Travis D. Butcher, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Travis Butcher appeals his convictions for burglary, Level 4 and Level 5 felonies. He argues that insufficient evidence supports his convictions and that his convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issues

[2] Butcher raises two issues, which we revise and restate as:

I. Whether sufficient evidence supports Butcher's convictions.

II. Whether Butcher's convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

Facts

[3] Chester Sayler passed away on November 2, 2024. On the afternoon of November 18, 2024, Chester's daughter, Dawn Bayless, went to check on Chester's house in Rockville. Upon arriving, Dawn noticed that one of the doors was ajar, the house was disheveled, and several items were missing. She contacted her son, Jesse, and law enforcement. Parke County Sheriff's Department Deputy Josh Milbourn was dispatched to the residence.

[4] Jesse had a gut feeling that the burglars would return. At around 10:00 p.m., he drove to the property, hid behind a barn, and saw Butcher's truck approaching from the south. Butcher's wife, Amber, exited from the truck's passenger side and opened the garage using a key fob. Shortly after entering the garage, she pulled out of the driveway in Chester's sedan. Butcher's truck followed behind her, and the two vehicles headed south.

[5] Jesse contacted Deputy Milbourn, who headed in the direction of the vehicles. He executed a felony stop of Amber in the stolen sedan, but Butcher fled in the truck. Butcher called his cousin and asked him to meet Butcher at a casino in Illinois. Law enforcement, however, arrested Butcher in Vermillion County before he crossed the Illinois border.

[6] A search of Butcher's residence revealed numerous stolen items from Chester's house, including a television, a generator with the serial number painted over, tools, a rifle, a credit card, checkbook, and papers with Chester's name on them. License plate reading cameras captured photographs of Butcher's truck driving along roads between Butcher's and Chester's properties with Chester's generator in the bed.

[7] On November 20, 2024, the State charged Butcher with: Count I, burglary, a Level 4 felony, for the burglary of Chester's residence; and Count II, burglary, a Level 5 felony, for the burglary of Chester's garage.¹ Butcher was tried before a jury in January 2025, and he was found guilty as charged. The trial court ordered him to serve consecutive sentences of twelve years on Count I and six years on Count II for a total sentence of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. Butcher now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficient evidence supports Butcher's convictions.

[8] Butcher first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his two burglary convictions. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[9] Butcher was convicted of two counts of burglary, one as a Level 4 felony and one as a Level 5 felony. The elements of these offenses are listed in Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-1, which provides in relevant part:

A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony or theft in it, commits burglary, a Level 5 felony. However, the offense is:

(1) a Level 4 felony if the building or structure is a dwelling[.]

[10] A person can be found guilty of burglary even if they are merely an accomplice to the crime. See Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (“A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense[.]”). “ ‘[A]n accomplice is criminally responsible for all acts committed by a confederate which are a probable and natural consequence of their concerted action.’ ” Forney v. State, 742 N.E.2d 934, 938 (Ind. 2001) (quoting McGee v. State, 699 N.E.2d 264, 265 (Ind. 1998)). In determining whether a person was an accomplice, we consider four factors: “(1) presence at the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at scene of crime; (3) failure to oppose commission of crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after occurrence of crime.” Castillo v. State, 974 N.E.2d 458, 466 (Ind. 2012).

[11] These factors demonstrate that Butcher was at least an accomplice to the burglaries. The Level 4 felony burglary occurred sometime before Dawn checked on Chester's house. She noticed several items were missing, and many of the stolen items were later found in Butcher's house—including papers, cards, and a checkbook with Chester's name on them. License plate reading cameras photographed Butcher's truck with Chester's generator in the bed. See Holloway v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (noting that possession of recently stolen property along with additional circumstances can support a burglary conviction).

[12] The Level 5 felony burglary occurred when Amber stole the sedan later that evening. Butcher drove Amber to the garage and then followed behind her as she left. He later evaded the traffic stop and asked his cousin to pick him up from a casino in Illinois. See Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015) (noting that “ ‘[e]vidence of flight may be considered as circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt’ ”) (quoting Brown v. State, 563 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. 1990)).

[13] Butcher argues that the evidence did not demonstrate that he entered the house or that he was the person driving the truck. Under the accomplice theory of liability, the State was not required to prove that Butcher personally entered the house so long as he aided in the burglary, and the jury could infer that Butcher was the one driving his truck. Butcher merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Sufficient evidence supports Butcher's convictions.

II. Butcher's convictions do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

[14] Butcher next argues that his convictions violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. His convictions “fall under separate statutory provisions, each defining a separate crime,” so the Wadle test applies. Koziski v. State, 172 N.E.3d 338, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied; see Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020).

[15] Under the Wadle test, we first determine whether the provisions clearly permit “multiple punishment, whether expressly or by unmistakable implication[.]” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 253. Unless the provisions so permit, we proceed to the second step, which asks whether the offenses are included, “either inherently or as charged[.]” Id. If the offenses are not included, there is no double jeopardy violation. But if the offenses are included, we proceed to the third and final step, in which we “examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial.” Id. Only if the facts demonstrate that the defendant's actions were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction” will we find that the defendant's convictions constitute double jeopardy. Id.

[16] Here, neither provision in the burglary statute authorizes multiple punishment, so we proceed to Wadle step two. Under this step, the two burglary offenses are included because burglary as a Level 4 felony includes all the elements of burglary as a Level 5 felony, except that the former requires the “building or structure” to be a “dwelling.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1; see Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168 (providing that an offense is “included” if it “is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged”).

[17] We, thus, proceed to Wadle’s third step. Here, the facts demonstrate that two independent burglaries occurred. The burglaries occurred at least several hours apart, different property was stolen each time, and Butcher could have decided not to return for the second burglary. Butcher's actions were not “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction,” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 253, and his convictions do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.

Conclusion

[18] Sufficient evidence supports Butcher's convictions, and his convictions do not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Accordingly, we affirm.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Amber was charged with identical counts in Cause No. 61C01-2411-F4-348.

Tavitas, Judge.

Judges Vaidik and Felix concur. Vaidik, J., and Felix, J., concur.