IN RE: J.G. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that J.G. (“Child”), the adopted son of A.G. (“Mother”) and R.G. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”), is a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. After the fact-finding hearing, the trial court granted Father's motion under Indiana Trial Rule 15(B) to have the pleadings conform to the evidence, and the court adjudicated Child a CHINS under Indiana Code Sections 31-34-1-1 (“CHINS 1”), 31-34-1-3 (“CHINS 3”), and 31-34-1-6 (“CHINS 6”).

[2] On appeal, Parents argue that the trial court clearly erred in adjudicating Child a CHINS under CHINS 1. On cross-appeal, DCS argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Father's Trial Rule 15(B) motion and adjudicating Child a CHINS under CHINS 3 and CHINS 6. We vacate all three CHINS adjudications and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born in March 2013. His biological father was Father's brother. At some point, Child's paternal grandmother became Child's guardian. Father's brother passed away, and Parents adopted Child. At that time, Parents had two younger children: Z.G., born in October 2019, and E.G., born in January 2023. Sometime in 2023, Parents tried to get Child in therapy, but he “threw a massive, violent fit, put [Mother] in danger and refused to go.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 132. Shortly thereafter, in October 2023, Child molested Z.G. To separate the children, Parents sent Child to live with his biological maternal grandfather. Mother reported the molestation to DCS, but DCS did not open a case or offer services to Child or Z.G. because, according to DCS Family Case Manager Supervisor Hannah Burke, “the children were being kept apart” and Parents “were able to seek services ․ without the intervention of [DCS].” Tr. Vol. 2 at 87.

[4] In March 2024, Child underwent a forensic interview, during which he disclosed that he had been molested by his biological mother, his maternal grandfather, and his grandfather's friend. The record indicates that DCS arranged this interview, and Father thought that this would “get the ball rolling on getting [therapy] services[,]” id. at 130, but no services were offered.

[5] Thereafter, Child went to live with his paternal grandmother. He “became very violent and suicidal” and threatened to kill her. Id. at 123. She was concerned for her safety and Child's safety and took him to Community North Hospital's Children's Psychiatric Unit. He was released to her care, but “he became violent again and ended up back” in the hospital. Id. at 125. When Child was ready to be discharged a second time, his grandmother was not “willing for him to come back into [her] home” because she “felt like it was not a good situation for anybody for him to come back for his safety or anybody else's.” Id. at 123-24. Parents had similar concerns and did not pick Child up from the hospital.

[6] On May 17, 2024, DCS filed a petition under CHINS 1 alleging that Child was a CHINS. The petition alleged the following facts:¹

b. On or about May 1, 2024, Child was taken to Community North Hospital, Children's Psychiatric Unit, for an attempted suicide at school.

c. On or about May 11, 2024, Child was medically ready to be discharged from the hospital.

d. Hospital Staff called Mother and Father and they were to pick the Child up from the Hospital before midnight.

e. The Child remains at the Hospital.

f. Mother and Father stated that they would not come to the Hospital to pick Child up.

g. Mother and Father stated that Child could not return to their home.

h. Child has no caregiver to provide care for him.

a. [sic] Due to Child being admitted at Community North Hospital, Child being medically ready to be discharged, Mother and Father refusing to pick Child up from the Hospital, Mother and Father refusing to allow Child to return home and Child not having a suitable caregiver, DCS and Court intervention are necessary in order to ensure Child's safety.

Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 35-36.

[7] The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on December 13, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, pursuant to Trial Rule 15(B), Father's counsel moved “for the amendment to the pleadings to conform to the evidence that was presented today” based on his belief that “there is evidence that would allow a CHINS 6 or CHINS 3 finding that was presented at either the express or implied consent of DCS.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 134-35. DCS objected, and the court took the matter under advisement.

[8] On January 6, 2025, the trial court issued an order that reads in pertinent part as follows:

Findings of Fact

․

5. This case began after Child was taken to Community North Hospital due to suicidal statements in early May 2024. When Community North was ready to discharge Child, Mother and Father refused to pick him up.

6. ․ Child had been sexually molested by his biological mother and other people. His biological father passed away. The family attempted to remedy this situation by placing Child with relatives including [Parents]. Child sexually assaulted [Z.G.] in April [sic] 2023. They sought assistance from DCS but DCS did not formally become involved because Child had been separated from the victim by the family.

7. In May 2024, DCS detained Child and eventually placed him at Youth Services Bureau in residential care due to DCS's inability to find a Foster or Relative Home that was willing/able to take Child.[2]

8. Mother and Father admitted that they have not seen or spoken to Child since his last forensic interview in March 2024.

9. Father testified that Child was not successfully involved in any services while in [his] and Mother's home. The family had sought services for Child on their own, but his behavior prevented him [from] seeing a therapist. Father also testified the family had sought assistance from DCS but did not receive any meaningful assistance.

10. Mother and Father admitted that they are not willing to take Child home and into their care today.

11. Dr. Heather Holleman, a licensed clinical psychologist [with Safe Passage, where Child was placed following his two-month stay at Youth Services Bureau], conducted a Diagnostic Evaluation of Child. Dr. Holleman's diagnostic impressions were that Child has Posttraumatic Stress, ADHD, and Major Depressive Disorder [sic 3].

12. Dr. Holleman[ ] recommended that Child participate in outpatient wraparound programming while returning to Mother and Father's home, although she admitted that she did not have the benefit of knowledge of Child's behavior after the Diagnostic Evaluation that might change her recommendation.

13. Dr. Holleman cited the need to always recommend the least intrusive methods of treatment for a child and Child's lack of any previous outpatient care as partial explanations for her recommendation for outpatient treatment.

14. DCS Supervisor Hannah Burke testified that DCS met with Father, his attorney, CASA, and other service providers on August 21, 2024 in a Child and Family Team Meeting (CFTM).

15. DCS's intention for that CFTM was to discuss services that could be put into place in Mother and Father's home so that Child could safely come home, per Dr. Holleman's recommendation.

16. Mother was not present at the CFTM, however, Father maintained at the CFTM that he was not willing to allow Child to come home. Father continued to cite safety concerns for his younger child as his reason for being unwilling to allow Child to come home. DCS attempted to discuss what services and plans could be put into place to alleviate Father's concerns, however, Father continued to maintain that Child could not come home based on Father's belief that Child had sexually assaulted [Z.G.]

17. Because of Father's position at the CFTM, DCS was and remains unable to put referrals in place that would allow Child to return home and participate in outpatient services. Erika Limbert, Child's Case Manager in his current placement at Youth Services Bureau, testified and informed the Court that neither Mother nor Father have called, written letters, or tried to visit Child since he has been placed at Youth Services Bureau approximately two months ago.

18. Ms. Limbert further informed the Court that Mother and Father have also not been a part of the team meetings that Youth Services has had with DCS. These meetings would have kept Mother and Father informed of what was happening with Child and may have even taught them some skills to use when Child returns home.

19. Ms. Limbert informed the Court that Youth Services Bureau worked to get Child into the appropriate public school grade, however, it was difficult due to the lack of records from Child's previous schooling.

20. Child is now placed in public school and is doing fairly well despite some continued behavioral struggles. Child is working toward all goals in treatment and could be at Youth Services Bureau for a year or more due to his trauma history.

21. Dr. Sarah Szerlong, a licensed psychologist [called as a witness by Father], testified she had reviewed all available records about Child including the Diagnostic Evaluation conducted by Dr. Holleman. Dr. Szerlong's opinion was that a psycho-sexual evaluation would be essential before making any recommendation for appropriate treatment and making recommendation on a time-table for reunification with parents.

22. The Henry County CASA Director, Karmen McKillip, testified and informed the Court that she fully supports DCS's position and believes that Child and this family require DCS intervention and a CHINS finding.

23. Mother and Father have not called the DCS office, have not called the Youth Services Bureau, have not called the Henry County CASA, and have not driven to any of those ․ offices/locations to check on Child since the CFTM on August 21, 2024.

24. Mother and Father have made no real efforts to be a part of Child's life or participate in his treatment since the beginning of this case.

25. Child has had many significant traumas in his life. He poses a threat to physically and/or sexually harm other people. The Court sympathizes with the Parents who took ․ Child into their home which resulted in the sexual assault of their three-year-old child. However, what is not allowed by the law is the complete physical and emotional abandonment by the Parents of Child.

․

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. [DCS] has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Child is a Child In Need Of Services [under CHINS 1] in that his physical or mental condition is seriously impaired an[d] seriously endangered as a result of the parents failing to provide him necessary food, clothing, medical care, education, shelter or supervision when they are able to do so, and he needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that he was not receiving and will not be provided without the coercive intervention of the Court.

2. The Court also finds that Child is a Child In Need Of Services under [CHINS 3] in that he was a victim of a sexual offense and he needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he was not receiving and is unlikely to be provided without the coercive intervention of the Court. The Court further finds that Child is a Child In Need Of Services under [CHINS 6] in that he substantially has endangered his own health and the health of others, and he needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that he was not receiving and is unlikely to be provided without the coercive intervention of the Court.

․

The Court chooses to find Child to be CHINS under all three provisions of the Code because the Court believes this most accurately reflects the facts. Child was the victim of sexual assault by several people. Child currently poses a threat to himself and others. The parents have failed to meet their duties as parents since May 2024.

Appealed Order at 1-7 (emphases added).

[9] On January 30, DCS filed a motion to modify Child's placement to “Pierceton Woods Academy because Youth Services Bureau asked that Child be moved from their facility and recommended a more restrictive environment for Child to promote success for Child.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 168. The trial court granted the motion that same day. On January 31, the court held a dispositional hearing and stated that any services that Mother and Father would be “required to participate in” would not “be implemented immediately” because of Child's “change of placement[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 140. Thereafter, the court issued a dispositional order.⁴

[10] Parents now appeal the fact-finding order, and DCS cross-appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Parents’ Appeal

[11] Our Supreme Court has stated that “the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to protect children, not punish parents.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010). Thus, the focus in a CHINS proceeding “is on the best interests of the child and whether the child needs help that the parent will not be willing or able to provide—not whether the parent is somehow ‘guilty’ or ‘deserves’ a CHINS adjudication.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1285 (Ind. 2014). Notwithstanding “a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that—a determination that a child is in need of services.” N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105.⁵ “Because a CHINS proceeding is a civil action, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” Id. (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3).

[12] Under CHINS 1, a child is a CHINS where sufficient evidence establishes the following:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

I.C. § 31-34-1-1.

[13] Special findings are not required in a CHINS fact-finding order. S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1288. Here, the trial court entered findings at Father's request pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A). Accordingly, we engage in a two-tiered standard of review. Henry v. Henry, 758 N.E.2d 991, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “We must first determine whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and then whether the findings support the judgment.” Id.

The court's findings and judgment will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any facts or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them. The judgment is clearly erroneous when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and conclusions entered on the findings. In making these determinations, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, but we will consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences therefrom.

Id. at 992-93 (citations omitted).

[14] We “may affirm the judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings.” Id. at 993. Nevertheless, because a judgment entered with findings pursuant to a party's request is not a general judgment, we may not affirm merely because the judgment is supported by evidence in the record. In re Paternity of V.A.M.C., 768 N.E.2d 990, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), aff'd on reh'g in relevant part, 773 N.E.2d 359 (mem.). “Rather, we must determine whether the findings outlined by the trial court are sufficient to support the judgment.” Id.

[15] Parents do not deny that Child's mental condition is seriously impaired and seriously endangered and that he is in need of services. They do, however, contend that a CHINS 1 adjudication is clearly erroneous in this case because Child's mental condition did not result from their “abandonment” of Child, as the trial court characterized it. Appealed Order at 5. We must agree.

[16] “We have previously concluded that ‘abandonment exists when there is such conduct on the part of a parent which evidences a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.’ ” In re A.T., 219 N.E.3d 90, 105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting In re Adoption of M.L.L., 810 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)).⁶ The record establishes that Child's mental condition resulted from his molestation by multiple family members and not from any abandonment on Parents’ part. Paternal grandmother testified without objection that when Child was set to be released from Community North Hospital for the second time, she was “concerned” about him returning to Parents’ home with his younger siblings because Child had told her that “he could not refrain” from abusing children and that he “didn't understand why he couldn't stop doing it.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 124.⁷ Parents had and continue to have similar concerns, and that is why they “did not pick [Child] up” from the hospital. Id. at 29.⁸ Parents observe that if they had brought Child home, “they could not ensure Z.G.’s safety, which would have made them neglectful of Z.G.” Parents’ Reply Br. at 7.⁹

[17] Parents’ and grandmother's concerns were validated by Case Manager Limbert from Youth Services Bureau—Child's placement at the time of the fact-finding hearing—who testified that Child is “going to need residential care for about a year[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 59. She further testified that in her experience with cases involving a child who had sexually abused a younger sibling, she had never “seen the children just put back in the home together without therapists in place[,]” which would have happened in this case after Child was released from the hospital, and that therapists “would be necessary” in “helping that transition.” Id.¹⁰ Dr. Szerlong echoed this assessment. Id. at 115.

[18] To be sure, evidence was presented that Parents had not contacted Child since the May 2024 forensic interview, DCS since the August 2024 CFTM, or Child's service providers, and the trial court was not obligated to accept Father's explanation for this lack of communication at face value.¹¹ But evidence was also presented that DCS had not provided Parents with the service providers’ contact information and vice versa.¹² Perhaps Parents and DCS could have been more diligent in communicating with each other, and perhaps Parents could have taken more initiative to reach out to the service providers and to Child.

[19] But ultimately, we agree with Parents that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that Child's seriously impaired and seriously endangered mental condition resulted from any abandonment on their part. And we note that the trial court made no findings regarding Parents’ financial ability to supply Child with the necessary therapeutic care.¹³ Accordingly, we vacate Child's CHINS 1 adjudication. See In re E.K., 260 N.E.3d 901, 910 (Ind. 2025) (vacating CHINS 1 adjudication where record was “devoid of evidence that Mother could have done more—financially or otherwise—to provide [child] with the safe, secure, and stable shelter he needed” and was “replete with evidence that [child] would not have been safe in Mother's home with only the resources and services DCS made available”); In re A.T., 219 N.E.3d 90, 105-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (reversing CHINS 1 adjudication and finding in pertinent part that record did not support trial court's conclusion that parents abandoned child).

DCS's Cross-Appeal

[20] On cross-appeal, DCS asserts that the trial court erred in granting Father's Trial Rule 15(B) motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence and in adjudicating Child a CHINS under CHINS 3 and CHINS 6. Generally, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend for an abuse of discretion. In re A.T., 219 N.E.3d 90, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” In re Paternity of A.J.L.B., 224 N.E.3d 345, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236, 1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)).

[21] Trial Rule 15(B) reads in pertinent part,

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.

Here, Father raised a Trial Rule 15(B) motion based on his belief that “there is evidence that would allow a CHINS 6 or CHINS 3 finding that was presented at either the express or implied consent of DCS.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 134-35. The trial court granted the motion over DCS's objection.

[22] CHINS 3 provides in relevant part that a child is a CHINS if the child is a victim of certain offenses, including child molesting, and needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court. I.C. § 31-34-1-3(a). And CHINS 6 provides in relevant part that a child is a CHINS if “(1) the child substantially endangers the child's own health or the health of another individual; and (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that: (A) the child is not receiving; and (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” I.C. § 31-34-1-6.

[23] DCS acknowledges that our Supreme Court recently stated that “when DCS alleges a child is a CHINS under one category, the evidence presented at the hearing may show the child's circumstances fit a different category. In such cases, a party can ask the court to adjudicate the child under that other category” via a Trial Rule 15(B) motion. E.K., 260 N.E.3d at 914. But the Court also pointed out that “amending certain CHINS categories under Trial Rule 15(B) at fact-finding becomes complicated when the child is excluded from the hearing or unrepresented by counsel[,]”, id., both of which occurred in this case. “Such a child can neither meaningfully consent to nor object to trying issues outside the pleadings.” Id. See I.C. § 31-34-10-7 (providing that if a petition alleges that a child is a CHINS under CHINS 6, the court “shall determine whether the child admits or denies the allegations”); E.K., 260 N.E.3d at 914 (noting that when facing CHINS 6 allegations, “a child will need the assistance of counsel to meaningfully respond”).

[24] Based on E.K., DCS asserts, and Parents concede, that the appropriate remedy is to vacate both the CHINS 3 and the CHINS 6 adjudications and remand for further proceedings that protect Child's procedural rights, which are spelled out in detail in E.K. Accordingly, we vacate Child's CHINS 3 and CHINS 6 adjudications and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.¹⁴

Conclusion

[25] Based on the foregoing, we vacate Child's CHINS 1, CHINS 3, and CHINS 6 adjudications and remand for further proceedings.

[26] Vacated and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Here, and elsewhere, we have replaced references to “the Child” and Child's name or initials with “Child.”

2.   DCS Supervisor Burke testified that Child's perpetration of sexual abuse “made it difficult for [DCS] to find foster placement[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 88.

3.   Dr. Holleman testified that she diagnosed Child with “mild depression with mild anxious distress.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 50.

4.   Senior Judge Jack A. Tandy held the fact-finding hearing and issued the related order. Judge Bob A. Witham held the dispositional hearing and issued the related order.

5.   Mother and Father filed separate briefs, and DCS urges us to “reject arguments that Mother and Father attempt to make on each other's behalf.” Appellee's Br. at 26. We agree with Parents that they “have not raised arguments on behalf of each other; rather, they have raised arguments regarding the condition of [Child].” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 6.

6.   Mother notes that this Court has acknowledged that “a CHINS determination, especially one indicating that a parent had neglected or abandoned a child, could result in adverse job consequences or preclude a parent from serving as a foster parent in the future.” A.T., 219 N.E.3d at 98 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290).

7.   Safe Passage's Holleman acknowledged that psychiatrist Brian Esch, a member of Safe Passage's treatment team, noted that Child had “target symptoms of hyper and sexually inappropriate impulsive behavior[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 53.

8.   Father testified that he did not “feel safe” to leave Child at home with his younger children and with “[Mother] for that matter.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 30. Father further testified,We haven't got any, I guess okay from [Z.G.’s] therapist to say that it's safe for him to be with Child for [Z.G.’s] mental health. He was diagnosed with PTSD and so I would like to get their input and have a strong plan in play with going forward, so we know what goes on.Id.

9.   Father's counsel asked Dr. Szerlong, “If you had a therapy client that was telling you that there was this sexual event between the children, and they were in the home together without services in place would you be required to do anything or what would your response be?” Tr. Vol. 2 at 117. Dr. Szerlong replied, “So, I certainly would talk with that family to better understand the services, but in most cases I would report that incident to [DCS] so they could conduct their own investigation.” Id.

10.   Father testified that after the CFTM in August 2024, DCS told him that he “needed to bring [Child] home and that they could provide [him] alarms on the doors while we figured out other services.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 130. DCS Supervisor Burke acknowledged that “there would have to be an intake before what services were determined would be in place[.]” Id. at 84.

11.   Father testified that he had not contacted Child because he did not “know what [he] should and should not discuss with [Child] at this time” and wanted “input from someone that's providing therapy to him[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 34. He further testified that he had not contacted Youth Services Bureau and Safe Passage because he “did not have [their] contact information” and “didn't know if [he] was allowed to or what the proper steps were.” Id. at 133. Regarding DCS, Father testified, “We have attorneys now and I didn't know how much I should be getting ahold of you guys, or if you guys should be getting a hold of me.” Id. at 132.

12.   Father testified that he became aware that DCS had “said they were not able to contact [him] and [Mother] because of [their] phone number[s,]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 126-27, which had been the same “for at least the last five (5) years.” Id. at 126.

13.   DCS asserts that because Parents had obtained therapy for Z.G., it is reasonable to infer that they could financially meet Child's therapeutic needs. This is pure speculation.

14.   Parents assert that the “adjudications should be reversed to provide Child an opportunity to admit or deny the allegations. If he admits, the adjudications should be reinstated. If he denies, DCS will have an opportunity to prove the allegations that support those adjudications.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 5. DCS notes that it was Father, not DCS, who moved to have Child adjudicated under CHINS 3 and CHINS 6, and asserts that it “has no obligation to present evidence to support any CHINS 3 or CHINS 6 allegations.” Appellee's Reply Br. at 5. DCS further asserts thatif Parents want to continue to allege that Child was a CHINS 3 or a CHINS 6, it is Parents’ obligation to present the allegations and evidence to support a CHINS 3 or CHINS 6 adjudication so that Child may properly admit or deny with the aid of appointed counsel.Id. We agree with DCS.

Bailey, Judge.

Brown, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.