SMITH v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Zane T.G. Smith appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). The parties raise multiple issues for our review, but we find one dispositive: whether Smith's representations that the delays associated with several motions to continue his trial were attributable to him for the purpose of Criminal Rule 4(C) prohibit him from now contesting the trial court's attribution of those delays to him. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 10, 2022, the State filed charges against Smith alleging he committed two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting ¹ and one count each of Level 4 felony child molesting,² Level 5 felony child solicitation,³ and Level 6 felony dissemination of matter harmful to minors.⁴ The probable cause affidavit alleged Smith and the alleged victim, E.W., met online on the website Omegle.com in February 2021, and they also communicated via Snapchat. The probable cause affidavit also alleged Smith and E.W. met in person several times to have sex even though E.W. told Smith she was only twelve. In addition, the affidavit alleged that after E.W.’s parents reported Smith to the police, a taskforce officer with the FBI took control of E.W.’s Snapchat account and communicated with Smith while pretending to be E.W.

[3] The trial court initially set Smith's trial to begin on September 13, 2022. On August 25, 2022, Smith filed a motion to continue the trial because he needed additional time to obtain and review materials related to E.W.’s laptop and Snapchat records. Smith also stated in the motion that he provided the Indiana State Police with the passcode to his phone to expedite the police's forensic analysis of his phone and additional time was necessary for the police to complete that analysis. He believed the analysis would reveal exculpatory information. Smith asserted: “The Defendant accepts any and all delay associated with the Defendant's Motion for Continuance pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4.” (App. Vol. 2 at 45.)

[4] The trial court addressed the motion for a continuance at a hearing on August 29, 2022. At the hearing, the trial court questioned Smith:

THE COURT: Sir you understand that if the trial's continued that delay is charged to you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir.

THE COURT: And you can't then later complain that it's taking too long to get your trial.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 11.) The trial court granted the motion to continue and reset the trial for April 25, 2023. It explained: “Show CR4 to Defense.” (Id.)

[5] On April 14, 2023, the State filed a motion to continue the trial. The motion explained that a material witness for the State was not available to testify at trial because of a family emergency. The State's motion indicated “the Defense does not object to the State's Motion for Continuance” and “the Defense will accept the Criminal Rule 4 time[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 61.) At a hearing on the motion to continue, the State explained:

I spoke to [Defense Counsel] about the Criminal Rule 4 time because we weren't able to get a date as soon as we would like and he said that if necessary he would be willing to take that time.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 18.) Smith's counsel confirmed the accuracy of the State's representations, and the trial court granted the motion. It assessed the Criminal Rule 4 time to Smith and reset the trial to begin on October 24, 2023.

[6] At a hearing on October 11, 2023, the trial court commented that it was unlikely Smith was going to be able to be tried on October 24, 2023, because the trial court also had multiple murder trials scheduled for that week. Smith's attorney noted he anticipated moving to depose E.W. and asked, “does it make any sense just to continue this trial now for everybody to know that we're not gonna [sic] go in two weeks?” (Id. at 47-48.) Smith's attorney indicated Smith would “accept the CR4 time.” (Id. at 48.) The trial court then vacated the scheduled trial and ordered “CR4 to Defense.” (App. Vol. 2 at 126.) The trial court reset Smith's trial to begin on February 21, 2024.

[7] On February 8, 2024, Smith filed a motion to continue his trial. Smith asserted the State's “production of discovery failed to include potentially exculpatory exchanges which would support the Defendant's belief that he reasonably believed E.W. to be 16 years of age or older.” (Id. at 135.) The motion explained Smith needed “additional time to obtain an IT expert to review that assertion and prepare for his defense.” (Id.) It also provided that Smith “accepts any and all delay associated with this request pursuant to Criminal Rule 4.” (Id.)

[8] The trial court held a hearing on Smith's motion on February 12, 2024. At the hearing, Smith's attorney explained, “we need additional time to receive what will be some supplemental discovery that was not previously provided.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 66.) The State explained it needed to supplement its discovery responses with additional messages between Smith and E.W.’s social media accounts. With respect to Smith's motion for a continuance, the State asserted that it was not objecting to the motion “other than the CR4 time because we could go forward without those additional messages but they are in our view, incriminating rather than exculpatory so we would like to use them.” (Id. at 66-67.) Smith's counsel acknowledged he would accept the delay for the purpose of Criminal Rule 4. The trial court then questioned Smith:

THE COURT: Mr. Smith, do you understand that if the [t]rial's [c]ontinued at your request, the delay or what's called the CR4 time is charged to you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: I mean, your case is going to be over two years old at this point, you understand that sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

(Id. at 68.) The trial court granted the continuance and reset Smith's trial to begin on July 23, 2024.

[9] On July 2, 2024, Smith filed a motion to dismiss/suppress. The motion asserted “that the discovery materials provided by the State are selective and that the produced discovery is not full and complete with respect to communications by the Defendant on Snapchat.” (App. Vol. 2 at 138.) It asked the trial court to either dismiss his case or suppress the Snapchat conversations between E.W. and Smith. On July 8, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on Smith's motion to dismiss/suppress. During that hearing, the trial court explained:

And the parties just discussed in chambers the Defense Motion to Dismiss/Suppress. They hope they have found the files that are referenced in [Defense Counsel's] Motion. Defense is moving to continue to review those new files. CR4 to the State.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 76.) The trial court reset Smith's jury trial to begin on October 22, 2024. It left Smith's motion to dismiss/suppress pending so that Smith could review the State's supplemental production of discovery material.

[10] On September 24, 2024, Smith filed an amended motion to dismiss/suppress and a motion for discharge and dismissal. Smith maintained “that even after this latest set, there are still missing messages.” (App. Vol. 2 at 148.) He also filed a motion pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C) asking the trial court to dismiss his case. He asserted the State's delay in producing all of the discovery materials he requested was responsible for his trial being delayed by 837 days. The State responded by asserting Smith “seeks to renege on his explicit acceptance of CR4 time in his motions for continuance, and to attribute all the time elapsed in this case to the State, merely because discovery was ongoing and the State was continuing to provide additional discovery at Defendant's request.” (Id. at 167.)

[11] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Smith's motions on September 27, 2024. Several police officers testified regarding the State's collection of evidence and its subsequent disclosure of that evidence to Smith. Smith testified he had thoroughly reviewed the discovery material produced by the State. He explained he remembered having conversations with E.W. over social media in which she indicated that she was over sixteen years old, but the State failed to produce those conversations in discovery. On cross-examination, the State confronted Smith with several text messages he sent implying he was aware of E.W.’s true age. The State argued to the trial court that it “has provided every piece of evidence that it has ․ [it] has not withheld any evidence.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 161.) The State explained “just because the Defendant says messages exist does not make it so.” (Id. at 162.)

[12] The trial court summarily denied Smith's motions on September 30, 2024. Smith, in accordance with Appellate Rule 14(B), moved to pursue an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order refusing to dismiss his case pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C). The trial court granted Smith's motion and stayed the proceedings at the trial court level. We subsequently accepted jurisdiction over Smith's interlocutory appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[13] We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss premised on Criminal Rule 4(C) according to the standard of review our Indiana Supreme Court articulated in Bradley v. State:

When the issue involves ‘a question of law applied to undisputed facts, the standard of review—like for all questions of law—is de novo,’ with the ‘ultimate reasonableness of the trial court's findings’ dependent on ‘the facts and circumstances of the particular case.’ When the trial court makes factual findings (of congestion or emergency to justify a deadline extension), appellate courts show ‘reasonable deference to those findings and reverse only for ‘clear error.’

248 N.E.3d 563, 567 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039-40 (Ind. 2013)).

[14] Criminal Rule 4(C) states:

No person can be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Delays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period. If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed. The one-year time limit does not apply to a retrial following a mistrial or vacation of a conviction or sentence following a motion to correct error, appeal, post-conviction relief, or habeas corpus proceedings. The trial court must commence the retrial within a reasonable time.

The purpose of Criminal Rule 4(C) “is to assure criminal defendants of early trials, not to provide them with a technical means of avoiding trial.” Johnson v. State, 708 N.E.2d 912, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.

[15] Smith argues a large portion of the delay the trial court charged to him for the purpose of Criminal Rule 4(C) should have been attributed to the State. He contends the continuances he requested “were sought in response to the State's failure to provide timely discovery and were a necessity, not a defense trial strategy.” (Appellant's Br. at 20.) It is true that, under Indiana law, discovery delays by the State can result in a defendant being entitled to discharge. See, e.g., Wellman v. State, 210 N.E.3d 811, 817 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding discovery delays by the State entitled the defendant to discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C)); see also Biggs v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (“To put the defendants in a position whereby they must either go to trial unprepared due to the State's failure to respond to discovery requests or be prepared to waive their rights to a speedy trial, is to put the defendants in an untenable situation.”).

[16] However, before the trial court granted any of the continuances that Smith now seeks to attribute to the State, Smith expressly represented to the trial court that he would accept the associated delays for the purpose of Criminal Rule 4(C). “The doctrine of invited error, which is based on the legal principle of estoppel, forbids a party from taking advantage of an error that he or she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his or her own neglect or misconduct.” Bush v. State, 208 N.E.3d 605, 610-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. Invited error requires more than a mere failure to object. Id. at 611. It usually occurs “when a passive lack of objection ․ is coupled with counsel's active requests[.]” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 974 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 970 (2015), reh'g denied. “[T]o establish invited error, there must be some evidence that the error resulted from the appellant's affirmative actions as part of a deliberate, ‘well-informed’ trial strategy.” Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 558 (Ind. 2019). Likewise, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position that is inconsistent with one asserted in the same or a previous proceeding.” Morgan Cnty. Hosp. v. Upham, 884 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Judicial estoppel is intended to prohibit a party from gaining an advantage by litigating under one theory only to later assert, without a good explanation, an incompatible legal theory. Id.

[17] Each time Smith sought to have his trial delayed and represented to the trial that he would accept the time for the purpose of Criminal Rule 4(C), Smith invited the trial court to continue his trial and assign the associated delay to him. As the State notes, “the trial court relied on those assurances when it rescheduled his trial[.]” (Appellee's Br. at 20.) After the trial court relied on his representations, Smith is estopped from arguing the delay in bringing him to trial entitles him to dismissal of the charges against him. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Troxell v. State, 956 N.E.2d 164, 166-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding State could not argue defendant's petition was untimely when the State agreed in the defendant's plea agreement that he could petition to have his felony conviction converted to a misdemeanor when he completed probation).

Conclusion

[18] While more than three years have elapsed since the State charged Smith, he expressly accepted the delays associated with four continuances of his trial for the purpose of Criminal Rule 4(C). Therefore, he is estopped from asserting the delay in bringing him to trial should result in dismissal of the charges against him. We accordingly affirm the trial court.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(b).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-6(b).

4.   Ind. Code § 35-49-3-3(a).

May, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Scheele, J., concur