Simpson took Ledman's handgun from her purse and put it in a backpack. Simpson then left the bedroom, “came rushing past” Ledman with the backpack, and ran towards the front door. Id. at 192. Ledman got a “weird feeling,” checked her purse, and noticed that the gun was missing. Id. Ledman yelled after Simpson, “[G]ive me my gun,” but he left the apartment. Id.

[4] Ledman called 9-1-1 to report the theft, and she described the gun as a Taurus G3 nine-millimeter. Ledman also had video surveillance of Simpson holding the gun in her bedroom right before he ran off, and she had video surveillance of Simpson running out of her apartment carrying the backpack.

[5] The State charged Simpson with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Level 5 felony theft, Level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a handgun, Level 6 felony obstruction of justice, and Class A misdemeanor unlawful carrying of a handgun. And the State alleged that Simpson was a habitual offender. While Simpson was in jail pending trial, he called Ledman and asked her to change her story to say that he had taken a BB gun in order “to get the case dropped.” Id. at 198. She declined.

[6] Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude potential evidence that Ledman had “shot at” Tarryn Helderman, a girlfriend of Simpson's, earlier in the day on the date of Simpson's theft of Ledman's gun. Id. at 39. During a hearing on that motion, Simpson argued that Helderman had tried to pick him up from Ledman's apartment twice that day and that Ledman had fired a gun at her the first time. The trial court granted the State's motion but noted that the State might “open the door” to allow the evidence to come in. Id. at 41-42.

[7] On the first day of trial, the State moved to admit Ledman's deposition testimony in lieu of her live testimony. The trial court heard testimony from Brad Hayworth, an investigator with the Tippecanoe County Prosecutor's Office, about several unsuccessful attempts to serve Ledman with a subpoena to appear at trial, both in person at her apartment and by mail. And the trial court issued a writ of body attachment for Ledman. The trial court admitted Ledman's deposition testimony over Simpson's objection.

[8] At trial, Simpson testified that, during the early evening of November 22, Helderman came over to see Simpson at Ledman's apartment. Simpson testified, without objection by the State, that Ledman was angry, went outside, and shot at Helderman, who was sitting in her car in the parking lot. Simpson testified that later, Ledman ran an errand, and Simpson asked Helderman to come get him. When Ledman came home before Helderman arrived, Simpson was afraid that Ledman would shoot Helderman again, so he took Ledman's gun out of her purse. Simpson then left the apartment and got into Helderman's car. Simpson also testified that he eventually returned the gun to Ledman.

[9] The jury found Simpson guilty on all counts except obstruction of justice, and, in a separate proceeding, the trial court found that Simpson was a serious violent felon and a habitual offender. Prior to sentencing, the trial court vacated his two convictions for unlawful carrying of a handgun. And the court sentenced Simpson to an aggregate term of seventeen years, with fifteen years executed to the Department of Correction and two years on community corrections. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Deposition Testimony

[10] Simpson first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence Ledman's deposition testimony. We review the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of that discretion. Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “We reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.

[11] Simpson argues that the trial court violated his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that, “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” This right allows the admission of an absent witness's out of court statement only if the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a chance to cross-examine the witness. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).

[12] As our Supreme Court has explained, a witness is unavailable for purposes of the Confrontation Clause requirement only if the prosecution has made a good faith effort to obtain the witness's presence at trial. Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. 2002). Here, the trial court admitted Ledman's deposition testimony into evidence at trial only after the State presented evidence that it had tried several times, without success, to serve Ledman with a subpoena to appear at trial, both in person and by mail. The State also obtained a last-minute writ of body attachment for Ledman. While Simpson argues that the State could have done more, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that Ledman was unavailable for trial. See, e.g., Tiller v. State, 896 N.E.2d 537, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming trial court's determination that witness was unavailable where State had made several efforts to ensure his appearance at trial, including phone calls, personal service of subpoena, and writ of body attachment on the first day of trial).

[13] Still, Simpson

questions the reliability of [Ledman's] deposition [testimony given] ․ the subsequent testimony during trial that Ledman [had] shot at Taryn Helderman, ․ a witness in the instant trial. This information came to light after the deposition was taken. Ledman made no deposition reference, one way or the other, whether she had actually shot at Helderman. The absence of this shooting evidence during the deposition, or even a denial thereof, made Ledman's deposition less reliable and incomplete – and her presence even more critical at the trial.

Appellant's Br. at 15-16. However, as the State aptly points out, Simpson “cannot claim that he did not know about the alleged shooting at the time of the deposition because he testified at trial that he witnessed the shooting.” Appellee's Br. at 13-14 (citing Tr. Vol. 3, p. 4). We reject Simpson's contention that he was denied an opportunity to question Ledman about the alleged shooting during her deposition.

[14] For all these reasons, the trial court did not violate Simpson's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and the court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Ledman's deposition testimony into evidence at trial.¹

Issue Two: Excluded Evidence

[15] Next, Simpson contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded Helderman's testimony that Ledman had fired a gun at her. Again, we review the trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of that discretion. Jones, 982 N.E.2d at 421.

[16] Simpson alleges that the trial court excluded the testimony “based on general relevancy considerations.” Appellant's Br. at 20. But as the State explains, the trial court did not sustain its objection or grant its motion to strike Helderman's testimony that, while Helderman was in the parking lot waiting for Simpson to exit Ledman's apartment, Ledman came out, “shot the gun, and then shut the door and didn't come back out.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 15. That statement prompted the State's objection and motion to strike, which were discussed during a sidebar conference. In response to a few questions by the trial court, defense counsel said, “Judge for this witness, that was my last question. And so ultimately, I don't have any further questions for this witness[,] so I can move on.” Id. at 16.

[17] In sum, rather than excluding the testimony, the trial court made no ruling on the State's objection or motion to strike. And rather than proceeding with his examination of Helderman, Simpson stated that he had no further questions of her. Simpson has not shown any abuse of the trial court's discretion on this issue.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Simpson maintains that the trial court “should have considered the nature of the deposition in making its decision on admissibility.” Appellant's Br. at 15. Simpson suggests that he would have approached the discovery deposition differently if he had known that Ledman would not appear at trial. However, in Morgan v. State, 903 N.E.2d 1010, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, we rejected this argument and held that the defendant's confrontation rights were not violated where he had cross-examined the unavailable witness during a discovery deposition.

Mathias, Judge.

Judges May and Bradford concur. May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.