In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: K.C. (Minor Child), and T.C. (Mother), and M.C. (Father), Appellants-Respondents v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] T.C. (“Mother”) and M.C. (“Father” and together with Mother, “Parents”), appeal the involuntary termination of their parental rights to their minor child, K.C. (“Child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born to Mother in April 2022. Mother was incarcerated at the time of Child's birth. Child was removed from Mother's care in the hospital, and on April 17, 2022, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) due to Child being a drug exposed infant and because Mother had a history of illegal substance abuse. The petition named Mother's then husband, J.C., as Child's presumptive father. On June 6, 2022, following Mother's admission, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS as to Mother.¹ On June 29, 2022, the court entered a dispositional decree ordering Mother to participate in reunification services. The court dismissed J.C. from the case, noting that Child's biological father had not been identified.

[3] Father's paternity was established by DNA in September 2022. DCS filed an amended CHINS petition on October 25, 2022, alleging that Child was born drug exposed, Mother had a history of illegal substance abuse, and Father was incarcerated. Father's paternity was established by court order on November 17, 2022. On December 18, 2022, following Father's admission that he was incarcerated and unable to provide necessary care and supervision for Child, the court adjudicated Child a CHINS as to Father. On January 13, 2023, the court entered a dispositional decree ordering Father to participate in reunification services.

[4] As for Mother, she was released from jail on November 8, 2022. DCS provided services to her including a substance abuse assessment, substance abuse therapy, random drug screens, case management, and supervised visitation. Mother was inconsistent with drug screening through Cordant, but she did screen through DCS. At the beginning, Mother was consistent with supervised visitation and was loving and caring with Child. In October 2023, Mother gave birth to another child, W.S. On October 4, 2023, the court authorized a trial home visit for Child with Mother to begin on October 10, 2023. On January 23, 2024, Mother was involved in a “physical incident” with another adult with whom she and her boyfriend were sharing a residence, and that adult punched Mother in the face following a “verbal altercation.” Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 71. The court held a detention hearing on January 25, 2024. The court found that Mother had continued to provide positive drug screens, was involved in a physical altercation with a resident of the home where she was living, and continued to have unstable housing. The court ordered Child detained. On January 26, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging W.S. was a CHINS and W.S. was also removed from Mother's care. On May 22, 2024, the court adjudicated W.S. a CHINS.²

[5] The court held a review hearing on October 7, 2024. It found that Mother was still testing positive for illegal substances and had refused to submit to drug screens on July 10 and 12, 2024. The court also found that Mother was living in a one-bedroom apartment with Child's maternal grandmother and another individual who had a long history of substance abuse.

[6] As for Father, the court held a review hearing on April 13, 2023. Father was incarcerated at the Wayne County Jail at the time of that hearing. The court approved a concurrent permanency plan of reunification and adoption. The court held a review hearing on October 4, 2023. Father was incarcerated in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) at the time of that hearing. The court held a detention hearing on January 24, 2024, after which Child was detained. Father was still incarcerated in the DOC and was excused from that hearing. On September 12, 2024, DCS filed verified petitions to terminate both Mother's and Father's parental rights. The court held a review hearing on October 7, 2024. Father was no longer incarcerated but failed to appear for the hearing. The court modified the permanency plan to adoption only.

[7] On November 19 and 26, 2023, the court held a termination factfinding hearing as to Mother. DCS presented the testimony of Family Case Manager Kathleen Langer (“FCM Langer”), Assessment Family Case Manager Hannah Toschlog (“FCM Toschlog”), Family Case Manager Stephanie Ashbaugh (“FCM Ashbaugh”), Carol Childress, an intake specialist from Centerstone, Therapist Hope Peer from Centerstone (“Therapist Peer”), Court Appointed Special Advocate Mackenzie Dunckel (“CASA Dunckel”), and Child's current foster/pre-adoptive parent, B.C. Mother presented the testimony of Clarissa Andrews, a counselor for Healthy Families, friend Barabara Sawyer-Bryant, and Jason Norris, a home-based service provider. Mother also testified on her own behalf.

[8] FCM Langer testified that, during the multi-year pendency of the CHINS case, Mother was never “successfully discharged” from any ordered services. Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 65. Mother would sometimes start services but “then not stay engaged with them” and there were instances when she “didn't engage” at all for extended “periods of time.” Id. Langer noted that during the entirety of the CHINS case, Mother continued to test positive for illegal substances, and she lacked stable housing and employment. FCM Toschlog testified regarding the physical altercation between Mother and a resident of her home that resulted in the termination of the Child's trial home visit with Mother.

[9] Therapist Peer testified that Mother was referred to Centerstone for help maintaining sobriety. Mother's drugs of choice were methamphetamine and marijuana. Mother kept roughly only sixty percent of her appointments with Therapist Peer. Therapist Peer stated that Mother's attendance issues prevented her from referring Mother for additional services. Therapist Peer testified that Mother was discharged unsuccessfully from Centerstone due to lack of engagement in services and attendance. FCM Ashbaugh testified that Mother's “barriers to reunification” included housing, financial instability, and continued positive drug screens. Id. at 116. CASA Dunckel noted that Mother had not had stable housing throughout the CHINS proceedings, had not been consistent with services, and had continued to abuse illegal drugs.

[10] B.C. testified that Child had been placed with her family both before and after Child's trial home visit with Mother. She stated that Child “meshes very well” and “does very well” with the family. Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 138. B.C. stated that she and her husband had already filed for adoption of Child.

[11] Mother testified and admitted that she currently lives in a hotel with her mother and that she is not working but was attending beauty school. Mother admitted that she has smoked marijuana at least once or twice daily for the last seventeen years and that she was also living with her boyfriend who recently tested positive for cocaine.

[12] On December 5, 2024, and February 4, 2025, the court held a termination factfinding hearing as to Father. DCS presented the testimony of FCM Ashbaugh, CASA Dunckel, and B.C. Father testified on his own behalf.

[13] FCM Ashbaugh testified that Father had been incarcerated the majority of the CHINS case. She stated that Father was released from incarceration from “the middle of June, 2024 until the end of October, 2024.” Transcript Volume II at 25. She testified that when Father was released, he called DCS and set up an appointment to start services, but he failed to show up for that appointment. She stated that DCS was unable to reach Father after that missed appointment, and Father never participated in any services while not incarcerated including visitation with Child. Father became reincarcerated in October 2024 following a parole violation. FCM Ashbaugh noted that Father has never been in the same room with Child, has only “seen her a few times when she was a baby,” and that those visits were virtual while he was incarcerated. Id. at 30.

[14] CASA Dunckel testified that Father has been incarcerated “for all of Child's life.” Id. at 46. She stated that, although Mother took Child “down to the jail to visit” Father when Child was an infant, Child “would not know who [Father] is at all.” Id. CASA Dunckel noted that Child is very bonded with her current placement and opined that, due to Father's habitual criminal behavior resulting in repeated incarceration, there is no “path of potential reunification.” Id. at 47.

[15] Father testified on his own behalf. The record confirms that his earliest possible release date is October 30, 2025. Father admitted that he has no bond with Child because he has not “been around her long enough to get one.” Id. at 72. He further admitted that over the past thirteen years, he has only been released from incarceration for a total of fourteen months.

[16] On February 14 and 20, 2025, the court entered separate orders terminating the parent-child relationship between Parents and Child. Specifically, the court found that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside Parents’ care would not be remedied; termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child's best interests; and there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being adoption by Child's current placement.

Discussion

[17] Parents each challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of their parental rights. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 ³ provides in pertinent part that DCS must allege as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:[4]

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child․

[18] If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. “Because a case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. To the extent Parents do not challenge the court's findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[19] Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside his care will not be remedied.⁵ In determining whether the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M, 4 N.E.3d at 642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a parent's past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Id. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child's removal for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent's response to those services. Id.

[20] The record reveals that Child was removed from Mother's care due to being a drug exposed infant. Father's paternity was eventually established and, due to his incarceration, Father admitted that Child was a CHINS as he could not provide necessary care or supervision for Child. DCS presented evidence that Father is currently incarcerated with an earliest projected release date of October 2025, he was incarcerated during almost the entirety of the CHINS case and, even when not incarcerated, he failed to participate in ordered services. Father has never been in the same room with Child, and admits he has no bond with Child. Based upon the evidence, the court found that “Father has been incarcerated for all of [Child's] life” except for a short period and, “Father did nothing during his release from incarceration to remedy the removal of Child.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 196. The court found that when released, Father “did not have housing, a job, transportation, and did not initiate ANY services with DCS, so he could start the reunification of the parent[-]child relationship with [Child].” Id. In light of the unchallenged findings and evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding a reasonable probability exists that the conditions resulting in Child's removal and reasons for placement outside Father's care will not be remedied.⁶

[21] Both Parents challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination of their rights is in Child's best interests. In determining the best interests of children, the trial court is required to look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the children. Id. The court need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. The recommendation of a case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.

[22] As to Mother, CASA Dunckel opined that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption were in Child's best interests. CASA Dunckel noted that Child had “been involved with the DCS her entire life” and “[s]he's going to be three (3) years old in April.” Supplemental Transcript Volume II at 147. CASA Dunckel emphasized that Mother had been “under a Dispositional Order for years now, to not use illegal substances” but she “continues to use illegal substances” despite the fact that Child was removed from her care for that reason. Id. CASA Dunckel further testified that Child was very bonded with her pre-adoptive home, and that it provided her the stability and structure she needs. Accordingly, the trial court found based on “the totality of the evidence of [Child's] removal” that, “due to Mother's ongoing substance abuse issues, noncompliance with DCS services, lack of work and stable housing, and CASA's recommendation, termination is in the best interests of [Child].” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 198.

[23] Similarly, as to Father, CASA Dunckel opined that termination of Father's parental rights and adoption were in Child's best interests. She noted that Father had been incarcerated almost all of Child's life, Child did not know Father, and that due to Father's habitual criminal behavior, there was no “path of potential reunification.” Transcript Volume II at 47. Accordingly, the trial court found based on the “the totality of the evidence” of Child's “continued removal due to Father's ongoing incarceration, noncompliance with DCS services, not seeing [Child] except by phone for [Child's] whole life,” that “termination is in the best interest of [Child].” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 227. In light of the unchallenged findings and evidence set forth above and in the record outlining Parents’ historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of both Mother's and Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests.

[24] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination orders.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother admitted that she was incarcerated on multiple pending cases and, due to such incarceration, she could not provide Child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, and care. She further admitted that she was in need of mental health treatment and parenting education.

2.   The record indicates that Mother also has four older children who became subjects of CHINS cases in 2020.

3.   We note that Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 was amended March 11, 2024. Pub. L. No. 70-2024, § 4 (eff. March 11, 2024)). While each Parent appears to cite to the prior version of the statute in their briefs, as DCS filed the termination petition on September 4, 2024, there is no question that the amended version of the statute applies here.

4.   Although Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) contains twelve items DCS may allege in a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship, in this case DCS alleged only subsections (3) and (4).

5.   Mother's sole challenge on appeal is of the trial court's conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests.

6.   To the extent Father also challenges the trial court's conclusion that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being, we need not address that argument as the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires poof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).

Brown, Judge.

Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur. Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.