Mandale Hamilton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] During a traffic stop on a vehicle being driven by Mandale Hamilton, officers searched the vehicle and found a handgun. Hamilton was charged and later convicted of several offenses, including Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. He was also found to be a habitual offender. Hamilton now appeals, raising three issues: whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and whether he personally waived his right to a jury trial on the habitual offender enhancement. Because we previously determined the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, we decline to address that issue under the law of the case doctrine. Further, we find the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violet felon. However—as the State concedes—because Hamilton did not personally waive his right to a jury trial on the habitual offender allegation, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the enhancement.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts as recounted by this Court in Hamilton's interlocutory appeal are as follows:

On February 6, 2022, Brownsburg Police Department (BPD) K9 Officer David Shedrow was patrolling a Super 8 Motel parking lot and running license plate checks of cars parked in the lot “to see if there was anything out of place.” [Tr. Vol. II p. 11]. One of the license plates he checked was on a blue Cadillac that was registered to Jayella Jackson. “[A]fter doing some digging,” Officer Shedrow learned that Jackson had posted bond for Hamilton in Hamilton's pending drug case. Id. Officer Shedrow then spoke with the motel's manager, who told him that the driver of the Cadillac was registered to room 213 and that “there had been a lot of foot traffic coming and going from that particular room.” Id. Officer Shedrow knew such behaviors to be closely associated with criminal activity.

Officer Shedrow drove to a nearby parking lot to watch the Cadillac, which was parked on the north side of the motel. He observed the Cadillac as it was driven to the south side of the motel. He did not see anyone exit the vehicle during the fifteen minutes the Cadillac was parked on the south side. When the Cadillac returned to the north side of the motel, Officer Shedrow observed Hamilton and an unidentified woman exit the vehicle. Hamilton eventually got back into the Cadillac and drove away. Officer Shedrow followed Hamilton onto Interstate 74, and after observing the Cadillac “move[ ] across the center line of the lane of travel without any form of signal,” he initiated a traffic stop for a driving infraction. Id. at [12].

BPD Officer Mark Christian assisted Officer Shedrow during the traffic stop. As observed from both Officer Shedrow's bodycam and the dashcam in his marked vehicle, Officer Shedrow approached the Cadillac on the passenger side, made contact with Hamilton, and asked Hamilton for his driver's license and the vehicle's registration. He observed that Hamilton seemed “unreasonably nervous.” Id. at [20]. Hamilton provided the requested documents, and Officer Shedrow returned to his vehicle so he “could run [Hamilton's] information through the BMV files.” Id. at [12]. As Officer Shedrow returned to his police car, he instructed Officer Christian to have Hamilton step out of the vehicle so he could have his K9 perform “a free air sniff” around the Cadillac. Id. at [26]. Officer Shedrow then got into his car, examined the documents provided by Hamilton, and turned on his in-car computer.

Meanwhile, Officer Christian approached the Cadillac and asked Hamilton to exit the vehicle so that a dog could sniff around the car. Hamilton initially refused, saying he was allergic to dogs and then asking to speak with a supervisor. Within about two minutes, however, Hamilton agreed to exit the vehicle. Officer Christian then patted him down and moved him to the front of Officer Shedrow's police vehicle.

As soon as he heard over the police radio that Hamilton was refusing to get out of the car, Officer Shedrow stopped what he was doing and stepped outside of his car to observe the exchange between Hamilton and Officer Christian. As they moved toward the front of Officer Shedrow's car, Officer Christian told Officer Shedrow that he smelled the odor of marijuana coming from inside the Cadillac. Officer Shedrow then retrieved his K9 from the back of his vehicle and walked the K9 toward the Cadillac. The K9 alerted on the driver's side of the vehicle indicating the presence of narcotics or contraband. At the suppression hearing, Officer Shedrow testified that “Officer Christian did smell marijuana prior to ever deploying my narcotics detecting dog.” Id. at [15].

Officer Shedrow then searched the car and located a white pill, which he later identified as oxycodone, in the center console. Officer Christian assisted in the search of the car and observed a firearm in a small space in the dash of the vehicle, under the steering wheel. As officers went to place Hamilton in handcuffs, Hamilton tried to run from them. He was quickly subdued and placed under arrest. Marijuana was later found where Hamilton had been sitting in the transport vehicle and a methamphetamine pipe fell out of his pants at the jail.

Hamilton v. State, No 23A-CR-818, *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2024) (mem.) (Hamilton I).

[3] The State charged Hamilton with Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and three Class B misdemeanors. The State also alleged Hamilton was a habitual offender. In December 2022, Hamilton filed a motion to suppress, challenging the traffic stop and subsequent search and seizure of the Cadillac. The court held a suppression hearing, after which both parties submitted memoranda in support of their positions. The trial court denied Hamilton's motion to suppress. Upon Hamilton's request, the trial court certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal and this court accepted jurisdiction. On appeal, Hamilton argued in part that “Officer Shedrow did not have reasonable suspicion for the stop[.]” Id. at *3. We affirmed the trial court's ruling and held, among other things, that Officer Shedrow had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.

[4] Following the interlocutory appeal, a trifurcated jury trial was held on July 23, 2024. While the jury was deliberating on the underlying offenses, the parties discussed how the habitual phase would proceed if needed, and defense counsel informed the court that, “we are waiving jury” on the habitual enhancement. Tr. Vol. III p. 91. The jury found Hamilton guilty of the underlying offenses. The trial court then released the jury and held a bench trial on the habitual offender enhancement. The court found Hamilton was a habitual offender and sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of twenty years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Hamilton now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Law of the Case

[5] Hamilton first challenges the admission of any evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing the stop was “pretextual” and “unreasonable.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. However, in his interlocutory appeal, Hamilton challenged the validity of the traffic stop, and we determined the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him. Thus, the State contends the law of the case doctrine precludes this argument. We agree.

[6] “The ‘law of the case doctrine’ is a discretionary tool by which appellate courts decline to revisit legal issues already determined on appeal in the same case and on substantially the same facts.” Maciaszek v. State, 113 N.E.3d 788, 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “Under that doctrine, the decision of an appellate court becomes the law of the case and governs the case throughout all of its subsequent stages, as to all questions which were presented and decided, both directly and indirectly.” Id. However, if new facts are elicited upon remand that materially affect the questions at issue, then the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply. Id. at 792.

[7] Hamilton acknowledges this doctrine but argues it should not apply here because “new facts” were presented at trial. Appellant's Br. p. 16. Specifically, Officer Shedrow's testimony that he uses “criminal interdiction” tactics.¹ Tr. Vol. II p. 115. Hamilton argues this “new” fact supports that this was an unreasonable pretextual stop—an argument he claims was “not available ․ during the interlocutory appeal.” Appellant's Br. p. 16.

[8] We disagree that this was a new fact presented at trial. While Officer Shedrow may not have specifically used the term “criminal interdiction” at the suppression hearing, the officers testified to their proactive policing at length. Specifically, Officer Shedrow testified that: he was actively patrolling the motel parking lot looking for criminal activity, he did some “digging” on the Cadillac, and he followed the Cadillac and pulled it over after observing a minor traffic infraction. Tr. Vol. II p. 11. Furthermore, the subject of a potential pretextual stop was a large part of the suppression hearing. In fact, Hamilton's memorandum in support of the motion to suppress includes an argument regarding pretextual stops. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 85. This was not new information that would prevent our application of the law of the case doctrine. We decline to revisit this issue.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[9] Hamilton next argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Specifically, he argues the State failed to prove he had actual or constructive possession of the firearm.

[10] Our standard of review for sufficiency-of-evidence claims is well settled:

[W]e consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).

[11] To convict Hamilton of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, the State was required to prove he was a serious violent felon, and that he did “knowingly or intentionally possess[ ] a firearm ․” Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c). Possession can be either actual or constructive. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over an item. Id. A person constructively possesses an item when the person has both (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it. Id. The State argues Hamilton constructively possessed the firearm, and we agree.²

A. Capability to Maintain Dominion and Control

[12] The capability requirement is met when the State shows that the defendant is able to reduce the contraband to the defendant's personal possession. Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999). “A trier of fact may infer that a defendant had the capability to maintain dominion and control over contraband from the simple fact that the defendant had a possessory interest in the premises on which an officer found the item.” Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 174 (citing Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 2004)). This is true even when the possessory interest is not exclusive. Id. “In essence the law infers that the party in possession of the premises is capable of exercising dominion and control over all items on the premises.” Gee, 810 N.E.2d at 340-41.

[13] Here, the handgun was found in a car of which Hamilton was the driver and sole occupant. This is sufficient to show he had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the handgun. See Whitney v. State, 726 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (Sole possession of vehicle in which contraband is found is sufficient to show the capability to maintain control and dominion over the contraband.).

B. Intent to Maintain Dominion and Control

[14] To prove the intent element, the State must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Ordinarily, knowledge may be inferred from Hamilton's exclusive possession of the car. Id. at 826. However, additional evidence of knowledge is necessary to establish intent where, like here, the contraband is found in a hidden compartment in the vehicle. Id. Our Supreme Court has identified a non-exhaustive list of “additional circumstances” that tend to show an individual knew of the presence of the contraband:

(1) incriminating statements by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) a drug manufacturing setting; (4) proximity of the defendant to the drugs or weapons; (5) drugs or weapons in plain view; and (6) location of the drugs or weapons in close proximity to items owned by the defendant.

Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 574 (Ind. 2006).

[15] Here, the gun was found in a small space under the steering wheel, an area accessible from the driver's seat where Hamilton was. Further, after the gun was found Hamilton resisted arrest and attempted to flee. See Deshazier v. State, 877 N.E.2d 200, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant's acts of “resisting arrest” and “fleeing” after the contraband was found “are factors ․ in favor of finding constructive possession”), trans. denied. Finally, Hamilton's DNA was found on the firearm. See Williams v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1285, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (holding that DNA evidence on the firearm and holster supported constructive possession as circumstantial proof of knowledge). These additional circumstances, combined with Hamilton's exclusive possession of the vehicle, show his knowledge of the contraband. The evidence is sufficient to show Hamilton had constructive possession over the firearm.

III. Habitual Offender Enhancement

[16] Finally, Hamilton argues the trial court committed fundamental error by allowing defense counsel, rather than Hamilton, to waive his right to jury trial on the habitual enhancement. Our Supreme Court in Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1155 (Ind. 2016), made clear that the Indiana Constitution's right to a jury trial “may be waived by one, and only one, person—the defendant. Unless the defendant personally communicates to the judge a desire to waive that right, he must receive a jury trial.” This right extends to proceedings on the habitual-offender enhancement. Bradtmiller v. State, 113 N.E.3d 255, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). It is fundamental error to deny a defendant a jury trial unless there is a personal waiver of that right. Horton, 51 N.E.3d at 1160.

[17] Here, although Hamilton's defense counsel indicated, “we are waiving jury” when asked about a jury trial for the habitual offender proceeding, Hamilton never personally communicated waiver to the trial court. Tr. Vol. III p. 91. The State concedes this was a fundamental error requiring reversal, and we agree. See Saylor v. State, 55 N.E.3d 354, 367 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (reversing habitual offender determination where defense counsel, not the defendant, told the trial court the defendant waived jury trial), trans. denied. We therefore reverse the habitual offender determination, vacate the sentence imposed thereon, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

[18] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While this term is not defined by either party, Officer Shedrow's testimony described the “criminal interdiction process” in part as “finding what some may consider a minor crime and using that to find a bigger crime.” Tr. Vol. II p. 115.

2.   The State and Hamilton also make arguments as to actual possession. Because we find the State presented sufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the firearm, we need not address actual possession.

Scheele, Judge.

Judges Foley and Kenworthy concur. Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.